Northeast Asia is a global center of economic dynamism, propelled by phenomenal growth in social and cultural interactions among the region's nations. Still, wounds from past wrongs, committed during times of colonialism and war, have not yet fully healed, and the question of history has become a highly contentious diplomatic issue. After one and a half years in office, the leaders of China and South Korea (Korea hereafter) still refuse to hold bilateral summits with their Japanese counterpart, largely due to disputes over the past. Questions about history touch on the most sensitive issues of national identity, making it very difficult for countries to compromise.

How should we understand and approach current historical tensions in Northeast Asia? Pessimists worry that the legacies of the past will persist and that there is not much we can do about it. Optimists believe that these issues will inevitably fade over time as the wartime generation passes away and the countries of the region become increasingly integrated economically and culturally.

Last summer, I had an opportunity to deliver a special lecture series at a Korean university. More than 30 students from China, Japan, Korea, the U.S. and Europe attended the lectures, which focused on problems related to the modern history of Northeast Asia and territorial disputes. I asked students whether they thought Japan had apologized for its past actions of aggression. Korean and Chinese students mostly replied that Japan had either "not apologized at all" or was "not sincere." In contrast, most Japanese students were hardly aware of the misfortunes of the past and the controversies about the government's stance.

The historical amnesia of Japanese students is most worrisome, but the insistence by Chinese and Korean students that the Japanese have not apologized at all is troubling, too. Although the definition of "apology" may vary depending on circumstances, it is undeniable that Japanese leaders, including prime ministers, have directly expressed regret about Japan's actions of aggression to Koreans and Chinese. Of course, legitimate doubts arise in Korea and China as to Japan's sincerity. More than once, a prime minister's apology has been undercut by the denial of wartime responsibility by his education minister, or by a subsequent visit by the prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine to Japan's war dead.

My teaching experience illustrates the danger posed by a crucial gap in perceptions. History does not merely narrate events or developments. In reconstructing the past, it is inevitable that certain parts are omitted or stressed, producing different views. Divided historical memories separate nations, resulting in distinct, often contradictory, perceptions. Those perceptions become deeply embedded in the public consciousness, transmitted to succeeding generations formally by education and informally through the arts, popular culture and mass media.

Time isn't a cure-all

Why have these nations developed distinct, and incomplete, memories of the wartime period?

One common answer is that Japan was an aggressor while China and Korea were victims, but this is too simplistic to explain the complexities of modern history and collective memory in Northeast Asia. Different events acquire disproportionate weight in the formation of each nation's historical consciousness. For China and Korea, Japanese acts of aggression -- such as the Nanjing Massacre or forced labor and sexual slavery -- constitute the most crucial elements. For Japan, events related to U.S. actions, such as the firebombings of Japanese cities or the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are more important. Korea and China are a less significant element in Japan's memory, while Japan looms large in theirs.

Japan's focus on U.S. actions, over the sufferings of Koreans and Chinese, explains the country's historical amnesia and reluctance to come to terms with its Asian neighbors. Unlike Germany, postwar Japan developed a mythology of victimhood, shaped by the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the massive incendiary and atomic bombings of its cities. Victim consciousness provided fertile soil for the growth of postwar neo-nationalism that justified colonialism and war and denied Japan's responsibility for atrocities.

Balanced historical memory with a better understanding of the perspective of the other side is urgently needed. Japan needs to clearly comprehend the mindset of its neighbors, instead of complaining about its "apology fatigue." China and Korea are also responsible for educating their citizens about Japan's own struggle to come to terms with its past. That kind of mutual understanding rests on resuming efforts at joint historical study with a commitment to open-minded debate. Only then can the nations of Northeast Asia begin to narrow perception gaps and forge a shared view.

This is a task not only for governments but for civil society. We should encourage exchanges among young people from the three countries, including joint visits to historic sites such as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Seodaemun Prison History Museum in Seoul. Such gatherings would constitute a regionwide attempt to share and heal the pains of the past. Disregarding or ignoring dark events means not only evading historical accountability but also missing the opportunity to learn from history. Germany's failure to learn from its defeat in World War I led to the rise of Nazism and another world war. The German experience should provide a valuable lesson for all, especially Japan.

We cannot depend on time alone to heal these wounds. When issues of the past posed a stumbling block in improving relations between China and Japan in the 1970s, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said, "Because our generation is not wise enough to resolve all of the pending questions, let's leave the unsettled ones to the next generation." Contrary to his expectations, however, the two countries are stricken today with a worse situation involving history and territorial disputes, and the younger generation tends to be even more swayed by the fever of nationalism.

This is a moment of both danger and opportunity for Northeast Asia. The current impasse in regional relations demands a commitment to confronting the corrosive nationalism fed by the unresolved issues of history. As the wartime generation passes from the scene, they are called upon to leave behind a wiser generation capable of realizing the potential of Northeast Asia to be the center of the 21st century.

This article was originally carried by Nikkei Asian Review on 25 July and reposted with permission.

The Japanese Cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, announced a reinterpretation of the country’s Constitution on July 1st, marking a significant shift in its pacifist security policy that it has held for nearly seventy years.

A controversial aspect of the Constitution’s reinterpretation concerns Article 9, a defense clause that outlaws a traditional military and use of force to settle disputes. The recent announcement, however, suggests lifting Japan’s ban on collective self-defense, extending the country’s ability to apply use of force not only to respond to an armed attack against Japan but also when an armed attack occurs against its allies.

Ryo Sahashi, a visiting associate professor at Shorenstein APARC, writes on the %link1% that it is necessary for Japan to enhance its deterrence through greater diplomacy, not just an enlargement of its military. He says Japan, like other nations, is entitled to secure its territory and pursue its own alliance partners. However, the lack of public support toward the reinterpretation is concerning, and will present challenges as the administration seeks to implement its new policies.

Sahashi also spoke with %link2% about Japan’s changing security paradigm in the context of Mr. Abe’s state visit to Canberra, Australia. He points out that it will take a year for the administration to change the laws associated with the Constitution’s reinterpretation, saying this time gap will allow the Government to shore up national support. His interview is available below, it starts around minute 1:12.

Following the Cabinet’s announcement, a poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun reported a 48 percent approval rating of the Abe administration, down nine percentage points when compared to last month. Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, says in the %link3% that the poll reflects the public’s lack of support for the policy changes.

Stanford economist Takeo Hoshi’s new co-authored working paper, “Implementing Structural Reforms in Abenomics: How to Reduce the Cost of Doing Business in Japan,” is cited in the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe formed a panel to rewrite national textbooks that reference the country's wartime past. Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at Shorenstein APARC, says those actions are a “backdoor way of limiting references to Japanese aggression” in an Economist article analyzing the history debates.

Update: A full report summarizing the discussion of the 12th Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum is available below.

Northeast Asia has been rife with animosity over the past year. Among the outstanding concerns are China’s naval movements in the South China Sea and the threat of a fourth nuclear missile test by North Korea. While no major incidents have occurred in recent months, the uncertainty weighs heavily on policymakers and observers. What if an accidental clash happens in the sea or air?

Senior security scholars and practitioners from South Korea and the United States recently gathered for the Korea–U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, a Track II workshop to exchange views on these major issues impacting the Northeast Asia region.

The Strategic Forum, established in 2006, is held semiannually and alternates between Seoul and Stanford, hosted by the Korean Studies Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The Korean counterpart organization is the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, the foreign ministry’s think tank within the Korea National Diplomatic Academy. 

Twenty-four participants gathered on June 20 at the Bechtel Conference Center, and offered a diversity of opinions on Korean peninsula issues and the potential impact they could have on the countries’ allies. The participants collectively expressed a desire for regional stability, increased dialogue, and commitment to maintaining the U.S.–ROK alliance and cooperation on other trust-building activities.

The conference operates under the Chatham House Rule of individual confidentiality to allow for candid conversation. A few main points from the sessions are disclosed below:

Session I: Northeast Asia Regional Dynamics

Many participants shared the concern that trilateral relations between China–South Korea–Japan are at one of the worst points in recent history.

China’s current attitude toward its neighbors and the United States was discussed at length. Many participants discussed the strategic trajectory of China and how the country’s domestic situation may challenge its ability to effectively move forward, contrary to popular perceptions that simply straight-line its current growth rate into the indefinite future. 

Korean participants expressed concern toward Japan’s position, particularly following Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine and the stance he has taken on other wartime issues like “comfort women.” They said they hoped the United States would do more to help Korea–Japan relations, as participants recognized the desirability of increased trilateral U.S.–Japan–Korea security and diplomatic cooperation.

Session II: U.S.­–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA)

Participants shared the view that the U.S.­–Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) is serving to broaden and deepen the U.S.­–ROK relationship.

The KORUS FTA is only in its second year of implementation, so additional time is needed to make a comprehensive evaluation, but it appears that it will significantly increase bilateral trade as time passes.

Session III: U.S.–ROK Alliance

The U.S.­–ROK relationship, on the whole, is in very good shape. South Korea and the United States have similar policies in most strategic areas.

The two countries cooperate on many diplomatic and security initiatives, such as the U.S. 28,500-strong troop presence in South Korea and many United Nations peacekeeping missions abroad. 

Session IV: North Korea

Participants agreed that North Korea continues to engage in provocative behavior. This remains the chief concern of the U.S.–ROK alliance, as well a priority of the international community in total.

The policies of the United States and South Korea toward North Korea are well-coordinated and principled, but a number of Korean and American participants expressed concern that more creative thinking was needed, as the challenges North Korea poses are increasing. 

Reports from past forums are available on the Shorenstein APARC website.