Each president of the United States enters office thinking he will be able to define the agenda and set the course of America's relations with the rest of the world. And, almost invariably, each confronts crises that are thrust upon him-wars, revolutions, genocides, and deadly confrontations. Neither Woodrow Wilson nor FDR imagined having to plunge America into world war. Truman had to act quickly, and with little preparation, to confront the menace of Soviet expansion at war's end. JFK, for all his readiness to "bear any burden" in the struggle for freedom, did not expect his struggle to contain Soviet imperial ambitions would come so close to the brink of nuclear annihilation. Nixon was tested by a surprise war in the Middle East. Carter's presidency was consumed by the Shah's unraveling and the Iranian revolution. George H.W. Bush rose to the challenge of communism's collapse and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Clinton squandered the opportunity to stop a genocide in Rwanda and waited tragically too long before stopping one in Bosnia. George W. Bush mobilized the country to strike back after September 11, but, in the view of many, he put most of his chips in the wrong war.

In the eye of the historical storm, and in the absence of a challenge as immediate and overpowering as September 11, Pearl Harbor, or the Nazis' march across Europe, it is risky to identify any set of world events as game-changing. Yet that is what many analysts, including myself, believe the Arab revolutions of 2011 are. And a surprising number of specialists-including hard-eyed realists like Fareed Zakaria-have seized upon the crisis in Libya as a defining moment not just for the United States in the region but for the foreign policy presidency of Barack Obama as well.

To date, one could say that Obama has had a surprisingly good run for a foreign policy neophyte. He has revived the momentum for arms control with a new START treaty with Russia, while pressing the issue of human rights within Russia. He has managed the meteoric rise of China decently, while improving relations with India. He has not cut and run from Iraq-as most Republicans were convinced he would. And he has ramped up but at least set limits to our involvement in Afghanistan. As the Arab revolutions have gathered momentum, he has increasingly positioned the United States on the side of democratic change. His statements and actions have not gone as far as democracy promotion advocates (like myself) would have preferred, but they have overridden cautionary warnings of the foreign policy establishment in the State Department, the Pentagon, think tanks, and so on. Without Obama's artful choreography of public statements and private messages and pressures, Hosni Mubarak might still be in power today.

All of this, however, may appear in time only a prelude to the fateful choice that Obama will soon have to make-and, one fears, is already making by default in a tragically wrong way-in Libya. Why is Libya-with its six million people and its significant but still modest share of global oil exports-so important? Why must the fight against Muammar Qaddafi-a crazy and vicious dictator, but by now, in his capacity for global mischief, a largely defanged one-be our fight?

When presidents are tested by crisis, the world draws their measure, and the impressions formed can have big consequences down the road. After watching Jimmy Carter's weak and vacillating posture on Iran, the Soviets figured he'd sit on the sidelines if they invaded and swallowed Afghanistan. They misjudged, but Afghanistan and the world are still paying the price for that misperception. In the face of mixed messages and a long, cynical game of balance-of-power, Saddam too, misjudged that he could get away with swallowing up Kuwait in 1991. When the United States did not prepare for war as naked aggression swept across Asia and Europe, the Japanese thought a quick strike could disable and knock out the slumbering American giant across the Pacific. When Slobodan Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb allies launched their war of "ethnic cleansing," while "the West"-which is always to say, first and foremost, the United States-wrung its hands, many tens of thousands of innocent people were murdered and raped before President Bill Clinton finally found the resolve to mix air power and diplomacy to bring the genocidal violence to a halt.

If Muammar Qaddafi succeeds in crushing the Libyan revolt, as he is well on his way to doing, the U.S. foreign policy establishment will heave a sad sigh of regret and say, in essence, "That's the nasty business of world politics." In other words: nasty, but not our business. And so: not their blood on our hands. But, when we have encouraged them to stand up for their freedom, and when they have asked for our very limited help, it becomes our business. On February 23, President Obama said: "The United States ... strongly supports the universal rights of the Libyan people. That includes the rights of peaceful assembly, free speech, and the ability of the Libyan people to determine their own destiny. These are human rights. They are not negotiable. ... And they cannot be denied through violence or suppression." Yet denying them through murderous violence and merciless suppression-with a massacre of semi-genocidal proportions likely waiting as the end game in Benghazi-is exactly what Qaddafi is in the process of doing.

Barack Obama has bluntly declared that Qaddafi must go. The Libyan resistance, based in Benghazi, has appealed urgently for the imposition of a no-fly zone. Incredibly, the Arab League has endorsed the call, as has the Gulf Cooperation Council. France has recognized the rebel provisional government based in Benghazi as Libya's legitimate government-while Obama studies this all. Can anyone remember a time when France and the Arab League were ahead of the United States on a question of defending freedom fighters?

There is much more that can be done beyond imposing a no-fly zone. No one in their right mind is calling for putting American boots on the ground in Libya. But we can jam Qaddafi's communications. We can, and urgently should, get humanitarian supplies and communications equipment, including satellite modems for connection to the Internet, to the rebels in Benghazi, where they can be supplied by sea. And we should find a way to get them arms as well. Benghazi is not a minor desert town. It is Libya's second largest city, a major industrial and commercial hub, and a significant port. Through it, a revolt can be supplied. If Benghazi falls to Qaddafi, it will fall hard and bloodily, and the thud will be heard throughout the world.

Time may be running out. As the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday, "All that stands between Kadafi and rebel headquarters in Benghazi are disorganized volunteers and army defectors spread thinly along the coastal highway." They have passion and courage, but they lack weaponry, strategy, and training. Like so many rebel movements, they need time to pull these all together. Time is what a no-fly zone and an emergency supply line can buy them.

Libya's rebels are pleading for our help. "Where is America?" asked one of them, quoted in the L.A. Times, who was manning a checkpoint in Port Brega. "All they do is talk, talk, talk. They need to get rid of these planes killing Libyan people." The "they" he was referring to was the Americans, beginning with their leader-one would hope, still the leader of the "free world"-President Obama.

Many prudent reasons have been offered for doing nothing. It is not our fight. They might lose anyway. We don't know who these rebels really are. We have too many other commitments. And so on. The cautions sound reasonable, except that we have heard them all before. Think Mostar and Srebrenica. And we had a lot of commitments in World War II as well, when we could have and should have bombed the industrial infrastructure of the Holocaust. As for the possibility that the rebels might lose-a prospect that is a possibility if we aid them and a near certainty if we do not-which would be the greater ignominy: To have given Libya's rebels the support they asked for while they failed, or to have stood by and done absolutely nothing except talk while they were mowed down in the face of meek American protests that the Qaddafi's violence is "unacceptable"?

Oh yes. There is also the danger that China will veto a U.N. Security Council Resolution calling for a no-fly zone. Part of us should hope they do. Let the rising superpower-more cynical than the reigning one ever was-feel the first hot flash of hatred by Arabs feeling betrayed. Go ahead, make our day.

Presidents do not get elected to make easy decisions, and they certainly never become great doing so. They do not get credit just because they go along with what the diplomatic and military establishments tell them are the "wise and prudent" thing to do. This is not Hungary in 1956. There is no one standing behind Qaddafi-not the Soviet Union then, not the Arab League now, not even the entirety of his own army. That is why he must recruit mercenaries to save him. Qaddafi is the kind of neighborhood bully that Slobodan Milosevic was. And he must be met by the same kind of principled power. For America to do less than that now-less than the minimum that the Libyan rebels and the Arab neighbors are requesting-would be to shrink into global vacillation and ultimately irrelevance. If Barack Obama cannot face down a modest thug who is hated by most of his own people and by every neighboring government, who can he confront anywhere?

For the United States-and for Barack Obama-there is much more at stake in Libya than the fate of one more Arab state, or even the entire region. And the clock is ticking.

Over the course of three short months, popular uprisings have toppled regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, sparked a civil war in Libya and created unrest in other parts of the Middle East. They also have raised a question in many people's minds: Are all authoritarian regimes now threatened by this new democratic wave? In particular, is China, a rising superpower, vulnerable to these forces?  

The Communist government in Beijing is clearly worried. It has limited news coverage of the recent uprisings and has clamped down on democratic activists and foreign reporters, acting pre-emptively against anonymous calls on the Internet for China to have its own "Jasmine Revolution." A recent front-page editorial in the Beijing Daily, an organ of the city's party committee, declared that most people in the Middle East were unhappy with the protests in their countries, which were a "self-delusional ruckus" orchestrated by a small minority. For his part, President Hu Jintao has urged the strengthening of what has been dubbed the "Great Firewall"-the sophisticated apparatus of censorship and surveillance that the regime uses to control access to the Internet.

No social scientist or intelligence analyst predicted the specific timing or spread of the Arab uprising-the fact that it would start in Tunisia, of all places, that it would be triggered by an event like the self-immolation of a vegetable seller, or that protests would force the mighty Egyptian army to abandon Hosni Mubarak. Over the past generation, Arab societies have appeared stolidly stable. Why they suddenly exploded in 2011 is something that can be understood only in retrospect, if at all.

But this doesn't mean that we can't think about social revolutions in a more structured way. Even unpredictable things take place in a certain context, and the present-day situations of China and the Middle East are radically different. Most of the evidence suggests that China is pretty safe from the democratic wave sweeping other parts of the world-at least for now.

Perhaps the most relevant thinker for understanding the Middle East today and China tomorrow is the late Samuel Huntington-not the Huntington of "The Clash of Civilizations," who argued that there were fundamental incompatibilities between Islam and democracy, but the Huntington whose classic book "Political Order in Changing Societies," first published in 1968, laid out his theory of the development "gap."

Observing the high levels of political instability plaguing countries in the developing world during the 1950s and '60s, Mr. Huntington noted that increasing levels of economic and social development often led to coups, revolutions and military takeovers. This could be explained, he argued, by a gap between the newly mobilized, educated and economically empowered people and their existing political system-that is, between their hopes for political participation and institutions that gave them little or no voice. Attacks against the existing political order, he noted, are seldom driven by the poorest of the poor in such a society; they tend to be led, instead, by rising middle classes who are frustrated by the lack of political and economic opportunity.

All of these observations would seem to apply to Tunisia and Egypt. Both countries have made substantial social progress in recent decades. The Human Development Indices compiled by the United Nations (a composite measure of health, education and income) increased by 28% for Egypt and 30% for Tunisia between 1990 and 2010. The number of people going to school has grown substantially; Tunisia especially has produced large numbers of college graduates. And indeed, the protests in Tunisia and Egypt were led in the first instance by educated, tech-savvy middle-class young people, who expressed to anyone who would listen their frustrations with societies in which they were not allowed to express their views, hold leaders accountable for corruption and incompetence, or get a job without political connections.

Mr. Huntington stressed the destabilizing power of new social groups seeking political participation. People used to be mobilized by newspapers and radio; today they are spurred to action by cell phones, Facebook and Twitter, which allow them to share their grievances about the existing system and to learn about the possibilities of the larger world. This change in the Middle East has been incredibly rapid, and it has trumped, for now, old verities about the supposed passivity of Arab culture and the resistance of Islam to modernization.

But do these remarkable developments tell us anything about the possibility for future instability in China?

It is certainly true that the dry tinder of social discontent is just as present in China as in the Middle East. The incident that triggered the Tunisian uprising was the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, who had his vegetable cart repeatedly confiscated by the authorities and who was slapped and insulted by the police when he went to complain. This issue dogs all regimes that have neither the rule of law nor public accountability: The authorities routinely fail to respect the dignity of ordinary citizens and run roughshod over their rights. There is no culture in which this sort of behavior is not strongly resented.

This is a huge problem throughout China. A recent report from Jiao Tong University found that there were 72 "major" incidents of social unrest in China in 2010, up 20% over the previous year. Most outside observers would argue that this understates the real number of cases by perhaps a couple of orders of magnitude. Such incidents are hard to count because they often occur in rural areas where reporting is strictly controlled by the Chinese authorities.

The most typical case of outraged dignity in contemporary China is a local government that works in collusion with a private developer to take away the land of peasants or poor workers to make way for a glittery new project, or a company that dumps pollutants into a town's water supply and gets away with it because the local party boss stands to profit personally. Though corruption in China does not reach the predatory levels of certain African or Middle Eastern countries, it is nonetheless pervasive. People see and resent the privileged lives of the nation's elite and their children. The movie "Avatar" was a big hit in China in part because so many ordinary Chinese identified with the indigenous people it portrayed whose land was being stolen by a giant, faceless corporation.

There is, moreover, a huge and growing problem of inequality in China. The gains from China's remarkable growth have gone disproportionately to the country's coastal regions, leaving many rural areas far behind. China's Gini index-a standard measure of income inequality across a society-has increased to almost Latin American levels over the past generation. By comparison, Egypt and Tunisia have a much more equal income distribution.

According to Mr. Huntington, however, revolutions are made not by the poor but by upwardly mobile middle-class people who find their aspirations stymied, and there are lots of them in China. Depending on how you define it, China's middle class may outnumber the whole population of the United States. Like the middle-class people of Tunisia and Egypt, those in China have no opportunities for political participation. But unlike their Middle Eastern counterparts, they have benefited from a dramatically improving economy and a government that has focused like a laser beam on creating employment for exactly this group.

To the extent that we can gauge Chinese public opinion through surveys like Asia Barometer, a very large majority of Chinese feel that their lives have gotten better economically in recent years. A majority of Chinese also believe that democracy is the best form of government, but in a curious twist, they think that China is already democratic and profess to be satisfied with this state of affairs. This translates into a relatively low degree of support for any short-term transition to genuine liberal democracy.

Indeed, there is some reason to believe that the middle class in China may fear multiparty democracy in the short run, because it would unleash huge demands for redistribution precisely from those who have been left behind. Prosperous Chinese see the recent populist polarization of politics in Thailand as a warning of what democracy may bring.

The fact is that authoritarianism in China is of a far higher quality than in the Middle East. Though not formally accountable to its people through elections, the Chinese government keeps careful track of popular discontents and often responds through appeasement rather than repression. Beijing is forthright, for example, in acknowledging the country's growing income disparities and for the past few years has sought to mitigate the problem by shifting new investments to the poor interior of the country. When flagrant cases of corruption or abuse appear, like melamine-tainted baby formula or the shoddy school construction revealed by the Sichuan earthquake, the government holds local officials brutally accountable-sometimes by executing them.

Another notable feature of Chinese government is self-enforced leadership turnover. Arab leaders like Tunisia's Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Egypt's Mr. Mubarak and Libya's Col. Moammar Gadhafi never knew when to quit, hanging on 23, 30 and 41 years, respectively. Since Mao, the Chinese leadership has rigidly adhered to terms of about a decade. Mr. Hu, the current president, is scheduled to step down in 2012, when he is likely to be replaced by Vice President Xi Jinping. Leadership turnover means that there is more policy innovation, in sharp contrast to countries like Tunisia and Egypt, which have been stuck for decades in the rut of crony capitalism.

The Chinese government is also more clever and ruthless in its approach to repression. Sensing a clear threat, the authorities never let Western social media spread in the first place. Facebook and Twitter are banned, and content on websites and on China-based social media is screened by an army of censors. It is possible, of course, for word of government misdeeds to get out in the time between its first posting by a micro-blogger and its removal by a censor, but this cat-and-mouse game makes it hard for a unified social space to emerge.

A final critical way in which China's situation differs from that of the Middle East lies in the nature of its military. The fate of authoritarian regimes facing popular protests ultimately depends on the cohesiveness and loyalty of its military, police and intelligence organizations. The Tunisian army failed to back Mr. Ben Ali early on; after some waffling, the Egyptian army decided it would not fire on protesters and pushed Mr. Mubarak out of power.

In China, the People's Liberation Army is a huge and increasingly autonomous organization with strong economic interests that give it a stake in the status quo. As in the Tiananmen uprising in 1989, it has plenty of loyal units around the country that it could bring into Beijing or Shanghai, and they would not hesitate to fire on demonstrators. The PLA also regards itself as the custodian of Chinese nationalism. It has developed an alternative narrative of 20th-century history that places itself at the center of events like the defeat of Japan in the Pacific war and the rise of a modern China. It is very unlikely that the PLA would switch sides and support a democratic uprising.

The bottom line is that China will not catch the Middle Eastern contagion anytime soon. But it could easily face problems down the road. China has not experienced a major recession or economic setback since it set out on its course of economic reform in 1978. If the country's current property bubble bursts and tens of millions of people are thrown out of work, the government's legitimacy, which rests on its management of the economy, would be seriously undermined.

Moreover, Mr. Huntington's scenario of rising but unfulfilled expectations among the middle class may still play out. Though there is a labor shortage among low-skill workers in China today, there is a glut of the college educated. Every year into the future, China will graduate more than seven million people from its universities, up from fewer than a million in 1998, and many of them are struggling to find work suitable to their self-perceived status. Several million unemployed college graduates are far more dangerous to a modernizing regime than hundreds of millions of poor peasants.

There is also what the Chinese themselves call the "bad emperor" problem. China's historical achievement over the centuries has been the creation of high-quality centralized bureaucratic government. When authoritarian rulers are competent and reasonably responsible, things can go very well. Indeed, such decision-making is often more efficient than in a democracy. But there is no guarantee that the system will always produce good rulers, and in the absence of the rule of law and electoral checks on executive power, there is no way to get rid of a bad emperor. The last bad emperor, commonly (if quietly) acknowledged as such, was Mao. We can't know what future tyrant, or corrupt kleptocrat, may be waiting in the wings in China's future.

The truth is that, much as we might theorize about the causes of social revolution, human societies are far too complex, and change too rapidly, for any simple theory to provide a reliable guide. Any number of observers dismissed the power of the "Arab street" to bring about political change, based on their deep knowledge of the Middle East, and they were right every year-up until 2011.

The hardest thing for any political observer to predict is the moral element. All social revolutions are driven by intense anger over injured dignity, an anger that is sometimes crystallized by a single incident or image that mobilizes previously disorganized individuals and binds them into a community. We can quote statistics on education or job growth, or dig into our knowledge of a society's history and culture, and yet completely miss the way that social consciousness is swiftly evolving through a myriad of text messages, shared videos or simple conversations.

The central moral imponderable with regard to China is the middle class, which up to now has seemed content to trade political freedom for rising incomes and stability. But at some point this trade-off is likely to fail; the regime will find itself unable to deliver the goods, or the insult to the dignity of the Chinese people will become too great to tolerate. We shouldn't pretend that we can predict when this tipping point will occur, but its eventual arrival, as Samuel Huntington might have suggested, is bound up with the very logic of modernization itself.

Go out there and change the world.
- Tim Draper, Draper Fisher Jurvetson

"Whatever the world looks like now, it will change," said Tim Draper, founder and managing director of Draper Fisher Jurvetson (DFJ), during the keynote session at the March 1 Entrepreneurship in the Global Marketplace seminar, organized by the Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) with sponsorship from Alibaba.com, the first in a series of seminars by the Schwarzenegger Emerging Entrepreneur Initiative. Concluding his remarks, Draper urged the overflow audience: "Go out there and change the world."

Draper and the nine other participants shared different perspectives on entrepreneurship, but a key message underlying all of the presentations was that the world is a dynamic, rapidly changing place where entrepreneurs can succeed by anticipating and responding to global trends. In doing so, many suggested, it is also possible to change the world—for the better. The participants all concurred that China is one of the key places in the world—now and in the future—to do business, representing a challenging but a vast frontier of opportunity.

Global demographic trends are a major factor that venture capitalists consider when making investments. Addressing the worldwide aging phenomenon, which is particularly acute in Asia-Pacific countries such as Japan and China, Draper explained how DFJ has invested in a company that manufactures videogame-like devices designed to improve cognition, noting the growing market for such devices that help keep cognitive health apace with a longer life span. Hans Tung, a partner with the Shanghai-based venture capital firm Qiming Ventures, described how his firm is tracking the large segment of China's population living in small cities away from commercial hubs. These members of the populace, who prefer to shop online where they can find a wider selection of goods than in their local shopping malls, are quickly becoming a driving force in China's e-commerce market.

It is China's e-commerce and other Internet firms—fueled by the explosion of Internet users—that carry increasingly significant weight in China's domestic and the global economy. Duncan Clark, a visiting scholar at SPRIE, presented related findings from SPRIE's China 2.0: The Rise of a Digital Superpower research initiative, which is led by Marguerite Gong Hancock, associate director of SPRIE. China 2.0, explores the conditions generating such rapid growth of the Internet, and investigates questions surrounding the possible global implications of it. Clark noted that as China's three largest Internet firms—search engine Baidu, instant-messaging service Tencent, and e-commerce portal Taobao—expand, domestic competition will not only intensify, but move further into the global economic arena. The "big three" firms are already ranked among the top 20 Internet sites in the world based on site traffic. According to Clark, the key question in the future for U.S. companies will be how to partner with Chinese companies in order to insure their own growth.

Riding the global wave of innovation and entrepreneurship, Jonathan Ross Shriftman, co-founder of Solé Bicycle Company, and Ryder Fyrwald, vice president of global operations at the Kairos Society, have discovered opportunities to effect positive change despite a global climate of intense economic competition. Shriftman, a recent University of Southern California (USC) graduate, described the lessons that he has learned through his company's quest to manufacture low-cost, quality fixed-gear bicycles that provide a stylish, alternate form of transportation. Despite funding and language challenges, Shriftman and his partner succeeded in connecting with a manufacturer in China through Alibaba.com, and have sold nearly 800 bicycles to date. Fyrwald, who is still an undergraduate at USC's Marshall School of Business, explained the philosophy behind the Kairos Society, an international network of student entrepreneurs who seek to solve world issues through entrepreneurship and innovation. He cited the example of WaterWalla, a company that has developed, among other technologies, a low-cost water purification device for use by urban slum dwellers.

From the perspective of seasoned venture capitalists Draper and Tung and emerging entrepreneurs Shriftman and Fyrwald, the message at Entrepreneurship in the Global Marketplace was clear: the way to succeed in a rapidly changing world is to react promptly—and creatively—to global trends. And, as Shriftman suggested, it is possible to "do well by doing good," and change the world in a positive way.

The breadth of [Shorenstein] APARC's work is truly impressive... I look forward to making full use of the resources and opportunities afforded me through the visiting fellowship.

-Dr. Siyan Yi

How can Stanford University contribute to improved health policy in the low-income countries of Asia? In addition to our formal degree-granting and research programs, mentorship of young scholars can play a role in strengthening the evidence base and analytic skills undergirding health policy for the millions of Asians who live on only a few dollars a day.

The Asia Health Policy Program (AHPP) is delighted to announce the inauguration of a fellowship program for young health policy experts from developing countries in Asia. The first Developing Asia Health Policy Fellow will be Dr. Siyan Yi from Cambodia. He holds a medical doctor degree from the University of Health Sciences in Cambodia as well as a doctoral degree in international health sciences from the Graduate School of Medicine at the University of Tokyo. Dr. Karen Eggleston, director of AHPP, will be his primary sponsoring faculty member.

Dr. Yi's research has centered largely on epidemiological methods. This has included, for example, work on surveys in Cambodia on adolescent risky sexual behaviors, substance abuse, and depression; a health promotion project in primary schools; sexual behaviors among people living with HIV/AIDS; and HIV risk behaviors among tuberculosis patients. Currently, he is involved in hospital- and community-based research projects in several developing countries as well as in Japan.

Cambodia has recently created a School of Public Health and is facing an increasing burden of chronic disease, while the burden from infectious diseases such as tuberculosis remains significant. Since Dr. Yi's research interests lie in health promotion and risky behaviors, he could someday be instrumental in helping to set policies to address the public health challenges Cambodia will face.  

Dr. Yi will join the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) in autumn 2011 for a nine-month fellowship to immerse in the academic environment and to develop additional skills to contribute to improved health policy in Cambodia. He notes that "the breadth of [Shorenstein] APARC's work is truly impressive... I look forward to making full use of the resources and opportunities afforded me through the visiting fellowship."

The 2011 SPICE catalog is now available.  SPICE has four curriculum units featured in this year's catalog.

Inter-Korean Relations: Rivalry, Reconciliation, and Reunification

This curriculum unit provides students with a multifaceted view of inter-Korean relations, asking them to study the relationship through the lenses of history, politics, economics, security, and socio-cultural and human dynamics. Finally, students apply their knowledge of inter-Korean relations to consider future prospects for the Korean peninsula.

Indigo: A Color That Links the World

This teacher's guide was developed specifically for teachers in the New York City Public Schools to encourage the use of Indigo: A Color That Links the World, Calliope: Exploring World History (September 2010, Volume 21, Number 1) and the study of the Silk Road in their classrooms. The indigo issue of Calliope and the teacher's guide were developed in collaboration with Yo-Yo Ma's Silk Road Project as part of its Silk Road Connect education initiative.

Early Encounters: The First Japanese Embassy to the United States, 1860

This graphic novel tells the story of the first Japanese diplomatic mission to leave Japan after over two centuries of isolation under the Tokugawa Shogunate. Chronicling encounters with foreign leaders, cross-cultural mishaps, and unlikely friendships that develop despite barriers of language and politics, the graphic novel follows the embassy's voyage to San Francisco, Washington D.C., and other cities on the East coast.

Sadako's Paper Cranes and Lessons of Peace

In collaboration with the Tribute World Trade Center Visitor Center (Tribute Center) in New York City, SPICE has developed educational materials that help students to reflect upon the impact of September 11th and the humanitarian efforts that took place in the aftermath of the attack on the World Trade Center.

A group of leading American and Japanese venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, academic experts, government officials, and leaders in business and related fields joined the "U.S. - Japan Dialogue to Promote Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Job Creation" symposium, organized by the Stanford Project on Japanese Entrepreneurship (STAJE), the largest U.S.-Japan event held at Stanford in many years, on February 23, 2011.

Representatives from both governments opened the event by underscoring the economic and strategic reasons for closer U.S.-Japan cooperation in promoting innovation and entrepreneurship. U.S. Ambassador to Japan John V. Roos emphasized how an economically vibrant Japan is critical to the security of the United States, and how it creates opportunities for U.S. trade, investment, and job creation. Moreover, innovation and collaboration are vital to addressing critical global issues, such as climate change. Under Secretary of State Robert D. Hormats noted how innovation and entrepreneurship, often involving young firms bringing new technology to market, are fundamental to ensuring sustainable growth and inclusive prosperity, both at home and across the globe. For Japan, Teruhiko Mashiko, a Ranking Member of the Diet's Committee on Economy and Industry and a former Senior Vice Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, highlighted the potential for greater employment, development of green technology, and the circulation of human and other resources through innovation and entrepreneurship.

Several speakers pointed to ways government and the private sector can foster the creation of entrepreneurial ventures with a global outlook. Professor William F. Miller, co-director of the Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE), focused attention on the need to support the full entrepreneurial habitat—including an active angel investor and venture community, entrepreneurial education, passionate entrepreneurs, and business services (legal, consulting, financial) that understand the needs of start-up companies. Additionally, several speakers suggested that mid-career hiring by large Japanese firms and greater willingness on their part to grow by acquisition would increase labor mobility and expand opportunities for entrepreneurial ventures. They expressed concern that, at present, a public offering of shares is practically the only option for startup firms to exit the venture stage in Japan. Others highlighted how greater English-language proficiency and changes in immigration law could expand the linkages between Japan and the global community of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.

Larry W. Sonsini, Chairman of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, reflected on the waves of innovation that Silicon Valley has generated, both in terms of new technologies coming to market as well as the maturing of technology already out. Defining Silicon Valley as a culture rather than a place, he outlined the ingredients in the recipe for its success: an entrepreneurial culture, with such features as mobility of talent, diversity, and acceptance of failure as a type of learning; ready access to capital; sources of technology and technologists, particularly from universities and large forward-looking corporations; government support; developed laws and accounting systems; availability of exit options for ventures; and an infrastructure of lawyers, accountants, bankers, and consultants. He also offered his thoughts on key trends that will influence the position and direction of emerging technology companies, including: globalization, regulatory changes, development of capital markets, education, and the rule of law.

In the closing remarks of the day-long symposium, Robert Eberhart, a SPRIE researcher and the leader of the SPRIE-STAJE project, summarized the three potential roles for governments to play in promoting innovation and entrepreneurship: to establish rules to ensure fair dealing and access to the market; to rewrite (i.e., reform) the rules of a market thereby ensuring firms will address it in new ways; and to stimulate demand for advanced technology by purchasing it for its own reasons, thereby creating new opportunities for entrepreneurial technology ventures.