In South Korea’s June 3, 2026, local election, the ruling Democratic Party won most contests, but lost the pivotal Seoul mayoral race, suggesting voters were reluctant to grant the party unchecked power. This election served as the first nationwide test of the Lee Jae Myung administration, Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC's Korea Program, told news agency AFP.
The Seoul mayoral race attracted particular attention because the office is widely viewed as a launching pad to the presidency. But while the re-elected conservative Seoul mayor, Oh Se-hoon, is a seasoned political veteran and one of the most recognizable figures in his party, "he projects a sense of political fatigue, offering no fresh image and no new agenda to anchor a national candidacy," Shin noted.
Read the two AFP reports featuring Shin's commentary:
Reactionary Politics in South Korea: Understanding Far-Right Ideas and Practices
University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa sociologist Myungji Yang offers a historical account of South Korea’s far right, arguing that recent reactionary mobilization reflects long-standing Cold War legacies, anti-communism, and conservative political networks. Although South Korea is often viewed as one of Asia’s democratic success stories, Yang suggests that recent political turmoil has revealed how deeply rooted illiberal forces remain.
The Arctic Is Rewriting Energy Geopolitics – and Testing South Korea’s Strategy
As Arctic ice melts, South Korea sees new opportunities in energy, shipping, and shipbuilding – but also growing geopolitical risks tied to US-China-Russia competition.
To survive in the global competition for talent while facing the AI era, low fertility, and the crisis of a new brain drain, South Korea must comprehensively review and continuously adjust its talent strategy through a portfolio approach.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s ruling Democratic Party won the majority of key local contests in the country's local elections, but faced a symbolic blow as conservative opposition incumbent Oh Se-hoon secured another term as mayor of Seoul.
South Korea's stock market has been the world's hottest over the past year, with the Kospi Index surging 165% on the back of the country’s two semiconductor powerhouses, Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. This new territory "is creating a lot of issues within Korea," Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, director of APARC's Korea Program, tells Barron's.
The magazine's story – South Korea Has a Chip Conundrum – Huge Profits and a Serious Selloff – highlights how the two companies' mind-boggling earnings and bonuses have opened something of a Pandora’s box of social and economic friction. For example, disgruntled employees at less-privileged Samsung divisions are leaving their union and trying to form a new one, Shin says.
The story notes, however, that these controversies "might look like a mild kerfuffle if the chip makers’ shares keep falling back to earth." Despite a 150% year-to-date gain, Samsung shares dropped 16% last week amid foreign investor sales and leveraged local buying.
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AFP Quotes Gi-Wook Shin on South Korea's June 2026 Local Election Outcomes
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s ruling Democratic Party won the majority of key local contests in the country's local elections, but faced a symbolic blow as conservative opposition incumbent Oh Se-hoon secured another term as mayor of Seoul.
Reactionary Politics in South Korea: Understanding Far-Right Ideas and Practices
University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa sociologist Myungji Yang offers a historical account of South Korea’s far right, arguing that recent reactionary mobilization reflects long-standing Cold War legacies, anti-communism, and conservative political networks. Although South Korea is often viewed as one of Asia’s democratic success stories, Yang suggests that recent political turmoil has revealed how deeply rooted illiberal forces remain.
The Arctic Is Rewriting Energy Geopolitics – and Testing South Korea’s Strategy
As Arctic ice melts, South Korea sees new opportunities in energy, shipping, and shipbuilding – but also growing geopolitical risks tied to US-China-Russia competition.
The return of President Donald Trump to the White House has not only increased geopolitical volatility – it has fundamentally altered expectations about how far major powers are willing to go to secure strategic advantage. What once seemed rhetorical excess—such as his repeated remarks about acquiring Greenland – now appears less implausible in light of recent events. From the escalating crisis in Venezuela in early 2026 to the ongoing Iran War as of May 2026, the United States has signaled a willingness to pursue geopolitical advantage with fewer constraints than before.
Against this backdrop, the Arctic is no longer a peripheral theater. It is rapidly emerging as a central arena where climate change, energy security, and great-power competition intersect. The question is not whether the Arctic matters, but how states will position themselves in a region where the rules are still being written.
A Strategic Arctic, not a Peripheral One
The renewed US interest in Greenland should not be understood narrowly as a territorial ambition. Rather, it reflects a broader strategic calculation about the Arctic. The melting of Arctic ice – combined with technological advances—is making previously inaccessible resources and shipping routes increasingly viable. In this sense, Greenland is not the story – the Arctic is.
The Arctic is estimated to hold roughly 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its natural gas, making it one of the last major frontiers of global energy development. At the same time, new maritime routes such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the emerging Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) promise to significantly shorten shipping distances between Asia and Europe.
For major powers, the implications are profound. Russia has already positioned itself as the dominant Arctic actor, leveraging its geography and resource base. China, through its “Polar Silk Road” initiative, seeks to embed the Arctic into its broader connectivity strategy. Meanwhile, the United States, increasingly viewing the region through a strategic lens, is attempting to mobilize its alliances to counterbalance these moves.
As recent studies suggest, the Arctic is becoming a new frontier of great-power competition – one where economic, military, and legal dimensions are deeply intertwined.
Why South Korea Is Paying Attention to the Arctic
For South Korea, interest in the Arctic may appear surprising at first glance – especially given the ideological orientation of its current progressive government. Traditionally, progressive administrations in Seoul have emphasized engagement with continental powers such as China and Russia, while seeking rapprochement with North Korea. They have also shown interest in infrastructure connectivity across the Eurasian landmass.
Yet the Arctic presents a different kind of opportunity – one that aligns with both geopolitical necessity and economic ambition.
Eunjung Lim, a professor in the Division of International Studies at Kongju National University (KNU), is a visiting scholar at Shorenstein APARC from April 2026 to February 2027. She is also a member of the governing board of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network and a member of the Subcommittee on Energy and Just Transition of the Presidential Commission on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth. She earned a BA from the University of Tokyo, an MIA from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, and a PhD from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
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Indo-Pacific Powers Diversify and De-Risk as Multipolar World Takes Shape
At the 2026 Oksenberg Conference, scholars and foreign policy experts assessed how Indo-Pacific powers are coping with a less predictable United States as China pursues selective leadership and Russia exploits Western divisions.
Reactionary Politics in South Korea: Understanding Far-Right Ideas and Practices
University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa sociologist Myungji Yang offers a historical account of South Korea’s far right, arguing that recent reactionary mobilization reflects long-standing Cold War legacies, anti-communism, and conservative political networks. Although South Korea is often viewed as one of Asia’s democratic success stories, Yang suggests that recent political turmoil has revealed how deeply rooted illiberal forces remain.
A Homecoming for Korean Studies: The Journal of Korean Studies Returns to Stanford
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center’s Korea Program welcomes back The Journal of Korean Studies with the publication of Volume 31, Issue 1.
Snow-capped mountains and a seascape on the shore of the Arctic town of Longyearbyen. | Dragon_XXC via Pixabay
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As Arctic ice melts, South Korea sees new opportunities in energy, shipping, and shipbuilding – but also growing geopolitical risks tied to US-China-Russia competition.
During Stanford’s “Health AI” week, join experts from Korea, China, and Singapore to learn about applications of AI supporting healthy aging in Asia. The webinar will explore the promise of health AI for enabling everyone to enjoy healthy aging to avoid or postpone institutionalization.
Korea, the world's fastest-ageing society, is building a comprehensive system for aging in place — anchored in Universal Health Coverage, long-term care insurance, social care, and the newly enacted Integrated Care Act (March 2026). Professor Kim will share how AI is being embedded across public health, long-term care, and community services, drawing on national applications (AI care calls, social robots, frailty prediction) and a SNU-Stanford collaborative project, with attention to questions of equity, gender, and ethical, legal, and social implications.
Professor Ma of Peking University will then discuss an economic evaluation of integrating AI-enabled diabetic retinopathy (DR) care into primary diabetes care in rural China. Finally, Professor Wong will discuss his research, leadership, and policy experience in Singapore and China, including DR screening, dementia screening, PRIMARY-AI, and the landscape of medical AI in the region. The speakers’ presentations will be followed by Q&A.
This annual event fosters conversations between the US and Asian research communities about AI for healthy aging, including incentive alignment, task augmentation vs automation within health labor markets, and health policymakers’ approaches to accountability, governance, and social impact.
Speakers:
Hongsoo Kim is a professor of health policy and aging at the Graduate School of Public Health and director of the Center for AI in Health and Care at the Artificial Intelligence Institute at Seoul National University (SNU), South Korea. Dr. Kim’s research areas include aging and health policy, long-term care systems, health-care system performance and evaluation, and care innovation. She has conducted numerous government-funded research projects and also participated in reviews of health and long-term care policies at various levels. She was a 2016-2017 Fulbright Visiting Scholar & Takemi Fellow in International Health at Harvard School of Public Health. She has been the recipient of an AXA Research Award (2016) and a Humboldt Research Fellowship (2019). She is currently an expert member of the WHO advisory group for the UN Decade of Healthy Aging (2021-2030). Dr. Kim received her PhD from New York University, where she worked as an assistant professor before she joined SNU.
Xiaochen Ma is an assistant professor of health economics at the China Center for Health Development Studies (CCHDS), Peking University. As a health and development economist, Dr. Ma’s research focuses on health decision-making and health system strengthening. In the past and ongoing projects, he has led several large-scale randomized trials on improving access to quality care through digital health and nudge interventions to disadvantaged communities in China. His work has appeared in leading medical and economics journals such as BMJ and the Journal of Health Economics.
Tien Yin Wong is a physician-scientist-innovator and the Senior Vice-Chancellor of Tsinghua Medicine and Vice-Provost of Tsinghua University, China. He has worked and held senior leadership roles in Singapore and Australia, including at the National University of Singapore, SingHealth Duke-NUS Medical School, Singapore National Eye Centre, and University of Melbourne.
Professor Wong is a practicing retinal specialist with a research portfolio on retinal diseases, ocular imaging, AI, and digital technology. He has published >1,700 peer-reviewed papers (H-index >230, highly cited researcher 2020-2025), given >600 invited named, plenary, and symposium lectures, and received >US$100 million in grant funding. Prof Wong has been recognized with multiple international awards, including the Arnall Patz Medal (Macula Society), Jose Rizal Medal (Asia Pacific Academy of Ophthalmology), and Friedenwald Award (ARVO). He has received Singapore’s President’s Science and Technology Award. He is an elected Member/Fellow of five national academies: the US National Academy of Medicine, the UK Royal Society, the Singapore National Academy of Science, the Australian Academy of Health and Medical Sciences, and the US National Academy of Inventors.
South Korea is projected to become the world’s most aged country by 2045, raising concerns about the fiscal sustainability of healthcare (HC) and long-term care (LTC) systems. This study examines the impact of long-term care insurance (LTCI) coverage expansions on healthcare utilization and expenditures in South Korea, using nationwide claims data from 2006 to 2019. We find that LTCI expansions reduced hospitalizations and inpatient days, potentially driven by improved management of chronic conditions and fall-related risks, suggesting substitution from HC to LTC. However, LTCI expansions consistently increased dementia-related outpatient visits, even during earlier expansions that did not explicitly target dementia. These findings suggest that while LTC can substitute for some healthcare services, it may also complement healthcare by improving access to dementia-related care.
Speaker: Eunkyeong Lee is a health economist and health policy researcher at the Korea Institute of Public Finance (KIPF), and a Visiting Scholar in the Asia Health Policy Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University. Her research focuses on health policy, with particular interests in policy evaluation, population aging, public health, and improving the efficiency of healthcare expenditure. Her academic work has been published in Applied Economics and Korean peer-reviewed journals. At Stanford, she examines the effects of long-term care insurance (LTCI) and dementia-related policy changes on healthcare utilization and costs in South Korea.
Tracing the archival “discovery” of a mass killing of women in South Korea during late 1950, this talk explores the country’s social history and politics of polarization relating to women and the legacies of the Korean War. What happened? Why is this event relatively unknown compared with other massacres that preoccupy Korea’s reconciliations with its authoritarian pasts and state violence? By addressing these questions, this talk tells a larger story about the forces that have durably divided the peninsula through a gendered lens.
Speaker: Diana S. Kim is an Associate Professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and core faculty member of the Asian Studies Program. Kim is the author of Empires of Vice: The Rise of Opium Prohibition across Southeast Asia (Princeton University Press, 2020) and Rethinking Colonial Legacies across Southeast Asia: Through the Lens of the Japanese Wartime Empire (Cambridge University Press Elements Series, 2025). Her research addresses legacies of colonial rule, state-building, illicit economies and transnational history with focus on Southeast and East Asia since the late 19th century. Kim received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and was formerly a US-Korea NextGen Scholar with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Member at the Institute for Advanced Study.
Japan’s semiconductor industry, once globally dominant in DRAM during the 1980s, declined through the 1990s and 2000s due to trade friction with the United States, the rise of Korean competitors, and a failure to adapt to the fabless/foundry model. Today, Japan’s logic IC process technology lags at the 40nm node.
The 2020 global semiconductor shortage prompted Japan to launch two major revitalization projects under the banner of economic security: TSMC Kumamoto, a joint venture producing 12–28nm logic ICs for Japan’s automotive, industrial, and consumer electronics sectors; and Rapidus, an ambitious startup targeting 2nm logic IC manufacturing by 2027.
The paper argues that while TSMC Kumamoto meaningfully strengthens Japan’s domestic supply chain — connecting Japanese equipment and materials suppliers with downstream industries — Rapidus tells a different story. Because Japan has virtually no domestic industrial base currently using 2nm chips, Rapidus’s primary market will likely be the United States. Rather than enhancing Japan’s supply chain resilience, Rapidus effectively inserts Japan into a global advanced logic IC supply chain running from the Netherlands through Japan to the United States. Unless Japan develops industries using these chips, the Rapidus project will not directly address Japan’s economic security strategy.
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The Co-Governance of Community in China’s Megacities
At a seminar on reactionary politics in South Korea, University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoasociologist Myungji Yang argued that the large far-right mobilizations defending former President Yoon Suk Yeol after his martial law declaration were not an isolated development. Instead, they were the product of decades of ideological conflict, authoritarian legacies, and organizational infrastructure on the Korean right.
Yang argued that much of the existing scholarship on the far right focuses on globalization, economic insecurity, and anti-immigrant politics. In South Korea, however, the far-right is shaped less by immigration than by the country’s Cold War history and deeply entrenched anti-Communism during the authoritarian era.
For decades, anti-Communism functioned as a dominant state ideology, defining the boundaries of acceptable political thought. Under authoritarian governments, even moderate reform movements could be dismissed as sympathetic to Communism or North Korea. Yang argued that these ideological structures were never fully dismantled after democratization.
As a result, the boundary between mainstream conservatism and the far right remains blurred. Yang suggested that what is often labeled as conservatism in Korea would be considered far-right politics in many other democracies.
Far-right politics in Korea is organized around anti-Communism, hostility toward North Korea and China, and strong pro-Americanism. It is also tied to nostalgia for authoritarian leaders such as Syngman Rhee, Park Chung Hee, and, increasingly, Chun Doo Hwan, who are remembered by supporters as figures who protected the nation and delivered economic growth.
Building a Right-Wing Infrastructure
Rather than viewing the far right as a fringe movement, Yang described it as a broad right-wing infrastructure made up of parties, religious groups, intellectuals, media organizations, and grassroots activists.
She emphasized that these actors are closely connected. Conservative politicians often participate in far-right rallies, while influential pastors, online personalities, and activists help shape the broader political agenda and organize these events. In this sense, Yang argued, the Korean far right cannot be understood simply through party politics or street protests alone. It is the interaction between formal institutions and social movements that gives the far right its durability.
Yang traced the growth of this infrastructure to the “lost decade” between 1998 and 2008, when reform-oriented governments and former democracy activists became newly influential. Many conservatives viewed this period as a moment of political and cultural displacement. In response, the “New Right” invested heavily in think tanks, publishing houses, online media, and cultural organizations to spread conservative worldviews and challenge the legacy of the democratization movement.
Drawing on ideas of cultural hegemony, these groups focused not only on elections but also on shaping how Koreans think about history, democracy, and national identity.
New Strategies and New Constituencies
Yang also highlighted how the Korean far right has adopted new forms of mobilization. Far-right activists increasingly portray themselves as defenders of freedom and democracy, borrowing the language of civil disobedience and resistance. In their view, they are protecting South Korea from totalitarian threats associated with North Korea, China, and the domestic left. Some even compare their actions to the struggles of figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and Nelson Mandela, framing themselves as guardians of democracy rather than opponents of it.
At the same time, anti-feminism has become a powerful source of support, particularly among younger men. Yang noted that many men in their twenties and thirties have been drawn to right-wing politics because anti-feminist rhetoric resonates strongly with their frustrations and sense of exclusion. These appeals have allowed the far right to expand beyond its traditional base of older anti-Communist conservatives and build support among a younger generation.
Yang also pointed to the far-right’s growing transnational connections. Korean conservative activists increasingly borrow strategies, messaging, and organizational models from global right-wing movements, while cultivating relationships with foreign donors and international conservative networks.
Yang concluded that South Korea’s far right is best understood as “old wine in a new bottle.” Its core narratives – anti-Communism, fear of the left, and nostalgia for authoritarian order – are not new. What has changed are the strategies, technologies, and social coalitions through which those ideas are expressed.
Key Takeaways
Cold War legacies remain central: anti-Communism and authoritarian political culture continue to shape South Korea’s right-wing politics.
The boundary between conservatism and the far-right is often blurred in Korea, making far-right ideas more socially accepted than in many other democracies.
South Korea’s far-right operates through a broad infrastructure of parties, churches, media outlets, and protest movements rather than through fringe groups alone.
Old narratives have found new forms: anti-feminism, social media, conspiracy theories, and transnational conservative networks are helping the far right expand its influence.
Kerstin Norris is a research associate at APARC’s Korea Program and managerial editor of The Journal of Korean Studies.
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A Homecoming for Korean Studies: The Journal of Korean Studies Returns to Stanford
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center’s Korea Program welcomes back The Journal of Korean Studies with the publication of Volume 31, Issue 1.
Indo-Pacific Powers Diversify and De-Risk as Multipolar World Takes Shape
At the 2026 Oksenberg Conference, scholars and foreign policy experts assessed how Indo-Pacific powers are coping with a less predictable United States as China pursues selective leadership and Russia exploits Western divisions.
The Untapped Social Capital of International Students in Japan and Korea
This article examines how international students can play a strategic role in “rebalancing” national talent portfolios in countries with strong ethnonational identities facing demographic decline. In Japan and South Korea, “brain linkage” facilitated through international students’ transnational social capital offers a pathway to leverage foreign talent without requiring immediate, large-scale immigration reforms.
Supporters of impeached South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol gather on April 4, 2025, in Seoul, South Korea. | Han Myung-Gu/ Getty Images
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University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa sociologist Myungji Yang offers a historical account of South Korea’s far right, arguing that recent reactionary mobilization reflects long-standing Cold War legacies, anti-communism, and conservative political networks. Although South Korea is often viewed as one of Asia’s democratic success stories, Yang suggests that recent political turmoil has revealed how deeply rooted illiberal forces remain.
The Journal of Korean Studies(JKS), the flagship peer-reviewed publication in the field of Korean studies, returns to Stanford University’s Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) with the publication of Volume 31, Issue 1. JKS publishes a broad range of original scholarly articles related to Korean history, culture, politics, and society. The journal also publishes reviews of new Korea-related books, making it both a venue for original research and a guide to the field’s expanding literature. Its contributors and readership span disciplines and continents, bringing together historians, literary and cultural scholars, sociologists, political scientists, and anthropologists representing the wide range of disciplinary approaches in Korean studies.
The journal’s institutional history traces the arc of Korean studies in the United States. The journal was originally established in 1969 at the University of Washington in Seattle, the early center of gravity for Korean studies in America. After the publication of two standalone volumes (1969, 1971), James Palais, an influential historian of premodern Korea, shaped the journal's intellectual character through serial publication (1979-1987). Michael Robinson, at Indiana University-Bloomington, carried the journal forward as editor (1988-1992) before a long publication hiatus. In 2004, JKS was revived at Stanford University by co-editors Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea and director of the Korea Program at APARC, and John Duncan, professor of Korean history at UCLA and former director of its Center for Korean Studies. It was housed at Stanford until 2008. The journal has since been guided by editorial leadership at the University of Washington (Clark Sorensen), Columbia University (Theodore Hughes), and The George Washington University (Jisoo Kim). JKS returns to Stanford under the new editorial team of Paul Chang (Shorenstein APARC), Yumi Moon (Department of History), and Dafna Zur (Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures).
JKS welcomes manuscripts from researchers at all career stages, working across the full range of topics, periods, and methodologies reflected in the field of Korean studies. Korean studies is undergoing genuine growth with new generations of scholars producing compelling work that is reshaping our understanding of Korea’s past and present. The Journal of Korean Studies exists to support and disseminate that work.
Kerstin Norris is a research associate at APARC’s Korea Program and managerial editor of The Journal of Korean Studies.
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The Untapped Social Capital of International Students in Japan and Korea
This article examines how international students can play a strategic role in “rebalancing” national talent portfolios in countries with strong ethnonational identities facing demographic decline. In Japan and South Korea, “brain linkage” facilitated through international students’ transnational social capital offers a pathway to leverage foreign talent without requiring immediate, large-scale immigration reforms.
How Gender Inequality Drives Talent Abroad and Keeps Women Away
Minyoung An, a postdoctoral fellow with the Korea Program and the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab at APARC, studies how gender inequality shapes migration pathways and return decisions among South Korean highly skilled women, highlighting risks to Korea's long-term future and revealing that gender is a powerful yet often overlooked driver of global talent flows.
Income-Based Health Inequalities Persist in the US and South Korea, Though Universal Coverage Helps Reduce Disparities
South Korea achieves comparable clinical outcomes at lower per-capita spending than the United States, according to a new study. The co-authors, including Stanford health economist Karen Eggleston, find systemic income-based inequalities in health care access and utilization in both countries, albeit they are less pronounced under South Korea's universal health care system.
The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center’s Korea Program welcomes back The Journal of Korean Studies with the publication of Volume 31, Issue 1.
The legacies of colonialism, the Cold War, and U.S. policies significantly shaped state-building and economic growth in post-World War II Asia, including South Korea. While these factors have been extensively studied, one crucial aspect has been underexplored: the power of ideas. This talk will cover the historical changes and continuity of ideas and knowledge on public administration in South Korea during the 1940-1960s. The presenter will focus on the dissemination and transformation of American administrative knowledge in this period, addressing how the original American knowledge was disseminated to South Korea, and why and how it was sought to be ‘Koreanized’ by public administration scholars in South Korea.
Speaker: Seok Jin Eom is a professor of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Seoul National University in Korea. He is a Fulbright scholar and a 2025-26 visiting scholar at Stanford's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. His current research interests include the intellectual history of Korean public administration, the changes and continuity of public governance in Korea, and the digital transformation of government in the AI era. He has published numerous academic papers and books including The Intellectual History of Korean Public Administration Research and Education (2026, Seoul National University Press), Enabling Data-Driven Innovation and AI Government in Korea (2026, Springer), and The Changes and Continuity of Japanese State Apparatus (2015, Seoul National University Press).
