"That advantage is entirely theoretical," Doshi conceded. "Unlocking its potential, though, is the central task of American statecraft in this century." In practice, that might mean Japan and South Korea investing in American shipbuilding; Taiwan building semiconductor plants in the U.S.; allies co-producing advanced weapons systems; and all parties maintaining a shared tariff or regulatory wall against China's excess industrial capacity. On the economic side, Doshi called for common investment screening, coordinated industrial policy, and an "economic Article 5" ensuring that when China uses economic coercion against one ally, all respond together.

Addressing the Skeptics
Doshi acknowledged "the new pessimism," the view that Trump-era damage to U.S. alliances has made allied scale impossible. The strain is real, he said, but not terminal, for three reasons:

1. The alternatives are worse. Spheres of influence, unrestrained multipolarity, and a China-led order all leave the U.S. and its partners poorer and less secure. 
2. Alliances have absorbed serious shocks before and survived. For example, France's withdrawal from NATO's unified command, Nixon's opening to China, the Plaza Accord. 
3. The underlying logic of interdependence persists. Allied economies are growing more dependent on U.S. markets as China buys less from them, allies are purchasing record numbers of American weapons, and even the Trump administration has not escaped the pull of allied scale, with Vice President Vance publicly calling for a trading bloc among allies to break China's chokehold on critical minerals.

Eight Principles to Achieve Allied Scale
Doshi closed with a practical blueprint — eight principles for building allied scale.

1. Turn the page on the Trump era. Persuade allies that the most damaging recent policies were products of individual leadership rather than durable features of the American political system.

2. Begin with humility. Start with small, achievable projects: a joint shipbuilding effort, a critical minerals offtake agreement, a co-production line. Build from there.

3. Build mutually beneficial bargains. Allies invest in America; America invests in allies. All extend each other more preferential terms than they do to non-market economies like China.

4. Pay attention to domestic politics. “The danger of the ‘Trump Approach’ is alienation and polarization of allied politics that makes diplomacy impossible.” Any allied scale strategy must be first grounded in domestic politics.

5. Build ad hoc coalitions. Allied scale does not mean doing everything with everyone. It means assembling the right groupings for specific challenges and opportunities.

6. Bolster credibility through congressional legislation. Executive orders are too easily reversed. Durable commitments to allies require legislative backing that is harder to undo with a change in administration.

7. Build on existing platforms. Frameworks like the Quad, AUKUS, the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral, and the G7 already exist. Allied scale should strengthen what works, not start from scratch.

8. Articulate an affirmative vision. "Allied scale can't just be about balancing China," Doshi said. "It has to be about building the kind of world that we want to see and live in."

“That work is hard,” Doshi concluded, but “it's not impossible. And the alternatives are far more concerning than the future that I’m outlining.” Doshi ended his address on a note of optimism: a call to action for the U.S. to reforge our alliances and rebalance the world order to create a better world for not just the U.S., but for nations across the globe.

A full recording of Dr. Rush Doshi’s talk is available on YouTube and below.

Stanford e-Tottori is a distance-learning course sponsored by the Tottori Prefectural Board of Education and the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) at Stanford University.

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Stanford e-Tottori Program, a milestone that provides an opportunity to reflect on a decade of learning, cross-cultural exchange, and partnership between Stanford University and Tottori Prefecture.

Launched in 2016, Stanford e-Tottori was the first regional program in Japan developed by SPICE. The program was created through a partnership between SPICE and the Tottori Prefectural Board of Education with the goal of helping high school students in Tottori engage in global issues, deepen their understanding of the United States and U.S.–Japan relations, and strengthen their English communication skills.

When the program began, none of us could have imagined that it would still be thriving 10 years later. Over the past decade, approximately 250 students from across Tottori Prefecture have participated in the program. Through weekly assignments, online discussions, virtual classroom sessions, guest lectures, and independent research projects, students have explored topics ranging from education and entrepreneurship to sustainability, diversity, leadership, and U.S.–Japan relations.

Having taught every cohort since the program’s founding, I have had the privilege of working with an extraordinary group of students. Each year, I am impressed by their curiosity, thoughtfulness, and willingness to engage with complex issues. Although students enter the program with varying levels of English proficiency and different academic interests, they consistently demonstrate a desire to learn, challenge themselves, and better understand perspectives beyond their own.

One of the defining features of the program has been the students’ final research projects. At the end of each course, students select a topic of personal interest, conduct independent research, and present their findings in English. Over the years, they have investigated subjects as diverse as artificial intelligence, environmental sustainability, education systems, cultural identity, social welfare, entrepreneurship, history, and international relations. These presentations have provided students with opportunities not only to strengthen their research and communication skills but also to share their passions and interests with others.

The success of Stanford e-Tottori also helped to lay the foundation for SPICE’s broader expansion of regional programs throughout Japan. What began as SPICE’s first regional program has grown into a network of educational partnerships that now serve students in prefectures and cities across the country. Today, SPICE offers regional programs in Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Oita, Tottori, and Yamaguchi prefectures, as well as in the cities of Kagoshima, Kawasaki, and Kobe.

One of the greatest joys of the program has been seeing students experience California and Stanford University firsthand. Each year, two top-performing students are invited to Stanford as honorees in recognition of their outstanding achievement in the course. During their visits, students participate in award ceremonies, tour the Stanford campus, meet Stanford faculty and staff, and connect with fellow students from other SPICE regional programs.

These visits have also provided opportunities for students to glimpse into American high school life firsthand. Over the years, I have had the pleasure of accompanying students to local schools, where they have attended classes and met with American students. I am especially grateful to local educators, including Yoko Sase of The Nueva School in Hillsborough and Matt Hall of Gunn High School in Palo Alto, who have generously welcomed our students into their classrooms and school communities.

The Stanford e-Tottori Program would not exist without the vision, dedication, and support of many individuals and organizations. I am especially grateful to Takeshi Homma, whose passion for education, entrepreneurship, and international exchange helped inspire the creation of the program 10 years ago. Since its inception, Homma-san has remained a steadfast supporter, generously sharing his experiences and insights with students through annual guest lectures on entrepreneurship, innovation, and global citizenship.

I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to Governor Shinji Hirai for his longstanding commitment to international education and global engagement. His support of educational exchange between Tottori and Stanford has helped create opportunities for hundreds of students to broaden their horizons and develop a deeper understanding of the United States and U.S.–Japan relations.

I am deeply grateful to the Tottori Prefectural Board of Education for its partnership and commitment to providing meaningful international educational opportunities for students. Over the years, I have had the pleasure of working with many dedicated educators and teacher consultants whose efforts have been essential to the program’s success, including Koji Tsubaki, Takuya Fukushima, Tomoya Minohara, Shuichi Hata, Natsu Odahara, and Satoru Hamahashi. Their enthusiasm, professionalism, and unwavering support have helped make the Stanford e-Tottori Program a rewarding experience for students throughout Tottori Prefecture. 

As I reflect on the past 10 years, what stands out most are not the individual lessons, assignments, or presentations, but the relationships that have developed through the program. Education is ultimately about people, and one of the greatest rewards of teaching Stanford e-Tottori has been the opportunity to learn from and work with so many talented students, teachers, and colleagues in both Japan and the United States.

As Stanford e-Tottori enters its second decade, I am excited to see what the future holds. I look forward to continuing to learn alongside future generations of students and to strengthening the bonds of friendship and understanding that have connected Stanford and Tottori over the past 10 years.

Congratulations to all of the students, educators, and partners who have been part of the Stanford e-Tottori story. Thank you for making the past 10 years such a remarkable journey.

Stanford e-Tottori is one of SPICE’s local student programs in Japan.

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This article was written by Dr. Larry Becker, Africa Project Coordinator at SPICE, 1982–1985, and Professor Emeritus of Geography at Oregon State University in Corvallis. This is the fourth of several articles—focusing on the 50-year history of SPICE—that will be posted this year. In its early years, SPICE comprised several separate area-focused projects.

Happy 50th birthday to SPICE! Those 50 years are a testament to the enduring value of the program and its ability to change with the times.

While enrolled in the Stanford Teacher Education Program (STEP) in 1982, I took David Grossman’s Global Education course and learned about the work of SPICE. It felt like a comfortable fit and welcome program following my upbringing in the integrated Berkeley public schools and undergraduate degree in geography. After the course, David approached me about the SPICE Africa Project Coordinator position. The coordinator at the time, Nebby Crawford, was leaving. Two years earlier, I had spent a summer in Mali with Operation Crossroads Africa. I gave a presentation at the Bay Area Global Education Program (BAGEP) Africa Summer Institute for teachers, plunging into the SPICE world of in-service teacher education at age 23.

Over the next three years, I had the privilege of working with the SPICE team, Stanford African Studies faculty and students, Bay Area K–12 teachers, and a network of African Studies outreach coordinators around the country. At the time, the Africa Project Coordinator position was partly funded by the Title VI Joint Center for African Studies at Stanford and U.C. Berkeley. I thus was exposed to rich academic African Studies educational resources while representing SPICE at annual conferences. I also established working relationships with members of the Stanford African Students Association. Graduate students from various countries contributed to the Summer Institute on Africa, visited precollegiate classrooms, and reviewed supplementary curriculum SPICE units that we developed with K–12 teachers. 

In the summer of 1984, I co-led a U.S. Department of Education-funded summer education trip for teachers to Nigeria. Together with co-leader, Dr. Faye McNair-Knox—with a background in Hausa linguistics and community organizing in East Palo Alto—we navigated a country recently under military rule with an overvalued currency on a limited budget. As the group travelled from a festival in the Gumel Emirate near the Niger border south to the metropolis of Lagos on the Gulf of Guinea, we stayed at university campuses where Bay Area teachers were exposed to Nigeria’s rich culture through professors from a variety of fields, local leaders, and artists. (Photo below of the Emir of Gumel’s entourage at the end of Ramadan, June 1984, in what is now Jigawa State, Nigeria, as seen during a summer education trip for teachers; courtesy of Larry Becker.)

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By the time I left SPICE, the Africa Project had five curriculum units: Analyzing the Press (1985), Development Decisions: Ghana’s Volta River Project (1985), What Is a Resource? (1985), Two Voices from Nigeria: Nigeria through the Literature of Chinua Achebe and Buchi Emecheta by Nigeria trip participants Lyn Reese and Rick Clarke (1985), and Voici l’Afrique Francophone with Foster City French teacher Joan Henley (1986).

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Enriched by the work at SPICE, I completed a PhD in geography with research on agrarian change in Mali at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) and a postdoc at the Africa Rice Center in Cote d’Ivoire. I had a university career teaching geography, notably large enrollment world regional geography courses, that greatly benefited from what I learned while at SPICE. 

Over the years of teaching about Africa in the U.S., I saw how attention to the context, identity, and positionality of the instructor and students contributes to successful classroom strategies and curriculum development. My SPICE experience provided a base for understanding this evolving pedagogy. In touch with SPICE colleagues years later, former colleague Steve Thorpe contributed to a seminar series that I led at Oregon State University aimed at globalizing courses throughout the campus. The ideas of SPICE carry on in familiar ways in new teaching settings!

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This blog first appeared in The National Interest.

The return of President Donald Trump to the White House has not only increased geopolitical volatility – it has fundamentally altered expectations about how far major powers are willing to go to secure strategic advantage. What once seemed rhetorical excess—such as his repeated remarks about acquiring Greenland – now appears less implausible in light of recent events. From the escalating crisis in Venezuela in early 2026 to the ongoing Iran War as of May 2026, the United States has signaled a willingness to pursue geopolitical advantage with fewer constraints than before.

Against this backdrop, the Arctic is no longer a peripheral theater. It is rapidly emerging as a central arena where climate change, energy security, and great-power competition intersect. The question is not whether the Arctic matters, but how states will position themselves in a region where the rules are still being written.

A Strategic Arctic, not a Peripheral One

The renewed US interest in Greenland should not be understood narrowly as a territorial ambition. Rather, it reflects a broader strategic calculation about the Arctic. The melting of Arctic ice – combined with technological advances—is making previously inaccessible resources and shipping routes increasingly viable. In this sense, Greenland is not the story – the Arctic is.

The Arctic is estimated to hold roughly 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its natural gas, making it one of the last major frontiers of global energy development. At the same time, new maritime routes such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the emerging Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) promise to significantly shorten shipping distances between Asia and Europe.

For major powers, the implications are profound. Russia has already positioned itself as the dominant Arctic actor, leveraging its geography and resource base. China, through its “Polar Silk Road” initiative, seeks to embed the Arctic into its broader connectivity strategy. Meanwhile, the United States, increasingly viewing the region through a strategic lens, is attempting to mobilize its alliances to counterbalance these moves.

As recent studies suggest, the Arctic is becoming a new frontier of great-power competition – one where economic, military, and legal dimensions are deeply intertwined.

Why South Korea Is Paying Attention to the Arctic 

For South Korea, interest in the Arctic may appear surprising at first glance – especially given the ideological orientation of its current progressive government. Traditionally, progressive administrations in Seoul have emphasized engagement with continental powers such as China and Russia, while seeking rapprochement with North Korea. They have also shown interest in infrastructure connectivity across the Eurasian landmass.

Yet the Arctic presents a different kind of opportunity – one that aligns with both geopolitical necessity and economic ambition.

Eunjung Lim, a professor in the Division of International Studies at Kongju National University (KNU), is a visiting scholar at Shorenstein APARC from April 2026 to February 2027. She is also a member of the governing board of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network and a member of the Subcommittee on Energy and Just Transition of the Presidential Commission on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth. She earned a BA from the University of Tokyo, an MIA from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, and a PhD from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.

Introduction and Contribution:

There is a growing recognition, both in and outside of the academy, that democracy requires more than simply voting for and removing incumbents during elections. For one, relying solely on elected representatives deprives those being represented of direct control over decisions that affect them. In addition, it can also generate — as it has in the United States and elsewhere — large gaps in responsiveness and representation, particularly for historically disenfranchised and marginal groups. 

Participatory budgeting (PB) represents one influential attempt to overcome these gaps in democratic practice. First introduced in the 1980s by the Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT), PB empowers voters to allocate public funds to projects that benefit them. Since then, ordinary citizens in thousands of places across the world have helped determine the content of local budgets.

Despite its successes, academics and practitioners remain unclear about how to address and balance considerations related to budget constraints and ease of participation. This coincides with well-known mathematical difficulties surrounding the aggregation of votes, for example, that individually consistent preferences can yield inconsistent group outcomes.

In “Rank, Pack, or Approve,” Lodewijk Gelauff and Ashish Goel introduce a dataset drawn from the novel and comprehensive Stanford Participatory Budgeting platform. The data span over 150 real participatory budgeting processes, or “elections.” Importantly, the elections vary in terms of how ballots are designed and how participants make budgeting decisions. Gelauff and Goel ask how such variation shapes important budgeting outcomes, such as when participants are more likely to become fatigued and abandon the process. 

Two key findings from the study are as follows: First, more complex PB designs lead voters to, perhaps unsurprisingly, spend more time participating; however, this does not significantly increase abandonment or “dropout” rates. Second, voting methods that force participants to deal with cost trade-offs — as opposed to merely indicating their preferences — have been found to generate less expensive projects. 

The reader comes away with a sense of how subtle differences in the design of budgeting elections meaningfully shape the allocation of resources. This will resonate with social scientists who are familiar with how, for example, different kinds of electoral rules shape political competition. To understand Gelauff and Goel’s findings, it helps to first outline how PB elections differ from one another.

Ballot Design and Voting Methods:

The basic PB setup involves organizers choosing a voting method, a list of projects to potentially be funded, and an authentication process (i.e., checking that participants are valid voters). Voters then select or rank projects given the constraints of each voting rule or method. These three rules, captured in the paper’s title, are as follows: 

The first, “K-approval,” asks voters to select up to “K” projects. The top-voted projects receive funding until the budget runs out. K-approval is simple, but its main drawback is that it ignores the costliness of each project: voters only indicate which projects they like, rather than how those choices fit within a fixed budget. The second method, “K-ranking,” asks voters to rank their preferred projects, capturing their preferences in a more fine-grained manner. As votes are aggregated using the Borda scoring method, higher-ranked projects receive greater weight or value. Finally, the “knapsack” method asks voters to choose projects that fit within a fixed budget. This method best allows participants to balance costs in a way that mimics real city councils. However, knapsack is more complex and time-consuming than K-approval or K-ranking, although the online interface design, which mimics a shopping cart, is already much simpler than it would be on paper. 

Data Collection and Findings:

As mentioned, Gelauff and Goel’s data is drawn from the open-source Stanford PB platform. This tool enables cities to conduct online PB elections with a great deal of customizability, including location, budget, language of operation, authentication process (e.g., requiring personal information or sending SMS messages), as well as methods, phases, and windows of voting. Key for the authors’ purposes, it also tracks (anonymous) voters’ choices and how much time they spend during the election. Data collection began in 2014. 

The first key finding is motivated by the fact that election organizers often prefer K-approval for its simplicity. As such, Gelauff and Goel analyze how much time participants spend on their ballots and how often they quit. Although more complex ballots — those with a larger budget and number of projects — are shown to predict longer completion times, they do not significantly increase dropout rates. The authors note that more research is needed to assess whether knapsack specifically affects dropout.

The authors also find that voters select more expensive projects with K-approval compared to the knapsack methods. However, voters indicate similarly expensive preferences for their most-preferred projects under both methods; the key difference appears lower down the list of preferences, where the knapsack constraint forces them to be more cost-conscious. In other words, the knapsack cost constraint doesn’t affect which expensive project participants most prefer. Rather, it limits how many extra expensive projects they can add.

Overall, “Rank, Pack, or Approve” deepens our understanding of how PB can improve direct democratic engagement while reducing burdens on participants. It does this while providing a large quantity of real-world data, compared with prior research that has relied on crowdworkers without a real stake in the budgeting outcome. The authors helpfully illustrate how local governments can design PB processes that are clearer and more inviting to ordinary voters. Subsequent research will benefit from using this powerful data resource, as will organizers seeking to expand local engagement.

*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.

As U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to visit Beijing on May 14-15, 2026, for a highly anticipated summit with President Xi Jinping, the world is watching to see if the two leaders can stabilize a U.S.-China relationship strained by disputes over trade, technological race, the future of Taiwan, and the rippling effects of the conflict with Iran.

Trump’s trip to Beijing – already rescheduled once due to the conflict in the Middle East – has been described as having tremendous symbolic significance. Yet, expectations for a breakthrough on specific deliverables should remain low, according to Susan Thornton, a China expert and former U.S. diplomat. Thornton joined APARC Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui on the latest episode of the APARC Briefing video series to analyze the potential outcomes of the Trump-Xi summit and the high-stakes dynamics shaping U.S.-China relations.
 

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Trade and Tech: A Call for a Paradigm Shift

On the economic front, Thornton drew on her deep experience in trade negotiations to critique the lack of focus in U.S. policy.

"The biggest problem for U.S. negotiators is deciding what it is that we want from China," she said. "We tend to give them a long list of revolving priorities, which [makes it easy for the] other side of the negotiating table to just fob them off and not actually commit to anything over years of negotiations.”

On the technology rivalry between the two powers, Thornton urged a shift in strategy. Rather than pursuing sweeping export controls that are often unilateral and incomplete, she advocated for a narrower, multilateral approach focused on the most sensitive technologies, combined with a greater emphasis on American innovation. AI governance is one of the areas Thornton believes could be a common ground for Washington and Beijing to align their policies.

“It's going to be very hard for the United States to contain China's technological ambitions and growth,” she said. “I don't think that we're exactly competing on the same metrics. I question how it is that we're going to be able to keep China from getting technologies that are dual-use but might be useful in some military application when these things are basically economy-wide products.”

When it comes to technological competition, "We need to try to run faster than China, not be constantly trying to trip China up and looking in the rearview mirror," Thornton urged. "I don't think that's going to bode well for the long-term development of the U.S. tech sector."

The Taiwan Flashpoint: A Longer-Term Challenge

While Taiwan remains the most dangerous flashpoint that could trigger a kinetic warfare between the United States and China, Thornton believes that the immediate risk of conflict has receded, in accordance with recent U.S. threat assessments that no longer see 2027 as a likely target date for a potential Chinese takeover of the island.

Beijing, she argued, is closely watching the domestic political situation in Taiwan and how the leadership in Taipei views U.S. reliability and support. “I think the Chinese have determined, based on both of those things they've been watching, that they can afford to wait a bit longer, see what happens.”

Thornton cautioned, however, that, even as a conflict over Taiwan may no longer pose an immediate-term threat, “it is a problem that is going to develop over the coming decade.”

Diplomacy in a Multipolar World Order 

When asked about the future of the global order, Thornton described a trend toward fragmentation. If the United States steps back from its global leadership role, it is difficult to see who else would be willing or able to shoulder the cost of providing global public goods, she said. A “thinner world order,” with the United Nations at its center, may eventually find favor with countries that can afford to pay for some of those goods, she reflected.

In a closing advice for aspiring foreign service officers, Thornton argued that the emergence of a multipolar world reinforces the need for skilled diplomacy. “As the global order changes and more countries come into the mix of the councils of politics in the world, the United States will have to lean back toward diplomacy more,” she predicted.

“We're going to need very good diplomats,” she concluded, because it will be significantly harder to be an American diplomat in a fragmented world order in which the United States is no longer the single overwhelmingly dominant power.