Gi-Wook Shin: Is engaging North Korea still useful?
Two weeks ago, North Korea surprised the world by sending three of its top leaders to the South to attend the closing ceremony of the 17th Asian Games in Incheon. The visit occurred in the midst of growing speculation that North Korea's young leader, Kim Jong Un, was seriously ill, or even that he had been removed from power. That dramatic and unprecedented visit gave renewed hope for improved inter-Korean relations, which have been frozen since the sinking of a South Korean vessel in 2010.
The strategic situation on the Korean Peninsula has continued to worsen over the past several years. To produce material for more nuclear devices, Pyongyang has proceeded with a large-scale uranium enrichment program. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently expressed concern that North Korea may also have reactivated its plutonium production facilities, another means of making fissile material for nuclear bombs. Meanwhile, having rocketed its first satellite into orbit in December 2012, the North is busily developing longer-range missiles to target not only the South but also Japan and the United States.
Unfortunately, there is no initiative on the horizon likely to change this dangerous trajectory. The United States was willing to negotiate with Pyongyang when there was a chance of preventing it from developing nuclear weapons. With that goal now deemed unachievable, Washington is instead intent on containing the threat through increased sanctions and counterproliferation efforts, missile defense, and heightened defense cooperation, with South Korea and Japan. U.S. engagement with North Korea, much less negotiation, is off the table and likely to stay that way.
China's buffer
Earlier hopes that China would prove to be a deus ex machina have also foundered. While Beijing does not want Pyongyang to have nuclear weapons, it has always been more concerned about preventing instability in the North that might spill across their shared border. More recently, deepening suspicions among Beijing's leaders about U.S. strategic intentions have made North Korea even more important to China as a strategic buffer. China remains by far Pyongyang's most important foreign supporter, as reflected in the burgeoning trade across their border.
That leaves South Korea as the only country that could play a larger and more positive role in tackling the North Korea problem. South Korea is no longer a "shrimp among whales," as it used to think of itself, but a major "middle power." Strategically, Seoul is increasingly important not only to Washington but also to Beijing.
South Korea, however, has been a house divided when it comes to how to deal with the North. Conservative administrations, fearing that a North Korean nuclear arsenal would change the long-term balance of power on the peninsula, have made the North's denuclearization a condition for virtually all engagement with it. Progressive governments, on the other hand, have glossed over the nuclear issue, believing that increased contact will eventually promote change for the better in Pyongyang. The result has been South Korean policies that, whether from the left or the right, have proved unsustainable and ineffective.
"Tailored engagement"
Based on a yearlong study, my colleagues and I have called for more active South Korean leadership to ameliorate the situation on the Korean Peninsula. We call the concept "tailored engagement." It is based on the conviction that engagement is only one means of dealing with North Korea, but an essential one, and it must be carefully "tailored" or fitted to changing political and security realities on and around the peninsula. It eschews an "appeasement" approach to Pyongyang as well as the notion that inter-Korean engagement under the current circumstances would be tantamount to accepting the North's misbehavior, especially its nuclear weapons program.
Such engagement would not immediately change the nuclear situation, but, if carefully considered and implemented, it need not encourage Pyongyang in that regard, either. Meanwhile, it could help to reduce bilateral tensions, improve the lives of ordinary North Koreans and bring the two societies closer together. It could reduce the risk of conflict now while fostering inter-Korean reconciliation and effecting positive change in the North.
South Koreans must first, however, develop a broader domestic consensus in areas and in ways that do not undermine the international effort to press Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons. That is possible because many forms of engagement are in fact largely irrelevant to the nuclear program. For example, South Korea could provide much more humanitarian assistance to ordinary North Koreans; it could also engage in more educational and cultural programs, including sports exchanges. Concrete offers of expanded economic exchanges and support for the development of the North's infrastructure could become part of an incentive package in renewed six-party talks on ending the North's nuclear program.
Speculation about the state of Kim Jong Un's health and the North Korean leaders' visit to the South underline the fact that North Korean politics and society are experiencing great flux. For the outside world, this creates uncertainty, but also offers the possibility of positive change. Tailored engagement can at least test, and perhaps also influence, a changing North Korea.
Even a carefully "tailored" engagement strategy is no panacea. It is only one tool for dealing with the North -- military deterrence, counterproliferation and human rights efforts are among the others that are essential -- but why not try all available means when the situation is so worrisome? Japan should support such an approach because its interests, too, are threatened by the increasingly precarious situation on the peninsula.
This article was originally carried by Nikkei Asian Review on Oct. 16 and reposted with permission.
Has China Outgrown or Abandoned Deng’s Path to Wealth and Power?
Thomas Fingar is the inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He was the Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford during January to December 2009.
From May 2005 through December 2008, he served as the first deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and, concurrently, as chairman of the National Intelligence Council. He served previously as assistant secretary of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (2004–2005), principal deputy assistant secretary (2001–2003), deputy assistant secretary for analysis (1994–2000), director of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific (1989–1994), and chief of the China Division (1986–1989). Between 1975 and 1986 he held a number of positions at Stanford University, including senior research associate in the Center for International Security and Arms Control.
Fingar is a graduate of Cornell University (AB in government and history, 1968), and Stanford University (MA, 1969 and PhD, 1977 both in political science). His most recent book is Reducing Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford University Press, 2011).
Caixin Online Features REAP Research on Lowering High School Dropout Rates
An article published in Caixin Online (in Chinese) on March 28, 2014, features REAP research on how to improve high school enrollment rates in rural China.
Yi Hongmei, an assistant professor at the Chinese Academy of Sciences and researcher with REAP, found that in China's poor rural areas, 63 percent of high school students are not receiving a complete high school education. Yi Hongmei identifies four major causes leading to the high dropout rate: high tuition costs in Chinese high schools; rising opportunity costs of attending high school associated with rapidly increasing wages in the labor market; a lack of academic planning and guidance for high school students; and students with lower scores giving up on their education due to the competitive nature of the Chinese education system.
Yi Hongmei found that both subsidizing high school tuition for poor students and offering conditional cash transfers to students who stayed in school effectively lowered the high school drop out rate, whereas training students in academic and career planning was not an effective means to do so. Furthermore, solving the problem of secondary education in rural China will also require improving vocational schools, which, despite their growing popularity in China, have very low quality in many rural areas.
Read more here
Examining China’s transition
Economic and demographic transition pose major challenges for countries worldwide, particularly in large developing countries like China; however, strengthening social welfare programs can offset negative effects and help promote a sustainable future, according to Karen Eggleston, a scholar of Asia health policy at Stanford University.
“Unprecedented economic growth in China spanning the last three decades has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and restored China to the prominence in the world economy that it once enjoyed centuries ago,” said Eggleston, who is a Center Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.
“Demographic change not only shapes the trajectory of [its] development, but interacts with macroeconomic and microeconomic forces” in numerous ways.
Eggleston, who presented “China’s Demographic Change in Comparative Perspective: Implications for Labor Markets and Sustainable Development” at the Jackson Hole 2014 Economic Symposium “Re-evaluating Labor Market Dynamics,” says a combination of societal changes makes China distinctive, and that the country can offer insights in comparative perspective. She joined two other experts for a panel discussion on demographics during the three-day conference led by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, which draws dozens of central bankers, policymakers, academics, and economists from around the world.
The research stems from a project that Eggleston heads on policy responses to demographic change in Asia. The initiative, which is a part of the Asia Health Policy Program, grew out of a 2009 conference cosponsored by the Global Aging Program at the Stanford Center on Longevity. Its outcomes have included the publication, Aging Asia, a special issue of the Journal of the Economics of Aging focused on China and India co-edited with David Bloom of Harvard University, and two forthcoming books on urbanization and demographic change in Asia.
China in flux
China is the most populous country in the world with more than 1.3 billion people. Its sheer size alone creates heavy demands as demographics change, and the economy continues its shift from a centrally-planned system to a market-based system.
China’s population age 60 and older is projected to increase from one-tenth of the population in year 2000 to a staggering one-third by year 2060. Simultaneously, the population age 14 and under is projected to decrease by one-third between years 2010 and 2055 (Figure 2).
Eggleston, and others who closely watch the situation, say these demographic changes will bring a myriad of challenges to the labor market and to cultural norms related to intergenerational support, work and retirement.

China’s low birth rates have largely been influenced by family planning campaigns that begun in the early 1970s, and later, the “one child policy,” a population control policy that allowed for the birth of only a single child in many families. Recently, the government has relaxed that policy, and analysts believe the change will eventually help to balance the population age structure and infuse the workforce with new employees, filling the void caused by retiring workers in the coming years.
In the meantime, preparing support structures for the older generations’ departure from the labor market is essential. Social welfare programs, including health insurance and retirement and childcare services, will see significant demand, and require restructuring to handle the influx.
China’s aging population experience is similar to other countries in Asia. Japan, South Korea and India are also projected to see significant increase in median age over the next 30 years (Figure 1).

Eggleston says China has made positive steps toward restructuring its institutions, including establishing government-subsidized health insurance programs and reforming pension systems. Most notably since 2002, China took a large step towards universal health care by implementing the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme for rural residents. Now, nearly all citizens have access to basic medical care, which can support healthy aging as well as mitigate large “precautionary savings” and help those struck by medical conditions requiring significant services.
A pension system for people in China’s rural areas, developed by the government in 2009, also set up a supportive system by providing increased transfers for seniors, and, interestingly, supporting labor markets by easing the worries of adult children who migrate to urban areas for work.
China has been forward thinking with its related public policies, but it certainly can do more, Eggleston says. Integrating technology into its health systems, and making its services more fiscally responsible could improve efficiency, and expand access to care.
The full paper and handout from Eggleston’s presentation at the conference are available on the Federal Reserve of Kansas City website.
Jim Leape
473 Via Ortega, Room 193,
Stanford, CA 94305
Jim Leape is the co-director of the Center for Ocean Solutions and William and Eva Price Senior Fellow at the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. Through research, writing and direct engagement with private and public sector leaders, he is developing ways to catalyze private sector leadership on sustainability globally and, specifically, in China, and looking at how to drive large-scale systemic shifts to sustainability.
Leape has 30 years of conservation experience spanned a wide range of conservation efforts on every continent. From 2005 to 2014, he served as Director General of WWF International and leader of the global WWF Network, which is one of the world’s largest conservation organizations, active in more than 100 countries. In that capacity, he worked with government, business and civil society leaders on wide range of issues including climate change, forest conservation and sustainability in global commodity markets. Previously, he directed the conservation and science initiatives of the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, a leading philanthropy in the U.S. Jim has also served as a lawyer for the United Nations Environment Programme in Nairobi, Kenya, a law professor and a trial attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice.
Leape has served as an advisor to the World Economic Forum, on the board of the International Civil Society Center, and on the China Council for International Cooperation in Environment and Development, which advises the Premier of China on environmental policy.
Leape received an A.B. with honors from Harvard College and a J.D. with honors from Harvard Law School.
Policing China: Fragmentation of the Security State
Abstract:
By design, policing in China is a centralized affair in which local bureaus are ultimately held accountable to the Ministry of Public Security in Beijing. In reality, policing practices vary dramatically across region and issue area, even within provinces. This fragmentation is deeply entrenched in the bureaucracy, creating enforcement problems that vex upper level officials and aggravate public dissatisfaction while simultaneously opening up opportunities for lower level innovation. Drawing from over 100 interviews with 51 police officers at the central, provincial, and local levels, I examine fragmentation of the police bureaucracy by parsing out observable patterns of control over the local level and analyzing the ways in which the central government's exercise of power both helps and hinders policing on the ground.
Speaker Bio:
Recent Developments on Rule of Law in China
******* LOCATION CHANGE******* New Location - Philippines Conference Room , 3rd Floor, Encina Hall
ABSTRACT
After China’s new leadership took office in 2012, rule of law, as a powerful tool to re-shape state governance, was back to the stage as a focus of the ruling Party of China. There are a number of reform steps taken, and the political implication behind the veil is significant. This presentation will analyze the major reform steps to strengthen the rule of law and the debates in recent two years, especially judicial reform and anti-corruption. In addition, it will interpret the reform blueprint on rule of law issued by both the 3rd and 4th plenary sessions of the 18th CPC Congresses.
SPEAKER BIO
Qing Gu is the Team Leader of the Poverty, Equity and Governance Team of the United Nations Development Programme in China. She manages the governance, poverty reduction and equity portfolio of UNDP’s development assistance to China. She ensures that the portfolio brings transformational change at the request of China in democratic governance, civil society development, rule of law, public administration reform as well as poverty reduction and equity. She bridges the government, think tanks, civil society and the private sector in absorbing the best international expertise, knowledge and policy advice, to fulfill UNDP’s mission to make the Chinese people live better lives in a strengthened governance system, and enjoy democratic, equitable and sustainable development. Qing was previously a division director responsible for international cooperation at the Ministry of Justice of China. She was a Chevening scholar and received her Master Degree with overall distinction at the Faculty of Law of Oxford University in 2006. She assisted the research on organized crime at the Center for Criminology of Oxford University in 2007 and 2008. Qing was a Draper Hills Fellow at the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law in 2013.
Philippines Conference Room
3rd Floor , Encina Hall Central
New Approaches to China
The China Program’s "New Approaches to China" series features scholars and practitioners who are focused on policy-relevant research questions that offer a fresh examination of enduring themes in the study of contemporary China. These themes include the sustainability of China's growth model, resilience of the Chinese party-state, frictions in Chinese state-society relations, and China's evolving relationship with a dynamic region and global system.
China under Xi Jinping
The 3rd Plenum of the 18th Party Congress unveiled details of the reforms to come under Xi Jinping’s rule of China. But how significant are they? Are the proposed reforms sufficient to tackle the challenges that China faces? Can they be achieved? Are they contradictory? These questions are all the more pressing given Xi Jinping’s seemingly divergent policy directions in the economic and political realms.