This is the second of several articles—focusing on the 50-year history of SPICE—that will be posted this year. 

As noted in the article, “Celebrating SPICE’s 50th: SPICE’s Roots in the Bay Area China Education Project (BAYCEP),” that was written by Dr. David Grossman, founding director of SPICE, SPICE was established in 1976. Professor Daniel Okimoto joined Stanford in 1977, and I met him in 1988 when I joined SPICE. I had first heard of Professor Okimoto in fall 1972 during my freshman year in college. I read an excerpt, “The Intolerance of Success,” from his book, American in Disguise, that was reprinted in Roots: An Asian American Reader. During my first meeting with him, I learned that his family was incarcerated in the same concentration camp for Japanese Americans as my family during World War II. The camp was in Poston, Arizona. Okimoto was born in 1942 at the Santa Anita Assembly Center, a temporary detention facility for Japanese Americans. The detention facility was located at the Santa Anita Racetrack in Southern California, and Okimoto was born in a horse stable. From there, his family was moved and incarcerated in Poston. Since learning about this connection between Okimoto’s family and mine, I felt a strong personal connection to him.

Since the beginning of my time at SPICE, Professor Okimoto has been unwavering in his support of SPICE’s projects on U.S.–Japan relations and the Japanese American experience. He served as the Principal Investigator for multiple U.S.–Japan relations- and Japanese American-focused curriculum projects, the Reischauer Scholars Program (an online course that has been offered to high school students in the United States since 2004), and Stanford e-Japan (an online course that has been offered to high school students in Japan since 2015). One of SPICE’s most popular multimedia offerings is “An Interpretive History of Japan,” which is based on six lectures by Okimoto. Through these projects, I also established a strong professional connection to him.

Professor Okimoto has been an incredible champion for the Reischauer Scholars Program from its inception, rallying other U.S.–Japan experts and leaders to back our mission of teaching and inspiring the next generation of young scholars to strengthen ties between the United States and Japan. Over the past 20+ years, his guidance and example as a mentor have shaped me as a teacher and profoundly strengthened a vibrant community of educators and students.—Naomi Funahashi, Reischauer Scholars Program instructor

Prof. Daniel Okimoto has championed the Stanford e-Japan Program since its inception. In addition to providing some of the lectures for the initial cohorts, Dan was also generous with his time and knowledge with high school students in Japan through guest speaking in Virtual Classrooms.—Waka Takahashi Brown and Meiko Kotani, Stanford e-Japan Program instructors

Importantly, numerous SPICE staff (past and present) have studied under Okimoto, including Dr. Mariko Yang-Yoshihara, an educational researcher and instructor for SPICE whose primary advisor was Okimoto. She noted the following: “Having Dan Okimoto as my doctoral advisor was one of the greatest blessings in my life. What I gained from his mentorship both as a student and as a person was immense, and two moments in particular stay with me today. The first was the Japanese Imperial couple’s visit to the Stanford campus in 1994. Dan’s role as Stanford’s leading Japan expert often meant welcoming distinguished visitors from around the world; and on that occasion, he chose to share something deeply personal, that he had been born in a horse stable as his family was sent to a concentration camp. And in response, Empress Michiko called him ‘another great man born in a horse stable.’ This brief exchange stayed with me through my time as a student as it felt like a real glimpse into my advisor’s life as a Japanese American scholar, carrying the weight of history while still holding onto the quiet warmth of our shared humanity. The second anecdote came shortly after 9/11, when so many of us were grappling with fear and uncertainty of the future. As I sat in his office, anxious and overwhelmed, Dan said very little except, very quietly, ‘I worry about the Muslim American community.’ In that moment, I came to understand how deeply his own experiences had shaped how he cares for the world: amid a national crisis, his heart instinctively focused on vulnerable communities. These were the moments from which I learned the most as his student: lessons in humanity and empathy. They have since become the foundation of the learning goals in the courses I teach. I hope that our work at SPICE will honor and carry forward Dan’s legacy by developing curricula that shed light on the Japanese American experience and nurture empathy and a sense of shared humanity in future generations.”

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On behalf of the SPICE staff, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Professor Okimoto for his unwavering support of SPICE. As someone who was born in a horse stable and unjustly incarcerated as a child without due process by his own country—along with approximately 120,000 people of Japanese descent, two thirds of whom were U.S. citizens—and is now Professor Emeritus of Stanford University, he remains a tremendous role model and inspiration to us at SPICE. He and his wife, Michiko, are still contributing greatly to U.S.–Japan relations through organizations like the Silicon Valley Japan Platform and the U.S.-Japan Council. They worked closely with the late Secretary Norman Mineta (left) and the late Senator Daniel Inouye (center); photo above courtesy of Daniel Okimoto. Like Okimoto, Secretary Mineta was also incarcerated by his country as a child during World War II. Senator Daniel Inouye was a Medal of Honor recipient for his service in the U.S. Army during World War II. Like Okimoto, Mineta and Inouye were also recipients of the Order of the Rising Sun. 

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The optimistic assumptions that shaped the wave of globalization at the turn of the 21st century have given way to geoeconomics, also known as economic statecraft, or the use of economic leverage to advance the geopolitical interests of nation-states. In this environment of "weaponized interdependence," corporations have become actors on the frontlines of the U.S.-China rivalry, the Russia-Ukraine war, China-Taiwan tensions, and other national security conflicts in which they are organizationally ill-suited to play a central role, cautions APARC Faculty Affiliate Curtis J. Milhaupt, the William F. Baxter-Visa International Professor of Law and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. 

Milhaupt, an internationally recognized expert on comparative corporate governance, delivered a keynote speech titled Corporate Governance in an Era of Geoeconomics at the Corporate Governance Conference in Milan, Italy, on February 12, 2026. He described the era of geoeconomics as representing a dramatic departure from early 2000s thinking, when capital markets were viewed as politically neutral, shareholder identity was considered irrelevant, and scholars predicted global convergence on Western corporate governance models. All three assumptions have collapsed, posing significant repercussions for firm-specific legal risks and governance challenges. Watch Milhaupt's presentation:

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Heightened Compliance Risk

The U.S.-China rivalry has created a particularly complex challenge for corporate governance, says Mihaupt. The United States has enacted multiple laws to curtail technology transfers to China, with China responding in a tit-for-tat fashion. The resulting, rapidly shifting and conflicting legal environment makes it "virtually impossible for a compliance department to comply with both U.S. and Chinese regulations."

Milhaupt introduced the concept of "ESG + G," adding geoeconomics to the Environmental, Social, and Governance framework used by investors and companies to assess a company's sustainability, ethical impact, and risk management beyond mere financial performance. Like ESG, geoeconomics involves corporations taking on roles traditionally played by governments. "I think in many respects private companies have become national security partners of their home country governments," he said.

Milhaupt's review of the disclosures of risk factors in the securities filings of public companies in the United States over the past 20 years shows the dramatic shift in corporate risk perception. Mentions of geopolitical risks related to export controls, the China-Taiwan conflict, and supply chain vulnerabilities have spiked sharply since 2020, with a particularly dramatic increase following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Despite these challenges, corporations appear to be unprepared for the exploitation of the vulnerabilities created by economic interdependence in the era of geoeconomics. Only 5% of Russell 3000 companies disclose information on how they monitor geopolitical risk, Milhaupt finds. Among those that do, most provide no details about their strategies. Meanwhile, the expertise necessary for geopolitical risk assessment is declining as a percentage of S&P 500 boards of directors.

Divergent Governance Paths

In the era of globalization, corporate governance systems worldwide largely converged around the liberal vision of shareholder primacy. In today’s geoeconomic era, however, a different kind of convergence may be emerging: one shaped less by market ideology and more by the shared political values and strategic priorities of the home governments of globally active firms. Thus, we are witnessing increasing concern with the national identity of corporations and their shareholders, Milhaupt observes. "The standard legal tests for corporate national identity – jurisdiction of incorporation, or the real seat doctrine – are in danger of being overriden by political determinations such as the one that was applied to TikTok in the United States."

At the same time, Milhaupt argues, we may be witnessing the beginning of a movement in the opposite direction to the Western model of corporate governance: "the spread of what might be thought of as state capitalism in the West." To illustrate this trend, Milhaupt cites the case of the U.S. government's "golden share" in U.S. Steel as a condition for allowing its merger with Japanese company Nippon Steel.

While Milhaupt recognizes the necessity of government actions to protect national security in the corporate sector, he warns against ad hoc informal interventions in the private sector. "I don't think that these are really the answer to competition with Beijing," he said. "I'm particularly concerned about the impact of these government interventions on global investment, which relies on a predictable legal regulatory enforcement regime."

Milhaupt concludes that the era of geoeconomics is "the new normal," and both companies and governments must adapt to a world where economic and national security concerns are inextricably linked.

The deliberations yielded clear priorities for building trust through safeguards during this early phase of agentic development and adoption. Currently, participants favor AI agents for low-risk tasks, while expressing caution about high-stakes applications in medical or financial domains. In deliberation, participants indicated an openness to these higher-risk applications if provided safeguards around privacy or user control, such as requiring approval before finalizing an action.

The Forum also revealed support for culturally adaptive agents, with a preference for asking users about norms rather than making assumptions. Lastly, the discussions underscored the need for better public understanding of AI agents and their capabilities, pointing to the importance of transparency and education in fostering trust in these emerging technologies.

"The perspectives coming out of these initial deliberations underscore the importance of our key focus areas at Cohere: security, privacy, and safeguards,” said Joelle Pineau, Chief AI Officer at Cohere. “We look forward to continuing our work alongside other leaders to strengthen industry standards for this technology, particularly for enterprise agentic AI that works with sensitive data."

This pioneering forum sets a new standard for public participation in AI development. By seeking feedback directly from the public, combining expert knowledge, meaningful public dialogue, and cross-industry commitment, the Industry Wide Forum provides a key mechanism for ensuring that AI innovation is aligned with public values and expectations.

“Technology better serves people when it's grounded in their feedback and expectations,” said Rob Sherman, Meta’s Vice President, AI Policy & Deputy Chief Privacy Officer.  “This Forum reinforces how companies and researchers can collaborate to make sure AI agents are built to be responsive to the diverse needs of people who use them – not just at one company, but across the industry.”

Through Stanford’s established methodology and their facilitation of industry partners, the Industry-Wide Forum provides the public with the opportunity to engage deeply with complex technological issues and for AI companies to benefit from considered public perspectives in developing products that are responsive to public opinion. We hope this is the first step towards more collaboration among industry, academia, and the public to shape the future of AI in ways that benefit everyone.

“We have more industry partners joining our next forum later this year”, says Alice Siu, Associate Director of Stanford's Deliberative Democracy Lab. “The 2026 Industry-Wide Forum expands our discussion scope and further deepens our understanding of public attitudes towards AI agents. These deliberations will help ensure AI development remains aligned with societal values and expectations.”

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At a recent seminar hosted by APARCʼs China Program, Professor Jessica Chen Weiss, the David M. Lampton Professor of China Studies at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, presented findings from her forthcoming book, Faultlines: The Tensions Beneath China's Global Ambitions (under contract with Oxford University Press), which examines how domestic politics and regime insecurity shape China’s foreign policy ambitions, prospects for peaceful coexistence, and the future of international order. Drawing on research and fieldwork in China, Weiss argued that understanding Beijingʼs behavior on the world stage requires looking beyond ideology to the contested priorities and political calculations that drive decision-making within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Weiss proposed a framework centered on three pillars that have sustained CCP legitimacy since the late 1970s: sovereignty (nationalism), security (civility), and development. Her analysis reveals that China's objectives are not static but moving targets shaped by competing domestic interests, leadership priorities, and international pressures.

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The Sovereignty-Security-Development Paradigm
 

At the heart of Weissʼs argument is the recognition that the CCPʼs foremost concern is domestic survival. In the face of the collapse of most communist regimes, the Party has remained vigilant against what it calls “peaceful evolution” and democratic contagion.

On issues touching core sovereignty concerns – Taiwan, Hong Kong, and maritime territorial claims – China has been “hyperactive” in making demands, even when doing so invites international censure. Weiss explained that the more central an issue is to CCP domestic legitimacy, the harder it becomes to make concessions, and the more likely international pressure is to backfire.

Yet tensions exist between competing priorities. China has compromised on certain border disputes to shore up domestic security, while its evolving stance on climate change reflects a shift from viewing carbon limits as threats to growth to recognizing the greater threat environmental catastrophes present to the nation’s stability.

Beyond the Monolith: China's Internal Contestation
 

Weissʼs research demonstrates that authoritarian China is far from monolithic. Different geographic, economic, institutional, and even ideological interests shape policy debates, even if most actors lack formal veto power. Local governments can resist central directives, as evidenced during the COVID-19 outbreak, when local officials initially withheld information about human-to-human transmission from the central government to prevent panic from disrupting important political meetings.

This pattern of center-local tension extends to China's international commitments. Local officials often game environmental regulations to juice growth and secure promotions, undermining Beijingʼs pledges on carbon emissions. On issues ranging from Belt and Road investments to export controls, implementation frequently diverges from stated policy as local actors pursue their own interests.

Weiss’s framework distinguishes among issues that are both central and uncontested (such as Taiwan), those that are central but contested (like climate change and trade policy), and peripheral issues where Beijing has shown greater flexibility (such as demonstrated by many UN peacekeeping initiatives). This helps explain why international pressure succeeds in some domains but fails spectacularly in others.

"The more central an issue is domestically, the more pressure the government faces to perform, and the harder it is to defy these domestic expectations," Weiss said. As a result, international pressure on these central issues is more likely to backfire, forcing the government to be seen as defending its core interests. She underscored that "even on these central issues, there's often tension with other central priorities, and managing these trade-offs comes with a number of different risks. It also means that sometimes an issue that touches on one pillar of regime support can yield to another."

Nationalism as Constraint and Tool
 

Weiss described nationalism as both a pillar of the CCPʼs legitimacy and a potential vulnerability when the government’s response appears weak. While large-scale anti-foreign protests have become rare, nationalist sentiment remains active online and shapes diplomatic calculations.

During Speaker Nancy Pelosiʼs 2022 visit to Taiwan, Chinese social media erupted with calls for the PLA to shoot down her plane. One interlocutor told Weiss his 14-year-old son and friends had stayed up past bedtime to watch Pelosiʼs plane land, illustrating nationalismʼs penetration into Chinese society.

Survey research reveals Chinese public opinion is quite hawkish, with majorities supporting military spending and viewing the U.S. presence in Asia as a threat. The government often refrains from suppressing nationalist sentiment to avoid backlash, even when doing so creates diplomatic complications. Weissʼs public opinion survey experiments, however, reveal that tough but vague threats can provide the government with wiggle room for de-escalation, although disapproval emerges when action is not sufficiently tough.

Regime Security Without Ideological Crusade
 

Weiss pushed back against arguments that China is bent on global domination or that ideology drives conflict with the West. While the CCP seeks a less ideologically threatening environment, it must balance this against development and market access.

This pragmatic calculus explains China's constrained support for Russiaʼs war in Ukraine — Beijing fears secondary sanctions more than it values autocratic solidarity. Rather than exporting revolution, China has worked with incumbents of all political stripes in the service of its national interests.

Chinaʼs strategy focuses on making autocracy viable at home, not on defeating democracy globally. This suggests room for coexistence if both sides can reach a détente on interference in internal affairs.

“China's activities are making autocracy more viable and, to the extent that China is succeeding, making China's example more appealing as a consequence. But its strategy doesn't hinge on defeating democracy around the world,” argued Weiss. This implies, to her view, that “there is more room for coexistence between autocracies and democracies if these different systems can find or reach a potential détente in the realm of ideas about how countries govern themselves, and importantly, they need to pull back their efforts in other societies across boundaries.”

Interdependence and Future Trajectories
 

Weiss concluded by outlining how her framework suggests different engagement strategies depending on where issues fall within the centrality-contestation matrix. On central but uncontested issues like Taiwan, pressure proves counterproductive, and reciprocal restraint may be most promising. On central but contested issues like currency, multilateral pressure can influence certain Chinese constituencies against others. On peripheral issues, such pressure is most effective unless powerful domestic constituencies subvert implementation.

Addressing questions about U.S.-China decoupling, Weiss noted that both sides recognize there are interdependencies that don’t have quick solutions. Even in a critical area like minerals, diversification will take at least a decade, and Chinese processing will still dominate globally. The goal of diversification should be to preempt coercion, not to achieve true decoupling.