There are three major components of Cyber security from China’s perspective: Internet information management, Civilian cyber security, and Cyber warfare.

The Chinese government worries that misinformation, dissent opinions and dissemination of rumors could cause social instability, and thus overthrow the regime. As a result, the government has taken many approaches to manage the information in cyberspace. Can the Chinese government fully control the information flow? If not, why?

China has 500 million netizens, more than any other country in the world. How do the government and companies deal with privacy and cyber crime?

Cyber attack from China is widely reported in US media. How do Chinese view US cyber warfare capability? Can "Pearl Harbor" happen in cyberspace?

A better understanding of these questions could be helpful for shaping US cyber policies on China.

Ting Wang is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. His research concerns on space debris problems, ASAT weapons, and cybersecurity in China. Before coming to CISAC in 2011, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Cornell University. He received a PhD at the Beihang University in China. His PhD dissertation was titled "Orbital Debris Evolution and Threat to Spacecraft." He also holds a B.A. in aerospace engineering from Beihang University and has worked at the Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering. He was a visiting scholar at the Union of Concerned Scientists in 2003, where he began to be interested in security issues.

Francis Fukuyama, has written widely on issues relating to democratization and international political economy.  His most recent book, The Origins of Political Order, was published in April 2011. He is a resident in FSI’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, a senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, and a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 

Tu Weiming, has been instrumental in developing discourses on dialogue among civilizations, Cultural China, reflection on the Enlightenment mentality of the modern West, and multiple modernities.  He is currently studying the modern transformation of Confucian humanism in East Asia and tapping its spiritual resources for human flourishing in the global community.  He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), and a Member of the International Philosophical Society (IIP).     

Sponsored by Stanford Confucius Institute, Beijing Forum, Institute for Advanced Humanistic Studies, Peking University

The United States commercial nuclear industry started just a few years following the conclusion of the second world war with the start of operation of the Shippingport reactor. Over a relatively short period of time, the industry grew to over one hundred reactors all based fundamentally on the same light water reactor technology that served the naval nuclear program well. Since the start of the industry, the nuclear power research and development community has explored a large number of reactor concepts for a variety of conventional and not so conventional applications. Many of these technologies were demonstrated as both test reactors and prototypical demonstration reactors. Despite the promise of many of these concepts, the commercialization cases for many of these technologies have failed to emerge. In this talk I will discuss the barriers reactor vendors currently face in the United States and the inherent challenges between promoting evolutionary versus revolutionary nuclear technologies. I will then discuss the prospects for the development of advanced commercial reactor technology abroad with an emphasis on the Chinese nuclear program. In particular, I will discuss recent developments in their advanced light water reactor program, high temperature gas reactor demonstration, and thorium molten salt reactor program.

About the speaker: Dr. Edward Blandford is an Assistant Professor of Nuclear Engineering at the University of New Mexico. Before coming to UNM, Blandford was a Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. His research focuses on advanced reactor thermal-fluids, best-estimate code validation, reactor safety, and physical protection strategies for critical nuclear infrastructure. Blandford received his PhD in Nuclear Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley in 2010.

Abstract:

In light of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) electoral resurgence in Taiwan, it is well worth reconsidering the election that initiated its time out of power. In this talk, I draw on comparative evidence to challenge two narratives about the 2000 presidential election: one emphasizing the KMT’s declining resource advantages as the primary cause of its defeat, and the other placing the blame on personality conflicts within the party or on other idiosyncratic factors unique to Taiwanese politics. Instead, the KMT’s defeat had much to do with the simple fact that presidential elections are higher-variance than parliamentary ones. Thus, we should not be surprised either that the KMT lost or that it has subsequently returned to a position nearly as dominant as it was in prior to 2000.

Speaker Bio:

Kharis Templeman received a BA (2002) from the University of Rochester and a Ph.D. in political science (2012) from the University of Michigan. For the 2012-13 academic year he is a post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies at the University of Michigan’s International Institute. A fluent Mandarin speaker, he has lived, worked, and traveled extensively in both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. His dissertation is a comparative study of the origins and decline of dominant party systems, in which incumbent parties hold power for an extraordinary period of time despite facing regularly, contested elections. 

Current interests include democratization, party system development in newly-contested regimes, and political institutions, with a regional focus on the new and transitioning democracies of Pacific Asia. He is also engaged in collaborative research on constitutional design for divided societies, on the effects of regime change on how client states manage the arms-allies trade-off, and as a regional manager for the Varieties of Democracy project.

In addition, he has taught a wide array of courses while at Michigan, ranging from an introduction to college writing to a senior seminar in the International and Comparative Studies program; in 2010, he won the political science department’s Kingdon teaching award for outstanding graduate student instructor.   

Gregory Poling will begin with a multimedia presentation highlighting the most important aspects of the South China Sea disputes, including the competing legal claims, recent clashes, and the oil, fisheries, and trade interests that help feed the conflict. He will then examine recent actions by the various claimants and the motivations behind them, including the Philippines' recent decision to take China's claims to a UN arbitration tribunal. He will show why commentators have been too quick to dismiss Manila's case. During the Q&A he will field questions on any aspect of the disputes, including what they imply for Asia and US-Asian relations.

Gregory Poling’s work at CSIS includes managing projects focused on US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia. In addition to the South China Sea, his research interests include democratization in Southeast Asia and Asian multilateralism. Before joining CSIS he lived and worked in China as an English language teacher. He has an MA in international affairs from American University, earned his BA in history and philosophy at Saint Mary's College of Maryland, and has studied at Fudan University in Shanghai.