SPRIE and Heidrick & Struggles, the premier global executive search and leadership consulting firm, have just released a report that is the product of their collaborative research project over the past 18 months on leadership in Chinese high tech companies.

The report, entitled "Getting Results in China: How China's Tech Executives are Molding a New Generation of Leaders," is based on extensive interviews with many top executives in China's high tech industries--both domestic companies and multinationals with considerable presence in China, as well as start-up companies from the last several years.

"Getting Results in China" looks at what the top Chinese executives are doing on the ground to address their most significant challenges in acquiring leadership talent. Chinese high tech industries are facing talent gaps at every level and competition for skilled leaders is keen; the increased presence of multinationals is only exacerbating this crisis.

The findings in this report will provide insights on:

• How pioneering executive leaders in China have adapted multinational strategies to acheive results in their organizations;
• What the leading companies in China are doing to come out ahead in the competition for leadership talent;
• Which critical leadership skills are most needed and also hardest to find in the current Chinese high tech playing field.

"Getting Results in China" will be of interest to Chinese executives, leaders of multinational companies operating in China and investors in Chinese enterprises across all industry sectors who want to understand the talent approaches that are getting results in a challenging environment.

North Korea's declared nuclear bomb test program will increase the incentives for other nations to go nuclear, will endanger security in the region and could ultimately result in nuclear terrorism. While this test is the culmination of North Korea's long-held aspiration to become a nuclear power, it also demonstrates the total failure of the Bush administration's policy toward that country. For almost six years this policy has been a strange combination of harsh rhetoric and inaction.

President Bush, early in his first term, dubbed North Korea a member of the "axis of evil" and made disparaging remarks about Kim Jong Il. He said he would not tolerate a North Korean nuclear weapons program, but he set no bounds on North Korean actions.

The most important such limit would have been on reprocessing spent fuel from North Korea's reactor to make plutonium. The Clinton administration declared in 1994 that if North Korea reprocessed, it would be crossing a "red line," and it threatened military action if that line was crossed. The North Koreans responded to that pressure and began negotiations that led to the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework did not end North Korea's aspirations for nuclear weapons, but it did result in a major delay. For more than eight years, under the Agreed Framework, the spent fuel was kept in a storage pond under international supervision.

Then in 2002, the Bush administration discovered the existence of a covert program in uranium, evidently an attempt to evade the Agreed Framework. This program, while potentially serious, would have led to a bomb at a very slow rate, compared with the more mature plutonium program. Nevertheless, the administration unwisely stopped compliance with the Agreed Framework. In response the North Koreans sent the inspectors home and announced their intention to reprocess. The administration deplored the action but set no "red line." North Korea made the plutonium.

The administration also said early this summer that a North Korean test of long-range missiles was unacceptable. North Korea conducted a multiple-launch test of missiles on July 4. Most recently, the administration said a North Korean test of a nuclear bomb would be unacceptable. A week later North Korea conducted its first test.

It appears that the administration is deeply divided on how to deal with North Korea, with some favoring negotiation and others economic and political pressure to force a regime change. As a result, while the administration was willing to send a representative to the six-party talks organized by the Chinese in 2003, it had no apparent strategy for dealing with North Korea there or for providing leadership to the other parties. In the meantime, it increased economic pressure on Pyongyang. Certainly an argument can be made for such pressure, but it would be naive to think it could succeed without the support of the Chinese and South Korean governments, neither of which backs such action. North Korea, sensing the administration's paralysis, has moved ahead with an aggressive and dangerous nuclear program.

So what can be done now that might have a constructive influence on North Korea's behavior? The attractive alternatives are behind us. There should and will be a U.N. resolution condemning the test. The United Nations may respond to calls from the United States and Japan for strong sanctions to isolate North Korea and cut off trade with it. But North Korea is already the most isolated nation in the world, and its government uses this isolation to its advantage. Stronger sanctions on materials that might be of use to the nuclear program are reasonable, but the horse is already out of the barn. Economic sanctions to squeeze North Korea would increase the suffering of its people but would have little effect on the elite. In any event, they would be effective only if China and South Korea fully participated, and they have shown no inclination to do so.

There will be calls to accelerate our national missile defense program. But the greatest danger to the United States from this program is not that North Korea would be willing to commit suicide by firing a missile at the United States, even if it did develop one of sufficient range. Rather, it is the possibility that the North Koreans will sell one of the bombs or some of their plutonium to a terrorist group. The president has warned North Korea not to transfer any materials from its nuclear program. But the warnings we have sent to North Korea these past six years have gone unheeded and its acts unpunished. It is not clear that this latest one will have any greater effect. If a warning is to have a chance of influencing North Korea's behavior it has to be much more specific. It would have to promise retaliation against North Korea if a terrorist detonated a nuclear bomb in one of our cities. It must be backed by a meaningful forensics program that can identify the source of a nuclear bomb.

This test will certainly send an undesirable message to Iran, and that damage has already been done. But it is important to try to keep this action from precipitating a nuclear arms race in the Asia-Pacific region. Both Japan and South Korea have the capability to move quickly to full nuclear-weapon status but have not done so because they have had confidence in our nuclear umbrella. They may now reevaluate their decision. We should consult closely with Japan and South Korea to reassure them that they are still under our umbrella and that we have the will and the capability to regard an attack on them as an attack on the United States. This may be necessary to discourage them from moving forward with nuclear deterrence of their own.

Our government's inattention has allowed North Korea to establish a new and dangerous threat to the Asia-Pacific region. It is probably too late to reverse that damage, but serious attention to this problem can still limit the extent of the damage.

The writer was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997.

Copyright 2006, Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive and The Washington

Post. All rights Reserved.

On November 13-14, 2006, SPRIE and the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) together with the School of Technology Management, National Tsing Hua University, co-sponsored "High Tech Regions 2.0: Sustainability and Reinvention," a workshop at Stanford University.

Scholars met during the two-day event to present research papers and discuss their work at the nine workshop sessions.

The central topic, explored in extensive discussions, was the sustainability of high tech regions, both here in the United States and around the world. Several sessions were devoted to case studies of regional high tech centers: Silicon Valley, Hsinchu (Taiwan), Daedeok (South Korea) and a number of cities in mainland China.

Other sessions investigated the role of government policy in the creation, survival and evolution of high tech regions, as well as the impact of innovation strategies on regional networks.

Select materials from the workshop will be made public in the future and will be available on the SPRIE web site.

A proposal to assess the societal and security implications of the female deficit in China, a study of the impact of higher education's rapid expansion in large developing economies, and incentives for provision of health care services for one billion people in rural China were among the new projects funded by Stanford's Presidential Fund for Innovation in International Studies (PFIIS) in mid-February. Planning grants for an international health and society initiative in the Indian subcontinent and psychosocial treatment for children orphaned by the tsunami in Indonesia were also awarded.

"These projects show great potential to advance human knowledge, help devise sustainable solutions, and build a better, more secure future for millions around the world," said Stanford President John Hennessy. "In launching The Stanford Challenge, we committed to marshal university resources to address some of the 21st century's great challenges in human health, international peace and security, and the environment."

The $3 million, intellectual venture capital fund was established by the Office of the President and the Stanford International Initiative in 2005 to encourage new cross-campus, interdisciplinary research and teaching among all seven schools at Stanford on three overarching global challenges: pursuing peace and security, improving governance, and advancing human well-being. The first $1 million was awarded in February 2006 to eight interdisciplinary faculty teams examining such issues as the HIV/AIDS treatment revolution in sub-Saharan Africa, why Latin America has been left behind in recent gains by developing countries, and food security and the environment.

"It's impressive to see the committed, collaborative, and innovative ways Stanford faculty are joining together in new interdisciplinary research and teaching to generate new understanding of the linkages among complex problems and train a new generation of leaders to address them effectively," said Freeman Spogli Institute Director Coit D. Blacker, chair of the International Initiative Executive Committee.

New projects qualifying for funding and their principal investigators are:

• Female Deficit and Social Stability in China: Implications for International Security. Melissa Brown, anthropological sciences; Marcus Feldman, biological sciences, and Matthew Sommer, history. As the number of surplus, marriage-age men in China approaches 47 million in 2050, this project will study factors that predict men's inability to marry before 30, the availability of social welfare to men and their families, their contribution to the floating population of rural-to- urban migrants, the labor-related migration of unmarried women, and the impact of this migration for domestic stability and international security.
• Potential Economic and Social Impacts of Rapid Higher Education Expansion in the World's Largest Developing Economies. Martin Carnoy, education; Amos Nur, geophysics; and Krishna Saraswat, electrical engineering. The development of higher education systems in Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) will have a major impact on their ability to transition to large, developed, knowledge-based economies. Is the way nation states expand and reform higher education in response to global pressures an important indicator of societal capacity to achieve sustained economic growth? This project will examine differing approaches of BRIC governments to higher-education growth and reform, and ask whether these reflect differing levels of state capacity to expand the knowledge base for economic and social development and whether differing approaches result in significant changes in formation of analytical skills in university graduates, particularly scientists and engineers.
• Health Care for One Billion: Experimenting with Incentives for the Supply of Health Care in Rural China. Scott Atlas, radiology; Scott Rozelle, the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, FSI. This project examines the effects of existing health policies and institutions in rural areas of China - including rural health insurance, privatization of rural clinics, and investment in township hospitals - and introduces a new experiment to study and realign incentives to address a serious flaw in China's health care system, the practice in which doctors both prescribe and derive significant profits from drugs.

Two planning grants were also awarded, as follows:

• Stanford International Health and Society Initiative: Proposal to Plan for an Initial Program in the Indian Subcontinent. Vinod K. Bhutani, pediatrics; Nihar Nayak, obstetrics and gynecology. This project seeks to improve unacceptably high maternal and childhood morbidity and mortality rates in the Indian subcontinent by devising innovative strategies to bridge existing social and access barriers in the micro- and macro- health environment. Includes leadership training and cooperative work on practice and policy strategies with experts from Stanford and the subcontinent.
• Psychosocial Treatment of Children Orphaned by the Asian Tsunami in Indonesia. Hugh Solvason, psychiatry; Donald Barr, sociology. This project's goal is to develop and implement changes to reduce the sense of dislocation, anxiety, and behavioral problems among tsunami orphans at the As-Syafi`iyah Orphanage in Jakarta. By arranging the children into more cohesive groups that can operate like "families" rather than their current state of random associations typically found in orphanages, the project will create a new and ordered social system. In addition, Solvason and Barr plan to develop a system of counseling interventions for the most severely symptomatic children (supervised by Stanford Psychiatry faculty). Translated measures of depression, anxiety, and PTSD will be used to assess the success of the intervention.

The projects will produce new field research, conferences, research papers, books, symposia, and courses for Stanford students.

A third round of project awards will be made in February 2008. A formal request for proposals will be issued in the fall of 2007, with proposals due by December 14, 2007. Priority is given to teams of faculty who do not typically work together, represent multiple disciplines, and address issues that fall broadly within the three primary research areas of the International Initiative. Projects are to be based on collaborative research and teaching involving faculty from two or more disciplines, and where possible, from two or more of Stanford's seven schools.

For additional information, contact Catharine Kristian, ckristian@stanford.edu.

It is tempting to dismiss President Bush's travel through Southeast Asia as aimless floating by a doubly lame duck. Getting things done will be harder without either the right to run for a third term in 2008 or the support of a legislative majority between now and then. But if that means having to work with others, at home and abroad, these new limits could be a virtuous necessity -- an opportunity to shed his administration's my-way-or-the-highway image and reverse the squandering of American legitimacy and leverage around the world.

Asia is a good place to begin rebalancing U.S. foreign policy because it is huge, it is dynamic -- and it is not Iraq. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit that the president is attending in Vietnam this weekend includes leaders from 21 economies that jointly account for 56, 48, and 40 percent, respectively, of global GDP, trade and population. Since 1989, the forum's economies have grown 26 percent compared with 8 percent for the rest of the world. The Middle East looks trivial by comparison.

The Middle East also lacks a tradition of successful multilateral cooperation. But if the Arab League has accomplished little, Southeast Asia is an exemplar of regional harmony. Cynical observers may deride as mere "talk shops" the many overlapping frameworks that span or involve Southeast Asia. On its calendar of events in 2005 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations listed 612 meetings. But talking is better than fighting, and no two ASEAN members have made war on each other since the group was formed nearly 40 years ago.

Northeast Asia is another matter. There is no ANEAN -- no Association of Northeast Asian Nations. Mistrust among China, Japan and South Korea is still too deep. But North Korea's decision to rejoin the Six-Party Talks (among China, Japan, Russia, the two Koreas, and the United States) has revived the prospect that these conversations could evolve into a framework for broader security in Northeast Asia. Of the six, all but North Korea will attend the economic summit this weekend in Hanoi. On the sidelines of that event, President Bush and his delegation should discuss with these five counterparts a possible shared strategy on North Korea when the talks reconvene, probably in China later this year.

Another key goal for the president on this trip should be helping to revitalize APEC. The "Doha round" of global trade liberalization has run aground. Without a last-minute push, APEC's goals of "free trade" among advanced economies by 2010 and among developing ones by 2020 will not be met. Meanwhile, bilateral trade agreements among APEC members have proliferated. The result is a "noodle bowl" of inconsistent arrangements that may, on balance, divert as much trade as they create. There is, for example, no consistent definition of the "rules of origin" that determine which items benefit from lowered barriers and which do not. Without lowering the quality of all these many bilaterals to their lowest common denominator -- i.e., the least liberal arrangement any signatory will accept -- an effort should be made to link and standardize them so that trade flows are enlarged and not merely redirected.

This may seem like a non-starter. On Monday, the House of Representatives failed to approve permanent normal trade relations with Vietnam. And that was even before the newly elected and arguably more protectionist Democratic majority is seated in January. But progress can still be made in Vietnam.

An advantage of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit for the United States is that it includes both China and Taiwan, and excludes the repressive regime in Burma. But APEC's uniquely trans-Pacific character is a more important political reason for strengthening the grouping. While APEC has lagged, East Asian regionalism has boomed. That has been good for East Asia. But U.S. and East Asian interests alike could be hurt if the Pacific Ocean ends up being split between rival Chinese and American spheres of influence.

The risk of gridlocked government should not keep the United States from seeking to deepen Asia-Pacific economic and political cooperation. The Bush administration may be a lame duck. But even a healthy duck needs a tranquil pond.

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum in the Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. He wrote this article for the Mercury News which was printed on Sunday, November 19, 2006. Reprinted with permission from the San Jose Mercury News.