The January 3, 2026, U.S. “Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela to capture and remove President Nicolás Maduro has raised urgent questions about its repercussions for the U.S.-China competition, Taiwan Strait security, American strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific region, and U.S. allies and partners.

In two new episodes of the APARC Briefing series, Stanford scholars Larry Diamond, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and APARC faculty affiliate Oriana Skylar Mastro, a center fellow at FSI, join host Kiyoteru Tsutsui, the director of APARC, to unravel what happened in Venezuela and the implications of the U.S. actions in Latin America for Taiwan, security and alliances in the Indo-Pacific, and U.S. relations with stakeholders in the region.

Both scholars agree that the U.S. mission in Venezuela is a precedent that likely emboldens rather than deters China in its Taiwan calculus, warning that the shift it represents in U.S. national security policy might detract from American capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region at a crucial moment. They also provide sobering advice for U.S. allies struggling to adjust to rapidly shifting geopolitical realities under the second Trump administration.

A Shocking Action in World Affairs

There is no dispute that the Maduro government has been deeply authoritarian, deeply corrupt, and deeply illegitimate, says Diamond, author of Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency. Yet the United States “has probably violated international law to intervene forcibly in the internal affairs of Venezuela and remove its political leader," creating enormous implications for the international community. If it does not pursue a strategy of systemic democratic change in Venezuela, “all of this will have been for naught, and it will have paid a tragic price in terms of international precedent and international legitimacy,” Diamond argues.

Beijing is already using the operation as a "discourse power win," depicting the United States as crushing sovereignty and international law, Mastro notes. Moreover, in addition to Venezuela, President Trump continues to make statements about Greenland, reiterating its importance for U.S. national security and his interest in acquiring the territory, which has alarmed European partners and exacerbated strains with NATO.

“For the first time since WWII, some European countries have declared the United States to be a security threat,” Mastro says. “So I am curious to see if the Chinese try to bring along the Venezuela case as well, to convince U.S. allies and partners to distance themselves from the United States, which would have significant repercussions for the global order and for the United States' role in it.”

A Risky Strategic Reorientation

By unilaterally bypassing international norms to wield power in its own "backyard," the United States may have set a precedent that China can now exploit to justify its own ambitions in Taiwan as a legitimate exercise of regional dominance.

Diamond remarks on this line of thought: “If the United States, as a hegemon, can just do what it wants to arrest and remove a leader, in its kind of declared sphere of influence, what's to stop Xi Jinping from doing the same in his sphere of influence, and with a democratic system in Taiwan, whose sovereignty he does not recognize?” 

On the other hand, many commentators have argued that Operation Absolute Resolve serves as a deterrent to Chinese aggression. Granted, there is no doubt that the operation was a remarkably successful military attack showcasing the capabilities of U.S. special forces, notes Mastro, who, alongside her academic career, also serves in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she currently works at the Pentagon as deputy director of research for Global China Strategy. Nevertheless, she emphasizes that the United States cannot carry out a similar attack in Asia.

“There is no situation in which we ‘neutralize’ Chinese air defenses and then somehow do some sort of infiltration,” says Mastro, author of Upstart: How China Became a Great Power. The U.S. intervention in Venezuela, therefore, “does not tell us a lot, operationally, about what the United States is capable of in a contingency via China.”

More troubling, Mastro identifies the Venezuela operation as demonstrating a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic priorities, with the raid conducted just weeks after the Trump administration released its 2025 National Security Strategy, which prioritizes restoring “American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.” Mastro characterizes it as “the one region where U.S. dominance faces no serious challenge.” Thus, Venezuela suggests “the Trump administration means business about the renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere, and, unfortunately, that makes me concerned that there might be strategic neglect of the Indo-Pacific moving forward,” she points out.

Diamond stresses that, virtually throughout the entire presidency of Xi Jinping, dating back to 2012, China has been rapidly building up its military capabilities, prioritizing those specifically suited for coercing, isolating, or potentially seizing Taiwan. Against this backdrop, “I am much more fearful about the future of Taiwan in the week following U.S. military action on January 3 in Venezuela than I was before that action.” 

Mastro agrees with this assessment about the ripple effects of the operation in Venezuela. “I would say that it probably emboldens China.”

Frank Advice for U.S. Allies

For U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, as well as allies and partners in Europe, both scholars offer pragmatic counsel for coping with the Trump administration.

Diamond urges U.S. allies to manage Trump diplomatically while staying focused on core interests, namely, prioritizing the preservation of the alliances and strengthening autonomous defense capabilities to demonstrate commitment and hedge against potential U.S. retrenchment.

“It takes constant, energetic, proactive, imaginative, relentless, and in some ways deferential working of the relationship, including the personal relationship between these leaders and Donald Trump [...] The future will be better if the leaders of these countries internalize that fundamental lesson about Trump.”

Mastro is equally direct about the limited alternatives ahead of U.S. allies: "You don't really have an option. That Chinese military – if it gives the United States problems, it definitely gives you problems. There's no hope for a country like Taiwan without the United States. There's no hope for Australia without the United States."

Counterintuitively, U.S. assertiveness may indicate its insecurity about the balance of power with China. “It seems to me that the United States also needs to be reassured that our allies and partners support us [...] And if we had that confidence, maybe the United States would be less aggressive in its use of military force.”

Watch the two APARC Briefing episodes:

🔸 What the U.S. Raid in Venezuela Means for Taiwan and Asia - with Larry Diamond >

🔸 Does Venezuela Provide China a Roadmap for Taiwan? – with Oriana Skylar Mastro >

Authoritarian rebalance 

Maduro served as president of Venezuela for more than 10 years before he was ousted Jan. 3 in a U.S. military operation that brought him to America to face narco-terrorism charges.

Trinkunas, a senior research scholar at FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), discussed the possibility of Venezuela transitioning to democracy, especially given the opposition's overwhelming victory in the 2024 presidential elections. But an authoritarian rebalancing looms large, he noted.

“We have to remember that all the institutions of power and all the electoral offices in Venezuela below the president are held by supporters of the regime,” he said.

Trinkunas recalled political scientist Alexander B. Downs’ book, “Catastrophic Success,” which examined the negative consequences of foreign-imposed regime changes and highlighted that such interventions often lead to civil war and violent removals of leaders.

“About one-third to 40% of all regimes installed by a foreign intervention end up in civil conflict within 10 years,” Trinkunas said. And, almost half of leaders installed by foreign powers withdraw from or are pushed from office before their terms are up.

He foresees a divergence between the interests of the intervening power, the U.S., and Venezuela’s power elites and population under the proposed arrangement. “The people with the guns stay employed.” And they may not be eager to cooperate if it involves sharing Venezuela’s mineral wealth with the United States government.

Díaz-Cayeros said, “Nothing has changed in the basic underlying economic conditions of Venezuela that has forced an exodus of 8 million people.” Days after the arrest of Maduro, the government in office is still the same government that came into office through an electoral fraud, he added.

Status quo interests

Curiel, a research scholar at CDDRL, research manager for the Democracy Action Lab, and a native of Venezuela, described the ecosystem of armed actors in Venezuela and outlined how both state and non-state security forces have the incentives and capabilities to preserve the status quo. 

“They’ve had arrangements that have been important for their survival, up until now. And so, there’s a question that these groups face with the loss of Maduro and [his wife Cilia] Flores,” she said.

To the extent they perceive their arrangements are under threat, they might respond with violence or engage in chaos, Curiel added. This is further complicated by the fact that different armed groups are loyal to different members of the governing coalition, creating competing power centers.

Fuentes, a CDDRL visiting scholar and Venezuelan native, noted that the situation in Venezuela remains extremely fluid and that it is still too early to determine whether Maduro’s removal will lead to authoritarian rebalancing or a genuine democratic transition. He argued that policymakers face a real tension between two objectives: stabilizing the country while accounting for the complexity and fragility of the Venezuelan state, and recognizing that stabilization without a clear commitment to democratic transition as the ultimate goal is not sustainable.

“The stability is not going to happen unless you promise and commit to the final goal of a democratic transition,” said Fuentes, a lawyer and policy expert from Venezuela.

He explained that the regime’s basic instinct is to resist and survive any U.S. involvement in the way its key ally, Cuba, has done through the decades.

Zambrano, a Stanford law professor and CDDRL affiliated faculty member who grew up in Venezuela, said he was guardedly optimistic about a democratic transition and supported the military operation that removed Maduro. As for the legal implications of the capture of Maduro, he cited prior examples of the U.S. taking military action in Kosovo, Libya, and Panama, among others, without Congressional approval and in apparent violation of international law.

The international law prohibition on the use of force “has been violated [maybe] 40 times” in the last few decades, he said. “This is one more violation. Is that good? No, that’s not good, but it’s not a drastic change the way the Russian invasion of Ukraine was,” because the latter implicated the international prohibition on the annexation of territory. Moreover, in Venezuela’s case, the Venezuelan people welcomed the U.S. intervention.

Kronick, an associate professor of public policy at UC Berkeley and Stanford alum, observed that U.S. officials at a January 3 press conference didn’t mention democracy and totally dismissed María Corina Machado, whom she described as “Venezuela's most popular politician and the driving force behind the opposition candidate in last year's presidential election.”

The 2024 Venezuelan presidential election was highly controversial, given that both the opposition showed incontrovertible evidence, widely verified by the international community, that the election was stolen by Maduro and that the opposition actually won by a landslide.

Kronick said the acting president of Venezuela, Delcy Rodríguez, is clearly not a democratic activist and has been a key member of the regime for years. “It’s a little bit hard to be optimistic about the prospects for democratization,” given her current role.

On the other hand, Venezuela has very capable election-vote-counting technology and decades of high-turnout elections, all of which could potentially facilitate re-democratization. 

‘Gangster diplomacy’

In the question-and-answer session, Michael McFaul, former FSI director, described the Trump Administration’s current attempt to take more than $2 billion in oil from Venezuela as “gangster diplomacy” and a “travesty.” 

Díaz-Cayeros said, “This kind of U.S. unilateral action strikes a very deep chord in the Latin American psyche. And it doesn’t really matter if someone is on the left or on the right” in Latin and South America.”

Kathryn Stoner, Mosbacher Director of CDDRL, noted that the U.S. arrest of Maduro raises troubling questions about whether Russia would attempt a similar action against Ukraine’s leaders in the future. “What then stops Putin, other than the incompetence of the Russian armed forces, from going in and trying to get (President Volodymyr) Zelensky or any other high leader in Ukraine?”

Kronick suggested audience members read a recent Foreign Affairs essay, “A Grand Bargain With Venezuela,” in which the author argues for a “pacted transition,” a negotiated, power-sharing arrangement, as the most viable path for Venezuela. This would involve an agreement between the current regime and opposition to coexist and gradually democratize, rather than one side seeking total victory.

“Whether you read this and think this is pie in the sky and this is never going to happen, or you think this is what we need to really push for, I think it’s really worth engaging with, so I’ll end with that recommendation,” she said.
 

The following is Part 12 of a multiple-part series. To read previous installments in this series, please visit the following articles: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, Part 6, Part 7, Part 8, Part 9, Part 10, and Part 11.

Since December 8, 2020, SPICE has posted 11 articles that highlight reflections from 88 students on the question, “What does it mean to be an American?” Part 12 features seven additional reflections. The reflections below do not necessarily reflect those of the SPICE staff.

The free educational website “What Does It Mean to Be an American?” offers six lessons on immigration, civic engagement, leadership, civil liberties & equity, justice & reconciliation, and U.S.–Japan relations. The lessons encourage critical thinking through class activities and discussions. On March 24, 2021, SPICE’s Rylan Sekiguchi was honored by the Association for Asian Studies for his authorship of the lessons that are featured on the website, which was developed by the Mineta Legacy Project in partnership with SPICE.

Emma Estrada, California 
For me, being an American means utilizing all the opportunities provided by the country to the people. Being able to fulfill your hopes and dreams that seem impractical to accomplish. There is a meaning behind people coming to this country. It’s because they are in search of a fresh start and our nation’s liberty and individualism allows them to have one. America has many different cultures and beliefs to explore, and everyone is entitled to their own opinion. Being an American also means looking towards the future while remembering the past. There have been many people who came before us who sacrificed and fought for this country so that we could say that we are American. Living in this country allows us to not only correct but create new history to help improve our nation.

Miki Harris, California
To be American is to accept that I will never pass as one race. It is to accept that people may make a game out of guessing my ethnicity. It is to accept that I may feel out of place in family gatherings and countries of my ethnic origin.

But to be American is to realize the unique variation of people around me and celebrate it. It is learning cultural history in African American studies, trying my friend’s homemade tamales, or simply people-watching in the school hallways.

For me, having the freedom to decide where I fit and who I am is what it means to be American. How could I ever feel out of place when there is no one place to begin with?

Bo Ichiki, California
While living in Japan, I felt an overwhelming catalog of systematic milestones for success—attend a nice elementary school, get good grades, take extracurricular activities, attend a nice middle school, and eventually get accepted for a job at a successful company, known as ōte kigyō (大手企業). For me, being American is the governing of one’s own life. Here, society seems only to shadow who we are, and leave the outline and colors for ourselves to picture—good or bad. The freedom can result in too much for one to handle. In Japan, crime rates are much lower than those of the U.S., and the disparity of wealth is much smaller; there are fewer poverty-stricken citizens or incredibly rich individuals. In the U.S., there is less guidance on the “proper” way to become successful, which leads to the inconsistency that proves to be either the gift of abstract and unique innovations or the curse of poverty and being misled. Being American allows citizens to draw a new path to the good or to the bad. Being American grants the right of control.

Claire Ishimatsu, California
When I think of America, I think of freedom, particularly the freedom to learn about my culture. As a fifth-generation Japanese American, I grew up in a very American household where being Japanese wasn’t a large part of my life. Seeing my friends speak a second language and celebrate cultural holidays inspired me to explore my ancestral heritage. I learned that my grandparents were incarcerated in the Japanese American Incarceration Camps during World War II. They lived during a time when it was “wrong” to be of Japanese descent so they distanced themselves from their native tongue and traditions. Nonetheless, they remained proud Americans with some even fighting in the war against Japan. Hearing their experiences made me grateful for the freedoms I have today. Now my family celebrates Japanese holidays and traditions. I’m also taking Japanese at my high school, and slowly, the language has started to fill my house like it did a century ago. Being American means having the freedom to learn about and embrace my Japanese identity.

Jibhum Lee, Hawai‘i
clank...clank…clank

One hundred and seventy six years ago, immigrants from many countries as well as from other parts of the United States took on a perilous journey to California. They were drawn to the California Gold Rush. Accompanying them were rhythmic “clanks”—the sound of their tools, wagons, and buckles. At each step, a “clank” gave a powerful beat as they headed toward their destination. Being an American does not mean having a navy-blue passport with the gold-leafed “United States of America.” When I was young, I compared my green-covered Korean passport with the dark blue my eyes drowned in, thinking to myself, “When will I have that?” These things are arbitrary in comparison to the rhythmic beat every American carries—the sound of passion and trust in finding their North Star. “American” is a label too small for the people who make up this country. Yet, the “clanks” made by those who immigrated and struggled to keep their place in America are passed through generations. What unites us is this beat: sometimes loud and oftentimes soft, but always steady.

Sofia McGullam Ornelas, California
The United States has a rich history of asking the complex question: What does it mean to be an American? The answer to this question has varied according to the time, place, and context of when it has been asked. For example, there have been times in American history that excluded ethnic minority groups from full citizenship rights. Our country is a mosaic of different ethnic groups who have collaborated to improve civil rights. The diversity of the United States informs the idea that anyone can come here and make a better life for themselves, despite a history of certain federal administrations preventing immigration from various countries. Americans can and should point out systemic flaws and implement legislation that can provide protections for minority groups. For example, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. witnessed economic and racial inequities and drew attention to how unjust society was for people of color in the United States. The Civil Rights Movement led to the historic passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Ultimately, the meaning of being an American is always working to better this country for all its citizens while still proudly identifying and acknowledging one’s heritage.

Ryan Tonkovich, California
Most countries are founded on geographic, ethnic, and religious heritage. Not America. Unlike anywhere else, America is founded on ideas. It is these ideas that unite us as Americans and not some shared ancestral lands or a shared ethnic or religious heritage. For nearly 250 years, people have come to America seeking economic opportunity or fleeing poverty, war, and persecution. Because nearly every race, ethnicity, and religion is represented in America, it is not these elements that bind us as Americans. Rather, it is our fundamental beliefs. It is our belief in democracy, in freedom of speech, in freedom of assembly, in religious freedom, in equal protection under the law, in a nation of laws, and in “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” that defines us as Americans. 

My time in the Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan program was transformative. I came in with a jumble of passions and questions about the world and left with lifelong friends across the world, invaluable mentoring, and a clear vision.

Every session was a journey in and of itself. It combined strong individual and team preparation, presentations to and from amazing guest speakers, and reflective discussions at the end. This constantly pushed me and my peers to grow into better critical thinkers, speakers, listeners, and team players; high expectations yielded high results. I was amazed by the diversity of the guest speakers and the topics we dove into: design thinking, AI & philosophy, sustainability, and more. Each gave me new world perspectives and challenged me to think in ways I hadn’t before. I began pondering upon questions such as “How does this choice impact the world around me?” “Does philanthropy benefit the rich more than the underprivileged?” “How can we navigate a world of AI?” This in turn has helped me view entrepreneurship as something inherently social, a means of designing thoughtful solutions to real problems and ultimately making a positive difference in the world.

One of my most memorable moments was the final group presentation, where we advocated for a charitable organization that would receive a donation if picked by the judges. My group chose The Ocean Cleanup and devoted ourselves to understanding the socio-environmental consequences of plastic pollution, as well as presenting it in a way that would resonate with our audience. I vividly remember calling my group members past 2am one night out of pure excitement and motivation, giving feedback on each other’s slides and encouraging one another. We ended up winning! But even more than that, I am truly grateful for the relationships that SeEJ has gifted me.

In fact, as one of the few students living in the United States, I was so honored to share a screen with people from Okinawa to Hokkaido. So much so that I decided to create a Canvas announcement titled “SeEJ Hangout in Tokyo!!!!” Mission accomplished: I got to spend a few hours with my peers in person (in Shibuya!) after three months of Zoom boxes, which was an incredible and unforgettable experience.

SeEJ allowed me to embark on a journey of self-discovery as well. Through the individual research paper and 2-minute video on a social issue of choice—core pillars of SeEJ—I discovered my passion for nuclear disarmament. Growing up listening to my hibakusha (atomic bomb survivor) grandfather’s childhood stories, I never fully realized the power of his voice and my own. (Photo below courtesy of Erin Tsutsui.) Through SeEJ, I was able to name this passion and imagine a concrete path forward. Now, I commit myself to dismantling the mindset and weaponry that allows war to exist, as I am building a youth-led initiative that mobilizes and educates youth to spread hibakusha stories by utilizing digital media and grassroots engagements.

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None of this could have been possible without the generosity and dedication of our instructor, Dr. Makiko Hirata, and the incredible lineup of guest speakers who graciously shared their time, stories, and wisdom with us. They instilled in us empathy, bravery, tenacity, and a deep responsibility to care for our people and planet; I now see myself and my peers as visionaries, each with our own unique background and goals.

I thank Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan for teaching me that at the core of social entrepreneurship is community and humanity. One of our guest speakers, Ms. Megan Carroll, taught us a South African word that embodies this spirit: ubuntu—“I am because we are.”

Stanford e-Entrepreneurship Japan is one of several online courses offered by SPICE.

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David Meale, former U.S. diplomat and current consultant, offered a cautiously optimistic perspective on U.S.-China relations at an APARC China Program seminar, arguing that despite significant tensions, there remains substantial room for what he calls “managed rivalry”—a relationship that is neither warm nor easy, but constructive enough for both countries to serve their populations and address global challenges. Drawing on his 33 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, he traced the evolution of U.S.-China relations over the past three decades and assessed current trajectories, bringing both diplomatic experience and fresh insights from private sector concerns to his analysis.

Three Decades of Evolving Relations
 

His entry into China-focused diplomacy came in 1995 when he was assigned to Hong Kong during the handover. During that era and through the early 2000s, U.S. policy operated under the assumption that China would gradually embrace the post-war rules-based international order shaped largely by the United States. The thinking was that China would develop a self-interest in preserving this order, becoming a constructive, if not easy, partner. This belief undergirded the strong U.S. effort to bring China into the World Trade Organization in 2001.

During his service as an Economic Officer in Taiwan in the 2000s, Meale witnessed the merging of talent from Asia and the United States that built China’s electronics manufacturing industry. Five percent of Taiwan’s workforce had moved to the mainland; there were even Shanghainese dialect programs on Taiwanese television at night for those dreaming of seeking their fortunes through cross-strait opportunities. Although there was tension with the Chen Shui-bian administration, there was a surprising amount of positivity in Taiwan about the mainland. That, of course, has now changed.

The Obama administration continued to work within the framework of bringing China into the existing international order, even as concerns grew. The approach aimed to convince China to preserve and, if necessary, shape this order, while using it to constrain China when necessary, as demonstrated by the attempt to resolve the South China Sea dispute involving the Philippines through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Trump administration marked a decisive shift. Meale noted that Trump openly discarded the goal of integrating China into the existing order, instead pursuing aggressive trade policies, technology restrictions, and explicit framing of China as a threat. The Chinese hoped the Biden administration would turn this around, but it instead maintained this posture, pursuing an “invest, align, compete” strategy—investing in the United States, aligning with allies, and defining the relationship as a competition.

Trump 2.0 brought “Liberation Day,” which Meale sees as the belief that the U.S. place in the world needs to be corrected; the United States is economically overextended, the trade imbalances and the associated debt cannot continue, and the supply chain vulnerability from COVID must be addressed. Tariffs were ratcheted up, and both sides imposed export controls. 

The Chinese hit back hard; Chinese officials are very proud of China’s pushback against an unchecked Trump. China’s economic growth is forecast at 5 percent this year, and the feeling from China is that it has shown the world the United States cannot push it around.

Looking ahead to 2026, Meale is optimistic. There will undoubtedly be crises that pop up: the Chinese will overreach on rare earth elements, and the United States will take an economic action that the Chinese did not plan on. Meale sees this as the “sine curve” of the U.S.-China relationship. There’s a crisis, tensions rise, there’s a response, and things eventually cool down. The curve goes up and down, but very little gets resolved.

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China's Current Challenges
 

China, Meale noted, effectively contains two economies: one serving approximately 400 million people who are producing world-class products with perhaps the world's best industrial ecosystem and impressive infrastructure, and another economy serving the rest of China's population, which has improved significantly over recent decades but relies heavily on informal work and the gig economy.
China faces deep structural problems, including a property sector crisis that has destroyed significant household wealth, an economy structured excessively around investment rather than consumption, youth unemployment reflecting a mismatch between graduating students and available jobs, and "involution" (neijuan, 内卷)—a race to the bottom in sectors where government incentives have driven overcapacity. China's reliance on export-led growth comes at a time when its overcapacity is increasingly unwelcome not just in developed countries but across the global South.

These challenges, Meale argues, will not result in a financial crisis or recession, but rather chronic headaches that will affect its foreign relations. Growth will continue, albeit at a slower pace, and the country will have significant work ahead to address inequality and structural imbalances.

On the question of Taiwan, Meale pushed back against predictions of imminent Chinese military action, particularly speculation about 2027 as a critical year tied to the 100th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army. He argued that, right now, one of China’s top goals is to avoid being drawn into a Taiwan conflict. China has recently purged nine senior military officials and is dealing with serious problems in its military. Five years from now, however, the situation could look quite different.

Defining End States and Finding Common Ground
 

Meale concluded by outlining what he believes each side seeks as an end state, arguing that these visions, while different, are not irreconcilable. Rather than global domination, he argued China seeks a world that works for what it calls "grand rejuvenation." This means overcoming the century of humiliation, reunifying with Taiwan, and living safely and securely on its own terms. China wants recognition as a global power, dominance in its near seas, freedom from technology containment, elimination of shipping chokepoints, access to markets, and the ability to pursue relationships with ideologically aligned countries.

The United States, meanwhile, accepts that competition with China is permanent but seeks a predictable China. U.S. goals include protecting advanced technology where it has an advantage, avoiding supply chain vulnerabilities, shaping Beijing's choices without attempting to control them, maintaining the Taiwan status quo until it evolves in a mutually and naturally agreed way, and ensuring fair trade to address what it sees as a stacked deck in current trade relationships. The United States also wants to prevent China from enabling adversaries, as seen in Chinese firms rebuilding Russia's military-industrial complex while maintaining nominal neutrality on Ukraine.

These end states, Meale acknowledged, collide in many ways but not in absolute ways. He sees substantial room for leader-driven, managed rivalry that can function constructively. This rivalry will not be easy or warm, but it can allow both countries to serve their populations while cooperating where global interests align.
 

Key Takeaways  
 

• The “integrated China” assumption is over. U.S. policy no longer aims to bring China into the existing international order, marking a fundamental shift from decades of engagement strategy.
• China's economy faces structural challenges, not a crisis. China will continue to grow, but must address inequality, overcapacity, and wealth destruction from the property crisis.
• Taiwan timing matters more to Beijing than deadlines. China seeks to control when and how the Taiwan issue is resolved, preferring not to be forced into premature action.
• Managed rivalry is possible. Despite significant tensions and incompatible elements of each side's goals, there remains space for constructive competition. While the relationship between the world's two largest economies will stay competitive and often contentious, it need not become catastrophic.