Click the link for a transcript of “Ukraine, Russia and the Fight for Democracy.”

The Complicated History Between Russia and Ukraine
 

Ukraine played a key role in the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it came out as the biggest independent country of the former Soviet states. Ukraine decided to be a democracy, thankfully, and this has been our path for the last thirty years.

This is a great achievement for our nation, because if you look around our country, even among hundreds of other successful European countries, there are not many other good examples of democracy. They have problems: Turkey has problems; Belarus has problems; Kazakhstan as well. We have some problems with corruption, but we are still an electoral democracy with fair elections.

Now, unfortunately, Russia understands itself as the successor, or empire, coming after the Soviet Union, and Putin has said many times that this collapse was the biggest catastrophe in the last twenty years of the last century. For him, Ukraine’s success is a tragedy.

Putin has invaded Ukraine before during the annexation of Crimea. He tried to divide Ukraine into a Russian, authoritarian Ukraine and a European, democratic Ukraine. But he failed. Our civil society worked hard to create voluntary military and paramilitary organizations and units, and Ukrainians pushed back as a nation.

And that was a moment when Putin understood, finally, that he lost Ukraine not only as an economic partner, but ideologically. Ukrainians chose freedom. We chose democracy. And for Putin, it's very dangerous to have examples of successful democratic countries – especially Slavic Orthodox Christian countries with close ties to Russia – like Ukraine. Putin needs the Russian people to believe that democracy is a weak, failing idea that doesn’t work.

A Struggle Broader Than One Country
 

This buildup of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border is not juist a regional conflict, and it's not just about NATO. It’s a battle between two conceptually different systems: the authoritarian system and the democratic system. It’s an attack towards democracy and the Western world. Our values in the Western world are a threat for Mr. Putin himself.

Putin is trying to shape the situation and to undermine the trust among countries and among people. He's trying to create destabilizing situations like an immigration crises, organize sabotages among the military, have political murders, and so on and so forth.

This buildup is only one element of this game to create one more additional crisis to attract attention, and to create a situation where Western leaders have to decide and make very hard decisions. Putin is trying to show that, “If I do attack, nobody will protect you. All of these values you have are just fairy tales. The West is weak, the West is insincere. When they tell you that values matter, it’s a lie because the only real value is money. There is no democracy.”

The Role of the West in Supporting Democracies
 

For Putin, the weak reaction from the West to the aggression towards Ukraine was a signal that it was acceptable to act like this. That's why Putin is raising the stakes and why he will continue to raise the stakes every year. Right now, the sanctions policy and general Western policy is creating a situation where time is playing against the victim, not against the aggressor.

Putin’s strategy is to wait, to use all his resources to undermine his democratic opponents, and to make sure that the next politicians in the western world will be more flexible. And maybe in 10 years or 15 years when the annexation of Crimea has become deep history, he will find some new trade-off with the next generation of democratic leaders.

This is why there needs to be a new model of smart or cascading sanctions where the EU adopts a package of sanctions for some period of time, maybe five, seven or ten years, and every next wave, every next package of sanctions will automatically come into power if the problem is not solved. So every single day, it automatically raises the price for the aggressor.

Supporting fragile democracies is not just about making a morally right choice; these countries on the frontlines that have paid an additional price – an additional tax, if you will, for democracy, and have taken on additional burdens, because they choose the democratic path. Whether it’s Ukraine or other countries, we need Western support now in a much bigger way than we have it now.

For more from Oleksiy Honcharuk, listen to his his remarks on "Ukraine vs Russia: The War for Democracy," given as a Liautaud Lecture at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

Russia maintains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional military forces in Europe. Russian military units currently are deployed — uninvited and unwanted — in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. As Russia’s massing of military power near Ukraine prompted a crisis, President Vladimir Putin has demanded legally-binding security guarantees for… Russia.

On December 17, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the unusual step of publishing draft U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agreements that encapsulate Moscow’s desired guarantees. The substance of the drafts and the way the Russians publicized them do not suggest a serious negotiating bid.

If the Kremlin is serious about negotiating and deescalates the situation near Ukraine, the West could engage on some elements of the drafts. Many, however, will go nowhere — as Moscow surely knew.

DRAFT NATO-RUSSIA AGREEMENT

Russia’s draft “Agreement on Measures to Ensure the Security of the Russian Federation and Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” would require that NATO members commit to no further enlargement of the alliance, including in particular to Ukraine. There is little enthusiasm within NATO now for putting Ukraine on a membership track, as Putin and other Russian officials undoubtedly understand. However, the alliance will not reverse its long-standing “open door” policy. That would require consensus, and few allies, let alone all 30, would agree that Russia can dictate NATO policy in this way.

This suggests that a middle ground of “not now but not never” might offer a way to kick this thorny can down the road. That is, if Moscow wishes to defuse the situation.

Another article in the Russian draft would require that NATO deploy no forces or weapons in countries that joined the alliance after May 1997. That month, NATO committed not to permanently station substantial combat forces in new members and said it had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory. From 1997 to 2014, NATO deployed virtually no troops or equipment in new member states.

That changed following Russia’s seizure of Crimea. NATO now deploys, on a rotating basis, relatively small multinational battlegroups in the Baltic states and Poland. It is difficult to see NATO agreeing to withdraw them absent a significant change in Russia’s military posture. However, the draft treaty would impose no requirements for redeployment of Russian forces.

Such provisions will prove non-starters with the alliance. Others might get a more positive reception. These include language on consultative mechanisms, such as the NATO-Russia Council, and the establishment of a hotline between NATO and Russia. Indeed, NATO has proposed NATO-Russia Council meetings, though Moscow suspended diplomatic relations with NATO in October.

The draft treaty also would bar deployment of intermediate-range missiles in areas where they could reach the other side’s territory. Of course, the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty banned all U.S. and Russian intermediate-range missiles. However, Russia’s deployment of the intermediate-range 9M729 cruise missile in violation of the treaty led to its collapse.

This idea sounds like Putin’s 2019 proposal for a moratorium on deploying intermediate-range missiles in Europe. While NATO turned that aside, it might be worth a second look, provided that Russia affirmed that it would apply to the 9M729 and had appropriate verification measures.

The draft treaty’s proposed bar on any NATO military activity in Ukraine, eastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Central Asia is an overreach, but some measures to limit military exercises and activities on a reciprocal basis might be possible. There is a history of such provisions, for example, the Vienna Document’s confidence- and security-building measures.

DRAFT U.S.-RUSSIA TREATY

The draft “Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees” also contains unacceptable provisions. Washington likely will not agree to a requirement that the two countries “not implement security measures … that could undermine core security interests of the other Party.” Moscow has shown it has a very broad definition of what it thinks could undermine its security. Likewise, it is unrealistic to ask the United States to prevent further NATO enlargement; Washington will not agree to close the “open door,” and even if it were to do so, it could not persuade all 29 other allies to agree to change the policy.

While interest could develop in the draft NATO-Russia agreement’s provision on intermediate-range missiles, there will be no interest in the draft U.S.-Russia treaty provision which would effectively ban U.S. intermediate-range missiles from Europe while leaving Russia free to deploy such missiles against NATO countries. The provision limiting the ability of heavy bombers and surface warships to operate in and over international waters will find no fans in Washington or, for that matter, in the Russian military.

Discussion on other provisions regarding military activities might be possible. It is unreasonable for Moscow to seek a veto over Kyiv’s foreign policy direction. However, the concern expressed by Putin earlier in December and then repeated about U.S. offensive missiles in Ukraine able to strike Moscow in a matter of minutes poses a different question. That concern could prove easy to address, as there is no indication that Washington has ever considered it. Other such Russian concerns might also be addressed, along with U.S. (and NATO) concerns about certain Russian military activities.

The draft provision requiring that all nuclear weapons be deployed on national territory should go into another forum. Biden administration officials hope to begin a negotiation with Russia that would cover all U.S. and Russian nuclear arms. That is the proper place for this issue. Whether a requirement that all nuclear weapons be based on national territory would prove acceptable to Washington would depend on the overall agreement and consultations with allies.

PROPOSALS INTENDED TO FAIL?

The unacceptable provisions in the two draft agreements, their quick publication by the Russian government, and the peremptory terms used by Russian officials to describe Moscow’s demands raise concern that the Kremlin may want rejection. With large forces near Ukraine, Moscow could then cite that as another pretext for military action against its neighbor.

If, on the other hand, these draft agreements represent an opening bid, and the Russians seek a serious exchange that also addresses the security concerns of the other parties, some draft provisions could offer a basis for discussion and negotiation. The North Atlantic Council stated last week that NATO is “ready for meaningful dialogue with Russia.” U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan reiterated that point: “We’ve had dialogue with Russia on European security issues for the last 20 years… That has sometimes produced progress, sometimes produced deadlock. But we are fundamentally prepared for dialogue.”

A deescalation of the situation near Ukraine would help greatly. U.S. and NATO officials will not want to engage as long as Russia hangs a military threat over Kyiv. Another question is the format. Washington and Moscow can have bilateral discussions, but negotiations have to include all affected parties, including Ukraine. The United States and Russia cannot cut a deal over the heads of the Europeans and Ukrainians. As Sullivan said, “nothing about you without you.”

The sides should come to the table prepared to address the other’s legitimate security concerns. Agreeing on the meaning of “legitimate” will consume long hours. For example, it is unlikely that the United States (or NATO) will compromise on the principle — to which Moscow has agreed as a signatory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act — that states have a right to choose their own foreign policy course. The question of military activities in the NATO-Russia region is a different issue, and NATO has already shown its readiness to undertake commitments in that regard.

These discussions and any negotiation will be long, complex, and arduous. That is the kind of work that diplomats do. Getting started down that path, however, will require very different signals than those the West and Ukraine have seen from Moscow the past several weeks.

Originally for Brookings Institution's Order from Chaos blog

At dinner at the American ambassador’s residence in Moscow some years ago, I asked a former senior foreign policy official if anyone in the Kremlin understood Ukraine.  He replied that someone there understood Ukraine very well.  He then added “but nobody listens to him.” 

The abject failure of Russian policy toward Ukraine over the past seven years suggests the Kremlin and Vladimir Putin have a flawed understanding of the country. 

On Dec. 17, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said, “Have we [Russia] lost Ukraine as a partner, ally and so on?  At this point, yes, completely.” 

The Russian leadership presumably did not intend this.  Thus, the question of whether the Kremlin and Putin understand Ukraine.  Many signs suggest that they do not. 

Putin’s last visit to Kiev occurred in 2013, when he traveled to mark the 1025th anniversary of Kievan Rus’s acceptance of Christianity. In a speech Putin said, “We are all spiritual heirs of what happened here 1025 years ago.  And in this sense we [Ukrainians and Russians] are, without a doubt, one people.”  

What an utterly tone-deaf statement to make in Ukraine.  Millions of ethnic Ukrainians heard it as a denial of their culture, history and language.  Putin has since often repeated that point. 

Russia’s use of military force to seize Crimea following the Maidan Revolution could hardly be expected to win over Ukrainian sympathies.  Nor would sparking and sustaining a conflict in Donbas that has now claimed more than 13,000 lives. 

Shortly after the Russia-Ukraine conflict began in 2014, Putin and other Russians started speaking of “Novorossiya” — the idea that much of eastern and southern Ukraine would rise in revolt against Kiev.  The allure of Novorossiya held sway in Moscow long after it became clear that there was little enthusiasm among Ukrainians for breaking away. 

Volodymyr Zelenskiy won the Ukrainian presidency in 2019.  He came to office a political novice who comfortably spoke Russian and promised a different approach from that of his predecessor, whom Moscow despised.  Zelensky endorsed the Minsk agreements as the basis for resolving the Donbas conflict and spoke approvingly of the “Steinmeier formula” for moving forward—politically risky steps for the new president given growing frustration and anger in Ukraine about the failure of the Minsk agreements to deliver peace in Donbas. 

What did that get Zelensky?  Putin agreed to a meeting in December 2019 with the Ukrainian leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron.  The meeting produced agreement on a prisoner exchange, a full ceasefire in Donbass and a follow-up meeting in spring 2020.  Only the prisoner exchange occurred. 

Rather than seek compromise, the Kremlin leaders seemed to calculate that they could force the newcomer to make humiliating concessions.  

Moscow increasingly took the position that it was not a party to the conflict — despite a Russian signature to the Minsk II agreement — and sought to force Kiev to deal directly with the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics.”  The Kremlin now swats away any request by Zelensky to meet Putin. 

The unsurprising result:  Zelenskiy’s attitude toward Moscow has hardened.  While he brought to office an ambivalent view of the Ukraine-NATO relationship, he now publicly calls for an early membership path for Ukraine.  

Kremlin policy has driven Ukraine away.  More than anything else, it has persuaded the Ukrainian government and an increasingly large segment of the Ukrainian population that they can find security and stability only if their country is anchored in institutions such as the European Union and NATO. 

The Kremlin appears intent on continuing this course.  Putin released an essay in July in which he all but denied Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign nation.  In October, former President Dmitry Medvedev termed talking to Kiev “pointless.”   

The Russian military has massed tens of thousands of troops and tanks, artillery and other combat vehicles in staging areas near Ukraine, suggesting that Russia is preparing a major military assault. 

That would not bring Ukraine back to Russia.  It would instead generate more sanctions on Russia, an increased flow of Western arms to Ukraine, a bolstering of NATO military presence near Russia’s borders — and dead Russian soldiers.   

The Russian military is undoubtedly stronger, but the Ukrainian military would exact a price.  Moreover, Kiev is preparing for partisan warfare, and an early December poll showed that one-third of those asked, including one-fourth in the country’s east, would take up arms if the Russians invade. 

It is time for the Russian leadership to reexamine the premises on which it has based its approach.  Bad understanding leads to bad policy, and the Kremlin appears poised to make another in a line of mistakes in its approach toward Ukraine.  This one would prove a tragedy for Ukraine … but also for Russia. 

Originally for The Moscow Times

As Russian troops gather on Ukraine’s borders, the outstanding question is whether Russian President Putin is prepared to bear the domestic and international costs of a full-scale invasion or if he’ll stop at pressuring NATO and the West for political concessions. Steven Pifer explains why a military incursion in 2022 will not be as easy for Russia as annexing Crimea in 2014, and where there are avenues for dialogue to defuse the brewing confrontation.

Read the rest at Brookings