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Global Affiliate Visiting Scholar, 2022-23
Head & Shoulders Financial Group, Hong Kong
Stanley Choi

Chiu Fai Stanley Choi is a global affiliate visiting scholar at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) for 2022-23. Choi is the founder of Head & Shoulders Financial Group based in Hong Kong. He has over 25 years of experience across the area of derivatives, private equity and blockchain. Currently, he has shifted his focus to personal investments becoming a major shareholder of Air Asia, a leading budget airline in Asia, and China Reinsurance, the largest reinsurance company in China. Choi earned his Master of Science (MS) at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign and his Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) at City University of Hong Kong.

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Cover of the book 'The China Questions 2'
The belief that China presents a challenge, if not an outright threat, to U.S. national security is increasingly prevalent in elite and public discourse. The main points of contention lie in the degree to which China threatens U.S. national security, how exactly China may challenge U.S. national security, and uncertainty about how the answers to these questions may change over time (which is fundamentally a debate about the drivers of Chinese strategy).

In this chapter, included in the volume The China Questions 2: Critical Insights into US-China Relations​ Harvard University Press, 2022), Oriana Sklayar Mastro focuses on the direct and indirect ways the People's Republic of China poses a threat to U.S. national security today.

Two caveats are in order. First, this focused discussion on challenges and threats may distort the degree to which China threatens the United States. On aggregate, the discussion presents a malign influence from the Perspective of U.S. national security. But it could be much worse. China has resolved many of its territorial disputes peacefully. Beijing has relied mainly on economic and political tools to blunt U.S. influence beyond its immediate region. China is an active member of the vast majority of international institutions. Even though faced with a conventionally superior U.S. military, China has yet to change its minimal no-first-use nuclear doctrine.

Second, while Mastro presents information on trends and trajectories, her focus is on today's challenges. These are likely to expand in scope and increase in intensity over the next five to ten years.

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A chapter in The China Questions 2: Critical Insights into US-China Relations, edited by Maria Adele Carrai, Jennifer Rudolph, and Michael Szonyi.

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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Harvard University Press
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2022 Sam Dr. Sam-Chung Hsieh Memorial Lecture
Date & Time: Wednesday, September 28, 2022     |    4:30 - 6:00 PM PT 
Location: Green Library, Bing Wing, 5th floor, Bender Room


Overreach and Overreaction: The Downward Spiral in the U.S.-China Relations 

Stanford Libraries and the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions are pleased to present the 2022 Dr. Sam-Chung Hsieh Memorial Lecture featuring Professor Susan Shirk who will be speaking on Overreach and Overreaction: The Downward Spiral in the U.S.-China Relations.  This is an in-person event.

Why did China abandon its successful foreign policy of restraint and shift toward confrontation and unchecked control over its own society? Surprisingly the shift began under Hu Jintao’s collective leadership (2002-12). Under the personalistic leadership of Xi Jinping the trend has intensified. Those who implement Xi's directives compete to outdo one another, provoking an even greater global backlash. To counter China’s overreach, the worst mistake the rest of the world, and the United States in particular, can make is to overreact. Understanding the domestic political drivers of foreign policy in both countries can help us stem the downward spiral in relations.


About the Speaker

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Susan Shirk

Susan Shirk is Chair of the 21st Century China Center and research professor at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. Shirk’s book, China:  Fragile Superpower helped frame the policy debate on China in the U.S. and other countries. Her articles have appeared in leading academic publications in political science, international relations, and China studies. She previously served as deputy assistant secretary of state (1997-2000) responsible for U.S. policy toward China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Mongolia. She is director emeritus of the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and founded the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, an unofficial forum for discussion of security issues. Shirk is a graduate of Mt. Holyoke College and received her PhD from M.I.T.


The family of Dr. Sam-Chung Hsieh donated his personal archive to the Stanford Libraries' Special Collections and endowed the Dr. Sam-Chung Hsieh Memorial Lecture series to honor his legacy and to inspire future generations. Dr. Sam-Chung Hsieh (1919-2004) was former Governor of the Central Bank in Taiwan. During his tenure, he was responsible for the world's largest foreign exchange reserves, and was widely recognized for achieving stability and economic growth. In his long and distinguished career as economist and development specialist, he held key positions in multilateral institutions including the Asian Development Bank, where as founding Director, he was instrumental in advancing the green revolution and in the transformation of rural Asia. Read more about Dr. Hsieh.


Questions? Contact Sonia Lee from Stanford Libraries 

Green Library, Bing Wing, 5th floor, Bender Room

Susan Shirk University of California San Diego
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Earlier this year the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions (SCCEI) joined the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to launch Big Data China, a new project aimed at bridging the gap between cutting-edge academic research on China and the Washington policy community. Since the launch of the collaboration, SCCEI and CSIS have hosted a number of featured events, organized briefing sessions for academics to speak directly with policy makers,  launched a new project website, and much more.

We just don’t understand China — if we understood China better, we could make better policy decisions.
Scott Rozelle

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The Big Data China website features regular multimedia analysis with high-quality data that explores important trends in China’s economy and society. In the newest video release, Scott Rozelle, SCCEI Co-Director, and Scott Kennedy, CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, sit down to discuss why the Big Data China collaboration is needed now, more than ever. As Scott Rozelle puts it, "we just don’t understand China — if we understood China better, we could make better policy decisions." This collaboration aims to reduce the current gap between academia and Washington by identifying and highlighting the policy implications of cutting-edge scholarly work on China and presenting it directly to the policy community. 


Watch the video and visit the website for more from Big Data China!

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Politico: Biden Bets Big on Asia

Jude Blanchette from CSIS recommends Scott Rozelle's new book "Invisible China" saying, "If you’re thinking seriously about China’s future trajectory, it’s imperative you read this book to understand the possible impacts of China’s chronic underinvestment in education.”
Politico: Biden Bets Big on Asia
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In this video short, Scott Rozelle, SCCEI Co-Director sits down with Scott Kennedy, CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business, to discuss Big Data China, a new project aimed at bridging the gap between cutting-edge academic research on China and the Washington policy community.

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CDDRL/HAI Predoctoral Scholar, 2022-2023

Eddie Yang is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC San Diego. His research focuses on repression and the politics of Artificial Intelligence. His dissertation studies how existing repressive institutions limit the usefulness of AI for authoritarian control, with a focus on China. His work has been published in both computer science and political science. 

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Oriana Skylar Mastro
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This commentary originally appeared in The Economist.


In the afternoon of August 4th, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) kicked off the largest and most sophisticated military exercises it has ever conducted. Over the course of a week, the Chinese launched dozens of missiles and conducted drills near Taiwan with 100 aircraft, ten destroyers and support vessels. Submarines and aircraft carriers also played a role. The display has made the third Taiwan Strait crisis, which occurred between 1995-96, when China conducted four rounds of tests over the course of several months, with barrages of no more than six missiles, look like child’s play.

Part of the rationale for the latest exercise was to signal Beijing’s anger over Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. Ms Pelosi, the speaker of the House of Representatives, was the highest-ranking American government official to visit the island since 1997. Back then Newt Gingrich, who was also the House speaker, made the trip. China warned that if Ms Pelosi added Taipei to her itinerary, there would be hell to pay.

The exercise is also a bit of a “coming-out party” for Beijing. In 1996 the third crisis ended when America sent two aircraft-carrier strike groups within 200 miles (322km) of Taiwan. America saw this as a great strategic success, and Chinese leaders were unhappy with its interference in what China considers a domestic affair. The resentment helped to drive China to build the PLA into one of the greatest armed forces in the world.


Subscribe to APARC newsletters to receive our experts' analysis and commentary.


Compared with 1996, China’s forces today are barely recognizable. Back then it had a large army, with roughly 4m people, but that was a sign of its backwardness more than anything else. With obsolete equipment and poor training, China barely had what could be considered an air force and a navy. Its pilots could not fly over water, at night or in rough weather. In 1999 less than 2% of its fighters were fourth generation, just 4% of its attack submarines were classed as modern (nuclear powered, for example) and none of its surface ships was. Its navy was a glorified coastguard with ships that, lacking air-defense systems, had to hug the coastline on any patrol. Its nuclear weapons, solid-fuelled and housed mainly in fixed silos, could have been taken out in one fell swoop by America.

Now China’s armed forces are comparable to America’s in quality and quantity. Most of its platforms are modern (of the latest technology for the relevant domain) and it boasts the largest navy in the world. In some areas, Chinese military capabilities already surpass America’s—in shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air-defense systems. China possesses the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, one that is currently undergoing major modernization.

Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities. If China had done so out of the blue, instead of using Ms Pelosi’s visit as a pretext, international opprobrium would have been stronger.

But even with all these improvements, it is unclear whether China could take Taiwan by force. China has not fought a war since 1979, when it made heavy weather of a “punitive” invasion of Vietnam. An amphibious attack, and to a lesser degree a blockade of the type the exercises off Taiwan were simulating, would demand complex joint operations (involving army, air force and navy), which in turn require impeccable logistics and command and control. Xi Jinping, China’s leader, launched a massive organizational reform to improve in these areas, and the PLA undoubtedly has. But the war in Ukraine may have given him heightened anxiety, given that the Russians struggled precisely with logistics and command.

For this reason, we should see the massive exercises off Taiwan less as a signal, and more as a rehearsal for combat. Mr Xi wants progress on the Taiwan issue, and domestically talk in the press is shifting from peaceful reunification to armed reunification. Chinese leaders knew the PLA had to conduct a series of large, realistic exercises to identify issues and hone their capabilities. If China had done so out of the blue, instead of using Ms Pelosi’s visit as a pretext, international opprobrium would have been stronger.

China will seize the opportunity to practice as much as possible. It has announced already that this round of exercises will continue and that another round in the Bohai Gulf/Yellow Sea is next. And it won’t just be large-scale exercises. It is unlikely that Beijing will return to its previous level of operations. Instead, China might attempt to normalize greater Chinese activity around Taiwan. That makes war more probable. Through a series of exercises the PLA, and the party leadership, might gain confidence that China’s forces are ready to take Taiwan sooner than they would otherwise have thought.

Of course, this all depends on how the exercises and operations go. From the outside, this is hard to assess. The missiles landed where they should have in recent days, and there were no accidents. But we don’t know how much and how well different groups are communicating with each other. To prepare for joint operations, air-force units need to operate in close proximity and coordinate with ground troops and amphibious elements. The PLA needs to practice providing supplies, such as prepositioned fuel stocks, and bringing munitions and medical supplies to forward locations such as Fujian, the province directly across the Taiwan Strait.

This is where the real trouble lies. If activities in the vicinity of Taiwan become more routine, not only does this heighten anxiety in Taipei (and probably other regional capitals as well) but it helps to disguise any preparations for a real military campaign. China needs an element of surprise to be able to take Taiwan before America has time to mobilize adequate forces in the region to defend the island. If China’s forces are simulating formations, blockades, attacks, and amphibious landings, it will be harder to decipher when they are preparing for the real thing. Ms Pelosi’s visit has allowed Beijing to move to a new level of military activity unchallenged, which will make it harder for America to defend Taiwan. No signal of America’s commitment to the island can fix that.

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Honor guards prepare to raise the Taiwan flag in the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall square.
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Biden Says We’ve Got Taiwan’s Back. But Do We?

Many will applaud Mr. Biden for standing up for democratic Taiwan in the face of Chinese threats. But he could be putting the island in greater danger, and the United States may not be able to come to the rescue.
Biden Says We’ve Got Taiwan’s Back. But Do We?
An Island that lies inside Taiwan's territory is seen with the Chinese city of Xiamen in the background.
Commentary

The Taiwan Temptation

Why Beijing Might Resort to Force
The Taiwan Temptation
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A Taiwanese F-5 fighter jet is seen after taking off from Chihhang Air Base on August 06, 2022 in Taitung, Taiwan.
A Taiwanese F-5 fighter jet is seen after taking off from Chihhang Air Base on August 06, 2022 in Taitung, Taiwan. Taiwan remained tense after U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's visit to the island as part of a tour of Asia aimed at reassuring allies in the region. China has been conducting live-fire drills in waters close to those claimed by Taiwan in response.
Annabelle Chih/ Getty Images
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Nancy Pelosi’s visit was more pretext than provocation.

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Purpose: We examine how adolescent free time allocation—namely, screen time and outdoor time—is associated with mental health and academic performance in rural China.

Methods: This paper used a large random sample of rural junior high school students in Ningxia (n = 20,375; age=13.22), with data collected from self-reported demographic questionnaires (to assess free time allocation), the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (to assess mental health), and a standardized math test (to measure academic performance). We utilized a multivariate OLS regression model to examine associations between free time allocation and adolescent outcomes, controlling for individual and family characteristics.

Results: Our sample’s screen time and outdoor time both averaged around 1 hour. About 10% of the sample adolescents reported behavioral difficulties, while a similar percentage (11%) reported abnormal prosocial behaviors. Adolescents with higher levels of screen time (> 2 hours) were 3 percentage points more likely to have higher levels of behavioral difficulties (p< 0.001), indicating that excessive screen time was associated with worse mental health. Meanwhile, outdoor time was associated with better mental health, and positive correlations were observed at all levels of outdoor time (compared to no outdoor time, decreasing the likelihood of higher levels of behavioral difficulties by between 3 and 4 percentage points and of lower prosocial scores by between 6 and 8 percentage points; all p’s< 0.001). For academic performance, average daily screen times of up to 1 hour and 1– 2 hours were both positively associated with standardized math scores (0.08 SD, p< 0.001; 0.07 SD, p< 0.01, respectively), whereas there were no significant associations between outdoor time and academic performance.

Conclusion: Using a large sample size, this study was the first to examine the association between adolescent free time allocation with mental health and academic performance, providing initial insights into how rural Chinese adolescents can optimize their free time.

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Risk Management and Healthcare Policy
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Huan Wang
Scott Rozelle
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Stanford e-China has been an incredible academic experience from day one.

My journey with the program started with the interview, which was an enjoyable and memorable experience. I was greeted by a warm smile the moment I entered the Zoom room, and Ms. Carey Moncaster showed genuine interest in learning about me as a person. Rather than focusing on my experiences or achievements, she wanted to know more about my personality, interests, and dreams. Ms. Moncaster and the director of SPICE, Dr. Gary Mukai, have remained passionate advisors and generous mentors to many students even after the course, including me. Over the last year and a half, they were always there when I needed advice on how to proceed with a project or wisdom on dealing with a difficult situation.

The sense of community permeated the course itself, which was designed to be highly interactive. The expert speakers gave insightful lectures, followed by long sessions of Q&A. I can still remember my excitement at being able to ask Mr. Roy Ng, our fintech speaker, three questions after his seminar, where he explained how blockchain could help us reach the unbanked. In fact, my current obsession almost perfectly mirrors that topic—exploring how Central Bank Digital Currencies can help facilitate financial inclusion to mitigate inequality. That session made me realize that social entrepreneurship and tech-based solutions will be key players in upholding justice.

The Q&A was also a chance for my cohort to learn from each other. We bonded over our productive, collaborative, and enthusiastic discussions, and many of us stayed in touch after the course. Over the last year and a half, I have grown to be close friends with my fellow honoree, Jason Li. After meeting in person when he visited Shanghai, we decided to co-found a platform to connect students across the globe. Inspired by the diverse community of brilliant students we saw at Stanford e-China, we developed SPOT. The acronym stands for Student Projects Organized Together, and we hope to bring together an international network of passionate youth. We believe that together, we undertake global initiatives that make tangible impacts. Our website is www.spotaproject.com.

It is not every day that a course leaves such a significant impact, continuing to play a role in my life long after its conclusion.

Last but not least, e-China has helped me with my work in social justice. Design Thinking has not only aided in my endeavors with SPOT but also in my other initiatives, including the Law Association for Crimes Across History (LACAH) mock trial, where we put perpetrators of atrocities on the stand (lacah.net). Dora Gan from my e-China cohort is actually a member of our Youth Council! Design Thinkings methodical approach helped us scale up rapidly, and we were recently honored by the EARCOS Global Citizen Grant.

Throughout high school, I have learned a lot from a wide range of outstanding programs. I have also met many other fabulous peers through them. However, it is not every day that a course leaves such a significant impact, continuing to play a role in my life long after its conclusion. Stanford e-China is truly an exceptional experience. I am very thankful to have been a part of the first cohort.

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arches at Stanford University
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High School Students in China and the United States Collaborate

Students in SPICE’s China Scholars and Stanford e-China Programs meet in virtual classrooms.
High School Students in China and the United States Collaborate
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Nathan in Shanghai; photo courtesy Nathan Chan
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The following reflection is a guest post written by Nathan Chan, an alumnus and honoree of the 2021 Stanford e-China Program, which is accepting student applications until September 1, 2022.

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The event will be webcast live from this page.

The Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions (SCCEI) and the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics launch the third feature of the new collaboration, Big Data China, on July 27 at 9 a.m. PDT / 12 p.m. EDT.  The feature, “The AI-Surveillance Symbiosis in China,” highlights the work of professors Noam Yuchtman (London School of Economics) and David Yang (Harvard University) and their colleagues. The feature shows how China‘s large-scale investments in surveillance technology is both enhancing the state‘s capacity to repress dissent and providing commercial advantage to Chinese AI companies operating in the facial recognition and surveillance space.


The event will feature a presentation of the key findings of the analysis and its implications for the Washington policy community by Noam Yuchtman of London School of Economics, David Yang of Harvard University, and Trustee Chair Fellow Ilaria Mazzocco. Trustee Chair Director Scott Kennedy will moderate a panel discussion which will include questions from the public and questions from the audience. The distinguished panelists for the event are: Emily Weinstein of CSET, Paul Mozur of the New York Times, and Trustee Chair non-resident senior associate Paul Triolo


WATCH THE RECORDING

FEATURING

Noam Yuchtman 
Professor of Managerial Economics and Strategy, London School of Economics and Political Science
David Yang 
Assistant Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Emily Weinstein  
Research Fellow, Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Georgetown University
Paul Mozur 
Correspondent, New York Times
Scott Kennedy 
Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics
Ilaria Mazzocco 
Fellow, Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics
Paul Triolo 
Senior Associate (Non-resident), Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics
 

EVENT PARTNERS
 

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Scott Kennedy
Ilaria Mazzocco
Paul Mozur
Paul Triolo
Emily Weinstein
David Yang
Noam Yuchtman
Panel Discussions
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