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The 2018 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue was held in Singapore, June 1-3. Shorenstein APARC's Donald Emmerson was in attendance; some of his observations from the the 17th Asia Security Summit are provided below.

NOTE: This post is forthcoming from YaleGlobal.

 

The 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue on 1-3 June in Singapore might as well have been renamed the “Indo-Pacific Dialogue.” In the plenaries and the panels, in the Q&As, corridors, and coffee breaks, not even the imminent Trump-Kim summit hosted by Singapore could compete with the “Indo-Pacific” among the attendees. Although the toponym itself is old, its sudden popularity is new, reflecting new geopolitical aspirations for the region. 
 
What explains the latest revival and rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in the international relations of Asia? What does the term now mean, and why does it matter?  In March, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the “Indo-Pacific” as “an attention-grabbing idea” that would “dissipate like ocean foam.”  Is he right?  And is the “Indo-Pacific” purely maritime, or does it have legs on land as well?  Is the strategy Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s way of labeling his shift from “looking east” to “acting east” – and perhaps his hope of looking and acting westward past Pakistan toward Africa as well?  Does the term frame a potential rival to China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road?  Is it an American rebranding of former President Barack Obama’s “pivot” or “rebalance” toward Asia?  In the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” that Washington favors, what do the adjectives imply?  Is the “Indo-Pacific” a phoenix – a Quadrilateral 2.0 meant to reunite Australia, India, Japan and the US in leading roles?  Could the strategy someday morph into a five-sided “win-win” arrangement with “Chinese characteristics”? 
 
Understandably, the officials who spoke at Shangri-La preferred not delve into such controversial and speculative questions. Satisfactory answers to some of them are not possible, let alone plausible, at least not yet. But the dialogue, a summit on Asian security, did stimulate thought and discourse about just what the “Indo-Pacific” means, for whose purposes, and to what effect.
 
It is easy to load the “Indo-Pacific” with geopolitical intent. Having accepted the invitation to keynote the dialogue on 1 June, Modi became the first Indian prime minister to speak at Shangri-La since the event’s inception in 2002.  Many at the gathering read the prefix “Indo-“ as a geopolitical invitation to India to partner more explicitly with states in an “Asia-Pacific” region from which it had been relatively absent, and thereby to counterbalance China within an even larger frame. 
 
Perhaps aiming to mend relations with China after the Wuhan summit, held in April, Modi unloaded the loaded term. “The Indo-Pacific,” he said, “is a natural region. …  India does not see [it] as a strategy or as a club of limited members.  Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate.  And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country. A geographical definition, as such, cannot be.”  Modi flattened the Indo-Pacific to a mere page in an atlas – the two dimensions of a map – while widening it to include not only all of the countries located inside “this geography” but “also others beyond who have a stake in it.”  Modi thus drained the toponym of controversially distinctive meaning. India’s rival China could hardly object to being included in a vast “natural” zone innocent of economic or political purpose or design. 
 
Not so, countered US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis. Unlike Modi, he explicitly linked ideology to geography by repeatedly invoking a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Nor did these qualifiers apply only to external relations – a state’s freedom from foreign interference and its freedoms of navigation and overflight under international law. For Mattis, “free and open” implied internal democracy as well – a state’s accountability to an uncensored society. In Singapore during his question and answer period, Mattis acknowledged the “free and open press” that had thronged to cover the dialogue.   
 
In corridor conversations, understandings of the “Indo-Pacific” ranged widely, from an inoffensively natural region on the one hand, to a pointedly ideological one on the other. Will the real Indo-Pacific please stand up?  
 
The rise of the “Indo-Pacific” in American policy discourse amounts to a rejection, a resumption, and a desire.  Because Donald Trump cannot abide whatever his predecessor did or said, Barack Obama’s “rebalance” to the “Asia-Pacific” could not survive. The “Indo-Pacific” conveniently shrinks Obama’s “Asia” to a hyphen while inflating the stage on which a celebrity president can play. Yet Mattis also, without saying so, reaffirmed the result of Obama’s “pivot” to Asia by assuring his audience that “America is in the Indo-Pacific to stay. This is our priority theater.” Alongside that rejection-cum-resumption, the prefix “Indo-” embodies the hope that India as a major power can help rebalance America’s friends against what Mattis called China’s “intimidation and coercion,” notably in the South China Sea. 
 
In Honolulu, en route to the dialogue, Mattis had added the prefix to the US Pacific Command – now the Indo-Pacific Command. But continuity again matched change in that the renamed INDOPACOM’s area of responsibility was not extended west of India to Africa. As for Modi, while recommitting his country to “a democratic and rules-based international order,” both he and Mattis ignored the Quad – the off-and-on-again effort to convene the United States, India, Japan and Australia as prospective guardians and agents of the Indo-Pacific idea.
 
The first effort to create the Quad died at the hands of Beijing and Canberra.  Quietly in May 2007, on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting in Manila, the four governments met at a sub-cabinet level, followed that September by an expanded Malabar naval exercise in the Indian Ocean among the four along with Singapore. Early in 2008, however, then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, bowing to pressure from Beijing, withdrew Australia from Quad 1.0 and it collapsed. 
 
It took the subsequent upbuilding and arming of land features in the South China Sea by China to re-embolden the quartet. Beijing’s maritime militancy, Trump’s disdain for Obama-style “strategic patience,” the worsening of Japan’s relations with China, and alarm in Australia over signs of Beijing’s “sharp power” operations there all came together to motivate a low-key, low-level meeting of a could-be Quad 2.0 on the margins of another ASEAN gathering in Manila in November 2017.  
 
The question now is whether the quartet will reconvene in Singapore during the upcoming November ASEAN summitry and if it does, whether the level of representation will be nudged upward to cabinet status. Trump’s addiction to bilateralism, mano a mano, may be tested in this four-way context. Or his one-on-one real-estate developer’s proclivity could cripple the Quad from the start. 
 
More grandiose is the idea that the “Indo-Pacific” could shed its cautionary quote marks and become a rubric for building infrastructure on a scale rivaling China’s own Belt and Road Initiative to lay down railroads, roads and ports from Kunming potentially to Kenya. That surely is, so to speak, a bridge too far.  
 
In short, the temptation to read multilateral diplomatic content into a map of the “Indo-Pacific” drawn in Washington should be resisted. Having objected to any reference to “the rules-based international order” in the June G7 communiqué that he refused to sign, Trump is unlikely to fit the “Indo-Pacific” into any such frame. Nor is it likely to think that he would wish to augment a resuscitated Quad by adding China. Not to mention that Beijing might fail to see the humor in belonging to a five-sided “Pentagon” whose name is a metonym for the American Department of Defense. 
 

Donald K. Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Program at Stanford University where he is also affiliated with the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

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The following article first appeared on The Diplomat.

With the historic U.S.-North Korea summit on the immediate horizon, we must recognize that denuclearization will not and cannot be permanent or irreversible as long as there is a desire to reverse it. U.S. President Donald Trump may strike a “grand deal” with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to denuclearize North Korea, but Kim can — and most likely will — reverse course at his convenience to construct new nuclear weapons. By focusing solely on denuclearization, we risk losing sight of the bigger, more important picture — that is, transforming North Korea into a normal state that no longer sees the need to pursue nuclearization for deterrence, survival, or any other reason.

Much of debate has centered on why Kim suddenly emerged from long-held silence to take the world’s center stage through a series of summits. Was he pressured by toughened sanctions, as Trump credits himself for? Or was it an expression of Kim’s confidence as a leader of a now de facto nuclear power, with more leverage for negotiation? Or has he simply been trying to buy time to avoid war — to get through the unpredictable and ruthless Trump’s tenure as U.S. president? Yet, what really matters now is not so much the question of why Kim came to the table, but rather how we can make the latest détente sustainable without repeating the failures of the past. Will it be different this time?

With the Trump-Kim summit now back on the track after a 24-hour drama of cancellation then resumption, each side seems to have softened its stance by lowering the bar. Next week in Singapore, both leaders will be sorely tempted by clear political and economic interests to paint the meeting as a success. Real challenges, however, will arise as the logistical details of North Korea’s denuclearization are discussed following the summit. The Trump team is unlikely to abandon its goal of the CVID (complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization) of North Korea, while Kim and his men will stand firmly against this all-out approach so as not to follow the footsteps of Libya, Iraq, or Ukraine. North Korea has reportedly demanded a CVIG (complete, verifiable, and irreversible guarantee) of the security of the current regime, but there is a great danger that these deals, if made, will be nothing more than another sheet of paper full of empty words. The deep mistrust between the two countries cannot be overcome overnight, especially considering that both leaders have pretty bad track records of reneging on previous commitments. Neither CVID nor CVIG has much chance of being realized in the current context, from either a technical or a practical perspective.

With all this skepticism, why should we still bother playing this game with North Korea again? It is because we see a window of opportunity to guide North Korea into the international community through processes of diplomatic communication, exchange, and engagement. North Korea’s summit diplomacy has revealed its desire to appear a normal state. Kim vigorously showcased four summit meetings  — twice each with China’s Xi Jinping and South Korea’s Moon Jae-in — and numerous high-level meetings, within two months, all within the parameters of conventional “state-to-state” relationships, departing from past practices. Standing side-by-side with the South Korean president to read out a joint declaration, immediately releasing news of Kim’s summit meetings through its media, presenting Kim’s wife, Ri Sol-ju, as the state’s first lady — all of this would have been unthinkable in his father or grandfather’s generation.

North Korea’s latest efforts at international recognition as a normal state may be insincere and ill-intentioned, but even so, we should continue to allow North Korea and Kim to experience firsthand what it feels like and means to be treated as a normal state and a normal leader according to the ordinary conventions of international diplomacy. Although the goal seems so far away and unreachable, we should strive to normalize North Korea in all respects — its economy, its domestic and international politics, its integration into international institutions, and its adherence to international laws, norms, rights, duties, orders, etc.

CVID can still serve as a short- to mid-term goal, but not as a definitive solution to the long-standing North Korean threat. Whatever is decided at the upcoming summit, a more comprehensive roadmap should be set for enacting desirable transformations in security and economic relations with North Korea, putting the country on a path to become a stable and normal state increasingly integrated into the international community, where it would feel secure without a need for nuclear armament. As Trump says, he is starting a “process” of dealing with North Korea; the upcoming summit should be the beginning of an opportunity to advance this goal. After all, a normal North Korea can achieve CVID, but CVID cannot achieve a normal state.

Gi-Wook Shin is director of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, and Joyce Lee is a research professional in the Korea Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.

 

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The health insurance marketplaces created by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) could unravel because its enrollees strategically drop in and out of coverage, Stanford scholars write in a new working paper released June 4 by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

The end result could be a complete unraveling of the market, said Petra Persson, an assistant professor of economics in the Stanford School of Humanities and Sciences.

“If you have too many people who drop out after a few months of coverage, you might end up in a situation where insurers don’t want to offer any insurance at all in the market,” said Persson, who co-authored the paper with Stanford Graduate School of Business assistant professors Rebecca Diamond and Timothy McQuade and NYU Stern’s Michael J. Dickstein. Persson and Diamond are also fellows at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.

The ACA, also known as Obamacare, passed in March 2010 with the goal of making health insurance more accessible. It established a competitive marketplace where individuals could shop for federal and state-level health care plans. Over 2014 and 2015 – the first two years of the program – the share of Americans covered by individually purchased health insurance rose by 50 and 75 percent, respectively.

Health care consumption surged, especially in low-income households and families with young children. But, as the researchers discovered, so did attrition: Dropout was sharpest after just one month of coverage. And only half of all new enrollees committed a full year to an insurance program.

Health care consumption and attrition

To analyze enrollment and attrition, the researchers studied 104,233 households that purchased health insurance in California either before or after the ACA came into effect.

The researchers examined spending habits and income sources for possible explanations of why people might have discontinued health care coverage. For example, did they drop out because they could no longer afford it, because of a job loss or other large expense?

The researchers found that this was the case before the ACA came into effect. Pre-ACA, people often dropped out early because they experienced a loss of income, like unemployment. But post-ACA, the loss of income was much less important in explaining early dropout.

“These findings indicate that the ACA limited the risk of being forced to drop insurance coverage due to unexpected liquidity shocks,” said Persson.

If income shocks can’t account for dropout, then what can?

The researchers found that some people strategically drop coverage after they have used the health care services they need.

“Our analysis shows that many consumers are strategically signing up for insurance to help defray the costs of non-chronic, potentially discretionary, health care needs and then dropping coverage once they have satisfied these needs,” said Diamond.

“The regulatory structure of the ACA law potentially incentivizes exactly this behavior,” the researchers wrote, noting that because the ACA prevents insurers from discriminating against applicants, they cannot legally reject applicants who strategically dropped coverage the previous year.

The fallout of dropouts

This behavior makes it difficult for insurers to set prices, said Persson.

When people consume a year’s worth of health care in only a three-month period – and only pay a portion of the annual premium – it can be incredibly expensive for insurers. They can only guess what fraction of policyholders will end up dropping out mid-year.

The researchers discovered a counterintuitive response from insurers: Health care plans that experienced more dropouts reduced their premium prices the following year.

“Insurers are trying to increase the demand from the pool of consumers who don’t drop out,” said Diamond, observing that these are the people who are more price sensitive to the cost of an annual plan. “People who drop out are going to be less sensitive to the price set by the plan. They are always going to be willing to pay a higher monthly premium because they know they are not going to pay the full annual amount.”

While lowered annual premiums may seem like a beneficial result for committed health care consumers, the presence of dropouts undermines the stability of the market, the researchers said. As a result, insurers may be unwilling to offer plans in the individual market, they said.

Next steps

The ACA has been especially effective in providing lower-income households with health care coverage through a market that previously had largely served more affluent households, said Persson.

But for ACA to continue being effective, enrollees must stay enrolled, Persson added.

While the ACA originally came with penalties for ceasing coverage early, the researchers said it was not enough. It was still cheaper for new enrollees to pay the fine for dropping out mid-year than paying a full year of annual premiums, the researchers found in their cost analysis.

The recent removal of the individual mandate will likely increase the midyear dropout rate, said Diamond. “More dropout will raise financial pressure on insurers, increasing the possibility that the market unravels completely.”

 
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Most participants in clinical trials believe the benefits of broadly sharing person-level data outweigh the risks, according to new research by Stanford Medicine's Michelle Mello and Steven N. Goodman. 

And despite low levels of trust in pharmaceutical companies, most of those who take part in clinical trials are willing to share their data with the drug firms.

The Stanford researchers surveyed 771 current and recent participants from a diverse sample of clinical trials at three academic medical centers in the United States. They asked about the practice of making personal data collected in medical research studies widely available, after information that could identify individual participants is removed. Nearly 80 percent of those surveyed responded to the questions — and fewer than 8 percent of the respondents felt that the potential negative consequences of data sharing outweighed the benefits.

Some 93 percent of those surveyed said they were very or somewhat likely to allow their data be shared with university scientists, and 82 percent were either very or somewhat likely to share with scientists in for-profit companies. They found that the willingness to share was high regardless of the purpose for which their data would be used, with the exception of litigation.

Although some researchers and trial funders have worried that participants might object to data sharing as an invasion of privacy, the respondents’ greatest concern was that “data sharing might make others less likely to enroll in clinical trials,” Stanford Health Policy's Michelle Mello and her co-authors write in The New England Journal of Medicine. “Less concern was expressed about discrimination (22 percent) and exploitation of data for profit (20 percent.)”

Mello is a professor of law at Stanford Law School and a professor of health research and policy at Stanford Medicine. Her co-authors are Van Lieou and Steven N. Goodman, a professor of medicine and of health research and policy at Stanford Medicine.

The authors acknowledge there is no turning back from clinical data sharing.

“We are rapidly moving toward a world in which broad sharing of participant-level clinical trial data is the norm,” they wrote.

The European Medicines Agency has implemented a policy to expand public access to data concerning products it approves, and the Food and Drug Administration is considering expanding access to data pooled within a product class. Major research sponsors and journal editors have begun promoting data sharing, and the National Institutes of Health now requires all of its grantees to share data.

Pharmaceutical industry associations have committed to making data more accessible, and several data platforms are now available, such as the Yale Open Data Access Project.

Mello said she was somewhat surprised by the survey results, “given the amount of consternation one hears at conferences about data sharing. Interestingly, nearly half our sample had experienced a breach of their personal data privacy in another context, yet they were still willing to share their clinical trial data.”

Then again, she said, people who take part in clinical trials may be special.

“I suspect that clinical trial participants may be different from the public at large. They are already incurring risks to benefit science by dint of their trial participation.”

Most of those participants, along with clinical researchers, believe the benefits of sharing data include accelerating scientific discovery and improving accurate reporting of trial results.

Yet some investigators and industry sponsors of clinical trials are leery of the swift move toward broad data sharing, the authors note, because of “potential harm to research participants,” the authors wrote. “Investigators express worries that participants’ privacy cannot be adequately protected, particularly in light of the fact that experts have demonstrated that it is possible to reidentify participant-level data.”

Furthermore, they said, some pharmaceutical companies have warned that data sharing could chill willingness to participate in trials, thereby delaying the availability of new therapies. In fact, 31 percent of those surveyed were somewhat or very concerned about having their personal information stolen.  Nevertheless, most felt the benefits of data sharing were more important. 

“Reaching a world in which the sharing of clinical trial data is routine requires surmounting several challenges — financial, technical, and operational,” the authors concluded. “But in this survey, participants’ objections to data sharing did not appear to be a sizeable barrier.” 

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Gender inequality in the workplace is still a reality and an issue that must be tackled head-on in Silicon Valley and Japan. In 2017, the World Economic Forum reported for the first time in 10 years, a widening of the global gender gap. Numerous efforts to break this cycle have been announced and implemented to varying degrees of success in both countries making it clear that we must do more, together.

While women in the United States comprise 59% of the total workforce, they only make up 30% of major technology companies and only 11% of the executive positions in Silicon Valley are held by women. An industry that prides itself on innovative thinking and breakthroughs that can fundamentally improve quality of life has yet to find its way to disrupt gender inequality in its ranks. In recent years, Silicon Valley has been rocked by a number of high-profile sexual discrimination and harassment cases. In 2016, women tech leaders created the “Elephant in the Valley” survey to gather data on women’s experiences. The result was a bleak picture of Silicon Valley’s pervasive gender discrimination atmosphere but also the creation of a platform for women to share stories and build networks of support and activism based on shared experience.

As Japan faces a shrinking and aging population, it must pursue productivity growth to remain a wealthy nation. Women, long underutilized in Japan’s workforce, are receiving renewed attention with the Abe administration’s slogan of Womenomics as part of his Abenomics economic reform package. This political pledge has yielded some momentum with a number of concrete policy measures. Prime Minister Abe has even gone so far as to say “Abenomics is Womenomics.” There is still progress to be made. The Acceleration Program in Tokyo for Women (APT), spearheaded by Governor Yuriko Koike, the first female governor of Tokyo, aims to counter this narrative by providing opportunities for women entrepreneurs to build networks, receive mentoring, and become a focal point for dynamism.

The Break Through conference aims to create a dialogue that will spark innovative ideas for narrowing the gender gap by bringing together women thought leaders and entrepreneurs from Stanford, Silicon Valley and Japan to cultivate interpersonal support networks and collaboration.

This conference will:

  • Provide tools for branding and building support networks
  • Discuss progress and challenges in women’s advancement in Silicon Valley and Japan
  • Share practices and organizational features that better enable the hiring and retaining of women
  • Showcase Silicon Valley and Japanese women entrepreneurs

This conference is organized by Stanford University's Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (S-APARC) Japan Program thanks to the generous support of the Acceleration Program in Tokyo for Women (APT), Tokyo Metropolitan Government.

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Agenda

9:30-10:00       Registration

10:00-10:05     Opening & Welcome Remarks

10:05-10:35     Women Entrepreneurs in the United States

- Judy Gilbert, Chief People Officer, Zymergen   

10:35-11:00     Womenomics in Japan

- Yuko Osaki, Gender Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office, Japanese Government              

11:00-11:30     Fireside Chat 1

- Yoky Matsuoka, Chief Technology Officer, Nest

with Frances Colón, CEO, Jasperi Consulting

11:30-12:00     Fireside Chat 2

- Claire Chino, President & CEO, Itochu International Inc.

with Haruko Sasamoto, Assistant Manager Silicon Valley Branch, Mitsubishi Corporation (Americas)

12:00-13:00     Lunch

13:00-14:00     Start-up Showcase Group 1 (5 Japanese Startups)

14:00-14:15     Break

14:15-15:15     Start-up Showcase Group 2 (5 Silicon Valley Startups)

Feedback for both showcases given by:

- Allison Baum, Co-founder and Managing Partner, Fresco Capital

- Atsuko Jenks, Managing Direction-Japan, GSV Labs

- Jaclyn Selby, Research Scholar, Stanford University

15:15-16:15     Workshop: Leveraging Your Personal Brand to Effectively Lead

How others—from team members to board members—perceive you directly affects your ability to effectively lead and get results. For this reason, and especially for women entrepreneurs, it is crucial to understand your personal brand and carefully manage it. In this hands-on workshop, we will use Design Thinking as a framework to help you identify your strengths, skills and unique differentiators and how to effectively communicate these in your work environment.

Workshop Facilitator:

- Sylvia Vaquer, Co-founder and Chief Creative Officer, SocioFabrica

16:15     Closing Remarks 

 

Arrillaga Alumni Center, McCaw Hall

326 Galvez Street, Stanford, CA

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In a world complicated by terrorism, cyber threats and political instability, the private sector has to prepare for the unexpected. Amy Zegart, CISAC co-director, the Hoover Institution’s Davies Family Senior Fellow, and co-author (along with Condoleezza Rice) of Political Risk: How Businesses And Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, explains lessons learned in keeping cargo planes moving, hotel guests protected – and possibly coffee customers better served.  

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Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is dangerous to both North Korean and American interests, say Stanford scholars in a new research report. Instead, they advocate for phased denuclearization to take place over 10 years or more, allowing the United States to reduce the greatest risks first and address the manageable risks over time.

Immediate denuclearization of North Korea is unrealistic, said Stanford scholars in an in-depth report released by the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).
 
Instead, denuclearization should be phased over a 10-year period to allow the United States to reduce and manage risks, said Siegfried Hecker, who authored the study with his research assistant Elliot Serbin and Robert Carlin, a visiting scholar at CISAC.
 
In the report, the scholars laid out a “roadmap” for denuclearization, recommending what they call a “halt, roll back and eliminate” approach. Their advice – which includes informative color charts and detailed, qualitative analysis – emerged from a longer-term project about the nuclear history of North Korea between 1992 and 2017.
 
According to the research, the most important steps toward denuclearization include halting nuclear tests, stopping intermediate or long-range missile tests, stopping the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and banning all export of nuclear weapons, materials or technologies to North Korea.
 
“The roadmap lays out a reasonable timeline for denuclearization, but politics may delay final denuclearization as much as 15 years,” said Hecker, who worked at the Los Alamos National Laboratory for almost two decades, where he served as its directors for 11 of those years. He joined CISAC as a senior fellow in 2005.
 
Building trust and interdependence
In the short term, North Korea and the United States should take steps to build trust and interdependence, which the researchers believe are pivotal for a viable long-term solution like complete demilitarization of North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea, they argue, will likely want to retain some parts of its nuclear program as a hedge should any potential agreement fall apart. This is a manageable risk, they said.
 
The scholars also encourage Pyongyang to front-load its concrete plan towards  permanent nuclear dismantlement to make a phased approach more appealing to the US administration. This would include actions like halting nuclear and missile tests for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
 
According to Hecker, North Korea’s recent demolition of its nuclear test site is a significant step in that direction.
 
“The so-called ‘Libya model’ – complete and immediate denuclearization – is not a viable solution,” Hecker said. “Our approach leaves each party with a manageable level of risk. Even though it takes longer, it is safer for the world.”
 
Hecker also encouraged the US to recognize North Korea’s desire for civilian programs, including energy production, the use of radioactive substances in medical research, diagnosis and treatment, and a peaceful space program. These types of civilian programs can also foster opportunities for a collaborative relationship between the United States and North Korea. Further, increased cooperation –including with South Korea – can help make efforts for verification and monitoring with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) more reliable. The verification process that will confirm to what extent North Korea dismantles and destroys its military nuclear program is a big issue for negotiations, the scholars said.
 
Recent reconciliation
Critically, the researchers note that recent détente between North Korea and South Korea provides a window of opportunity to accomplish denuclearization – and that the US should take advantage of that window smartly. They  said they hope that the risk-management approach outlined in the report can maximize chances for a successful agreement.
 
“In the past, the US has missed opportunities to manage incremental risk,” Hecker said. “Now is the time to pay attention to that history and be prepared to implement a risk-management approach to denuclearization.”
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Siegfried Hecker meets with members of North Korea’s nuclear scientific community during a visit to Yongbyon.
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TITLE:  The China Wide Web:  The information Dilemma and the Domestsication of  Cyberspace

 

Qitong Tom Cao
Major:  Political Science; Computer Science (minor); MS&E (Computational Social Science) (coterm)

 

Abstract:


In order to preempt severe public discontent, an authoritarian government needs its citizens to convey their true political attitudes. But it does not want their attitudes to be communicated among themselves, which may trigger protests or even subversion in case widespread dissatisfaction exists and becomes citizens common knowledge. This information dilemma thus poses a fundamental threat to the stability and governance of all authoritarian regimes. This thesis, however, argues that the Chinese government is resolving the information dilemma through an innovative approach  by domesticating its internet. On this domestic cyberspace, social media companies delete unfavorable content and report user data to the regime, which can be analyzed to reveal citizens true political attitudes. As such, the government manages both to restrict communication of discontent and to gain knowledge of the political inclination of the public. I will demonstrate formally that this domestic cyberspace presents an optimal solution for authoritarian regimes, and that the Chinese government could attract the bulk of their internet users to the domestic cyberspace despite its inability to fully block access to foreign websites. Finally, I will show empirically that domestic social media also helps increase propaganda efficacy, which reduces perceived level of discontent and further consolidates regime stability. Together, this strategy may potentially afford the regime an information advantage enormous enough to secure its stability without fear of overthrow.

 

TITLE:  Whose California?  Power, Property Rights, and the Legacy of the 1851 California Land Act

 

Marin Callaway
Major: International Relations; Spanish (minor)
 

Abstract:

 

In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo ended the Mexican-American War and ceded over half of Mexico's territory to the United States. But, the valuable new lands gained by the United States were not empty. With the changing border, the country gained a sizable Mexican and Native American population. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed the protection of property rights and civil rights of Mexican nationals living on the newly acquired lands. But, in California, the much-delayed California Land Act of 1851 put the burden of proof on Mexican landowners to receive a formal U.S. patent to their land. Landowners, who had received private land grants or ranchos from the Mexican government, underwent lengthy litigation. This thesis evaluates the Land Act's impact on Mexican land ownership, measures the extent to which original grantees were able to retain their lands, and describes the contentious evolution of land and power in California in the nineteenth century. In an effort to add empirical evidence to the historical literature, I find that 58% of patented ranchos remained in the name of the original grantees by the patent date with greater retention in Southern California than Northern California. However, the finding that less than 20% of ranchos in Los Angeles County were owned even in part by original grantees by 1888 reveals that land loss became even more pronounced after patents were issued. The findings of this thesis both support and contradict traditional claims about the fate of Mexican land grant ownership in California throughout the nineteenth century. By determining what the rates of land grant retention were for original grantees throughout California and in individual counties, it is possible to better understand the legacy of the Land Act and how it interacted simultaneously with other social, economic, and political phenomena to ultimately result in significant loss of Mexican land ownership in the state. This thesis treats nineteenth century California as a case study of minority rights in annexed land. It ultimately argues that Mexicans and Mexican-Americans suffered most under a lack of rule of law and uncertainly surrounding property rights and citizenship. The California Land Act of 1851 upheld property rights but was too little too late for a group that was by 1851 the minority in the state.
 

 

Qitong Tom Cao
Marin Callaway
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