Chrystia Freeland discussed dealing with the United States at a talk on Monday.
Tuesday took us from Anthropic to the RAND Corporation to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and it turned out to be the day that most challenged my assumptions. I walked in expecting conversations about policy. What I got instead was a series of honest reckonings with uncertainty.
The morning began at Hoover Institution's DC office, where we met with Tarun Chhabra, Head of National Security at Anthropic. Our visit came just days after Anthropic's CEO published a landmark essay calling for a global slowdown in AI development. The timing made the conversation feel urgent in a way that none of us had quite anticipated. What struck me most was how candidly the discussion addressed the question of who should be making decisions about these technologies. The answer, surprisingly, was not the companies building them. The insistence that regulation needs to be democratic, that Congress has a role to play, and that the people at the frontier of AI development should not be the ones setting the rules for everyone else was not what I expected to hear from inside the industry. It reframed the way I think about the relationship between innovation and governance.
At RAND, we sat down with Salman Ahmed, Distinguished Chair in Strategy and Diplomacy, who brought decades of experience from the UN and the White House to a conversation about the forces reshaping the international order. He described the current moment as defined by two colliding realities: the unraveling of the post-Cold War era and the rise of AI. One observation that stuck with me was the idea that the Bay Area tends to focus on change while the rest of the world focuses on continuity, and that nobody agrees on what belongs in which category. In a week full of conversations about defending democracy, RAND offered something rarer: a genuine admission that the story is still unfolding and that even the most experienced strategists are improvising.
Our final stop was Carnegie, where we met with Frances Z. Brown, Vice President for Studies. The conversation shifted from technology to the parts of the world that risk being forgotten. Africa is experiencing both the most democratic transitions and the most democratic reversals of any region right now, and yet it has been pushed off the strategic agenda by the focus on Ukraine, China, and AI. That observation was a useful corrective. The discussion also touched on the elimination of USAID and what it means for American influence abroad, reinforcing a pattern I noticed across the entire week: the institutions that support democracy are stretched thinner than ever.
For me, the thread connecting all three meetings was a question I brought with me from my own research. My thesis examines Russia's looting and destruction of Ukrainian cultural heritage, and I have been wrestling with whether cultural heritage recovery ever makes it onto the agenda when institutions plan for what comes after conflict, or whether it is always an afterthought. Tuesday confirmed my sense that it remains largely invisible in the policy conversation, which only sharpened my conviction that the work of making it visible matters.
If I could share one takeaway with an incoming honors student, it would be this: the people shaping policy in Washington are not working with settled frameworks. They are navigating enormous uncertainty in real time. And the chance to sit across from them and ask questions is the kind of experience that changes how you read everything after it.
~ Amalia Abecassis
For our first meeting of the day, we visited the Hoover Institution's outpost in DC. We met with Tarun Chhabra, a visiting Hoover Fellow and Anthropic's current head of national security policy. We learned valuable insights into how frontier model labs assess the risks of powerful AI development and how they think about aligning AI's public benefit with national security and innovation. It was amazing to hear directly about how Anthropic sees the AI landscape today and the challenges it sees going forward. We also discussed AI’s implications for democracy and how this technological wave may be an opportunity for developing countries to build infrastructure and expand social access. While I candidly felt that we as humans are only at the first step of AI safety and still haven’t identified all the potential dangers of AI development, I was comforted by the thought that frontier model labs are asking the right questions about safety and innovation.
Next, we made our way to the Pentagon City area to speak with Salman Ahmed of RAND. He spoke broadly about his view of the state of the world and the main forces he identified as most influential today. Unsurprisingly, he spoke a bit about the risks of AI and especially about AI’s effect on the global information space. Notably, however, we heard a lot about how most people — outside of Silicon Valley, at least — are concerned about the continued transition away from the Post-Cold-War world order and how there is, internationally, little to no agreement on what comes next. It was refreshing to hear his thoughts on the other forces in the world shaping our future that are not AI. I particularly enjoyed his attention to the idea of a local political economy and how near-term effects of policy for communities can drive larger change. Salman’s thoughts prompted me to think more deeply about my own frameworks for viewing the world, especially how I identify mechanisms for change.
In the afternoon, we had our last meeting of the day with Frances Brown and Andrew O’Donohue of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace. We received a great breakdown of current democracy policy in the US and how the meaning of democracy can shift across partisan lines depending on each’s priorities and values.
Additionally, responding to my question about the relationship between think tanks and government positions, Frances shed light on how people move back and forth and how priorities look different on each side. In particular, she talked about how work in government can raise questions for her that she then has time to return to and study in depth at a think tank. This highly permeable cross-industry relationship was not something I was previously aware of, and I really enjoyed hearing about it. After two days of meetings, I felt I was starting to pick up on aspects of the broader policy ecosystem in Washington, D.C. We heard from a variety of think tanks and government-adjacent organizations, and I could better see how these groups interacted. While each organization had its own characteristics, I was surprised by the consistent academic feel across them all.
Overall, I was struck by how each speaker had breadth and depth of knowledge across a spectrum of topics, and by how articulate and thoughtful they were in thinking through the forces that shape our world. While I think everything is connected in some way, I felt the speakers we heard from identified the most relevant factors and defended their choices well.
Lastly, we finished the day with a thoughtful visit to the Lincoln Memorial and reflected on the relevance of the Gettysburg Address and Second Inaugural today.
~ John Churchill
This is the second story in a series of blog posts written by the Fisher Family Honors Program class of 2027 detailing their experiences in Washington, D.C., for CDDRL's annual Honors College.
American bureaucracies are frequently criticized for impeding the delivery of both public infrastructure and private development projects, wrapping them in the “red tape” of regulatory procedures. Of course, bureaucratic oversight is necessary to ensure public accountability, enable stakeholder input, and respond to market failures. It is hard to imagine how, for example, the natural environment could be protected from exploitation without regulation. Yet disagreement persists about whether the current regulatory landscape strikes the right balance between oversight and efficiency.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970 is one of the most significant federal administrative laws and is foundational to American environmental law. Per its objective of protecting the environment, NEPA requires agencies to assess the environmental impacts of major federal projects. These include construction, energy, water, and public lands projects.
NEPA’s highest level of review is the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), which requires substantial time and scientific expertise to complete. Accordingly, the EIS process has been criticized for causing project delays. This critique is plausible at first glance: average EIS reviews now take over four years to complete and often produce documents over 600 pages long (over 1,000 pages including appendices).
Despite criticism over NEPA procedures, little is known about why some EISs take longer to be approved than others. Answering this question is important for assessing whether American bureaucracies can adequately balance the oversight-efficiency tradeoff.
In “A hazard analysis of federal permitting under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970,” Michael Bennon, Daniel De La Hormaza, and R. Richard Geddes present findings on the correlates of EIS permitting. Using a dataset of nearly 1,300 EISs, the authors show that major construction projects and those occurring in states with more restrictive environmental laws are associated with longer permitting times. By contrast, privately financed projects are permitted more quickly. These findings will likely cohere with readers’ intuitions, namely that (a) more demanding regulations increase approval times and (b) private economic interests have the resources to navigate regulatory environments.
The authors’ findings are relevant not only for those interacting directly with NEPA. Indeed, as illustrated in their analysis of the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, lengthy environmental reviews can make it difficult to quickly undertake new infrastructure projects when they are needed — as was the case following the Great Recession.
The authors’ dataset includes 1,269 EIS reviews. Of these, 1,161 reached a Record of Decision (ROD), the federal agency’s final decision. The average duration of time from a Notice of Intent (NOI — i.e., the intent to undertake an EIS) to ROD was 4.5 years, and the median was 3.6 years. This underscores the time required for projects to complete environmental review under NEPA.
The authors include variables for (1) major construction and infrastructure projects, which comprise about half of the data set; (2) projects backed by private investors; (3) states with restrictive environmental laws, defined, for example, in terms of whether uninjured parties can challenge projects in court or whether private actions require environmental review; and (4) inclusion in the “federal permitting dashboard,” which was created in 2015 with the goal of improving the efficiency of large projects.
To measure the correlates of EIS permitting, the authors use a “Cox proportional hazards model,” a statistical method for estimating how different variables affect the time until an event happens. For example, hazard models are often used to measure how different medical treatments affect patient mortality. For the authors’ purposes, a lower hazard rate indicates a longer permitting duration.
The authors first hypothesize that larger projects will take longer to approve. This may be the case because such projects tend to attract greater stakeholder engagement, opposition, and litigation. Projects in states with more restrictive environmental laws, as well as those requiring supplemental EISs, are also hypothesized to take longer to approve. In addition, private financing ought to lead to faster approvals because private funders have the incentives and resources to expedite permitting. So too should the permitting dashboard decrease permitting times, consistent with its efficiency-maximizing objectives.
As mentioned, the authors find that major construction and infrastructure projects have significantly longer permitting times, averaging 5.2 years.
Conversely, privately financed projects are indeed found to be approved more quickly, taking an average of just 3.7 years. Meanwhile, projects in states with restrictive environmental laws, such as California, New York, and Washington, are found to take longer. Contrary to the authors’ expectations, however, projects included in the federal permitting dashboard face longer permitting times. This may reflect selection bias, or the fact that projects placed on the dashboard tend to be especially large or complex. In terms of page count, longer EISs are associated with longer permitting times and longer delays.
Finally, the authors examine permit completion rates by federal agencies, finding an average of 3 RODs per week. This rate is generally stable over time, though it spiked during Donald Trump’s election in 2016 and his inauguration in early 2017. Ultimately, the findings suggest that permitting duration is shaped not only by technical regulations but also by differences in economic resources, political conflict over projects, and federalism.
*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.
CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]
Milada Anna Vachudova of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill presented on “Europe in the Face of War and America’s Authoritarian Turn” during a Rethinking European Development and Security (REDS) seminar, co-sponsored by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) and The Europe Center (TEC). Drawing on research coauthored with Nadiia Koval of the European Policy Institute in Kyiv, Vachudova examined how Russia’s war in Ukraine, democratic backsliding within the European Union, and changing U.S. foreign policy are reshaping Europe’s geopolitical role.
Vachudova began by arguing that Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s full-scale invasion is also a defense of European democracy, national sovereignty, and the security of EU and NATO members. She situated this claim within a broader account of the EU’s power. Historically, the EU has exerted influence through its democratic norms, economic integration, market access, and enlargement rather than military force. Yet she rejected the idea that Europe must choose between defending liberal values and pursuing geopolitical interests. Military capabilities, she suggested, can complement the EU’s normative and economic strengths.
The EU’s potential as a geopolitical power has long been undermined by political expediency. Vachudova pointed to Europe’s pre-2022 dependence on Russian energy and continued economic engagement with Moscow, as well as the challenge posed by authoritarian-minded political parties within the EU. These vulnerabilities illustrated the costs of prioritizing short-term economic interests over democratic commitments and long-term security.
Russia’s February 2022 invasion nevertheless prompted an unusually rapid European response. EU institutions, particularly the European Commission, moved to assist Ukrainian refugees, expand market access, impose sanctions, provide financial and military assistance, and revive enlargement. Vachudova emphasized that this early institutional leadership occurred amid an absence of traditional French-German leadership. It also coincided with the emergence of ad hoc coalitions and a shift in influence toward northern and eastern EU member states, whose governments have often taken a more urgent view of the Russian threat.
However, translating this initial momentum into sustained military capacity has proven difficult. Increased defense spending, including in Germany and Poland, has not eliminated obstacles to coordination, implementation, and collective action. The EU must contend with powerful veto players even as uncertainty about the United States raises questions about Europe's ability to help defend Ukraine and eventually defend itself.
Vachudova characterized the current U.S. trajectory as an “authoritarian turn,” arguing that the Trump administration’s approach to Russia and Ukraine has eroded transatlantic trust. In her assessment, perceived American unreliability carries significant security, reputational, and economic costs, including growing doubts among allies about dependence on U.S.-made weapons systems.
Despite these challenges, Vachudova identified reasons for cautious optimism. Europeans will not stop mobilizing against authoritarian rule even as these forces continue to fight for power with the help of the Kremlin. External threats and shocks can catalyze European integration. Vachudova also described a pattern of “democratic bandwagoning,” exemplified by Canada moving closer to the EU. Ultimately, she suggested that Ukraine’s determination could help sustain enlargement and strengthen Europe’s identity as both a democratic community and a geopolitical actor. The central question is whether Europe can convert crisis-driven solidarity into lasting political unity and defense capabilities.
Milada Anna Vachudova traces how EU institutions mobilized rapidly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the harder task of converting solidarity into lasting capability.
This article was written by Dr. Nancy Sato, former Japan Project Associate at SPICE, from 1982 to 1991. In its early years, SPICE comprised several separate area-focused projects. This is the ninth of several articles—focusing on the 50-year history of SPICE—that will be posted this year.
My standout memory of SPICE from 1982–1991 is that our colleagues were the most expert, dedicated, community-minded, and heartwarming educators, devoted to international and cross-cultural education and understanding. Their most laudable and effective approach was amplifying teachers’ voices in developing and implementing curricula to best teach, learn from, and reach the rich diversity of students in their classrooms.
The unique combination of the top university experts in each geographic and content area, working together with experienced educators with exquisite teacher professional development and curriculum development skills, while also bringing teachers, students and families into the process, created the most meaningful ways to expand all of our perspectives of the world and global understanding.
I feel so fortunate to have been a part of this marvelous group of colleagues and mentors who transformed my personal and professional life, even gaining my “big brother” Steve Thorpe, fellow Social Studies educator. My early career at the Boston Children’s Museum, first as their school desegregation coordinator and then as their multicultural education specialist, set the stage. The museum’s reputation as a leader in advancing experiential education and hands-on learning was a natural match for highlighting the importance of engaging, interactive learning that characterizes SPICE materials.
My SPICE journey had a serendipitous beginning—since the Boston Children’s Museum housed Harvard’s Outreach program, a sister Outreach program to Stanford’s SPICE, David Grossman became a frequent, annual visitor. His consummate knowledge of teaching, working in the schools, and making learning authentic, comprehensive and enjoyable, was apparent. I knew that working in SPICE as I pursued a PhD in education would be a perfect match, so when David introduced me to that idea, and to Kay Sandberg Abe, the Japan Project director, I was blessed to enter the wondrous world of SPICE, with their excellent mentorship. The Discovery Box unit, about how to use artifacts to enhance classroom learning, was a highlight, along with Wendy Wong’s fabulous curriculum unit cover designs.
David’s leadership and engaging personality brought together an amazing group of educators, whose spirit, camaraderie, laughter, and expertise created a global, multicultural family that not only provided mutual support while working together, but spans generations, as we still keep in touch, share ideas, and gather at reunions. And all this was enabled through the strength, compassion, and wisdom of Ron Herring, Director of CISP (California International Studies Project), our umbrella organization at that time.
I’ll always remember the key features of our message for international education, that serve us all even more today: multiple perspectives, interdependence, context, change, authenticity, empathy, and genuine caring for people all over the world—with special attention to those voices and perspectives not typically represented. And those key principles mirror our SPICE family, the most caring, curious, close-knit family and community of scholars who continue to expand global understanding by promoting empathy, hope, and activism to improve the world around us. The SPICE family inspires us to continue our friendship and collective lifelong learning and action.
Stanford alum and former SPICE Japan Project Associate Dr. Nancy Sato shares memories of her years with SPICE.
What makes someone Black in American society today? From Donald Trump questioning Kamala Harris’s racial identity to Joe Biden’s claim that hesitant Black voters “ain’t Black,” American politics frequently brings questions of racial authenticity and belonging to the surface. Yet political science often approaches race as a fixed attribute, rather than a social construction. Here, we seek to understand how Americans define blackness in social and political life. Using a conjoint experiment with a racially diverse sample that includes Black, White, and mixed-race Black-White respondents, we evaluate how ascribed and acquired traits influence perceptions of blackness. The results show that inherited characteristics—particularly parentage and skin tone, which are the strongest determinants of racial classification—play a central role, yet sociopolitical cues such as partisanship, neighborhood context, and spousal race also influence racial classification. Using a continuous measure, we also show that respondents make graded assessments of blackness rather than purely binary classifications, with some individuals perceived as more Black than others. Black respondents are more likely than White respondents to classify a broader set of profiles as Black, consistent with a more inclusive understanding of racial membership; however, they also place greater emphasis on shared political identity. These findings clarify how racial categories are socially constructed and why that construction carries real political and social consequences.
One cannot today talk about important political phenomena such as democratic backsliding. Indeed, political leaders and parties in both democracies and autocracies increasingly appeal to differences between places, especially the divide between urban and rural communities, to mobilize voters. Narratives that blame urbanites for the social and economic problems facing rural communities have become an important tool for justifying anti-democratic measures and polarizing electorates. At the same time, voters in many urban places feel increasingly resentful toward rural residents, arguing that these residents exert too much political control over their lives. Apart from these broader developments, however, much remains unknown about how places shape and are shaped by politics.
In “Place Attachments,” Elizabeth Mitchell Elder and Hans Lueders argue that social scientists have failed to make an important distinction between being attached to a place and identifying with groups that live in a place. Place attachments provide a sense of continuity and stability in one’s life. By contrast, place identities are tied to various “reference groups” that share attributes and values and provide members with a sense of self-esteem. This distinction matters: individuals can be attached to a specific place, such as rural Appalachia or New York City, while not identifying with rural or urban places or the people who inhabit them. The former — what the authors call “place attachment” — brings about a deep investment in one’s local community and strong local political engagement. The latter — what the authors call “place identity” — may bring about the same amount of local political engagement, but can also come with animosity toward individuals residing in other places or types of places — animosity that can be exploited by political leaders.
To understand the consequences of place attachments, Elder and Lueders conduct original surveys of voters in Germany, the United States, and the Appalachian region of the United States. Survey respondents with a strong sense of belonging and commitment to their place are more trusting of local governments, more engaged with local politics, and tend to prefer local candidates. “Place Attachments” makes an important contribution by conceptualizing and measuring a phenomenon that has often been conflated with identity and that shapes political behavior in consequential ways.
Elder and Lueders leverage original surveys of voters in the United States and Germany because they differ considerably in terms of mobility and the role that place and geographic identity have played in each country’s history. An additional survey run among residents of Appalachia draws attention to a region where place attachments are strong despite the region’s poor socioeconomic outcomes; many residents remain strongly attached to it.
The authors operationalize place attachments in terms of respondents’ agreement with five statements about their current place of residence: that they feel like they belong there, that it is an important part of who they are, that they feel at home there, that it reminds them of their past, and that they would like to remain there for the rest of their lives. Respondents varied significantly in terms of the strength of their place attachments: about 25% agreed with all five statements, 15% disagreed with all five, and the remainder were evenly distributed across the other combinations (e.g., agreeing with two, agreeing with three). However, distributions were similar across all three geographic samples.
Fig. 1: Distribution of strength of local attachments in all three samples: share of respondents who agree somewhat or strongly with the number of statements reported on the horizontal axis.
Two main demographic correlates of place attachments are found to be of importance: older people and those who have resided for longer in a place have stronger attachments. In terms of politics, Germans who support the Social Democratic Party and the center-right Christian Democratic Union have stronger place attachments than do supporters of the far-right Alternative for Germany. In the United States, by contrast, the strength of one’s partisan identity matters more than party affiliation: Democrats and Republicans both score higher, especially as they identify more strongly with either party, than Independents.
Fig. 2: Demographic correlates of local attachments. Estimated strength of local attachments by select demographic groups.
Local attachments are weakly related to measures of a place’s “objective” quality, such as life expectancy or unemployment rates, and they also vary little across urbanites and ruralites. The latter is surprising given the common assumption that rural residents have especially strong attachments to place. When asked to describe what they like most about a place, respondents rarely mentioned their co-residents’ physical attributes or values. This provides evidence for the authors’ claim that place attachments are conceptually distinct from place identities.
The authors then analyze how place attachments relate to political behavior. They find that respondents with stronger place attachments are relatively more engaged in their local communities: they are more trusting of their local governments, spend more time reading and talking about local politics, and are more likely to believe that they can influence political outcomes in their local communities. Individuals with strong local attachments are also more likely to participate in local elections or local voluntary organizations.
Fig. 5: Correlations between local attachments and engagement in national and local politics. Left and center panels: estimated relationship between local attachments and various measures of political engagement at the national and local levels. Right panel: estimated relationship between local attachments and the difference in national vs. local engagement (negative values here mean relatively more local than national engagement).
Finally, respondents participated in a “forced-choice conjoint experiment,” which involved choosing between pairs of hypothetical candidates. Candidate profiles included their position on the importance of local autonomy, their experience in local politics, and length of residence in the community. Respondents with higher place attachments were significantly more likely to choose hypothetical candidates with stronger local orientations or connections — that is, candidates who supported autonomy, had local experience, and had lived in the community. Place attachments thus seem to shape not only how individuals perceive their communities but the criteria they use to evaluate politicians.
Fig. 6: Local considerations have a stronger effect on candidate choice among voters with strong local attachments. Left panel: propensity that a candidate with the attribute on the y axis is selected (marginal means), estimated separately for voters with strong and weak local attachments. Center panel: difference in marginal means between voters with strong and weak local attachments. Right panel: differences in average marginal component effects (AMCEs) between respondents with strong and weak local attachments for a particular attribute level compared to the baseline. See Figure A4 in appendix B.3 full results. See Figure A5 in appendix B.4 for AMCEs.
*Brief prepared by Adam Fefer.
CDDRL Research-in-Brief [4-minute read]
Sonia is an Editorial Assistant at the Journal of Democracy, in partnership with the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. She is an undergraduate in the Class of 2029, majoring in Political Science with a minor in Economics. Her academic interests focus on democracy, technology, and U.S. elections. She has worked at the California State Assembly, the Immigration Institute of the Bay Area, and Legora, a legal AI company.
Stanford e-Entrepreneurship U.S. (SEUS) is an online program offered through the Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) to high school students in the United States. The application for the Stanford e-Entrepreneurship U.S. spring 2027 course is now open. This article will briefly explore the purpose of the course and include comments from several participants.
The generous support of anonymous donors enables SPICE to offer SEUS free of charge to its participants. The student-centered format of SEUS represents a meaningful effort to help bridge Stanford scholarship with students from different backgrounds, including those who may never have experienced programs like this before.
SEUS Instructor, Dr. Makiko Hirata, refers to SEUS as a “journey of co-learning … to co-create the most meaningful learning experience for everyone by honing our ability to communicate and to collaborate and learn from each other’s experiences, perspectives, and backgrounds.” She notes that students “will consider entrepreneurship very broadly, asking questions about each of our responsibilities and rights as global citizens, and how to increase our efficacy to create a better future for all beings.” SEUS treats entrepreneurship as a practice: to notice what moves you, sit with complexity, listen across differences, and turn reflection into meaningful actions.
Lessons begin with several days of exchanges among the students via an online discussion board and collaborative group projects, after which, in a live virtual class, SEUSers engage directly with guest speakers with decades of experience at Stanford, Silicon Valley, and beyond.
“SEUS is an extraordinary opportunity for high schoolers who are curious enough to question, confident enough to share their mind, and open-minded enough to change their point of views.” —Haya Y., VA
“[In SEUS,] entrepreneurship was never presented as a good and scalable idea. We always thought about whom we were designing solutions for … and how to create ideas that incorporate both the big picture and zoomed-in perspective.” —Gaia B., CA
“I never thought an online program would have such a profound impact on how I see the world, but participating in lessons, reading about new issues, and discussing with peers who have radically different thoughts has made SEUS one of the best experiences I’ve had in high school” —Ved V., AZ
“SEUS taught me that entrepreneurship is more than just a drive to create meaningful change in the world. It is about both connecting and empathizing with the people whose lives you are looking to change.” —Nate G., CA
Dr. Hirata noted that “The collaborative learning with ample opportunities for brainstorming with their classmates brings out the best in these already-motivated and ambitious students. I hope that many high school students will consider applying for the course.”
SEUS’ inaugural cohort from 2025—co-created by 22 students representing 16 states and regions from Puerto Rico to Hawaii—have created an alumni network to keep their conversations going beyond the course. They are looking forward to growing this community of SEUSers over the years. Here are some of their retrospective views on what SEUS has meant to them.
“[Through SEUS,] I learned how our social context, background, and biases influence the problems we choose to solve and how we approach them. By applying design thinking and striving for balance as an entrepreneur, I feel better prepared to build impactful solutions in the future.” —Iraj S., AZ
“[SEUS] showed me that being a teenager does not mean I have to wait to start doing meaningful things. [Since SEUS,] I have become much more comfortable with experimentation, failure, and changing an idea as I learn more.” —Komi K., MI
For updates and application details, please visit the SEUS page on the SPICE website or sign up for announcements.
Stanford e-Entrepreneurship U.S. is one of several online courses offered by SPICE.
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High school students from across the United States are encouraged to apply.
