North Korea economic officials visit Stanford
On Friday, April 1, Stanford University hosted twelve North Korean officials making an unprecedented economic tour of the United States. Organized by Professor Susan Shirk of the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the two-week tour of American businesses and academic institutions was an opportunity for the visitors to see firsthand what improved relations with the United States might mean in terms of economic cooperation.
The North Koreans included senior and mid-level officials responsible for economic, trade, financial and foreign affairs. Their visit took place despite the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the continuing U.S. and UN sanctions against the country for its development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles.
Welcoming the visitors to a luncheon in Encina Hall, David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), briefed them on the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University (FSI) and its research centers, including Shorenstein APARC and the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Straub also introduced representatives from FSI and the School of Medicine who have been involved in policy, academic, and humanitarian engagement projects with the DPRK.
Mr. Henry S. Rowen, co-director of the Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE), then outlined the history and organization of Stanford University and its leading role in the development of Silicon Valley. Mr. John Sandelin, senior associate emeritus of the Stanford Office of Technology Licensing, described the university's policies on sharing university-generated intellectual property with the private sector. Following the presentations, American guests at the luncheon, including CISAC's Dr. William J. Perry and Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, had informal discussions with their North Korean tablemates about the possibilities of, and obstacles to, economic collaboration between the two countries.
The North Koreans' visit to Stanford concluded with a stop at the Hoover Tower observation deck for a panoramic view of the Stanford campus, where they were able to see how Stanford graduates had developed Silicon Valley literally around the campus. DPRK delegation members expressed appreciation for the hospitality they were shown at Stanford and underlined their hopes for economic exchanges with the United States.
The most recent previous visit to Stanford by a DPRK delegation took place in January 2008, when CISAC Professor John W. Lewis, Shorenstein APARC director Gi-Wook Shin, and the School of Medicine's Dr. Sharon Perry hosted five public health officials for discussions about collaboration on tuberculosis control. Out of that visit evolved Stanford's DPRK Tuberculosis Project, which, in association with the DPRK Ministry of Public Health and NGO partners, is developing the country's first laboratory with the capacity to diagnose drug-resistant tuberculosis.
Where is North Korea’s Nuclear Program Heading?
John Everard, Pantech Fellow, to join UN Security Council Panel of Experts
North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test in October 2006, prompting the UN Security Council to establish military and economic sanctions in an effort to block further development of the country's nuclear program. After North Korea conducted another test in May 2009—a move that U.S. President Barack Obama described as "directly and recklessly challenging the international community"—the UN Secretary General, at the request of the Security Council, convened a Panel of Experts to advise and assist the UN committee that enforces the sanctions (the "1718 Committee," after the UN Security Council Resolution that brought it into being).
John Everard, 2010-2011 Pantech Fellow with the Stanford Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) and former UK Ambassador to North Korea, left Stanford at the end of March to take up a position with the panel.
The seven-member panel comprises independent experts from the Security Council's five permanent member countries—China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and from South Korea and Japan. Some experts come from academic institutions while others have been lent to the panel by national governments. As part of its efforts to advise the 1718 Committee, the panel often travels to inspect banned goods—such as materials that could be used for nuclear purposes—in intercepted cargo shipping to or from North Korea.
During his diplomatic service in North Korea from 2006 to 2008, Everard closely observed and took photographs of the details of everyday life, discovering that the mindset of ordinary people frequently does not match official government ideology. "There is an openness toward warm relations with Americans if political relations improve," he says. Everard is currently working on completing a book describing his observations of the everyday life of non-elite North Koreans, as well as his experience as a foreigner living in North Korea. It also addresses how North Korea as a country has evolved over the past sixty years and provides suggestions for how better to deal with its government.
Although Everard looks forward to his new position with the Panel of Experts, he will not soon forget his time at Shorenstein APARC. "It has been a great experience," he emphasizes. "It has been a real delight to be surrounded not just by this beautiful architecture and the wonderful facilities that Stanford has, but also by the very friendly, very intelligent people here."
Prepare now for possible change in North Korea
Sooner or later, I believe, there will be major change in
North Korea. The system may be very strong, but it is also very brittle. Without
democratic electoral processes and free speech, smooth and gradual adjustments
cannot be made to meet changing circumstances and the needs of the people.
-David Straub
Korean Studies Program
In the mid-1990s, after the death of Kim Il Sung, I heard
many top U.S. officials, speaking privately, predict that the North Korean
regime would collapse in a matter of just a few years, if not months. I was
younger then and assumed they knew what they were talking about. They didn't.
They didn't know much about North Korea. They simply compared it to the situation
in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where communist regimes had just
collapsed, and thought the same thing would happen in the very different
circumstances of North Korea. Everyone was saying it would happen, so it must
true, people assumed. Americans don't like the North Korean regime, so wishful
thinking also contributed to this consensus among Americans.
These days, as another leadership succession is underway in North Korea, many people again are speculating about the "collapse" of the Pyongyang regime. The fact of the matter is that no one, not even in Pyongyang, really knows what is going to happen there. I believe there could be dramatic change in the regime in North Korea even as you are reading this, but I also believe it is possible that the regime could last many decades more.
A former colleague, Bill Newcomb, recently compared the situation in North Korea to the buildup of pressure along a fault zone. No one, he noted, can predict when a particular earthquake will occur and how large it will be, but scientists today can say with confidence that a major earthquake will inevitably occur in a certain area eventually. Pyongyang is indeed like that.
Sooner or later, I believe, there will be major change in North Korea. The system may be very strong, but it is also very brittle. Without democratic electoral processes and free speech, smooth and gradual adjustments cannot be made to meet changing circumstances and the needs of the people.
Whether the political earthquake in Pyongyang occurs sooner or later, it is only prudent to prepare thoroughly. The United States and other countries will help the Republic of Korea when dramatic change occurs in North Korea, but it will be the Republic of Korea and the people of North and South Korea who, inevitably, will bear the most risk and stand to gain the most.
Since we cannot predict exactly when or how change will come to North Korea or what its nature will be, South Koreans and their allies and friends abroad need to begin to prepare now for many possibilities. I understand that some South Koreans are concerned that such a discussion will offend and anger Pyongyang and may cause its own problems. But the consequences of not preparing could be far worse. This should not be a matter of pushing for collapse, much less risking war, but for preparing prudently to meet real dangers and real opportunities.
South Koreans need to pool their wisdom and their resources, so that they will be able to respond quickly and effectively no matter what eventually happens in North Korea. There needs to be much more thorough study and debate, both within the government and among the citizenry, about how to deal with various possible crises on the Korean Peninsula, including unification.
I worked on German affairs in the U.S. State Department shortly after German unification, and observed as the government in Bonn, while making heroic efforts, made many serious mistakes. Policies regarding currency unification, wages and pensions, property claims and many other issues caused human suffering and national problems that linger today, twenty years later. How great is the understanding in South Korea among government officials and the public about these issues?
One of the things that many South Koreans seem to have concluded from German unification is that unification will be too risky and too costly. There certainly will be risks and the costs will be great when unification occurs. But unification may occur whether all South Koreans want it or not, and whether they are ready or not. And most costs, if carefully planned, will actually be investments. Moreover, there will not only be risks; there will be opportunities for enormous gain. Unified Korea could be stronger, safer, more prosperous, and happier, not just for the people of North Korea but for all Koreans.
We all remember the earthquake that hit a very poor and unprepared Haiti last year, killing at least 100,000 people and leaving a million homeless. The terrible earthquake that Japan has just experienced was 1,000 times more powerful. Just imagine the consequences if Japan had not prepared as well as it had. It is time for the Republic of Korea to begin to prepare seriously for the eventual political earthquake on the Korean Peninsula.
[나와 통일]4. 스트라우브 스탠퍼드대 부소장
1994년 김일성이 사망한 뒤, 나는 미국의 많은 고위관리들이 사견으로 북한 정권이 몇 개월내 혹은 몇년 내 붕괴할 것이라고 예측하는 것을 들었다. 그때 나는 그들 스스로가 무엇을 얘기하고 있는지 알고 있다고 추측했다. 그러나 그들은 몰랐다. 그들은 단순히 북한을, 공산주의 정권이 붕괴됐던 소련과 동유럽의 상황과 비교했고, 이 같은 상황이 매우 다른 환경의 북한에서도 발생할 것이라고 생각했다. 미국인들은 북한정권을 좋아하지 않기 때문에 (북한이 망할 것이라는) ‘희망적 생각'(wishful thinking)도 이런 일치된 예측에 기여했다.
▲ 데이비드 스트라우브 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소 한국학 부소장은 남북한의 통일 비용이 결국은 투자가 될 것이라고 강조했다.
요즘 북한에서 권력 승계가 진행되면서, 많은 사람들이 북한 정권의 ‘붕괴'에 대해 다시 추측하고 있다. 이 문제와 관련해 명확한 사실은, 누구도, 심지어 평양에 있는 사람도, 거기서 실제 무슨 일이 일어나고 있는지 정확히 모른다는 것이다. 나는 북한 정권에 상당한 변화가 있을 수 있지만, 그 정권이 수십년 더 지속하는 것이 가능하다고도 생각한다.
●北시스템 강한만큼 깨지기도 쉬워
전직 동료인 윌리엄 뉴콤(전 미 재무부 경제자문관)은 최근 북한 상황을 ‘단층대를 따라 고조되는 압력'에 비유했다. 그는, 누구도 어떤 특별한 지진이 언제 발생할 것이고 얼마나 클 것인지 예측할 수 없지만, 오늘날 과학자들은 대규모 지진이 불가피하게 어느 지역에서 결국 발생할 것이라고 확신을 갖고 말할 수 있다고 지적했다.
평양은 정말로 이런 상황과 같다. 나는 조만간 북한에 큰 변화가 있을 것이라고 생각한다. 북한의 시스템은 매우 강할 수 있지만 역시나 매우 깨지기 쉽다. 민주주의적 선거 과정과 표현의 자유 없이, 사람들의 수요와 변하는 환경을 충족시키기 위한 평탄하고 단계적인 조정은 불가능하다.
평양에서 ‘정치적인 지진'이 조만간 일어나든 아니든, 철저하게 대비하는 것이 현명하다. 미국과 다른 나라들은 북한에 극적인 변화가 일어날 경우 한국을 도울 것이다. 그러나 남한과 남북한 사람들이 불가피하게 가장 위험을 감수하고, 가장 많은 이득도 얻게 될 것이다.
우리는 변화가 언제 어떻게 올지, 그것의 모습이 무엇일지 정확하게 예측하기 어렵다. 때문에 남한 사람들과 동맹국들, 우방들은 지금부터 많은 가능성에 대해 준비해야 한다.
나는 일부 남한 사람들이 그런 논의가 북한을 화나게 할 것이고 북한 내 문제를 유발할 것이라고 걱정하는 것을 알고 있다.
그러나 준비하지 않는 것의 결과는 훨씬 나쁠 수 있다. 이것은 붕괴를 재촉하는 문제가 아니라, 실제로 맞닥뜨릴 위험과 기회에 대해 신중하게 준비해 나가야 하는 문제다.
남한 사람들은 북한에 결국 무슨 일이 발생하든 신속하고 효과적으로 대응할 수 있도록 지혜와 자원을 공유할 필요가 있다. 정부와 민간에서 통일을 포함, 한반도에서 발생 가능한 다양한 위기들에 대해 어떻게 대처할 것인지에 대한 더 많은 철저한 연구와 논쟁이 필요하다.
나는 독일 통일 직후 미 국무부에서 독일 담당 업무를 했다. 당시 독일 정부가 용감하게 노력했지만 심각한 실수를 많이 한 것을 관측했다. 화폐 단일화, 임금, 연금, 재산권 등과 관련된 정책들이 20년이 지난 오늘날에도 맴돌고 있는 국민 고통과 문제를 야기했다. 한국의 관료들과 대중 가운데 이런 문제들에 대해 얼마나 이해하고 있는가?
●신속 대응위한 지혜·자원 공유를
많은 남한 사람들이 독일 통일로부터 결론을 내린 것으로 보이는 것들 중 하나는, 통일은 매우 위험하고 비용이 많이 들 것이라는 것이다. 통일이 이뤄질 때 위험과 비용은 당연히 클 것이다.
그러나 통일은 남한 사람들이 원하든 원치 않든, 준비가 돼 있든 아니든 일어날 수 있다. 그리고, 대부분의 비용은, 주의 깊게 계획된다면, 실제로는 투자가 될 것이다. 게다가 위험만 있는 것은 아니다. 엄청난 이득을 위한 기회도 있을 것이다.
통일된 한국은 단지 북한 사람들뿐 아니라 모든 한국인들을 더 강하고, 안전하고, 번영하고, 행복하게 할 수 있다.
우리는 지난해 준비되지 않은 아이티를 강타한 지진의 엄청난 피해를 기억한다. 최근 일본의 대지진은 아이티 지진보다 1000배 강력했다. 일본이 준비하지 않았다면 어떤 결과가 발생했을지 상상해 보라. 이제 남한은 한반도의 정치적 지진에 대해 심각하게 준비해야 한다.
번역·정리 김미경기자 chaplin7@seoul.co.kr
●약력
▲57 세 ▲미 루이빌대·하버드대 박사과정 ▲주서독 미대사관 근무 ▲주한 미대사관 근무 ▲주일 미대사관 근무 ▲미 국무부 독일팀장 ▲주한 미대사관 공사참사관 ▲미 국무부 한국과장·일본과장 ▲미 존스 홉킨스대·서울대 강의 ▲현재 미 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소 한국학 부소장
Everard discusses social change and reform in North Korea
The Sixth Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum
In this sixth session of the Forum, former senior government officials and other leading experts from the United States and South Korea will discuss current developments in North Korea and North Korea policy, the future of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and a strategic vision for Northeast Asia. The session is hosted by the Korean Studies Program at Shorenstein APARC in association with the Sejong Institute, a top South Korean think tank.
Bechtel Conference Center
Lessons from the Failure of Nuclear Negotiations with North Korea
Today nuclear negotiations with North Korea, begun twenty years ago, have returned to their starting point. The Geneva Agreement of 1994 collapsed as a result of North Korea’s clandestine uranium enrichment program, and the PRC-hosted Six Party talks have failed to halt nuclear tests by North Korea. Neither the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration nor the coercive policy of President Bush succeeded in resolving the North Korean nuclear conundrum. The North now claims it should be treated as a nuclear weapons state.
North Korea is currently waging a "peace offensive" to deflect criticism from the international community for its reckless military provocations against South Korea last year. The North may also need dialogue with the international community more than we do, to obtain economic assistance, since starving people would not support their regime and nuclear weapons cannot feed its people. The United States and South Korea agree, however, that under present circumstances, engagement with North Korea would be futile. They maintain that their refusal to resume talks with North Korea is a deliberate and strategic decision. Looking back on real-world experience, North Korea has consistently used provocations as "leverage" to arrive at negotiations on its terms. In most cases, it has gained considerable concessions, using its well-known brinkmanship tactics.
Now that North Korea has confirmed the existence of its uranium enrichment program and announced it will begin constructions of LWRs on its own, neighboring countries are deeply concerned about nuclear safety—not to mention nuclear security—in North Korea. This provides a reason for an unconditional dialogue with North Korea, apparently precisely the situation North sought. In this light, Mr. Yu will review the last twenty years of negotiations with North Korea to draw lessons for dealing with the regime in the future.
Mr. Yu is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea. He served as Korea's Ambassador to Israel, Japan and Philippines.
Philippines Conference Room
Myung Hwan Yu
Shorenstein APARC
Encina Hall E313
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Mr. Yu is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea. He served as Korea's Ambassador to Israel, Japan and Philippines.