The Program on Human Rights at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, together with Stanford Summer Session are proud to offer a special session on human rights June 25 - July 25, 2012.  The new course entitled, New Global Human Rights presents the question of human rights from an interdisciplinary perspective, taking into account the 21st century context, which requires that both state and non-state actors are included in the movement for rights for all. The course will examine emerging trends in international human rights with an analysis of new categories of human rights victims, actors, and technologies. Other related courses will be offered to allow students to build a summer schedule that allows them to engage in the academic study of human rights in a truly transformative way.

Helen Stacy, director of the Program on Human Rights will teach the course which draws on the expertise of leading figures in the field of human rights. Keynote speakers include Fatou Bensouda, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the former solicitor-general, attorney-general, and Minister of Justice of The Gambia. Last December, Bensouda was elected as the new ICC chief prosecutor and is the first African to hold a top position at the ICC. According to Stacy, “Her (Bensouda's) visit to Stanford is a unique opportunity for the Stanford community to learn about the continuity of the work of the ICC from someone who is genuinely concerned about human rights issues,” said Stacy.

Philip Gourevitch, an American author and journalist will also speak at the summer course. Gourevitch has written feature stories and books documenting global human rights abuses, including; the aftermath of genocide in Rwanda and Cambodia, the dictatorships of Mobutu Sese Seko in Congo and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe; the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka; and the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. “Gourevitch has reported on some of the major and current human rights issues across the globe, " said Stacy, "To hear him speak is the closest we can get the primary account on these situations.”

This course is cross-listed in POLISCI, IPS, and INTNLREL, and open to registered Summer Session students (including Stanford students who register for units in the summer) who wish to explore courses outside their major, or simply accelerate their degree program. They will be joined by students from around the world who are invited to experience campus life at Stanford. To find out more information or to apply, please visit summer.stanford.edu.

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To illustrate the worst-case scenario for China in the near future, Scott Rozelle pulls up a picture from Mexico. It's a completely barren manufacturing warehouse, abandoned after wages in Mexico rose to more than four dollars per hour.

Following its manufacturing moment in the 1980s, Mexico has been struggling to create jobs in part because 40 percent of its workers lack a high school education, the Stanford University Professor of Economics said.

Contrast this to South Korea, where almost the entire workforce has attained a high school degree. After manufacturing jobs left South Korea in the 1980s, he said, well-educated workers were able to upgrade to technical jobs like chip manufacturing and computer assembly.

The question for China is: South Korea or Mexico? Rozelle said.

With rising labor costs, China is under pressure to upgrade from low-cost manufacturing to high-tech production. But it's still an open question as to whether China's labor force will have the education levels to take on these new roles, or if the jobs will move elsewhere as they did from Mexico in the last few decades.

The odds are stacked against China. In some parts of the country, China's labor force more resembles Mexico's than South Korea's, with about 40 percent of workers in the poorest rural areas (China's 592 "nationally-designated poor counties," as deemed by China's anti-poverty authorities) lacking a high school education, Rozelle said.

Furthermore, the financial hurdles to attaining higher education are the highest in the world, illustrated most recently by a series of studies conducted by the Rural Education Action Project (REAP)—an umbrella group that includes Rozelle's Stanford University, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Peking University and the Xi'an-based Northwest University.

In one REAP study of 62 nations, China claimed the highest tuition price for public rural high schools: $160 per student per semester, not including costs like housing and everyday living expenses. This is nearly three times the world's second-highest tuition in Indonesia, which also fully subsidizes the education costs of children under the poverty line.

It's also a stark contrast to the fact that the vast majority of nations—93 percent of those studied—fully subsidize education, including places like Brazil, India and Kenya.

The high costs of education will become even more problematic, Rozelle said, once China's economy begins to restructure towards higher-value production. If the skill levels of the labor force cannot keep up, China will be caught in a middle-income trap, he said, possibly leading to high unemployment and social strife—not unlike what is plaguing Mexico now, he said.

Even a small subsidy could push thousands of students into high school. In REAP's most recent study, Rozelle and his colleagues took 250 junior high classes in Shaaxi Province and selected the two poorest students from each, providing one with a 1,500 to 2,500 yuan subsidy. The survey revealed that 51 percent of students who had received the subsidy were admitted to high school in the fall of 2010, while only 38 percent without the subsidy enrolled.

To some degree, the Chinese government has recognized the importance of limiting the costs of education. In 2009, officials enacted a policy to reduce high school tuition costs, providing 20 percent of students in central regions and 30 percent in the China's western parts with scholarships ranging between 1,000 and 3,300 yuan annually.

But the policy has proved somewhat illusory: In its 2011 survey of more than 3,000 students in Shaanxi Province, REAP discovered that less than five percent of the targeted students had actually received the subsidies.

The demand for food, feed and fuel will continue to rise as the world population grows and becomes more affluent. Meeting this demand will be especially challenging because of global warming, say climate experts, and the impacts of climate variability could make food markets even more volatile, adds Rosamond L. Naylor, professor of environmental Earth system science at Stanford University.

Naylor led a symposium on the compound effects of climate change and climate variability on food security at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) February 17th.

The symposium focused on two examples of climate variability: changes in growing-season temperature extremes beyond the range observed in the historical record, and changes in the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon – the most energetic form of year-to-year climate variability known.

Panelist David S. Battisti, professor of atmospheric sciences at the University of Washington, addressed key challenges in assessing the impact of extreme temperatures in coming decades. According to Battisti, global warming models forcast that temperature variability will increase as the average temperature warms, greatly compounding the likelihood of extreme heat and droughts. Unfortunately, these models typically have too much temperature variability in their simulations of present-day climate, he said. Battisti's talk focused on the cause of these modeling biases and their impact on climate forecasting.

Panelist Daniel J. Vimont, associate professor of atmospheric and oceanic sciences at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, discussed the impacts of El Niño in a warmer world. ENSO impacts can be severe in regions in and surrounding the tropical Pacific, and can extend around the globe, he said. ENSO variability – its return period and intensity – are very sensitive to changes in mean conditions in the tropical Pacific, he added, but these conditions are notoriously difficult to simulate using the present generation of global climate models. Vimont presented results from the linear ocean atmosphere model (LOAM), a new scientific tool for estimating global warming's impact on ENSO variability.

Naylor addressed the impacts of climate on global markets for major staple commodities, which are already under pressure from increased population-, income-, and energy-driven demands. She outlined the potential effects of climate variability on regional trade patterns, price volatility, policy responses and human welfare. 

Mark Shwartz is the Communications/Writer at Precourt Institute for Energy at Stanford University.

Newly printed “no smoking” signs went up across China when the government rolled out a nationwide public indoor smoking ban in May 2011. A sticky gray layer of smoke residue now coats many signs, representing the challenges China’s growing tobacco-control movement faces against a multibillion-dollar government-run industry and deeply embedded social practices.

How has the cigarette become so integrated into the fabric of everyday life across the People’s Republic of China (PRC)?

To get to the heart of this question, historians, health policy specialists, sociologists, anthropologists, business scholars, and other experts met Mar. 26 and 27 in Beijing for a conference organized by Stanford’s Asia Health Policy Program. They examined connections intricately woven over the past 60 years between marketing and cigarette gifting, production and consumer demand, government policy and economic profit, and many other dimensions of China’s cigarette culture.

Anthropologist Matthew Kohrman, a specialist on tobacco in China, led the conference, which was held at the new Stanford Center at Peking University. In an interview, he spoke about the history of China’s cigarette industry, cigarettes and society, and the tobacco-control movement.

The early years

Tobacco first entered China through missionary contact in the 1600s, says Kohrman, but it was not until the early 20th century when cigarettes began gaining popularity. The first cigarette advertising was a “confused tapestry” of messages as marketers figured out what spoke to the public. “There were just as many images of neo-Confucian filial piety as there were of cosmopolitan ‘modern women,’” says Kohrman.

Through improved marketing and aggressive factory building, British American Tobacco and Nanyang Brothers, China’s two largest pre-war firms, helped increase the demand for cigarettes. The Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) disrupted the cigarette supply, but their popularity had taken hold. Some cigarette firms shifted during the war to the relative safety of southwest China, where tobacco production has remained concentrated ever since.

Post-1949

After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the tobacco industry was nationalized and strong relationships between the central government and cigarette manufacturers in the provinces were formed. Cigarettes also began to be viewed as a part of everyday life. “Ration coupons for cigarettes were issued alongside grain, sugar, and bicycle coupons,” says Kohman. “The Maoist regime legitimized cigarettes as the right of every citizen."

During the Deng Xiaoping era (1978–1997), China’s cigarette industry really took off as manufacturers competed with one another for foreign currency to purchase cutting-edge European equipment and newer varieties of tobacco seed stock. Increased production and the return of full-scale advertising fueled greater consumer demand, and manufacturers began producing more and more varieties of cigarette. Vendors displayed glass cases filled with a colorful patchwork of cigarette packs bearing names like Panda, Double Happiness, and Red Pagoda.

The tobacco industry remained under government control as other industries privatized in the 1980s and 1990s. Party-state management of the cigarette became even more centralized in the early 1980s with the creation of the China Tobacco Monopoly Administration and its parallel external counterpart, the China Tobacco Corporation.

Since 1949, provincial protectionism has marked the cigarette market. It is now possible to purchase Beijing cigarettes in Kunming, Chengdu brands in Shanghai, and so on, but to distribute cigarettes in another province, a manufacturer must cut a deal with provincial government officials. Provincial administrations are loath to cut such deals because central government policy dictates that the portion of cigarette sales tax which does not go to the central government always is channeled to the finance bureau of the province of original production. China’s 2001 entry into the World Trade Organization opened the market ever so slightly to international brands like Marlboro and Kent, but domestic brands continue to dominate because of fierce protectionism.

...If it chooses to do so, China is in a position to lead and change the landscape in a very profound way.
-Matthew Kohrman, Professor of Anthropology, Stanford
A new era

In 2003, the World Health Organization established the first global health treaty, the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Although the United States still has not yet ratified the FCTC, China signed the treaty in 2003 and ratified it in 2005. Kohrman says China’s tobacco industry giants fear competition from international cigarette brands more than they worry about tobacco-control measures related to the FCTC.

Nonetheless, the FCTC ushered in a new era of public health research about tobacco and has helped increase public awareness about the dangers of smoking. New restrictions have been imposed on print and television advertising for cigarettes, and international organizations, such as the Bloomberg Family Foundation, have begun funding anti-tobacco work in China.

A big challenge to tobacco-control campaigns, says Kohrman, is the sheer amount of money that tobacco companies have available for marketing. “In 2010, China’s tobacco industry posted profits in excess of U.S. $90 billion—that’s huge. Tobacco control research and advocacy now annually receive a few million dollars, and much of that is coming through outside funders, which have very specific projects in mind.”

China’s tobacco advertisers have adapted to the new restrictions that prevent them from openly promoting cigarettes in the media. They have instead moved to point-of-sale and soft-marketing tactics, including misinformation campaigns about the “dangers” of quitting smoking. “The actual expenditure on marketing probably hasn’t dropped very much,” says Kohrman.

Cigarettes and society

Strong marketing and the legitimization of cigarettes as a part of everyday life have led to the deep integration of cigarettes into Chinese society. While only 3 to 4 percent of women in China smoke, cigarettes are an important part of male identity and social mobility. The wide range of cigarette brands has led to the growth of high-end varieties favored by businessmen and politicians, with some brands costing as much as $50 a pack. The custom of cigarette gifting has existed in China for decades, and it is difficult for a young man to turn down a package of cigarettes from a senior colleague or supervisor.

There is also the fact that nicotine is highly addictive, and quitting is difficult in an environment where smoking cigarettes is socially sanctioned. Kohrman says, “When you take an incredibly addictive substance like nicotine and throw it into the mix of all of these norms and customs, it creates a pretty toxic brew.”

The future?

Tobacco control presents a formidable challenge in China, one that requires understanding the historical context and complex dimensions of the cigarette industry. “Cigarettes have been insinuated into so many aspects of daily life across China, and the market for this product has now become so closely enmeshed with matters of government finance and operations,” says Kohrman.

What happens in China could have implications for the entire world. “There’s a tobacco-induced human annihilation unfolding right now in almost every country and questions about how society and Big Tobacco are enmeshed, and how cigarette culture and government finance have become mutually supportive are pivotal,” says Kohrman. “Every country except Bhutan has legalized cigarette sales and is subject to many of the same general issues as China—only in China they’re on a much larger scale. But if it chooses to do so, China is in a position to lead and change the landscape in a very profound way.”   

Japanese rule in Korea was harsh but the country witnessed significant social and economic transformation. In the process, Koreans were not simply victims or passive bystanders but active participants in the formation of colonial modernity, said Gi-Wook Shin during his keynote presentation at a conference held Feb. 16 and 17 at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa (UH Mānoa).

Shin's works on Japanese colonialism in Korea were published in many journals and books including Colonial Modernity in Korea (1999) and Ethnic Nationalism in Korea (2006).

The conference was held to commemorate the 40th anniversary of UH Mānoa’s Center for Korean Studies, the oldest Korean studies institution in the United States.

Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping recently visited the United States to meet with top officials and tour various cities. China experts followed the trip closely because Xi is anticipated to become China’s next president. Thomas Fingar spoke with the Shanghai Oriental Morning Post about the visit, and about the Obama administration’s Asia policy.

How will the Obama administration’s strategic adjustments towards the Asia-Pacific shape or influence Xi’s visit? Given the fast-changing environment and shift of power towards Asia, will there be any changes or differences in the United States’s treatment of China’s anticipated future leader?

The primary impact is likely to be on the discussions between Xi and his American interlocutors. I assume that U.S. officials will want to explain the announced strategic adjustments and that Xi will seek authoritative answers to questions that he and other Chinese leaders have about the objectives and implications of the adjustments.

Contrary to your question, I do not believe the environment is changing rapidly—shifts in the global system and the shift in dynamism and wealth toward Asia have been under way for decades. The United States has been and will remain a part of that transition. The U.S. goal is to ensure that the changes result in increased security and prosperity for all—a win-win situation not unlike what happened when first Japan and then the other “Asian tigers” preceded China on the path toward greater wealth and power. 

What interests Washington most about Vice President Xi? What expectations does the United States have for his visit?

Washington expects Xi to succeed Hu Jintao and understands that he will be first among equals in a collective leadership that constrains Xi’s ability to act independently. But U.S. officials also understand that Xi, like all leaders, brings personal preferences and agendas to the job and that dealing with him will be influenced by his personality, understanding of American culture, and goals for the relationship. Simply stated, the Americans Xi meets will want to get to know him and what he is like.

U.S. officials understand that he is here as China’s vice president and therefore is unlikely to be bringing new initiatives. They do expect him to have questions about U.S. and Obama administration positions on a wide range of global issues and to have questions about U.S. intentions in Asia.

Is the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy aimed at containing or encircling China? Almost all U.S. official statements try to clarify that the United States is not trying to contain China, but its policy focus and military deployments in the Asia-Pacific have made many Chinese scholars doubtful of U.S. intentions. What are your observations? Is U.S. rhetoric consistent with its actions?

I do not like the term “pivot to Asia” and am pleased that U.S. officials seem to have stopped using that term. The United States is not returning to Asia; we never left. I think the basic point of recent statements is that with the end of the U.S. role in the conflict in Iraq and plans to draw down in Afghanistan, the United States will be able to focus more attention on other parts of the world. Asia is, and has been, the most dynamic, fastest changing, and in many ways most-challenging region of the world for many years. The region is also very important to the United States and deserves more attention than it has received. The Asia-Pacific is a region of superlatives—biggest economies, largest militaries, most nuclear powers, largest military budgets, largest foreign exchange reserves, etc. It would be unwise and impossible not to pay attention to developments in and affecting the region and its relations with other parts of the global system.

I have been working on China for more than 45 years and working with Chinese counterparts for 40 years. I must say that I have just about abandoned efforts to persuade important groups in China that the United States is not attempting to surround, contain, or thwart China’s rise. They seem determined to believe that it is the case no matter what we say or do. It is impossible for me to look at the policies and actions of the last eight administrations and come to any conclusion except that the United States means what its leaders have said: that it is in the interest of the United States for China to be strong, secure, and prosperous. The record shows quite clearly that the United States has assisted China’s rise. It also shows that China’s rise has been beneficial to the United States. We are not poorer or weaker or more insecure because China’s people live better and China plays an increasingly important role on the world stage. 

Do you think the Obama administration has changed the direction of U.S. strategy toward China or Asia compared with the Bush administration?

The short answer is, “no. ” The Bush administration was preoccupied by terrorism, Iraq, and Afghanistan and devoted less time and attention to Asia. Obama is redressing the balance and better aligning attention with current interests. Arguably what has changed is the perception of China held by others in the region. A series of foreign policy blunders in 2010 undercut the success of China’s diplomacy and increased regional concern about China’s intentions. That prompted requests for reassurance that the United States would remain engaged in the region and that the Bush administration’s “neglect” of certain regional meetings was not a harbinger of a retreat from Asia. The Obama administration seeks to provide that assurance and to make clear that we are engaged in Asia because we are a Pacific power with great interests in the region. We are not there to contain or block anybody.

The United States is struggling with its economy and also cutting its defense budget. Do you think this strategy comes at the right time?

Downturns in the economy never come at a good time. The great recession has taken a heavy toll but we are recovering and will recover. We have been spending too much for too long and need to cut back. In my opinion, we also need to tax ourselves more to pay for modernization of infrastructure, better schools, and other requisites of continued prosperity. We are winding down two long and expensive wars and should reduce our defense budget. It will take time to replace worn out equipment and to reduce the large role that defense expenditures played in the U.S. economy during the Cold War, but we will get there eventually. More importantly, now is a good time to reduce defense expenditures and reorganize our military because we do not have any enemies and are not bent on conquering other nations.

Is the “pivot to Asia” strategy concrete or more of a “paper tiger” given the fact that other challenges, including Iran, are still occupying the United States?

As previously noted, the term “pivot to Asia” exaggerates the amount of change. The United States never left or lost interest in Asia, but is now able to devote more attention to the most dynamic, and in some respects most dangerous place in the world. Building a new security architecture that is inclusive—including China—and addresses concerns in and about North Korea is and should be a priority. Forging institutions to ensure continued stability and prosperity in the region despite paralysis at the global level and adjusting to changes in production and supply chains are among the long list of specific issues that need attention. The United States has a stake in the way these issues are addressed and must be engaged in the search for solutions.

This month marks the passing of 70 years since the February 19, 1942 signing of Executive Order 9066 by President Franklin Roosevelt, an act resulting in the forcible removal and incarceration of more than 110,000 people of Japanese descent. About two-thirds of those relocated to concentration camps scattered across desolate areas of the United States were U.S. citizens. To reflect on this milestone and its legacy, SPICE joined with the Inter-University Center for Japanese Language Studies (IUC) and the National Consortium for Teaching About Asia (NCTA) to co-sponsor “Commemorating 70 Years Since Executive Order 9066: A Panel Discussion on the Japanese-American Experience of World War II.” Moderated by Stanford Professor of Japanese literature and IUC Executive Director Indra Levy, the event drew a crowd of educators, students, and community members eager to enrich their understanding of this troubling chapter in U.S. history. Presentations were given by an esteemed panel: Professor Emeritus Donald Hata of California State University Dominguez Hills, writer and artist Dr. Ruth Y. Okimoto, Academy Award-winning filmmaker Steven Okazaki, and journalist and filmmaker gayle yamada. Drawing on their diverse experiences, the panelists addressed how the wartime treatment of Japanese Americans by the U.S. government does not, as Levy emphasized, “sit quietly in the past.”

A common thread connecting the presentations, raised both by panelists who spent their childhoods in the camps and those born after the war, was that the traumatic experience of the war years left an indelible mark on the Japanese-American community. In the words of yamada, “The Japanese-American experience during World War II defined us as a people. The war was not a personal experience for me but it defined who I have become almost without me realizing it.” Hata recalled that after the war, many families including his own lived in “fear of being singled out again as scapegoats,” and consequently “abandoned, rejected and suppressed Japanese language and culture. The desired goal was to be a 200% white American, an emasculated model minority devoid of any connection to their Japanese heritage.” Okazaki echoed this, explaining that he only realized years later how much the Japanese-American community in which he was raised was “acting out a post-camp experience…that’s why we had to be in Boy Scouts—it’s because of the camps—that’s why we had to be in every single sports league—it’s because of the camps…that’s why we had to be so American, that’s why we were constantly told not to stick out, to belong, not to get in trouble.” For Okimoto, the dislocation of being forced from her home and sent to the camps following Executive Order 9066 was paralleled by the challenges of then re-entering society following the end of the war: “We laugh about it now but it was very scary after the war to come back to a community being the only Japanese family and having people stare and chase us.”

The scars left by wartime experiences, panelists suggested, made it difficult for Japanese Americans to confront and openly discuss this period for many years. Yet, each of them discovered a way—teaching, archiving and creative reconstruction of the past—to explore the legacy of Japanese Americans in World War II, both for their own personal understanding and in order to share these stories with others. Hata found that his time at the IUC in Japan “brought clarity and a sense of identity and purpose to my life…I learned about Japanese history and about my Japanese immigrant heritage.” Hata later drew on this when he developed groundbreaking teaching materials in order to introduce the experience of wartime concentration camps into a college survey course on U.S. history. His text Japanese Americans and World War II: Mass Removal, Imprisonment, and Redress, co-authored with Nadine Hata, first came out as a slim 15-page supplement at a time when there were no other suitable materials for teaching this history, and is today a core source in this field. Okimoto, on the other hand, discovered that drawing and painting were her “salvation,” for they offered a way to “express myself about those years that I could not talk about,” which in turn enabled her to document the history of the Poston camp where she and her family were imprisoned during the war in Sharing a Desert Home: Life on the Colorado River Indian Reservation, Poston, Arizona, 1942-45 and contributions to From Our Side of the Fence.

Both Okazaki and yamada turned to documentary filmmaking to reveal unexplored aspects of Japanese-American wartime history. Okazaki’s many films have included a documentary on three men who challenged the legality of Executive Order 9066, an exploration of the life and art of Estelle Ishigo, one of the few Caucasians to enter the camps with her Japanese-American husband, and his third and most recent project All We Could Carry, from which Okazaki shared clips of poignant testimony of camp survivors. Yamada in turn was drawn to a project focused not on the camp experience, but rather the veterans of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), including her father and many other Japanese-American soldiers who served in the Pacific War by translating intelligence, questioning Japanese prisoners, and bravely leading “cave flushing” operations. Yamada’s film on the MIS, Uncommon Courage, which she screened during her presentation, vividly demonstrated how these Japanese Americans employed their language and cultural knowledge to save lives on both sides of the conflict, all while many of their families were behind barbed wire in the United States. 

Okazaki affirmed that even after making three films on the subject he remains convinced that there are still stories yet to be told, because the discussion is, in a sense, just beginning. “It shocks me that the discussion is evolving so much still that even the terminology is still in discussion and evolving, and probably will continue to evolve.” Hata directly confronted this previously unexplored aspect—the insidious bureaucratic nomenclature represented in terms like “evacuation,” “relocation camp,” and “non-alien” (rather than U.S. citizen), which “cleverly obscured the reality that U.S. citizens, solely on the basis of their race, were herded without trials or due process into concentration camps as political prisoners, surrounded by barbed wire, watch towers, machine guns and searchlights, and soldiers with orders to shoot anyone trying to escape. Let us never forget what WRA [War Relocation Authority] was designed to do and did very efficiently.” Raising consciousness, diligently archiving the past, and identifying new stories and perspectives, emerged as shared concerns among the panelists, even as they emphasized that fighting historical amnesia was a future-oriented endeavor. Yamada noted that the kind of archiving projects she is involved with enable people of any ethnic background or race to “look at a moment in time—which was the war—and figure out for themselves how they could work through the same kind of issues that are being brought up.” “I hope that no other child in America,” concluded Okimoto, summing up the lessons of her presentation, “has to go through such an experience as that, to stand in a barrack, in a classroom, and have the teacher say ‘Ok children, it’s time to salute the flag.’…You’re in a prison camp but you’re saying ‘I pledge allegiance to the flag’…I hope that there’s no war where an ethnic group would be put in that kind of situation.”

The presentations were followed by a discussion, during which speakers fielded questions from the audience and elaborated on their stories and work. Panelists also remained after the event to meet with participants and sign books and DVDs. The video of the panel presentations is now available online, so that even those who could not attend in person can be inspired to learn more on their own, share this history with students, friends and family members, and ultimately work together to confront the troubling legacy of racial profiling and hysteria in the United States during World War II. “All four panelists were the model of courage in their personal discussions of the meaning of Executive Order 9066,” reflected Levy, “For those who were unable to attend the panel discussion, I am thankful that we were able to make a video record of the event. This recording will be an important part of the lessons I teach my son, and I highly recommend it to all parents and educators who are concerned about the legacy we bequeath to the next generation of Americans.”