How does a nation grapple with the history of past atrocities? In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, Stanford Associate Professor of Political Science Vicky Fouka examined how public recognition of collective culpability has affected German national identity. In a new paper, Fouka and co-authors explore the origins of muted public nationalism among German citizens, investigating whether it hails from socialization or stigmatization.

In the shadow of the Nazi regime, post-WWII Germany was forced to contend with its past. The resulting narrative was critical — a self-righteous self-hate. The prevailing view entailed Germany assuming responsibility for WWII and the atrocities committed. This shift occurred in two stages. During the first stage (WWII- 1970), denazification was imposed by the Allied powers, and many Germans perceived it unjust — seeing themselves as victims. However, post-1970, teachings about the Holocaust were introduced in schools, and new generations were socialized to accept a message of responsibility.

Fouka began with two possible explanations for Germany’s muted nationalism. The first was stigmatization, or the idea that people may not be expressing their true views for fear of social sanctions imposed by broader society. The second is socialization. This explanation centers on shared internationalized values, a violation of which generates a strong emotional response on the part of the violator.

To determine which of these theories drives Germany’s weak national spirit, Fouka designed a survey to compare publicly and privately held views. A representative sample of 5,363 respondents was randomly assigned a “private” or “public” condition. Those given the “public” condition were informed that the survey results would be posted to a website, whereas those with the “private” condition were given assurances as to the anonymity of their responses. The team also asked a variety of controversial questions as a baseline — to gauge the difference between private and public preferences.

In the survey itself, Fouka asked respondents a variety of questions on national identity, emotions about German history, attitudes toward German vs. Allied crimes during WWII, and the importance of teaching the holocaust in school. She found that there was no difference in the public and private conditions on national pride — suggesting socialization was the primary driving force behind weak nationalism.

The only statement that seemed to move the needle on falsified preferences was one asserting that the crimes of the German past should be left alone. However, this only occurred in respondents living in West Germany. Additionally, the researchers did find evidence for falsified preferences on national pride, but primarily for Germans socialized in the East but living in the West. As East Germany only shifted their educational rhetoric after German reunification, those socialized in the East but living in the West seemed to censor more toward the West German norm.

This research holds important implications. If there is a divergence between what people feel privately and what they feel like they can express publicly, there can be rapid changes in public opinion and the status quo in response to small changes in information about people’s true preferences. This is especially important with the recent rise of the right-wing populist party, which may provide a platform for the expression of latent preferences.

Why do politicians belonging to religious minorities attain the highest political offices in some countries but not others? Koç University Professor of International Relations Şener Aktürk presented his research on the subject in a CDDRL research seminar series talk. 

A key element in shaping this outcome, Aktürk argued, is the configuration of a given nation’s constitutive conflict, which often takes the form of wars of independence or civil wars.  If the primary adversary in this conflict is of a different religion, he explained, the majority religion will likely be closely associated with national identity. However, in cases where that adversary is of the same religious sect, religious identity will end up becoming less central in the formation of national identity. Accordingly, it will become easier for religious minority politicians to assume leadership afterward.  If the majority religion is nationally institutionalized — which generally coincides with constitutive conflict structured along religious lines – it will likely be difficult for minority politicians to rise through the ranks. 

To illustrate this pattern, Aktürk reviewed the religious affiliation of chief executives across various countries. In the United Kingdom, whose constitutive conflict pitted Protestants against Catholics — and resulted in a Protestant victory — every Prime Minister from 1721 through 2021 was Protestant. Any claimed exceptions converted are a telling sign. Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim religious minorities had their first representatives, or “pioneers,” in the House of Commons by affiliating with the left, demonstrating that left-liberalism was their entry point into politics. 

In Catholic France, where the constitutive conflict was internal (French Revolution), there were 5 Protestant Prime Ministers, with the first one elected within the first 50 years of the Third Republic, when the new republican regime consolidated. A Jewish Prime Minister was reelected three times. The left represented politicians of minority religions, whereas the right represented those of the core group. 

In Hungary, the formative conflict consisted of Catholics fighting against each other. This has allowed Protestant minority leaders to claim they are more nationalistic than their Catholic counterparts, who were presumably forced to pick between their nation and religion. A similar story holds in Italy, the first country to have a Jewish Prime Minister. 

Germany is the most unique case, as it experienced a change in constitutive conflict. Following the Franco-Prussian War, Germany was majority Protestant, with state persecution of the Catholic minority. However, a bloodier and more traumatic constitutive conflict replaced the first one — the Holocaust and World War II. Under Hitler, who was of Austrian Catholic origin, German nationalism ceased to be a Protestant-led movement.

How did the adoption of civil service reform in the United States affect reelection rates of legislators? In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, Miriam Golden — the Peter Mair Chair in Comparative Politics at the European University Institute and CDDRL visiting scholar — argued that a decline in patronage appointments to state bureaucracies due to civil service legislation increased reelection rates in state legislatures. 

Civil service legislation in the United States began with the federal Pendleton Act in 1883 and continued with a series of staggered reforms at the state level. These reforms mandated that political appointments be made on the basis of merit, thereby limiting the ability of party machines to make patronage appointments to the bureaucracy. By 1987, every state (except for Texas) had adopted these measures. Golden’s work investigates the spillover effects of this legislation on the careers of politicians. 

The phenomenon of the “amateur politician” was prevalent for a good part of US history, especially at the state level. Operating under a patronage system, politicians did not face a strong incentive to seek reelection. However, following the introduction of civil service legislation, parties could no longer rotate their own cadre of loyalists through appointed and elected state offices. As such, the incentive for politicians to seek reelection increased, creating a more professional class of legislators concerned with elevating their own performance in office. 

This theory is consistent with Golden’s analysis of state legislator data covering the period between 1900 and 2016. Using a series of difference in difference estimators, Golden explored the effect of staggered reforms on reelection rates across all 50 state legislatures. Her analysis shows that the said reforms are associated with higher reelection rates. While reelection rates had already begun trending upward over the course of the 20th century, civil service reform coincided with the largest single surge in reelection rates yet observed.  

Golden found that across all the states under study, the rate of legislators seeking reelection and reelection rates track together. The data also suggests that individuals who were in office before the introduction of civil service reforms were driven out at slightly higher rates than those who served after. The trend is consistent with the idea that pre-reform legislators were replaced by a more professional class of politicians.

How will Russia’s renewed aggression in Ukraine affect Moscow’s relations with its Eurasian neighbors? In a recent REDS Seminar series talk, co-sponsored by CDDRL and The Europe Center (TEC), University of Michigan Professor of Political Science Pauline Jones addressed this broader question in a collaborative study (with Indiana University Professor Regina Smyth) examining Kazakhstan’s public attitudes toward the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). A Russian-forged security organization composed of Eurasian countries, the CSTO is aimed at collective defense, although its mandate has recently expanded to include the mitigation of internal conflicts.

Kazakhstan’s significance as a case study, Jones explained, is partly derived from its status as a regional hegemon and the largest non-Russian member state of the CSTO. Although some argue that Kazakhstan’s membership in CSTO contributes to interethnic harmony among its dominant ethnic Kazakh population and large ethnic Russian minority, mounting protests against the war in Ukraine, as well as an influx of Russians fleeing Putin’s war, have put pressure on Kazakhstan to leave the organization. Jones’s study of Kazakhstan’s public opinion on the CSTO suggests that popular sentiments matter in shaping foreign policy and that unpopular decisions can undermine support for the ruling party. 

Jones’s study relied on both direct questions and a list experiment to gauge Kazakhstani public attitudes toward the CSTO. The question asked interviewees whether they approved of Kazakhstan’s participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The list experiment offered participants a list of policies and asked them how many they agreed with. The treatment group’s list of policies included Kazakhstan’s engagement in the CSTO, whereas that of the control group did not.

Jones’ talk highlighted three main provisional findings. First, popular support for the CSTO is weak. Second, it is divided both across and within ethnic groups, with demographic variables being primary correlates of attitudes. Finally, attitudinal beliefs about Russia seem to reinforce these divides. 

Data analysis revealed two primary biases at play. The first is a fear bias, or the reluctance to adopt positions that run contrary to that of the regime. The other is a community preference bias, or an individual’s reluctance to express preferences inconsistent with prevalent views within their own ethnic community. The community preference bias seemed to be stronger, especially for ethnic Kazakhs. That is, ethnic Kazakh respondents were more likely to say that they do not support the CSTO, even when they do, likely out of fear of misaligning with the prevalent view within their own community. 

Attitudinal variables also played a role, albeit less so than the demographic ones. Trust in Putin and positive attitudes toward Russia were associated with greater support for the CSTO. In contrast, among those who saw the Ukraine war as the most salient issue facing the nation, support for the CSTO was weaker. 

These findings suggest that, in the future, Kazakhstan’s government may face pressure from public opinion to change its policy vis-à-vis the CSTO, and Russia, more generally.

In a CDDRL research seminar series talk, Anat Admati — the George G.C. Parker Professor of Finance and Economics at the Stanford Graduate School of Business — shared findings from her research on how banking practices can undermine democracy. Her talk highlighted themes from the new and expanded edition of her book, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What is Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It. Coauthored with Martin Hellwig, the book’s latest edition was published this year by Princeton University Press.

Admati argues that banks use their positions of influence to exploit their symbiotic relationships with politicians, breaking and distorting rules with impunity. The powerful consensus in the policy establishment that banks cannot be allowed to fail, has afforded these banks unrestricted power, knowing that the government will do whatever it takes to keep them afloat. The outcome has been detrimental to the rule of law and the quality of democracy. 

Admati brought to focus the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, which was formed in the wake of the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. The report found that the crisis was avoidable, and attributed the failures to gaps in regulation. The same weaknesses in the system of regulation, Admati noted, persist today. 

Much of the problem is rooted in the lack of sufficient equity. Banks, in other words, are allowed to operate with large amounts of debt, rendering them quite fragile. Exacerbating the problem is that banks are heavily interconnected, and when one indebted corporation fails, it takes down others with it; the 2008 crisis is a case in point.

The problem is global, but the U.S. provides a clear example. The U.S. government is central to how banks are able to get away with operating with such little equity. With the federal government prepared to support them through various bailout practices, banks find a strong incentive to borrow beyond their means. A recent example of that trend is Silicon Valley Bank, wherein the federal government took measures to guarantee that depositors would be made whole after the bank’s failure. This safety net that the government has consistently provided has, in effect, shielded banks from the downsides of taking on unsound risks. Better regulation is needed to require more equity so that banks would be prepared to absorb losses before being bailed out.

However, the current regulations — sponsored by the Basel Committee — are so complex that banks can weaponize and exploit them, spreading misinformation to shield themselves from accountability. Lobbying groups, like the Bank Policy Institute, are among the most powerful on Capitol Hill, ensuring that regulations remain lax, and banks continue to have the opportunity to game the system.

Banks hold disproportionate power in democracies and face limited political will to hold them accountable.