The Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) has received two grants to offer guidance for more effective U.S. foreign policy strategies in Asia and propose structural reforms that propel the region toward growth, innovation, and democratic resilience. The first grant, from the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), supports SNAPL's policy engagements with stakeholders in Washington, D.C., forthcoming this September. The second grant, from Stanford Global Studies, funds a series of SNAPL-hosted research workshops throughout the 2024-25 academic year.

Both funded initiatives underscore SNAPL's commitment to generating evidence-based policy recommendations and promoting transnational collaboration with academic and policy institutions to advance the future prosperity of Asia and U.S.-Asia relations.

Housed at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), SNAPL is led by Stanford sociologist Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, a senior fellow at FSI, and the director of APARC and the Korea Program. The lab’s mission is to address emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges facing Asia-Pacific countries and guide effective U.S. Asia policies through interdisciplinary, comparative research and collaboration with academic and policy research institutions in Asia and the United States.  

“We are grateful to FSI and Stanford Global Studies for supporting SNAPL's interdisciplinary, policy-relevant research,” says Shin. “The two grants provide a tremendous boost as we work to contribute evidence-based recommendations to advance a more nuanced understanding of Asia's role in global affairs and informed new directions for U.S. Asia policies.”

Policy Considerations for U.S.-China and U.S.-Asia Relations

With a grant from FSI to support policy engagement, SNAPL team members will share research findings from several of the lab’s flagship projects. The SNAPL team — including Shin, Research Fellow Xinru Ma, and Postdoctoral Fellows Gidong Kim and Junki Nakahara — will travel to Washington, D.C. in September 2024 to present these findings at forums and meetings with academic and policy communities. The trip includes a joint symposium with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a presentation at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and meetings with think tanks and Congress members.

Three core projects the team will share guide U.S. policies in Asia, particularly toward China. The first project challenges many pundits’ framing of the U.S.-China competition as a “new Cold War.” In contrast to this narrative, a recent SNAPL study reveals that contemporary U.S.-China relations are markedly different from the U.S.-Soviet Cold War dynamics. “Our analysis of over 41,000 Congressional speeches spanning 36 years suggests that current U.S. discourses on China mirror those on the past economic competition with Japan rather than the ideological or military conflicts with the USSR in the Cold War era,” says Ma. “Applying Cold War analogies to today's geopolitical landscape would thus misguide efforts to navigate current U.S.-China tensions.”

The research findings from a second SNAPL study offer a better understanding of how U.S. alliance relationships and U.S.-China tensions shape public attitudes toward China in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, another study challenges the conventional wisdom that democracy promotion gives the U.S. a competitive edge in its foreign policy over China. “Our research indicates that liberal values do not serve as a key lens through which Asia-Pacific citizens view recent geopolitical developments,” notes Kim. “The United States should therefore pivot from focusing on liberal rhetoric to emphasizing its role in promoting shared benefits with Asia-Pacific citizens in economic, trade, and military security areas.”

These studies are part of SNAPL’s U.S.-Asia Relations research track.

Racism in Global Context

At George Washington University, the SNAPL team will discuss findings from a project the lab explores as part of another research track, Nationalism and Racism. Recognizing that racism is a global problem with diverse roots and manifestations, this research track examines how nationalism and racism intertwine to create forms of exclusion and marginalization in Asia and provides policy recommendations to advance more inclusive societies in the region and beyond.

At this discussion, to be hosted by the Elliott School of International Affairs’ Sigur Center for Asian Studies, the team will present findings from a study that analyzes how 16 Northeast, Southeast, and South Asian nations discuss and justify their positions on race and racial discrimination. “Our study reveals various forms of racism ‘denial’ rooted in nationalist and religious ideologies, hindering efforts to address ongoing inequalities,” says Nakahara. “Addressing these forms of denial is crucial for promoting critical dialogue on race and racism in Asia and dismantling systems of oppression in the region and elsewhere.”

A Platform for Interdisciplinary Research on Contemporary Asia

SNAPL’s second grant, awarded by Stanford Global Studies, will enable the lab to host throughout the 2024-25 academic year a research workshop series focused on projects from the two research tracks above. Involving scholars and students from Stanford and Asia, the six-part series will foster cross-disciplinary dialogue and share policy-relevant findings grounded in the lab’s research.

The four workshop installments in fall and winter quarters 2024 will be dedicated to the projects discussed above. The spring quarter 2025 workshops will focus on two additional projects: one that examines the discursive construction of U.S. rivals and the respective roles of the media, executive, and legislative branches in this process, and the second that investigates elite articulation of “multiculturalism” in four Asia-Pacific nations.

“These workshops will be invaluable to advancing exchange and partnerships with academics and experts from Stanford and across Asia,” says Shin. “They directly promote SNAPL’s mission to serve as a platform that facilitates trans-Pacific, network-based collaboration."

Visit SNAPL's website for information about the workshops’ schedule and discussion topics.

This opinion piece originally appeared in The New York Times. 

Over the past 15 years, China has expanded its once-minimal military presence in the South China Sea into a significant one. Beijing has laid claim to nearly all of the strategic waterway, a vital shipping lifeline for the global economy that is rich in energy and fishery resources. China has used nonmilitary assets such as its Coast Guard, fishing vessels and maritime militia to bully its neighbors, blockade their ships and build Chinese military bases on disputed islands.

America is partly to blame. It has condemned China’s behavior, but, eager to avoid escalation, has consistently refrained from standing up militarily, which has only further emboldened Beijing. A new approach is needed. The United States must take real action to strengthen alliances and confront China before it eventually takes control of this hugely important body of water without firing a shot. 

Like any unchallenged bully, China has become increasingly aggressive. Last month, Chinese Coast Guard personnel attacked a Philippine supply vessel with axes and other crude weapons — Manila says a Filipino sailor and several others were injured — in one of the worst acts of violence between China and its rivals in the South China Sea in years. The incident took place near the Sierra Madre, a rusting World War II-era ship that the Philippines had beached 25 years ago at Second Thomas Shoal to assert its territorial claim. The shoal lies about 120 miles off the Philippine island of Palawan and is well within the nation’s exclusive economic zone.

China also had past territorial confrontations in the South China Sea or other waters on its periphery with Vietnam, the United States, Australia, Japan and Taiwan. In 2012, China took control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, and run-ins between China and the Philippines have grown in number and intensity in recent years. In late May, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the Philippines warned that any Filipino deaths caused by a “willful act” by a foreign force in the South China Sea would be “very close to what we define as an act of war.”

Concern has grown in Manila, Beijing and Washington that tensions in the South China Sea — perhaps even more than Taiwan — could trigger a conflict with China. These fears are overblown. I study Chinese military strength and strategy, and I’m convinced that if the United States were to take a more assertive stance in the South China Sea, Beijing would be likely to back down to avoid a war it knows it would lose.

China may enjoy military advantages in a potential conflict with Taiwan, which is just off the mainland. But its position is less secure in the South China Sea. Over the past 15 years China has built more than two dozen military outposts on disputed islands. Among the largest — at Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef — there are air strips, fighter jets, radar systems, and laser and jamming equipment. But so far China lacks sufficient antiaircraft and anti-ship missile systems in the region to deny U.S. forces the ability to operate, which leaves the Chinese bases vulnerable to air and naval bombardment.

And the South China Sea is vast — about half the size of the continental United States. The Sierra Madre is around 800 miles from the Chinese mainland. A conflict there would require the People’s Liberation Army to mount joint air and naval resupply operations and to refuel its fighters across great distances — something it has never done and is not equipped for.

If the Philippines is in the fight, treaty obligations would trigger the participation of the United States, which would have access to nine Philippine air and naval bases, greatly enhancing its already considerable ability to project military power in the region. China does have “carrier-killer” ballistic missiles based on its mainland. But U.S. carriers could still send fighters into parts of the South China Sea from outside the range of those missiles. In conjunction with land-based fighters operating from the Philippines, the United States could gain crucial air superiority over a Chinese surface fleet.

China has spent huge sums on its aircraft carrier program and has two in operation, with two more in development. But those still cannot rival the number or capabilities of nuclear-powered U.S. carriers, which are larger, support more aircraft and need to refuel only about every 20 years. China’s carriers need to be refueled about every six days. And learning how to effectively conduct carrier operations takes time; the Chinese have only just begun.

It’s telling that China has been careful to use Coast Guard and civilian vessels in its encounters with neighbors rather than hard military assets — the latter would signal an escalation that Beijing is not yet willing to embark on.

But there is another very good reason China is unlikely to risk war with the United States: It doesn’t need to. Its brinkmanship and use of nonmilitary assets to intimidate its Asian neighbors has been more than enough to take China from almost no military presence in the South China Sea in the late 2000s to a significant force today.

America should call China’s bluff and press its military advantage. This could include escorting Philippine resupply vessels headed to Second Thomas Shoal or even conducting some supply missions itself or with allies like Australia and Japan. This would send China the powerful message that its intimidation will no longer go unchallenged, while allowing Manila to remain visibly in the lead but part of a more enduring coalition. To save face for China, Washington could present operations like these as exercises or training to minimize pressure on Beijing to respond.

Manila is a strategically vital player in America’s regional competition with China. The United States and the Philippines should strengthen their alliance to allow for more U.S. bases in the Philippines and a stronger U.S. commitment to help defend against Chinese incursions into Philippine waters. Closer relations could also make it easier for the United States to resupply Taiwan from Philippine bases during a conflict with China and open the door for enhanced military cooperation with other South China Sea nations, whose fear of an unrestrained Beijing may be deterring them from taking that step. If China determines that its provocations are likely to draw in the United States, it might begin to moderate its behavior .

Of course, anything is possible — Beijing may respond with a full-on military escalation, a daunting prospect that should not be taken lightly. But that risk is low for a Chinese military whose own doctrine is to avoid any war in which victory is not ensured.

Neither U.S. option — standing up to China or backing down — is attractive. But unless the United States asserts itself, China will continue chipping away with its tactics of bluster and intimidation until its military presence in the South China Sea becomes so dominant that it no longer fears war.

The United States can re-establish a favorable balance of power, but it must act now.