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When China first proposed creating the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013, it generated considerable anxiety in Washington and many other capitals. Many pundits and policymakers view the AIIB as a bid to undermine or replace the international architecture designed by the United States and its allies since the end of World War II. Although several U.S. allies, including Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have declared their intention to join the AIIB, others, including Japan, have expressed ambivalence. For its part, the United States has made it clear that it will seek to influence the institution from the outside. But it would be a mistake to shun or undermine the AIIB. Rather, it should be welcomed. Both the United States and Japan have far more to gain by joining the AIIB and shaping its future than remaining on the sidelines.

The details remain vague, but the AIIB is meant to be a multilateral development institution that will focus on infrastructure needs in Asia. There is no question that this is a deserving cause. Asia’s large population, rapid growth, and integration with the global economy all generate demand for better infrastructure. A report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates the region needs about $750 billion annually in infrastructure-related financing. Citing historical underinvestment, McKinsey & Company, a global management consulting firm based in New York City, proclaims a “$1 trillion infrastructure opportunity” in Asia. [...]

This article was originally published on Foreign Affairs on May 7, 2015, and an excerpt has been reproduced here with permission. The full article may be viewed on the Foreign Affairs website.

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U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew meet with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at an economic dialogue between the two nations in July 2014. | Flickr/U.S. Department of State
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The damage that Mao Zedong wrought in China made it much easier for that country to move away from a Soviet-style economic model and toward a new market-oriented one, a Stanford scholar says.

In fact, China has been in full retreat for four decades from Mao's disastrous rule, according to a new book by Stanford sociology Professor Andrew Walder, a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and director emeritus of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center.

"Mao ruined much of what he had built and created no viable alternative," he wrote. "At the time of his death, he left China backward and deeply divided."

Led by Mao, China's Communist Party seized power in 1949 after a long period of guerrilla insurgency followed by full-scale war. Mao launched a bloody Chinese revolution that resulted in the deaths of millions of Chinese over the next few decades. 

In an interview, Walder said that Mao pushed campaign after campaign against the Chinese Communist party and bureaucracy after 1966 – "The bureaucracy was basically flat on its back at the time of his death."

By contrast, Walder noted, the Soviet bureaucracy was powerful and well-entrenched, and had enormous vested interests that thwarted genuine reforms.

"In post-Mao China, the economy was so backward and the bureaucratic interests so weak that market reform was bundled together with a program of national revival – restructuring the economy along market lines while rebuilding the party and bureaucracy," he said.

Therefore, the politics of reform were much easier for a Chinese leader like Deng Xiaoping than for a Soviet leader like Mikhail Gorbachev, who had to contend with an entrenched bureaucracy still proud of the fact that the USSR was (until the late 1980s) the second largest economy in the world and an undeniable superpower, according to Walder.

He noted that Mao's initiatives repeatedly led to unintended and unanticipated outcomes.

"What is so remarkable is that after 1956 this was a recurring pattern. His initiatives repeatedly ran into trouble, forcing him to backtrack and change direction constantly – although he always insisted that things had unfolded in ways that were according to his plans," Walder said.

Class struggle, imaginary enemies

Mao's China, he added, was defined by a harsh Communist Party rule and a socialist economy modeled after the Soviet Union. Mao himself intervened at almost every level, despite a large national bureaucracy that oversaw this authoritarian system.

"The doctrines and political organization that produced Mao's greatest achievements – victory in the civil war, the creation of China's first unified modern state, a historic transformation of urban and rural life – also generated his worst failures: the industrial depression and rural famine of the Great Leap Forward and the violent destruction and stagnation of the Cultural Revolution," Walder wrote.

He said that Mao misunderstood China's real problems in advocating a top-down "class struggle" against capitalism and imaginary enemies.

"At the time of his death (in 1976), he left China backward and deeply divided," Walder wrote.

The result was a gradual transition to the market-oriented system of today, he added. Almost immediately following Mao's death, his most fervent followers and supporters in the party were arrested and detained – all of which opened the door to reform and opportunity.

China has overcome widespread poverty to become the second largest economy in the world within the span of just a couple of decades. Still, according to Walder, China's rulers seek to cling to a sanitized version of Mao as a way to buttress their legitimacy.

"The damage of his misrule, and the incompetence on his part that it reflects, are not part of the official story anymore, and certainly this is not what is taught to school children or in party manuals in the present day," he said.

World War II and Stalinism

On two other key issues, Walder said his book challenges the conventional wisdom about China and Mao.

First, he says that Mao's forces did very little of the fighting against the Japanese in WWII.

Walder said that the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949 over the Chinese nationalist forces has usually been traced to the strategy of guerrilla warfare in rural regions championed early on by Mao.

"But that was simply a strategy of survival during the Japanese invasion – and Mao's forces did very little of the fighting against the Japanese, in stark contrast to the popular myth of rural resistance." (Only 10 percent of China's military casualties were Red Army, he said.)

What Mao's Chinese Communist Party (CCP) excelled at was mass mobilization for all-out warfare during the Chinese civil war of 1945-49, Walder said.

"And this – pushing your organization and the population for all-out mobilization for war – is the real source of the CCP's success over the Chinese nationalists. This was more like the Soviet Union's war against German armies during World War II than a 'people's war' led by a party that was close to the rural people and built support by catering to their needs," he said.

Second, Walder describes Mao's thinking as frozen in Stalinist doctrine, despite the conventional view of him as an original thinker.

"In fact, Mao's core ideas were absorbed from late-1930s Soviet pamphlets put out under Stalin, and his thinking was very much frozen in that earlier era," Walder said. "The core idea that he absorbed from these pamphlets in creating 'Mao Thought' was that socialism had to be built in an all-out mobilization, like warfare, by extracting huge sacrifices from the population."

The most pernicious idea that Mao absorbed from these old Soviet pamphlets, Walder said, was that class struggle actually intensifies after the means of production are put under public ownership and former exploiting classes are liquidated.

"The sad corollary to this idea is that the Great Leader is the fount of correct ideas, and those who doubt or oppose him represent class enemies who actually oppose socialism," said Walder.

Based on this logic, Walder pointed out, the class struggle had to be waged against "incorrect ideas" as judged by the Great Leader.

"Mao's personality cult was an imitation of Stalin's own," he said.

And so, the Chinese leader held on to old Stalinist ideas long after they were rejected by the Soviet Union as crude distortions of Marxism.

"Mao was actually insisting on keeping to the old and tattered Stalinist playbook," Walder said.

Clifton Parker is a writer for the Stanford News Service.

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A statue of Mao Zedong in Lijiang, China. | Flickr/Tauno Tõhk
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In a recent Q&A for The New York Times, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow Francis Fukuyama assesses China's political development, asserting that the country's strong state capacity must be balanced by rule of law and democracy. Although the country has found success as a highly autonomous bureaucracy, Fukuyama cautions that bad leadership in both business and government may serve as a source of political decay in the future. 

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U.S. President Barack Obama meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping at The Annenberg Retreat at Sunnylands in Rancho Mirage, California, on June 7, 2013. | Kevin Lamarque, Reuters
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Stanford Office of International Affairs: Stanford Graduate School of Business Assistant Professor Szu-Chi Huang talks about her research on consumer behavior and motivation and her faculty fellowship at the Stanford Center at Peking University last winter.  Read more.

 

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Professor Huang talks at the Stanford Center at Peking University in January 2015. | Courtesy of Stanford Graduate School of Business
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Registration is required. Tickets to this event can be obtained here.

 

***Please note that this event is closed to the press***

President Obama signaled the national import of cybersecurity with a White House Summit on Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection in February 2015. We watched as U.S. allegations of North Korea’s hacking into Sony Corporation unfolded on the world stage. China's PLA Unit 61398 grabbed headlines with its cyber espionage into U.S. interests. The threat of cyber espionage proves ubiquitous. This panel will focus on the most critical bilateral relationship in the world of cybersecurity today: between U.S. and China. Since the Mandiant report and the Snowden leaks, hostility between the two governments around cybersecurity has reached an all-time high. This program brings together leading experts from the government, private sector and academia to critically examine cyber espionage waged by both countries; the threats implied; and preventive measures envisioned by the best minds in the industry.

This is the second in a two-part ASNC program series titled Digital Dilemma on cybersecurity and U.S.-Asia relations.

Speakers:

Jing De Jong-Chen, Senior Director of Microsoft, Inc., and VIce President of Trusted Computing Group

Jesse Goldhammer (moderator), Associate Dean of Business Development and Strategy, UC Berkeley School of Information 

James Andrew Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow at Center for Strategic and International Studies

Herbert Lin, Senior Research Scholar for Cyber Policy and Security, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University

Michael Nacht, Schneider Professor of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs


 

Program Agenda:

5:30 - 6:00 pm: Registration
6:00 - 7:30 pm: Panel Discussion and Q&A
7:30 - 8:00 pm: Reception and Networking 

Promotional Co-Sponsors: Cal-Asia Business Council; Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford; Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity, UC Berkeley; Institute for East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley; School of Information, UC Berkeley

K&L Gates LLP

4 Embarcadero Center, Suite 1200

San Francisco, CA 94111

Panel Discussions
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Keyu Jin
There is a fundamental misunderstanding and misconception about the Chinese economy - about how it works and what are the true challenges it faces. In the talk, Dr. Keyu Jin will highlight three major myths: on what really drives growth in China, what explains its high savings rate, and the economic consequences of the one child policy. Everyone has something to complain about the Chinese economy: large misallocation of resources, low employment growth, a declining share of the economic pie going to Chinese households, environmental costs, financial repression, and wage suppression. Dr. Jin will argue that all of these phenomena are not disparate problems, but are all part of the same fundamental problem, one of macroeconomic structure. The Chinese economy is not 'imbalanced,' rather it is subject to a vicious cycle. And yet, there is still reason to view the Chinese economy with 'guarded optimism.'

Dr. Keyu Jin is an Assistant professor of Economics at London School of economics. She is from Beijing, China, and holds a B.A., M.A., and PhD from Harvard University. Her field of expertise is international macroeconomics and the Chinese economy. Her research has focused on global imbalances and global asset prices, demographics, as well as international trade and growth. Her research is tightly linked to examining the various economic issues in China. She has multiple publications in the American Economic Review, and has also written opinion pieces for the Financial Times and Project Syndicate. She sits on the Asian advisory board of Richemont Group and is also a World Economic Forum Young Global Leader. 

Please note this event is off the record.

Keyu Jin Assistant professor in Economics London School of Economics
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SCPKU sponsored a Stanford graduate seminar entitled “Chronic Disease in China: Health Care and Public Health Challenges” March 16 to April 3.  Taught by Stanford Professor Randall Stafford from the Stanford Center for Research in Disease Prevention, the seminar focused on analyzing the multiple factors leading to China’s increasing non-communicable disease (NCD) burden and implications for health care services and policies – both within China and globally. In addition to Professor Stafford and his Teaching Assistant, seven Stanford students participated in the seminar along with students from Peking University and Zhejiang University.   

Two Stanford participants share some of their seminar experiences below. Ben Seligman is in the School of Medicine pursuing his MD and PhD and Daisy Zheng is working on her PhD in Civil and Environmental Engineering. Content from the interview has been edited for length and clarity. 

 

Qu: Why did you decide to apply for this SCPKU graduate seminar?

Ben:  The topic was relevant to my research interests and I am interested in doing more work involving China.

Daisy:  It aligned very well with my research and provided a chance for short-term study at a prestigious campus, Peking University. 

 

Qu: What did you hope to learn in China as part of the program and were your objectives met?

Ben:  I hoped to work on my Chinese, learn more about available datasets, and network with local faculty.  I would say I was mostly successful across the board.

Daisy:  I hoped to learn: 1) the differences in performing research abroad, 2) the difference between China’s healthcare system and that in other countries, and 3) the impact that environment has on quality of life in China.  What I found most surprising were the differences in male and female health factors in China (obesity and smoking), the issues with particular Chinese databases, and the categorization of disease treatment and diagnosis. 

 

Qu: Did the Chinese students from Peking University and Zhejiang University have an impact on your experience?

Ben:  Yes, having them present was a core part of what made the experience worthwhile.

Daisy:  Yes, I found working with them was most enlightening when discussing research habits.  The challenge was that the students were taking full loads at their universities while attending the seminar so they were extremely busy.  It would have been ideal to have Chinese students with lighter loads participating – perhaps students at the PhD level no longer taking classes or holding the seminar during the summer.

 

Qu: Was this your first time participating in an overseas course/field trip?  If not, please share some of the challenges that you may have encountered on your other trips and how you resolved them. 

Ben:    This was not my first trip.  Cross-cultural communication is always a challenge, particularly if the working language is English and many of the participants are not fluent.  Likewise, keeping on-schedule is a significant and important challenge.

Daisy:  No, I participated in a National Science Foundation International Research and Education in Engineering program in which I conducted research at Tsinghua University in Beijing.  The largest challenge was getting access to academic resources at Stanford.

 

Qu:  What are the first three words or thoughts that come to mind which best describe your experience at SCPKU?

Ben:  Exciting, informative and fun

Daisy: Fun, enlightening, bonding

 

Qu: Do you have future plans to travel to China? 

Ben:  I hope to return to SCPKU as a pre-doc fellow.  Longer-term, I hope to do some of my epidemiological and demographic research in China, building partly off of the contacts I have made.

Daisy: I would love to be able to go back and study air quality conditions in Beijing.

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ABSTRACT

Over the past 20 years, the military balance between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan has rapidly shifted. As China’s defense budget has grown annually at double-digit rates, Taiwan’s has shrunk. These trends are puzzling, because China’s rise as a military power poses a serious threat to Taiwan’s security. Existing theories suggest that states will choose one of three strategies when faced with an external threat: bargaining, arming, or allying. Yet for most of this period, Taiwan’s leaders have done none of these things. In this talk, I explain this apparent paradox as a consequence of Taiwan’s transition to democracy. Democracy has worked in three distinct ways to constrain rises in defense spending: by intensifying popular demands for non-defense spending, introducing additional veto players into the political system, and increasing the incentives of political elites to shift Taiwan’s security burden onto its primary ally, the United States. Together, these domestic political factors have driven a net decline in defense spending despite the rising threat posed by China’s rapid military modernization program. Put simply, in Taiwan the democratization effect has swamped the external threat effect. 

 

SPEAKER BIO

Kharis Templeman is the Program Manager for the Taiwan Democracy Project in the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, in the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University.

 

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Why Taiwan's Defense Spending Has Fallen
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The Shaanxi Daily issued a press release on REAP's ongoing Perfecting Parenting project.  This article was translated and reprinted with permission from The Shaanxi Daily.  Read the original article (in Chinese) here.

 

China’s First “Parenting Trainers” Will Be Born in Shangluo

March 19, 2015
 
Shaanxi Media Online
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In Shangluo, tucked away in the distant parts of the Qinling mountain range, 70 officials have already undertaken the assignment of “early child development parenting trainers.”

Yaojiang Shi, Director of the Center for Experimental Economics in Education at Shaanxi Normal University, was brimming with confidence as he received journalists, saying, “before long, they will pass the evaluations and become China’s first generation of parenting trainers.”

According to statistics, in 2013, 40 percent of 6- to 12-month-old children living in rural areas in Shaanxi province clearly lagged behind in cognitive ability and social-emotional development. Parents are only concerned that their children have enough to eat and warm clothes to wear, neglecting their mental health and development. Scientific research has proven that the first three years of a child’s life is a critical period for mental development. However, in China’s vast rural areas, there is still a blank space in place of education for 0- to 3-year-old children. In order to change this situation, China’s National Health and Family Planning Commission, Shaanxi Normal University, Stanford University in the United States, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences jointly established the “Perfecting Parenting” project. Following this project’s officially launch last November, 70 “parenting trainers” were recruited from among the family planning officials in 58 townships across Danfeng, Shangnan, Shanyang, and Zhenan counties, and 275 babies were randomly selected to take part in the project. After undergoing rigorous training, the “parenting trainers” will teach scientific child-rearing knowledge to children’s parents and caretakers through demonstration and guidance. By having parents interact more with their children through story telling, singing songs with them, playing games, and engaging in other parent-child activities, they aim to improve the babies’ cognitive abilities, motor development, and social-emotional development.

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by Hannah Myers
 
As the bus lurches up the pot-holed dirt road into the village, a storm of seventh- and eight-graders comes rushing out to meet it.  This bus isn't taking them to class, but to a clinic that will revolutionize their school careers.  They are travelling to a OneSight Vision Clinic.  By the end of the day, they will have had their eyes examined, lenses edged, and frames selected for a brand new pair of eyeglasses.  For these children, such a simple intervention can have a huge impact on their education and future.
 
Three years ago, REAP researchers noticed something surprising: in rural China, almost no children wear glasses.  In response, REAP launched the Seeing is Learning program, and have screened over 30,000 children in a series of randomized controlled trials. REAP found that in a nine-month period, nearsighted students who were given glasses learned almost twice as much as those without them--putting them essentially a full grade-level ahead.
 
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Next, REAP and regional governments in China designed a scaleable sustainable vision care centers based in county hospitals. The vision centers target rural primary school students, and to date have provided new glasses to virtually all 3rd through 6th grade students who need them in two pilot counties.
 
But what about older rural students who need glasses, and whose schoolwork is suffering as a result?  The REAP-supported vision care centers are already operating at capacity to meet the needs of primary school students.  Therefore, from March 15th to 27th, OneSight—with support from REAP—operated a charitable clinic to provide vision care to all middle-school students in Yongshou county Shaanxi Province.  The REAP team trained Yongshou's middle-school teachers to screen their students, then organized buses to transport students who failed the vision tests to the Onesight clinic in the county seat.  OneSight's 65 volunteer optometrists and eye care specialists efficiently diagnosed each student, custom-ground lenses, and delivered a new pair of glasses.  In total, approximately 7,000 students were screened and almost 3,500 received new glasses in the 12-day clinic.
 
In this remote corner of rural China, the group of foreigner eye doctors pulling up in a massive OneSight truck stocked with autorefractors, eye-dilating medicines, and enormous lens-grinding machines was certainly a sight to see.  Local media captured much of the clinic, broadcasting it throughout Yongshou and surrounding areas.  Moving forward, REAP plans to use this momentum to expand its sustainable vision care model into more counties across rural China.

 

Contacts

Matthew Boswell: Project Manager, Seeing is Learning (boswell@stanford.edu)

Scott Rozelle: REAP Co-Director (rozelle@stanford.edu)

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