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To illustrate the worst-case scenario for China in the near future, Scott Rozelle pulls up a picture from Mexico. It's a completely barren manufacturing warehouse, abandoned after wages in Mexico rose to more than four dollars per hour.

Following its manufacturing moment in the 1980s, Mexico has been struggling to create jobs in part because 40 percent of its workers lack a high school education, the Stanford University Professor of Economics said.

Contrast this to South Korea, where almost the entire workforce has attained a high school degree. After manufacturing jobs left South Korea in the 1980s, he said, well-educated workers were able to upgrade to technical jobs like chip manufacturing and computer assembly.

The question for China is: South Korea or Mexico? Rozelle said.

With rising labor costs, China is under pressure to upgrade from low-cost manufacturing to high-tech production. But it's still an open question as to whether China's labor force will have the education levels to take on these new roles, or if the jobs will move elsewhere as they did from Mexico in the last few decades.

The odds are stacked against China. In some parts of the country, China's labor force more resembles Mexico's than South Korea's, with about 40 percent of workers in the poorest rural areas (China's 592 "nationally-designated poor counties," as deemed by China's anti-poverty authorities) lacking a high school education, Rozelle said.

Furthermore, the financial hurdles to attaining higher education are the highest in the world, illustrated most recently by a series of studies conducted by the Rural Education Action Project (REAP)—an umbrella group that includes Rozelle's Stanford University, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Peking University and the Xi'an-based Northwest University.

In one REAP study of 62 nations, China claimed the highest tuition price for public rural high schools: $160 per student per semester, not including costs like housing and everyday living expenses. This is nearly three times the world's second-highest tuition in Indonesia, which also fully subsidizes the education costs of children under the poverty line.

It's also a stark contrast to the fact that the vast majority of nations—93 percent of those studied—fully subsidize education, including places like Brazil, India and Kenya.

The high costs of education will become even more problematic, Rozelle said, once China's economy begins to restructure towards higher-value production. If the skill levels of the labor force cannot keep up, China will be caught in a middle-income trap, he said, possibly leading to high unemployment and social strife—not unlike what is plaguing Mexico now, he said.

Even a small subsidy could push thousands of students into high school. In REAP's most recent study, Rozelle and his colleagues took 250 junior high classes in Shaaxi Province and selected the two poorest students from each, providing one with a 1,500 to 2,500 yuan subsidy. The survey revealed that 51 percent of students who had received the subsidy were admitted to high school in the fall of 2010, while only 38 percent without the subsidy enrolled.

To some degree, the Chinese government has recognized the importance of limiting the costs of education. In 2009, officials enacted a policy to reduce high school tuition costs, providing 20 percent of students in central regions and 30 percent in the China's western parts with scholarships ranging between 1,000 and 3,300 yuan annually.

But the policy has proved somewhat illusory: In its 2011 survey of more than 3,000 students in Shaanxi Province, REAP discovered that less than five percent of the targeted students had actually received the subsidies.

The origins of intolerance toward Indonesia's Muslim-minority sect Ahmadiyah go back to the early twentieth century, says Jeremy Menchik. In a Jakarta Post op-ed, he unearths the connections between the Indonesian government and anti-Ahmadiyah sentiment, and makes suggestions for how the country can prevent future violence.

Since opening its doors to the world in 1978, China has pursued a sometimes erratic but reasonably steady course leading to increasing global economic and political interaction. Its interests now extend from Pyongyang to New York and Sydney to Riyadh. U.S. President Barack Obama’s announcement of a new “pivot” toward Asia, recent events on the Korean Peninsula, and China’s upcoming leadership transition provide additional reasons to seek greater understanding of China’s goals and interactions with other nations.

Thomas Fingar, Stanford’s Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, is leading a new multiphase Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) initiative to explore the nuances and complexity of China’s foreign relations and domestic issues. The China and the World research project aims to contextualize and better understand China’s regional and global interactions, both from the perspective of China itself and from that of other countries. Beginning with Northeast Asia, the project will analyze China’s relations region-by-region throughout the world, and will involve experts from Stanford, China, and the regions studied. It kicks off with a Shorenstein APARC-organized workshop held Mar. 19 and 20 at the new Stanford Center at Peking University.

Fingar discusses the development of China’s foreign relations since 1978, and describes the project and workshop’s background.

In the three decades since Deng Xiaoping enacted his 1978 Open Door reforms, what have been the main trends in China’s global engagement?

The general trend since 1978 has been for China to become increasingly active and engaged in a growing number of places around the world. There have been a number of phases to this.

The “honeymoon period” of U.S.-China relations (1979–1989) was a period of essentially no competition to China’s interaction within the U.S.-led world economic system. China concentrated on the OECD countries—especially the United States, Japan, and Western Europe—that had money to invest and willingness to trade.

After the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, China’s international options became more constrained as its relations with the developed world plateaued. It began to reach out to the places that would deal with it: Southeast Asia and particularly Africa. This was in part diplomatically motivated, and in part a search for new markets for the low-end goods it was beginning to produce. It was also the beginning of its search for energy.

Around 2000, China transitioned from building a more modern economy towards being one—beginning the era of its “rise.” China’s demand for resources went up, as did its capacity to supply more markets and its ability to invest more of its growing foreign exchange earnings. It became globally active, proclaiming that it had a new, less exploitative model than what the United States and Europe offered.

What Northeast Asia issues do you think China will focus on this year, especially as it plans for a major leadership transition?

North Korea’s stability and China’s growing investments in the DPRK. Beijing is acutely interested in whether Kim Jong Un will prove a viable leader and whether the regime will be able to manage its new challenges. China is concerned about possible North Korean provocations that might trigger responses by South Korea and/or the United States, putting at risk the peaceful regional and international situation China needs for its political and economic development.

The second issue is answering the question: what does the U.S. pivot toward Asia mean? What does it mean in terms of security, economics, and relations with Japan and Korea? China is the largest trading partner for each of these countries. They value it as a market, and as a source of resources. Yet they also worry about being excessively dependent on China. They appear not to have worried about this quite so much when their dependence on the U.S. market was comparable.

Two full workshop sessions will be devoted to Japan and South Korea, both countries with close U.S. ties. What are the most important factors with regard to China’s rise for these two countries? What about for Southeast Asia?

One of the reasons for our upcoming Beijing workshop is to develop a general template of questions we can ask for each region. We want to avoid focusing the questions too narrowly on Northeast Asia.

For Japan and Korea, one factor has to do with economic opportunities and with their own vulnerabilities. The other has to do with the security challenges of China’s rise, and the uncertainty of its military aspirations. Japan and Korea do not want to be drawn into U.S.-led activities, but they still value the United States for protection. They are concerned about managing the decoupling of economic and security dependence, about no longer being dependent on the same country for both.

Many regional issues are interrelated, such as maritime territorial claims and naval expansion. China is an economic player in Southeast Asia, and the Philippines and Thailand have an alliance with the United States. Indonesia is a rising county in Southeast Asia, and India is an outside player in the region. The U.S. 7th Fleet currently defends the shipping lanes to Northeast Asia that go through Southeast Asia, which probably is not the long-term solution.  

Russia played an important role in shaping the political ideology in the early days of the People’s Republic of China, and the politics of both countries—especially Russia—have changed so much. What is their relationship like now?

Correct and limited. The West imposed a military hardware embargo on China after Tiananmen, so Russia is a limited alternative for that, and it is also a source of energy and other resources. It is fair to say China has something close to disdain for Russia, for what it sees as political confusion and economic mismanagement. The idea of a strategic triangle—using Russia to balance U.S. influence—is something China sees as unviable.

As you move forward with this project, what is the ultimate goal?

The goal is to understand the dynamics of interaction—to understand the bigger picture. Other countries have objectives and concerns with regard to China, while China has objectives and concerns of its own. It is about identifying things such as where they see the same and different kinds of opportunities; what concerns they have about third country interests or involvement; and how they evaluate the success of policies to date.  

Riding around on the back of a motorcycle in 2009, Jeremy Menchik snapped photos of hundreds of Indonesian campaign posters. That number has now grown to over 5000 images, which Menchik and Colm Fox have painstakingly coded and analyzed to better understand the politics of identity in Indonesia. The initial results of their research reveal similarities between the United States and Indonesia, and shed light on the transitional democracies of the Arab Spring.

Menchik is a 2011–12 Shorenstein Fellow at Stanford University, and will take up a position as an assistant professor in international relations at Boston University in 2013.

Fox is a doctoral student at the George Washington University’s Department of Political Science.

How important is political identity in Indonesia? Why?

Indonesia is the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, and one of the most diverse. But what we found was that rather than being unique, Indonesian politicians behave remarkably similar to American politicians in using a variety of regional, religious, and ethnic identity symbols to court voters.

For example, just recently on NPR, I heard Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich using broken Spanish to appeal to Latino voters in Florida. That is no different than candidates for mayor in northern Sumatra, who often print one poster with them wearing Islamic clothing for one neighborhood, and another poster with them wearing Batak clothing for a different neighborhood. And a third where they are draped in the Indonesian flag.

Our research suggests that despite the obvious differences between a developed, Western country like the United States, and a developing, Muslim-majority country like Indonesia, politicians often act similarly when they are trying to win elections.

What is an important factor in determining a candidate’s use of identity symbols?

What we found is that the election rules matter, a lot. Candidates are far more likely to use religious and ethnic symbols in a plurality (“winner-take-all”) system like the United States than in a proportional representation system (PR) like Indonesia. This is an important finding, because tinkering with election rules is one of the tools that international relations practitioners can use to reduce ethnic and sectarian violence. And what we are saying is that it works. Changing election rules can change the types and levels of identities that are politicized. And that is an important lesson for conflict resolution.

What are some of the most surprising results to come out of your research?

The first is how badly the dominant explanations for identity politics—modernization theory and secularization theory—fared when they were tested on a large dataset. We are at an interesting juncture in time, where our theories of religion and politics have not caught up with the way the world works.

A second surprising finding is how much electoral rules shape the use of identity symbols. Indonesia is a Muslim-majority country, but you would not know it in many of the PR elections. Having strong party backing is so crucial to winning seats in the legislature that it overrides candidates’ religious identity. This points to a similarity between a developed, consolidated Western democracy like the United States, and a developing, unconsolidated Muslim-majority country like Indonesia. The rules are really important for understanding "how politics works" in the Muslim world.

Finally, it was interesting to see the continued importance of history for understanding contemporary political behavior. Regional rebellions that happened in the 1950s continue to echo in politics today. There are certainly ways that changing electoral rules and economic development can result in a shift in political identity, but without understanding the specific Indonesian context, a lot of our results do not make sense. That is an important lesson that for understanding how people in a Muslim country vote; the regionally specific history of that country is very important.      

During last year’s Arab Spring, the ideal of democracy was celebrated throughout the world. How might your research shed light on understanding the complexities of these transitioning democracies?

Well this research has clear implications for the Arab Spring, particularly for understanding the future of Egypt. Just because religious parties like the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafist Nour party come into office does not mean that democracy is doomed, or that religious minorities are going to suffer. As long as secular Muslims, Christians, liberals, and other groups have a stake in elections, we are likely to see cross-ethnic and cross-religious coalitions emerge. This is a very good thing. One obvious difference, however, is that we did not see a lot of overt military participation in politics in Indonesia after 1999. The military was largely absent. And that is one way that Egypt is very different from Indonesia. If there is a big threat to democracy in Egypt, it is not coming from the politicization of identity—it is coming from the suppression of the people's voice by the military.

Stanford’s Center on Food Security and the Environment (FSE) has received a $2 million grant from Cargill, a second gift from the company that raises its total contribution to FSE to $5 million over 10 years.

The announcement was made Nov. 10 at a dinner celebrating the launch of FSE as a full-scale research center. FSE has more than doubled in size in five years. Because of its growth and increasing importance of food security issues at Stanford and worldwide, it became an official center in September.

“The center’s rapid growth would not have been possible without the generous support of Cargill,” FSE Director and William Wrigley Senior Fellow Rosamond L. Naylor said. “Cargill’s initial investment provided seed-funding for the bold, new research and teaching that was happening at FSE while keeping our lights on and the staff running during our critical years of early development.”

A $3 million grant from Cargill in 2008 jump-started a visiting fellows program at FSE and helped build the infrastructure to support the center’s research.

The new grant will continue to provide program support, but will also be used to hire younger faculty and scholars to Stanford to work within the new Center.

Stanford-Cargill partnership

Stanford's partnership with Cargill extends back to 1976 when Cargill endowed Walter P. Falcon, then Director of Stanford's Food Research Institute and now FSE Deputy Director, with the Helen C. Farnsworth Professorship in International Agricultural Policy. The gift was intended to strengthen Stanford's work in agricultural policy, specifically as it relates to the international grain economy. FSI senior fellow Scott Rozelle now holds the Helen C. Farnsworth chair.

FSE and Cargill remain committed to helping feed a growing population while preserving the planet's natural resources. FSE is an applied group focused on providing real solutions to important food and agricultural issues.

“Poverty is the main issue driving food insecurity—it’s a question of access rather than food availability,” Naylor said.

FSE’s partnership with Cargill has demonstrated how Stanford-based research can be relevant to the private sector. FSE is conducting ongoing research on oil palm and land use issues in Indonesia that is helping inform and shape policy. Work on aquaculture feeds in China is another overlapping area of interest, as are ongoing assessments of biofuels in the U.S., Africa and Asia. Both have a stake in better understanding climate change impacts on agriculture and food commodity price volatility.

“It is clear to us at FSE—and increasingly to leadership of Stanford—that global food security will remain a critical issue within international policy circles,” said Naylor. “With support like the grant from Cargill, we are confident that Stanford can play a leading role in shaping the future policy discourse.”

STANFORD, Calif.—Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) is pleased to announce China’s Caixin Media as the recipient of the 2011 Shorenstein Journalism Award. Caixin was selected for its commitment to integrity in journalism, and for its path-breaking role as a leader in establishing an independent media in China.

The Shorenstein Journalism Award was launched in 2002 to recognize the contributions of Western journalists in deepening our understanding of Asia. In 2011, the recipients of the award have been broadened to encompass Asian journalists who are at the forefront of the battle for press freedom in Asia and who have played a key role in constructing a new role for the media, including the growth of social media and Internet-based journalism. The award will also identify those Asian journalists who, from that side of the Pacific Ocean, have aided the growth of mutual understanding between Asia and the United States.

Asia has served as a crucible for the role of the press in democratization in places such as South Korea, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. It has also figured greatly in the emergence of social media and citizen journalism. New tests of the role of the media are emerging in China, Vietnam, and other authoritarian societies in Asia. The Shorenstein Journalism Award aims to encourage the understanding of key issues facing the media in Asia, among them whether the Internet will be a catalyst for change or an instrument of authoritarian control.

The decision to name Caixin Media as the first recipient of this award in Asia is a recognition of the leadership role of a group of young journalists, led by a visionary editor, since their founding of Caijing magazine in 1998. The core group moved on in November 2009 to found Caixin Media in an effort to preserve their independence in a media environment dominated by the state in China. The company is based in Beijing and is guided by an independent advisory board of noted Chinese and foreign intellectuals and academics. The Caixin team has achieved renown for its coverage of the profound economic and social changes taking place in China and its willingness to dig into the darker corners of that change. In recent months, Caixin has probed into the errors that led to the crash of a high-speed train in China, and investigated the seizure and sale of children by family planning officials in Hunan province.

Hailed by the Economist as “one of China’s more outspoken media organizations,” Caixin is internationally recognized for its tough-minded investigative reporting. In 2011, Caixin editor-in-chief Hu Shuli was named one of Time Magazine’s Top 100 Influential People, and managing editor Wang Shuo was ranked among China’s top 10 young editors.

Caixin publishes several leading print and online publications, including the weekly business and finance magazine Caixin Century, the monthly periodical China Reform, the bimonthly journal Comparative Studies, and the English-language Caixin Weekly: China Economics and Finance. Caixin’s numerous other offerings include a Chinese- and English-language news portal Caixin.cn, a publication series, video programming, an international journalism fellowship program, and extensive use of social media.

On December 7, Hu and Wang will visit Stanford to accept the Shorenstein Journalism Award. They will participate in a daytime public panel discussion on the future of China’s independent media, joining acclaimed China historian and former Pulitzer Prize jury member Orville Schell, Shorenstein APARC associate director for research Daniel C. Sneider, and other noted Asia specialists. That evening, Hu and Wang will receive a cash prize of $10,000 during a dinner and award ceremony.

Hu’s distinguished career spans both print and broadcast journalism. She is a former Stanford Knight Journalism Fellow (1994), and, in addition to her role as Caixin’s editor-in-chief, currently serves as dean of the School of Communications and Design at Sun Yat-sen University. A recipient of the 2007 Louis Lyons Award for Conscience and Integrity in Journalism, Hu is frequently named on annual Who’s Who lists by publications such as Foreign Policy.

Wang is a former international editor for People’s Daily, a Chinese government-run newspaper published nationally. Recognized as one of the brightest rising stars in his field, Wang was named as a Young Leader in 2007 and 2008 by the Boao Forum for Asia, and as a media leader by the World Economic Forum. He has led the investigative journalism teams at Caixin.

About the Award

Established in 2002, the Shorenstein Journalism Award carries a cash prize of $10,000 and honors a journalist not only for a distinguished body of work, but also for the particular way that work has helped American readers to understand the complexities of Asia. The award was named after Walter H. Shorenstein, the philanthropist, activist, and businessman who endowed two institutions that are focused respectively on Asia and on the press: Shorenstein APARC in the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University, and the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

The award was originally designed to honor distinguished American journalists for their work on Asia, including veteran correspondents for leading American media such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, Newsweek, NBC News, PBS, and the Wall Street Journal. Past recipients include Stanley Karnow, Orville Schell, Don Oberdorfer, Nayan Chanda, Melinda Liu, John Pomfret, Ian Buruma, Seth Mydans, and Barbara Crossette.

Shorenstein APARC believes that it is vital to continue the Shorenstein Journalism Award, not only to honor the legacy of Walter H. Shorenstein and his twin passions for Asia and the press, but also to promote the necessity of a free and vibrant media for the future of relations between Asia and the United States. Moreover, as we have seen recently in the Middle East, a free press, not only in its traditional forms of print and broadcast but now also via the Internet and new avenues of social media, remains the essential catalyst for the growth of democratic freedom. The award is given annually based on the deliberations and decision of a distinguished jury whose members include:

Ian Buruma, the Henry R. Luce Professor of Democracy, Human Rights, and Journalism at Bard College, is a noted Asia expert who frequently contributes to publications including the New York Times, the New York Review of Books, and the New Yorker. He is a recipient of the Shorenstein Journalism Award and the international Erasmus Prize (both in 2008). 

Nayan Chanda, director of publications at the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, served for nearly 30 years as editor, editor-at-large, and correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review. He was honored with the Shorenstein Journalism Award in 2005.

Susan Chira, assistant managing editor for news and former foreign editor of the New York Times, has extensive Asia experience, including serving as Japan correspondent for the Times in the 1980s. During her long tenure as foreign editor, the Times twice won the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting (2009 and 2007).

Donald K. Emmerson, a well-respected Indonesia scholar, serves as director of Shorenstein APARC’s Southeast Asia Forum and as a research fellow for the prestigious National Asia Research Program (NARP). Frequently cited in the international media, Emmerson also contributes op-eds to leading publications such as the Asia Times.

Orville Schell is the Arthur Ross Director at the Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations, and is also a former jury member for the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. He has written extensively on China, and was awarded the 1997 George Peabody Award for producing the groundbreaking documentary the Gate of Heavenly Peace. He received the Shorenstein Journalism Award in 2003.

Daniel C. Sneider serves as the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC and also as a NARP research associate. He frequently contributes articles to publications such as Foreign Policy, Asia Policy, and Slate and had three decades of experience as a foreign correspondent and editor for publications including the Christian Science Monitor and the San Jose Mercury News.