Race and the Pursuit of Multiracial Democracy

Hakeem Jefferson kicked off the discussion with a presentation on race's role in American politics, especially during the 2024 election season. He argued against perspectives that minimize the salience of this issue, noting that the January 6 insurrection was a stark example of the influence of White identity politics on electoral dynamics. Jefferson, an assistant professor of political science and a CDDRL affiliated faculty, underscored the continued prevalence of racial appeals and overt racism in political messaging, which significantly affects public perception and voter behavior. He also examined Vice President Kamala Harris’s campaign, emphasizing the complexities of identity politics and the challenges in representing diverse coalitions.

In his closing remarks, Jefferson tackled the narrative surrounding Black male voters’ declining support, advocating for a nuanced understanding of political behavior within this demographic. He emphasized that the United States is at a crossroads, needing to embrace the potential for a multiracial democracy to avoid losing its democratic identity.

The Paradox of Political Parties

Didi Kuo, a Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), explored the challenges facing political parties in the United States. While parties seem strong due to the current state of polarization and surge in fundraising, they struggle with selecting candidates and managing extremist views, which has contributed to a decline in public trust. Historically, political parties acted as intermediaries, linking societal demands to political representation. However, the decline in support for mainstream parties and the rise of anti-system challengers reveal a troubling gap in responsiveness to critical issues.

Kuo noted that parties are transforming from grassroots organizations into professional campaign entities focused on fundraising, weakening their ties to the public, especially working-class voters. She mentioned that reforms like nonpartisan primaries reflect widespread dissatisfaction with how parties choose candidates. As nonparty actors assume traditional party functions, the future dynamics of political parties remain uncertain. Kuo called for parties to rebuild trust and re-engage with constituents to maintain their vital role in democracy.

Challenging Assumptions of Political Polarization

Professor of Political Science Jonathan Rodden challenged the prevailing belief that American political parties have become more homogenous. He argued that both the Democratic and Republican parties are becoming more diverse, complicating the narrative of ideological sameness. While contemporary politics often focuses on a single dimension of conflict, Rodden posited that American parties are increasingly varied in race, education, religion, and income.

Rodden explained that this growing diversity contributes to rising affective polarization, where animosity toward the opposing party intensifies. With party members holding a broader range of opinions, leaders face challenges in proposing policies that appeal to all constituents. This often leads to strategies that demonize the opposing party by emphasizing its extreme members, further deepening voter divides. Rodden's analysis illustrates that both parties are evolving into coalitions with diverse interests, inviting a reevaluation of political polarization in the U.S. 

Illiberal Populism: Patterns of Success and Failure

Putting the United States in comparative perspective, Professor of Political Science Anna Grzymala-Busse examined illiberal populism in Europe, focusing on why some populist leaders lose power despite initial successes. She defined illiberal populism as framing elites as corrupt while promoting an exclusivist concept of "the people." While populists can mobilize voter dissatisfaction, recent electoral defeats in Poland and the Czech Republic and anticipated losses in France highlight the vulnerabilities of such movements.

Grzymala-Busse, a senior fellow at FSI, where she serves as the director of The Europe Center, identified factors contributing to these populist setbacks. She noted that high voter turnout, especially among younger voters, can legitimize democratic processes and counter populist influence. Additionally, elite responses, such as isolating populists, have often proven more effective than attempts to co-opt their rhetoric. Lastly, she emphasized that populists frequently prioritize consolidating power over addressing core societal issues, leading to disillusionment among supporters. These dynamics illustrate the limitations of populist strategies and provide valuable lessons for democracies facing similar challenges.

The final event in our series will take place post-election on Tuesday, November 12, from 10:00 to 11:30 am on Zoom. You can register for that event here and catch up on previous sessions on the America Votes 2024 webpage.

Follow the link for a full transcript of "Global Threats Today: The 2024 Edition."

Illiberal Actors Are on the Move  |  Amichai Magen

Around the world, we are seeing a new axis of influence coalescing. Some have called it the "axis of misery" or the "axis of resistance." It is composed of Russia and Iran and North Korea, with a lot of Chinese involvement as well. It is transforming our international system in unbelievable ways. It is united by the desire to dismantle the liberal international order, and we're starting to see the nature and the interconnectivity of this new axis of chaos much more clearly. 

You see North Korean soldiers fighting for Putin in Ukraine. You see Putin helping the Houthis attack international Western shipping in Yemen. We see North Korean tunnel technology turn up in Lebanon with Hezbollah and then with Hamas in Gaza. The interconnectivity is something that we really need to know much more about.

Historically, emperors, kings, dukes, used to spend 50% of their resources on preparing for war or waging war. But in the post-Second World War era, we built a critical norm that we've called the liberal international order. And the miracle of the liberal international order is that we've managed to take global averages of defense spending from about 50% to a global average of about 7%. And the resulting surplus wealth has allowed us to invest in education, health, and scientific discovery.

What is at stake now is the possibility of a return of a norm where states are destroyed and disappear. And we have currently three states in the international system, at the very least — Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan — that are at risk of annihilation. To that end, we must articulate a positive strategic vision for the Middle East that will strive towards a two state solution, that would give the Palestinian people the dignity and the freedom that they deserve alongside a safe and secure Israel, and that will leverage the new spirit of cooperation that exists in the Middle East.

If we allow the norm of the non-disappearance of state to erode and collapse, we will go back to the law of the jungle, where we will have to spend so much more money on the wrong things. That is what is at stake in Ukraine, in the Middle East, and with Taiwan.
 

Challenges to Democracy Come From Within |  Didi Kuo

Many people think that the threat to democracy comes from outside our borders, particularly from countries like Russia and China that are asserting themselves in new and aggressive ways.

But the real threat to democracies that we're seeing across the globe is coming from within. Leaders come to power through democratic means, but then they begin to erode power from within. They attack the electoral system and the process of democratic elections, and they take power from other branches of government and aggregate it to themselves within the office of the executive. 

The good news is there are examples of countries like France, Brazil, and Poland where illiberal leaders have been stopped by pro-democracy coalitions of people who came together. These coalitions don't necessarily agree with each other politically, but they've come together and adapted in order to foreclose on these anti-democratic forces. 

That flexibility and adaptability is the reason democracies succeed. We see this over and over again in the the United States. When our institutions have become out of date, we've changed them. We extended suffrage, first to Black Americans who were formerly enslaved, then to women, then to Native Americans. We eliminating poll taxes and rethought what it means to have a multiracial democracy. We have a long track record of making changes.

Today in 2024, some of our democratic institutions are antiquated and don't reflect our contemporary values. This is a moment where we should lean into that flexible strength of democracy and think about institutional reforms that will both strengthen our system against illiberal creep and help us better achieve the ideals that we aspiring to as a people.
 

Ukraine Is Not Fated to Lose |  Steven Pifer

There's a narrative that's taking place that Russia is winning the war, Ukraine is losing, and it's only a matter of time. And it is true that Russia has captured a bit more territory than they occupied at the start of the year. But they've only achieved that at enormous cost.

As of September, the Pentagon says Russia had lost 600,000 dead and wounded soldiers. To put that in context, in February of 2022 when this major invasion began, the total Russian military — not just the army, but the total Russian military — was 1.1 million people. And the British Ministry of Defense earlier this week assessed that Russia now is losing 1,200 soldiers killed or severely wounded per day. You have to ask how long that's sustainable.

When I talk to Ukrainians, they still regard this war as existential. They're very determined to win, and we need to do a better job of supporting that. A stable and secure Europe is vital to America's national security interests, and you're not going to have a stable and secure Europe unless there's a stable and secure Ukraine. So we need to both provide them the weapons they need and relieve some of the restrictions we currently have and allow the Ukrainians to use those weapons to strike military targets in Russia.

Because we have to ask ourselves: what does an emboldened Vladimir Putin do if he wins in Ukraine? I don't think his ambitions end with Ukraine, perhaps not even with the post-Soviet space. There's going to be a much darker Russian threat hovering over Europe if Putin wins. So let's not count the Ukrainians out.
 

China Isn't Going Away Anytime Soon  |  Oriana Skylar Mastro

There is a lot of discussion right now about the fact that the economy in China is slowing down and its demography is undergoing significant changes. What I'm here to tell you is that the challenge of China is not over, and is not going to be over any time soon. China has built power in a different way than the United States, and we have to reassess how we understand that power if we want to effectively deter, blunt, and block them from acting out in ways that threaten our partners and allies.

Since the 1990s, China has developed a significant amount of political, economic, and military power. They've gone from having an economy smaller than France’s  to the second largest in the world. They've gone from not being involved in international institutions to a great degree, not even having diplomatic relations with major countries like South Korea, to now having stronger and greater diplomatic networks, especially in Asia, than the United States.

What we really need to understand is that the U.S.-China competition is not about the United States or about China; it's about the rest of the world, and how the rest of the world sees us and how China interacts with us. The balance of power is shifting, and we have to be a lot smarter and a lot faster if we want to make sure it shifts in favor of our interests.

The United States hasn't had a comprehensive strategy towards the developing world in a long time. And we are running out of time to get that balance right in Asia. We don't have the right stuff. We don't have it in the right numbers, and it's not in the right place. Some of this is about deterring war over Taiwan, but it's also about generally maintaining peace and stability in Asia.
 

We're Doing Better (But Not Enough) on Climate Change |  Marshall Burke

Many people don't recognize how much progress we're actually making on climate issues. Emissions have fallen by 20% since 2005. We're actually speeding up the amount of substantial progress being made in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and dealing with the core climate change problem, which is the human emission of greenhouse gasses.

In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act and the subsequent implementation of various rules the Biden administration has championed has given a huge boost in transitioning our economy to greener energy technologies, transportation technologies, and other kinds of infrastructure. We're moving a lot of cash to get that done, and the president is trying to get as much of it out the door as he can before his term ends.

Globally, the progress has been less rapid. Emissions are roughly flat. But overall, we're still making progress. I co-teach an undergraduate class on climate change, and we've had to update our slides on how much warming we're expecting over the next century. We thought it was going to be four degrees Celsius. Now we think it's going to be something between two and three degrees Celsius.

But the flip side of that is that we're still going to get warming of two to three degrees Celsius. We're already experiencing warming of about a degree Celsius, which is about two degrees Fahrenheit, and it's projected that we're going to get another three to five degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century. That is a lot of warming, and we are not prepared to deal with it. We need to do much more on mitigation and much more on adaptation if we're going to meet the realities of living in a changing climate.

So we've had progress on the one hand, but there's still a lot of work left to do in the coming decades.
 

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Team members of the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) recently presented findings from several of the lab’s research projects at forums and meetings with policy and academic communities in Washington, D.C. Their activities included a joint symposium with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a presentation at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and meetings with think tanks and Congress members. These policy engagements are supported by a Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies grant.

SNAPL, which is housed at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), is led by sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a senior fellow at FSI, and the director of APARC and the Korea Program. SNAPL is committed to generating evidence-based policy recommendations and promoting transnational collaboration with academic and policy institutions to advance the future prosperity of Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.

On September 16, 2024, SNAPL and CSIS co-hosted the symposium “A New Cold War?: Congressional Rhetoric and Regional Reactions to the U.S.-China Rivalry.” At this event, SNAPL team members presented fresh perspectives on the U.S.-China relationship, grounded in two original studies that challenge the application of the “new Cold War” narrative to frame the competition between the two powers. Both studies are part of SNAPL’s U.S.-Asia Relations research track.

Research Fellow Xinru Ma shared the first study, “A New Cold War? An Analysis of Congressional Discourse on U.S. Rivalries with the USSR, Japan, and China.” Discussant Evan Medeiros, Penner Family Chair in Asian Studies and the Cling Family Senior Fellow in US-China Relations at Georgetown University, commented on the study. In a following session, Postdoctoral Fellow Gidong Kim presented a second study, “The U.S. Alliance and Public Attitudes toward China: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific Region.” Discussant Matthew Kroenig, professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, offered feedback on the research.

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Moving Beyond Cold War Comparisons

Ma’s study, which analyzes over 41,000 Congressional speeches, upends the notion that today’s U.S.-China tensions mirror Cold War dynamics. The research shows that Cold War debates historically focused on two primary themes — ideological expansion and military aggression — with the former as the dominant concern. By contrast, current concerns about China center on human rights issues more than outward ideological expansion, while military concerns focus on budgetary issues rather than the kind of direct confrontations that defined the Cold War.

Ma’s findings also reveal that the current U.S.-China rivalry bears more resemblance to the U.S.-Japan economic competition of the 1980s, where economic concerns and domestic priorities took center stage rather than ideological or military threats. With these findings, the study establishes an empirical baseline for defining the current state of the U.S.-China relationship, illuminating the risks of framing it by the misleading “new Cold War” label.

Risks of the Cold War Analogy: Policy Implications

Ma’s study highlights that Cold War-era strategies are ill-suited for addressing the challenges posed by China today. Clinging to a Cold War analogy presents several risks:

• Misguided Focus: Framing China as a Cold War-like rival risks overemphasizing military buildup and ideological competition globally, overlooking the true nature of today’s competition, which is primarily economic and technological.
• Paranoia and Isolationism: The new Cold War analogy could foster a climate of paranoia and isolation, undermining the principles of open engagement and collaboration that have historically supported American leadership. Maintaining open dialogue and people-to-people exchanges that promote democratic values and human rights is more effective for preserving U.S. leadership in addressing ideological differences with China than confrontational ideological warfare.

The study has even further implications for U.S. domestic debates:
 

• Impacts on the American Workforce: At a bilateral level, the economic tensions that constitute the backbone of today's challenges with China, such as concerns over the loss of American jobs, were virtually missing from the dynamics of the Cold War era. Addressing these tensions requires new strategies and measures such as reinforcing free trade practices, upgrading infrastructure, upskilling the workforce, and fostering technological innovation.
• Overlooked U.S. Domestic Challenges: The Cold War analogy can also lead to ignorance about challenges rooted in pressing U.S. domestic issues — such as education inequality, the opioid crisis, and political polarization — which could be more consequential to American global leadership than the challenges China poses.

Public Perceptions of China in U.S. Allies

Kim’s study examines how geopolitical contexts such as the U.S.-China tensions and alliance relationships shape public attitudes toward China among citizens of U.S. allies. It analyzes data from the Gallup World Poll (2006-2022) covering 22 Asia-Pacific countries and the Asian Barometer Survey (2010-2021) from 14 countries.

The study shows that U.S. alliances and the U.S.-China rivalry influence public attitudes toward China. It finds that, as U.S.-China tensions escalate, citizens in U.S. allied countries — unlike those in non-allied nations — are more likely to develop unfavorable views of China. Additionally, public opinions of China and the United States tend to move in opposite directions as the great power competition intensifies because U.S. alliance relationships help strengthen a sense of shared identity during times of geopolitical crisis.

Shapers of Anti-China Sentiments: Policy Implications
 

• Strengthening Alliances Amid U.S.-China Tensions: The United States should understand that alliance relationships increasingly matter as U.S.-China tensions intensify. Strengthening these ties can be particularly effective in managing escalating tensions with China.
• Alliance Diplomacy vs. Traditional Value Diplomacy: During periods of geopolitical rivalry, U.S. alliances may have a greater impact than traditional diplomacy based on democratic values. In such times, alliances serve as critical frameworks for shared identity and mutual defense.
• Understanding Anti-China Sentiment: U.S. allies should recognize that rising anti-China sentiments among citizens are closely related to broader geopolitical dynamics. While anti-Japan or anti-America sentiments in countries like South Korea and the Philippines were historically bilateral issues, today's anti-China views are more structural issues and unlikely to diminish unless U.S.-China relations improve.
• China’s Need for a Shift in Strategy: China should consider the geopolitical factors contributing to rising anti-China sentiment in U.S.-allied nations. China’s public diplomacy efforts to strengthen its soft power through financial and non-financial measures may be ineffective when applied to U.S. allies. The Chinese government should therefore prioritize improving its relationship with the United States to mitigate anti-China sentiments in U.S. allies.
   

National Understandings of Race and Racism in Asia

On September 17, 2024, Postdoctoral Fellow Junki Nakahara shared findings from a SNAPL project that is part of another Lab research track, Nationalism and Racism, at a discussion titled Deconstructing Racism “Denial” in Asia, hosted by George Washington University’s Sigur Center for Asian Studies.

Nakahara’s study examines how nationalism and racism intersect to create exclusion and marginalization across Asia. By analyzing state reports from 16 Asian countries submitted to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the research investigates how these official reports conceptualize race and racism, uncovering pervasive patterns of their denial — literal, interpretive, and ideological. Nakahara thus offers a comparative view of how these perspectives by Asian nations align with or deviate from global norms. Her analysis also illustrates how historical identities and dominant social, political, and religious values shape national attitudes toward race in Asia.

Following Nakahara’s presentation, discussants Hiromi Ishizawa, associate professor of sociology at George Washington University, and Erin Aeran Chung, the Charles D. Miller Professor of East Asian Politics and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, provided insightful commentary. They emphasized the importance of studying race and racism in the Asia-Pacific region and their implications for marginalized communities. The event also sparked an engaging dialogue with the audience, addressing how racism in Asia remains a “blind spot” overlooked in policy, media, and public discourse.

See the coverage of the event in George Washington’s student newspaper >

Can We Trust The Polls?

Brandice Canes-Wrone, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hoover Institution’s Center for Revitalizing American Institutions, provided a succinct overview of different forecasting models, touching on their limitations and recent adaptations. Historically, models like that of economist Ray Fair have centered their election predictions on fundamentals like the economy. These models face two main limitations. First, they do not incorporate opinion polls on the candidates themselves. Second, even if voters care about economic performance, increasing partisanship has skewed subjective perceptions of the economy. Some forecasting models have responded by weighing partisanship more in their calculations, though these poll-reliant frameworks present their own limitations as well. Currently, even the most accurate models suggest this uniquely tight race remains too close to call.

Shifting to the two candidates themselves, Canes-Wrone points out that campaign messaging from both sides aligns with the expectations of most analysts. Reacting to high inflation rates, Donald Trump has centered his campaign on economic promises while Kamala Harris tries to “turn the page” to distance herself from President Joe Biden. Both their campaign strategies echo a historic shift from persuading swing voters to mobilizing their bases. Trump has taken a rather unconventional approach to the ever-important ground game, largely outsourcing mobilization to Super PACs. As Canes-Wrone argues, however, the factors determining presidential outcomes have changed far less than the rest of US politics in the last 50 years.

Restoring Trust in Elections

Americans have shown declining levels of trust in elections. While many picture January 6th as the root of this distrust, Justin Grimmer — Morris M. Doyle Centennial Professor of Public Policy and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution — argues this turning point occurred two months earlier when Trump falsely declared victory on election night. Since then, several Republican politicians have denounced electoral losses with a series of expansive voter fraud accusations. Some Democrats have also begun to mirror these undemocratic maneuvers under a different rhetoric.

Grimmer warns that if Trump were to win the election by a narrow margin, Democrats might argue that voter suppression caused them to lose. Yet, according to Grimmer, neither argument — voter fraud nor voter suppression — holds enough weight to justify overturning the election result. Studies show that election reforms provide no partisan benefit to either party. To restore Americans’ trust in their electoral institutions, both candidates must honestly accept the results of the November election, regardless of the outcome.

Ranked Choice Voting to Combat Polarization

Larry Diamond, Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, echoed Canes-Wrone and Grimmer in emphasizing the apparent hyper-partisanship and institutional distrust endangering American democracy. Diamond argued that, despite centuries of center-leaning politics under the Electoral College, this system now serves to heighten the social, economic, and informational factors driving polarization. The two-party dominant system is in dire need of structural reforms.

Diamond advocated for the adoption of Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) to reduce polarization. RCV is hardly a panacea, but it offers alternatives to bipartisanism by making room for moderate candidates, incentivizing parties to form broad coalitions, and affording voters more choices on their ballots. This transition, Diamond noted, is easier said than done as the polarized electorates that would benefit most from RCV are likely also most opposed to it. Beyond state-level efforts, Diamond stressed the need for bottom-up mobilization and education initiatives to accompany the implementation of RCV. 

The upcoming elections present both familiar and unprecedented challenges to American democracy. Economic fundamentals and campaign strategies have thus far reflected predictable historical trends, but bipartisan polarization and institutional distrust are at all-time highs. From structural reforms to personal integrity, everyone — states, media outlets, candidates, and voters — is responsible for safeguarding democracy. 

Campaign Strategies in a Polarized America

William Robertson Coe Professor of Political Science and Communication Shanto Iyengar highlighted the impact of increasing polarization on campaign strategies. The deep-rooted partisan divide, he explained, has made persuading voters across the partisan line nearly impossible, pushing campaigns to focus instead on mobilizing their own base and targeting independent voters. Iyengar illustrated the impact of this polarization on everyday life, noting that political affiliation is now a significant factor in personal relationships and even in matters like dating and marriage.

Campaigns have responded to this changing environment by relying heavily on negative advertising, which tends to resonate with partisan voters. Negative ads, Iyengar explained, are effective in cementing party loyalty. Additionally, campaigns have focused on get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts, identifying likely supporters and encouraging them to vote. For independents, campaigns use positive messaging, as these voters are generally more receptive to constructive content about candidates rather than attacks. Despite the challenges, Iyengar suggested that well-timed, targeted outreach can still influence persuadable voters who may have limited media exposure.

The U.S. in a World of Democratic Backsliding

FSI Senior Fellow Beatriz Magaloni situated the U.S. election vis-à-vis a global trend of democratic backsliding. Magaloni, who is the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford’s Department of Political Science, explained that the election is occurring against the backdrop of democratic regressions worldwide. Many democracies, she indicated, are experiencing the weakening of political institutions, increasing centralization power, and erosion of civil liberties.

Although the U.S. remains a robust democracy, Magaloni explained, it is not immune to elements of backsliding. Instances of political violence, such as the January 6th Capitol attack and rising polarization, pose challenges to democratic norms. She also highlighted troubling signs, such as threats to civil liberties and political violence. At the same time, Magaloni stressed that the U.S. has institutional safeguards that protect against democratic backsliding. Among them is a system of checks and balances across federal and state levels.

The panelists emphasized the challenges posed by political polarization and declining trust in the integrity of democratic processes. They suggest that ensuring a smooth and trustworthy election will require continued vigilance from election officials, proactive problem-solving, and public reassurance. Campaigns, meanwhile, will likely double down on mobilization and targeted messaging as they navigate the complexities of an increasingly divided electorate. Finally, the broader global trend of democratic backsliding serves as a reminder that safeguarding democracy is just as relevant in the United States as it is in other parts of the world.

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