This essay was first published by Seoul National University's Institute for Future Strategy. You can also view the Korean version.

Technological hegemony surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged as a central facet of national economies and security. Global competition among countries and corporations to secure high-level talent has intensified into a matter of survival. Worldwide demand for AI talent now exceeds supply by more than threefold. In Silicon Valley, AI dominates the discussion, and competition among big tech firms to attract talent is escalating. Ultimately, the rivalry between the United States and China will be decided not only by capital or technology but by who succeeds in attracting and retaining global talent.

In South Korea, concerns over talent outflows from Korea are growing. Last year, Korea ranked fourth among the 38 OECD countries in terms of AI talent outflow. Compared to other advanced economies, Korea’s AI industrial ecosystem remains underdeveloped, while overseas firms offer better compensation and research environments. The recent phenomenon of 56 Seoul National University professors relocating abroad over the past four years, a “new brain drain,” must be understood in this broader structural context.

This reality is also clearly reflected in the Global Talent Competitiveness Index, published annually by INSEAD. Korea ranked 31st this year, a position disproportionately low relative to its economic standing, and fell seven places compared to two years ago. In particular, Korea performed poorly in attracting and retaining talent, ranking 55th and 37th, respectively. These findings suggest that, beyond economic incentives, social, cultural, and environmental factors play a decisive role in talent mobility.

Korea’s talent outflow is especially alarming because it coincides with record-low fertility rates and rapid population aging. Before this convergence hardens into irreversible decline, Korea must establish a Ministry of Human Resources to oversee a comprehensive national talent strategy and devise systemic measures for talent development, attraction, and utilization.
 

Talent Portfolio Theory
 

In a recent book published by Stanford University Press, The Four Talent Giants, I proposed a framework titled “talent portfolio theory.” Just as financial investment strategies adopt a portfolio approach, national talent strategies should also be portfolio-based, emphasizing diversification to minimize risk and continuous adjustment (rebalancing). In other words, just as financial portfolios are composed of cash, stocks, real estate, and bonds, talent portfolios consist of four elements—the “4B's”: brain train, brain gain, brain circulation, and brain linkage.

Moreover, just as investors design different portfolios, each country’s talent portfolio varies depending on its economic needs as well as cultural and institutional contexts. Japan, Australia, China, and India (all discussed in the book) include all four B's but have constructed distinct portfolios that contributed to their respective economic development. A portfolio approach transcends the traditional binary of “brain drain versus brain gain” and offers a more comprehensive and flexible framework for understanding national talent strategy, one that is particularly relevant for Korea.

First, “brain train” refers to developing domestic human resources through education and training. It is a fundamental element of any portfolio. In Japan’s portfolio in particular, homegrown talent accounts for a large share. Japan has favored domestically educated and trained talent over foreign or overseas-trained individuals, making them the backbone of its economic development.

By contrast, Australia places greater emphasis on “brain gain.” Brain gain involves importing foreign labor, and approximately 30 percent of Australia’s workforce is foreign-born. Until the 1970s, Australia upheld the “White Australia” policy, but a major shift toward multiculturalism subsequently elevated brain gain to a central position in its portfolio. Brain gain pathways include the study-to-work route, where international students remain for employment, and the work-to-migration route, where individuals enter on work visas and later settle. Australia has effectively utilized both pathways.

“Brain circulation” involves bringing back nationals who were educated or employed abroad, and it has been critical to China’s portfolio. Following China’s opening in the 1980s, Chinese nationals came to represent the largest share of participants in the global talent market, including international students. Approximately 80 percent of them returned to China after the 2000s. Known as haigui (sea turtles), these returnees played prominent roles in China’s science, technology, education, and economy, supported by numerous central and local government programs designed to promote talent circulation.

“Brain linkage” refers to those who do not return home after studying or working abroad but instead serve as bridges between their host countries and their homeland. By leveraging their local networks, social capital, they support their home country from abroad, making this a key component of India’s portfolio. India refers to them as a “brain bank” or “brain deposit,” exemplified by leaders of Silicon Valley big tech firms such as Google CEO Sundar Pichai.

However, all talent portfolios carry inherent risks. When adjustment is delayed or fails, risks can escalate into crises with negative effects on the broader economy. The experiences of the four countries illustrate this point.

Japan has faced two major risks. A talent strategy centered on domestic talent weakened its global competitiveness, while demographic decline reduced its labor pool. Although Japan actively attracted foreign students to increase brain gain, its exclusive social and cultural environment limited their integration into the workforce after graduation. While there are many reasons behind Japan’s “lost 30 years” since the 1990s, one factor was its failure to adjust a portfolio overly concentrated on domestic talent in a timely manner.

Australia has confronted rising anti-immigration sentiment and tensions with China. Public concern grew over excessive immigration and perceived threats to national identity, prompting the government to tighten immigration policies. Amid conflict with China, Australia diversified its foreign talent sources from China to India and Southeast Asia. The pandemic, which restricted cross-border mobility, dealt a severe blow to Australia’s talent attraction efforts.

In China’s case, despite aggressive brain circulation policies, top-tier global talent has remained hesitant to return, as relinquishing careers built abroad is not easy. China accordingly shifted its focus toward brain linkage for these elite individuals. At the same time, brain circulation and linkage strategies became a source of friction with the United States, and rising anti-immigration and anti-China sentiment in the U.S. and Europe reduced opportunities for study and employment abroad. Recently, China has adjusted its portfolio to strengthen domestic talent development.

India, despite its strong brain linkage, remains vulnerable to brain drain. However, as economic opportunities expand domestically, return migration has increased, gradually reshaping its portfolio composition.
 

What Should Korea’s Talent Portfolio Strategy Be?

What, then, about Korea? Let us examine Korea’s situation by comparing it with the four countries through the lens of talent portfolio theory.

Brain train: Human resources have been critical to Korea’s economic development, with the government playing a central role. Key examples include preferential policies for technical and commercial high schools during the 1970s under the Park Chung Hee administration to support industrialization, and efforts to internationalize universities in the 1990s as part of globalization. While less dominant than in Japan, brain train has constituted a significant share of Korea’s talent portfolio.

Brain gain: Korea has imported low- and semi-skilled labor from China and Southeast Asia to fill so-called 3D jobs, but attraction of global high-level talent has remained limited. As in Japan, social exclusivity and cultural barriers continue to impede integration.

Brain circulation: Comparable to China, brain circulation has played a vital role in Korea’s economic development. Overseas education and experience have carried strong premiums, and China explicitly benchmarked Korea and Taiwan when designing its own policies.

Brain linkage: Compared to brain circulation, brain linkage has, until recently, occupied a relatively small share of Korea’s portfolio.

Facing the AI era, low fertility, and the crisis of a new brain drain, what strategy should Korea pursue in the global competition for talent? As noted above, rather than fragmented and ad hoc measures, Korea must comprehensively review and continuously adjust its talent strategy through a portfolio approach.

Brain train: Korea must cultivate talent for future industries, particularly in science and engineering. Training should be aligned with AI-related fields to better match university output with corporate demand. The excessive concentration of top students in medical schools must be corrected. Support mechanisms to retain domestic talent should be strengthened. A recent Bank of Korea survey of 1,916 science and engineering master’s and doctoral degree holders working domestically found that 42.9 percent of science and engineering master’s and doctoral graduates are considering overseas employment within three years—an alarming signal. While brain train will remain vital, its relative share is likely to decline.

Brain gain: As demographic crises intensify and the share of brain train diminishes, the necessity and importance of brain gain will grow. In particular, Korea must actively utilize the more than 300,000 foreign students currently in the country as human and social capital. At present, universities focus merely on filling enrollment quotas, and most foreign students either leave Korea immediately after graduation or remain employed only briefly. This, too, constitutes a form of brain drain. To increase the share of brain gain in the portfolio, foreign students must be managed holistically from selection to graduation and employment. While immigration is ultimately inevitable, it must be approached cautiously and deliberately, considering its impact on the domestic labor market and anti-immigration sentiment. Australia’s successful experience offers useful lessons.

Brain circulation: Although it occupies a relatively modest share of Korea’s portfolio, a certain level should be maintained. With declining numbers of students studying abroad and reduced inclination among overseas Koreans to return, care must be taken to prevent a sharp drop in this component. Otherwise, Korea risks losing global competitiveness, as Japan’s experience warns.

Brain linkage: Alongside brain gain, brain linkage is crucial to Korea’s portfolio adjustment. Key target groups include departing domestic talent (the new brain drain), foreign students, and the diaspora. Although their likelihood of reemployment in Korea is low, their potential for exchange and collaboration with Korea remains open. Like India, Korea should foster and support brain linkage by treating them as a “brain bank” or “brain deposit.”
 

Toward the Establishment of a Ministry of Human Resources

At the national level, a control tower is needed to design an optimal talent portfolio and make timely adjustments. Korea should establish a Ministry of Human Resources by consolidating functions currently dispersed across the Ministry of Education (universities and graduate schools), the Ministry of Science and ICT (R&D), and the Ministry of Employment and Labor (foreign employment support). It is worth recalling that Singapore, ranked first globally in talent competitiveness, established its Ministry of Manpower early on. Expanded and reorganized from the Ministry of Labor in 1998, it played a pivotal role in transforming Singapore into a talent powerhouse. Through education and development investments, Singapore strengthened domestic talent competitiveness while opening its doors to multinational talent, and it also implemented policies to promote talent circulation and linkage. From the perspective of talent portfolio theory, Singapore represents a successful case of diversification and continuous adjustment. In the increasingly fierce global competition for talent in the AI era, nations and firms that fall behind cannot secure their future. Korea is no exception.

This commentary first appeared in The Diplomat magazine.

In March 2025, one of the authors vividly observed hundreds of thousands of people filling downtown Seoul over President Yoon Suk-yeol’s impeachment. Reminiscent of the “candlelight protests” of 2017 but with greater intensity, these rallies began after the short-lived martial law declaration of last December, with some demanding Yoon’s immediate removal from office and others denouncing it as illegitimate. Even after the Constitutional Court’s unanimous decision to impeach him on April 4, rival protests continued through the June 3 snap elections.

Such rallies were hardly unprecedented in South Korea, given its rich history of civic engagement in politics. However, in the context of Yoon’s martial law declaration and subsequent impeachment, the protests illustrated a fragile democracy divided against itself. In fact, Yoon had justified his action as a necessary measure to remove “anti-state forces” in the face of the intensifying political fight with opposition forces, which controlled South Korea’s legislature throughout Yoon’s presidency.

Public opinion polls and election outcomes show how deeply divided the nation has been. A 2022 Pew survey found that 83 percent of South Koreans believed there were strong partisan conflicts, the highest among all 19 countries surveyed. Recent election results reflected such societal and political division. Yoon’s razor-thin 2022 victory over Lee Jae-myung and Lee’s narrow win in the 2025 snap election revealed a nation split down the middle.

In addition, mass protests, largely associated with progressives, have become common for conservatives too and spilled from plazas to online platforms. Politics has turned into “culture wars” and competing claims to be representative of “the people,” provoking moral charges and emotional responses. Polarization now cuts across gender and generational lines beyond political and ideological divisions of the past, standing alongside illiberalism and populism as a core threat to Korean democracy.

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We are pleased to share that Jihui Seong (MA '25 East Asian Studies) is the recipient of the 14th annual Korea Program Prize for Writing in Korean Studies, for her thesis "A Truce Built on Tension: The Korean War Armistice Negotiations and the Strategic Divergence Between Allies."

Advisor Daniel Sneider, Lecturer in East Asian Studies, notes that "Ms. Seong carried out extensive archival research at the National Archives in Washington, as well as digital archives of U.S. diplomatic and other records. She did similar research in the archives of the Republic of Korea. Ms. Seong read deeply into the secondary literature on this period of history...and consulted the memoirs of key figures, including Korean language memoirs.... The result of this research was a remarkably well-written and insightful thesis, one which genuinely breaks ground in its detailed research, analytical framing and persuasive argument. The conclusion has additional power in taking the thesis research and applying its conclusions and lessons to current alliance relations."

Reflecting on her thesis, Seong notes: "My thesis explores the Korean War armistice negotiations (1951–1953), with a focus on the deep strategic and political divergences between the United States and the Republic of Korea. While the two nations were de facto allies under the UN Command, they held fundamentally different visions for Korea’s future. Drawing from extensive archival research—including diplomatic cables, negotiation transcripts, and U.S. policy documents—I analyze how President Syngman Rhee’s opposition to a ceasefire clashed with Washington’s desire to end the war through limited settlement, leading to recurring tensions, threats of alliance rupture, and backchannel bargaining. The paper highlights that these conflicts were not merely tactical disagreements, but expressions of diverging national priorities, domestic political constraints, and fundamentally different perceptions of sovereignty and security. Ultimately, I argue that the Korean War armistice was not simply the cessation of hostilities between adversaries, but rather a fragile truce built through uneasy compromise forged through internal struggle between wartime partners—one that shaped the foundations of today’s East Asian geopolitical order and the enduring complexities of U.S.–ROK alliance management."

Sponsored by the Korea Program and the Center for East Asian Studies, the writing prize recognizes and rewards outstanding examples of writing by Stanford students in an essay, term paper, or thesis produced during the current academic year in any discipline within the area of Korean studies, broadly defined. The competition is open to both undergraduate and graduate students.

Past Recipients:

13th Annual Prize Co-recipients (2024)
12th Annual Prize (2023)
11th Annual Prize (2022)
10th Annual Prize (2021)
9th Annual Prize (2020)
8th Annual Prize (2019)
7th Annual Prize (2018)
6th Annual Prize (2017)
5th Annual Prize (2016)
4th Annual Prize (2015)
3rd Annual Prize (2014)
2nd Annual Prize (2013)
1st Annual Prize (2012)

Childhood weekends spent with my grandparents in New Jersey were like attending a school of all things Korean—not only of the language but of the culture and traditions. I learned to bow in my hanbok on New Year’s day, to shout “fighting” as a word of encouragement, and to eat ssam (Korean barbecue in lettuce wraps) in just one bite. Harabeoji (Grandpa) and Halmeoni (Grandma) had opened an early window into Korea for me, but their absence for the last five years left my deepening interest in and growing questions about my heritage and Korean history largely unexplored and unanswered. And although Harabeoji had left us The Bai Family book, memorializing his and our family’s stories, I have been unable to read beyond the first few chapters. I told myself that the English translation could not really capture his voice, but actually, I was too emotionally overwhelmed as I learned about his painful life under Japanese rule, as an impoverished refugee in what is now South Korea, and as a strange foreigner in America.

While searching for ways to learn more about Korea and the historical forces behind the traumatic events that shaped my grandparents’ lives and our family’s journey, I came across the Sejong Korea Scholars Program (SKSP), which seemed to magically check the boxes of what I had set out to learn.

For over four months, I was able to indulge in SKSP’s countless offerings—live online lectures from renowned professors and experts in the field, informative weekly readings of primary and secondary sources, lively discussions with an engaged peer group, our active virtual discussion board, and of course the supportive guidance of Dr. HyoJung Jang, the instructor of SKSP. We explored and appreciated Korea’s achievements, such as King Sejong’s invention of the Hangul writing system, which made literacy accessible to the general population, and the invention of a metal printing type more than a hundred years before Johannes Gutenberg’s printing press. We also delved deeply into understanding Korea’s historical identity as a “Hermit Kingdom” and the factors behind its long-held isolationist policies. We even read about the famous turtle ships used to successfully fend off Japanese encroachment. (I had always wondered about my grandpa’s small models of those ships.) And though painful, we also learned about the layered history of the Japanese occupation, including the period of cultural rule that my grandpa was subjected to in his youth.

The highlight of SKSP for me was the research paper. When Dr. Jang encouraged us to find a topic we were deeply interested in, I chose to explore the enduring power and resilience of Korean nationalism. Despite some initial struggles to define and frame my argument, with the readings and lecture on nationalism by Professor Gi-Wook Shin and Dr. Jang’s constructive feedback and supportive encouragement, I was able to think critically and write persuasively. Dr. Jang also pointed me to areas beyond the SKSP curriculum such as Korean sociology studies, which helped me to focus on the aspects of Korean nationalism related to ethnic solidarity and sense of civic duty.

SKSP provided a historical lens for me to be able to read Harabeoji’s words and understand the broader context of his personal stories. Now, as I continue to build upon my historical knowledge, Korean language skills, and even cooking, I will always carry with me the skills and knowledge I attained in SKSP—a truly immersive experience I believe any student will find rewarding.

SKSP is currently accepting applications for the 2026 course. Apply at https://spicestanford.smapply.io/prog/sejong_korea_scholars_program/. The application deadline is November 1, 2025.

SKSP is one of several online courses offered by SPICE.

To stay updated on SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, X, and Instagram.

Three of SPICE’s online programs for U.S. high school students have begun accepting applications for the spring 2026 academic term. The Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP) and the Sejong Korea Scholars Program (SKSP) welcome applications from high school sophomores, juniors, and seniors in the United States. U.S.–China Co-Lab on Climate Solutions brings together 10th–12th graders from the United States and China in the same program to collaborate on solutions to the global climate crisis.

The RSP engages students in an intensive study of Japan and the U.S.–Japan relationship, facilitating discussions with scholars, diplomats, and other guest speakers with personal and professional expertise in Japanese culture, society, and U.S.–Japan relations. The 2026 RSP course dates are February 1 to June 14. The application deadline is October 17, 2025.

The SKSP provides students an enriching and academically rigorous overview of Korean history and U.S.–Korea relations through online lectures with top scholars and experts and engaging student discussions. The 2026 SKSP course will run February through early June. The application deadline is November 1, 2025.

The U.S.–China Co-Lab program focuses specifically on climate-related issues and U.S.–China cooperation, past and potential, and strategies for global cooperation. High school students from the U.S. and China will get to know each other’s lives and environments and actively work together on projects to develop their expertise on local, bilateral, and global climate action. This is a joint program of SPICE’s Stanford e-China (for students in China) and China Scholars Program (for U.S. students). The spring 2026 Co-Lab course dates are February 27 to May 22. The application deadline for U.S. students is November 1, 2025.

Students who are interested in applying to more than one program may do so and rank their preferences on their applications. Those who are accepted into multiple programs for spring 2026 will be invited to enroll in their highest-preference course.

Applications for all three programs can be found at https://spicestanford.smapply.io/. Deadlines vary:

• Reischauer Scholars Program: October 17
• Sejong Korea Scholars Program: November 1
• U.S.–China Co-Lab on Climate Solutions: November 1

For more information on a specific online course, please refer to its individual webpage.

To stay informed of SPICE news, join our email list and follow us on Facebook, X, and Instagram.

To learn more about SPICE’s student programs, visit our Student Programs page.