Mr. Chun Yungwoo, the national security adviser to the South Korean president from 2010 to 2013, will analyze Korea’s strategic situation in light of the current geopolitical dynamics and challenges to peace and security in Northeast Asia. He will assess the state of bilateral relations among key states in the region, including the risk of territorial disputes spiraling out of control due to domestic politics or miscalculation. As a former chief South Korean negotiator to the Six Party Talks on ending North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, Ambassador Chun will also present his ideas for making progress on North Korean denuclearization while discussing the existential crisis facing North Korea and the long-term future of the Korean Peninsula.

Chun Yungwoo is the chairman and founder of the Korean Peninsula Future Forum (KPFF). Previously, Ambassador Chun served as the National Security Advisor to President Lee Myung-Bak from 2010 to 2013. In his 33 years of service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Chun served as Second Vice Foreign Minister (2009-2010), Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs and Head of the ROK Delegation to the Six-Party Talks (2006-2008), and Deputy Foreign Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations (2005-2006). He was also the Korean Ambassador to the United Kingdom (2008-2009), Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations (2003-2005), and also held earlier diplomatic postings in France, Morocco, and Austria. Ambassador Chun received a BA from Pusan National University and Master of International Affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.

Abstract: How do policymakers infer the long-term political intentions of their states' adversaries? A new approach to answering this question, the “selective attention thesis,” posits that individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices influence which types of indicators a state's political leaders and its intelligence community regard as credible signals of an adversary's intentions. Policymakers often base their interpretations on their own theories, expectations, and needs, sometimes ignoring costly signals and paying more attention to information that, though less costly, is more vivid (i.e., personalized and emotionally involving). In contrast, intelligence organizations typically prioritize the collection and analysis of data on the adversary's military inventory. Over time, these organizations develop substantial knowledge on these material indicators that they then use to make predictions about an adversary's intentions. An examination of three cases based on 30,000 archival documents and intelligence reports shows strong support for the selective attention thesis and mixed support for two other approaches in international relations theory aimed at understanding how observers are likely to infer adversaries' political intentions: the behavior thesis and the capabilities thesis. The three cases are assessments by President Jimmy Carter and officials in his administration of Soviet intentions during the collapse of détente; assessments by President Ronald Reagan and administration officials of Soviet intentions during the end of the Cold War; and British assessments of Nazi Germany before World War II.

About the Speaker: Professor Keren Yarhi-Milo is an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University’s Politics Department and the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs. Her research and teaching focus on international relations and foreign policy, with a particular specialization in international security, including foreign policy decision-making, interstate communication and crisis bargaining, intelligence, and US foreign policy in the Middle East.

Professor Yarhi-Milo’s forthcoming book (Princeton University Press) titled, “Knowing The Adversary: Leaders, Intelligence Organizations, and Assessments of Intentions in International Relations,” explores how and why civilian leaders and intelligence organizations select and interpret an adversary’s signals of intentions differently.