The New START Treaty has come under fire in recent weeks. Marshall Billingslea, President Trump’s new special envoy for arms control, said the Obama administration negotiated a very weak verification regime, which is odd because Trump administration officials have repeatedly acknowledged the security benefits of New START.

Read full article at Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Ending the moratorium would not advance U.S. security interests.  The United States has conducted about as many nuclear weapons tests as the rest of the world combined (and 30 percent more than the number conducted by the Soviet Union/Russia).  U.S. weapons scientists learned more from testing.  When I served as a diplomat at the American Embassy in Moscow in 1988, I accompanied a U.S. team to the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk (in what is now Kazakhstan).  Our Soviet hosts showed us a vertical shaft for an upcoming underground test; it was about three feet in diameter.  A U.S. team member from the test site in Nevada, which the Soviets would visit the following month, commented that U.S.-drilled vertical shafts for nuclear tests typically were nine to eleven feet in diameter.  That maximized the area above the weapon for instruments that would gather a burst of data in the nanosecond before they vaporized.

The testing moratorium and the CTBT, if ratified and entered into force, would seem to lock in an area of U.S. advantage regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear effects.  Why would we want others to test and erode that advantage?

Up until the idea of gaining leverage with Beijing and Moscow arose, the primary possible reason for a return to testing was if it became necessary to confirm the reliability of a weapons type in the stockpile.  However, the National Nuclear Security Administration has overseen for 25 years the Stockpile Stewardship Program, intended to confirm that U.S. nuclear weapons are safe, secure and reliable without having to test them in a manner that produces a nuclear yield. To do so, the program uses supercomputers, modeling and tools such as the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (think of the world’s most powerful X-ray device).

Each year, the commander of Strategic Command and the directors of the national nuclear laboratories at Los Alamos, Sandia and Lawrence Livermore certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile.  When I visited Los Alamos several years ago, the director told me that, as long as the Stockpile Stewardship Program was funded, he was confident that nuclear testing was not needed.  He added that, as a result of the program, weapons scientists had learned things about how nuclear weapons work that they did not and could not learn from testing nuclear weapons underground.

The smart thing for U.S. national interests is to continue the moratorium, ratify the CTBT, and press others to ratify so that the treaty can be brought into force.  The Senate failed to give consent to ratification in 1999, due to concerns about how to maintain the stockpile’s reliability without nuclear testing and about monitoring the treaty.  The Stockpile Stewardship Program, just in its beginning stage then, can now answer the first concern and has been doing so.

As for monitoring a test ban, U.S. national technical means have improved over the past two decades, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization has established the International Monitoring System with some 300 stations around the world.  It can detect underground nuclear explosions down to below one kiloton (the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima had a yield of 15 kilotons) as well as detecting tests in the atmosphere or ocean, both of which are banned by the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.  Once in force, the CTBT also provides for an inspection mechanism.

As former Secretary of State George Shultz said in 2013, senators might have been correct not to consent to ratification in 1999, but given the Stockpile Stewardship Program’s development and enhanced monitoring systems, they would be right to vote for ratification now.

Conducting a nuclear test to bring China and Russia to the negotiating table will not work.  It will instead open the door for others to resume testing and close a nuclear weapons knowledge gap that favors the United States.  That will not make us safer or more secure.  It is an unwise idea that hopefully will continue to meet resistance within the U.S. government.

Since 2016, SPICE has offered regional online courses to top high school students in Japan. The first regional course was offered to high school students in Tottori Prefecture. Since then, SPICE has increased its regional online course offerings to high school students in Hiroshima Prefecture, Kawasaki City, and Oita Prefecture. These courses present creative and innovative approaches to teaching Japanese high school students about U.S. society and culture and global themes. 

All four courses recently finished their 2019–20 term. The course instructors were most pleased with the achievement of their students and thus had an exceedingly difficult time choosing only two honorees for each course. This article provides a brief overview of each course and the naming of the student honorees.

Stanford e-Hiroshima
Given Hiroshima Prefecture’s historical ties with the United States, Stanford e-Hiroshima had special significance to the students and its Instructor Rylan Sekiguchi. Some of the course topics included Japanese immigration from Hiroshima to the United States, World War II, and the Honolulu-Hiroshima sister city relationship. Sekiguchi announced the honorees as follows:

Student Honoree: Ryoya Matsuyama
School: Hiroshima Prefectural Sera High School
Project Title: Ocean Acidification in Japan and the U.S.

Student Honoree: Karin Umeshita
School: Hiroshima Prefectural Hiroshima High School
Project Title: Survey of the Stanford Research Park as Industry-Academia Collaboration System

Stanford e-Kawasaki
Kawasaki City is a large industrial city in the greater Tokyo area with a population of approximately 1.5 million, making it Japan’s sixth most populous city. It is one of Japan’s most ethnically diverse cities. Many Japanese multinational companies are based in Kawasaki. Thus, Stanford e-Kawasaki’s main themes of entrepreneurship and diversity were familiar to students in concept, yet unfamiliar to their academic experience. Instructor Maiko Tamagawa Bacha announced the student honorees as follows:

Student Honoree: Shiori Makino
School: Tachibana High School
Project Title: Mindsets of Failure in American Comic Superheroes and Japanese Comic Superheroes 

Student Honoree: Yuki Nakata
School: Kawasaki High School
Project Title: The Role of Languages in a Diverse Society: The Case of Having an Official Language in a Company

Stanford e-Oita
Oita Prefecture, known for its hot springs, is located in the mountainous island of Kyushu. Having lived and taught on Kyushu for three years, Stanford e-Oita Instructor Kasumi Yamashita felt at home with her students. The focus of the course was the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Yamashita announced the honorees as follows:

Student Honoree: Hozuki Mori
School: Hita High School
Project Title: Education for Students Who Can’t Go to School

Student Honoree: Ken White
School: Oita Uenogaoka High School
Project Title: Immigration in Oita

Stanford e-Tottori
Tottori Prefecture is the least populous prefecture in Japan and is known for its seafood and nature, including its iconic sand dunes. The first kanji character of Tottori means “bird,” and Stanford e-Tottori Instructor Jonas Edman has helped his students gain a bird’s-eye view of U.S. society and culture with a focus on U.S.–Japan relations. Edman announced the honorees as follows:

Student Honoree: Mai Kageyama
School: Yonago Higashi High School
Project Title: Differences of Body Image Between Japan and the U.S.

Student Honoree: Yumeka Mizuno
School: Yonago Higashi High School
Project Title: Japanese Educational Issues and Their Solutions

The SPICE staff is looking forward to honoring these eight students at a ceremony at Stanford University on March 29, 2021. Each student will be given the opportunity to make a formal presentation in front of members of the Stanford community and the Consulate General of Japan in San Francisco.

SPICE also offers online courses to U.S. high school students on Japan (Reischauer Scholars Program), China (China Scholars Program), and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and online courses to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China Program) and to Japanese high school students on the United States and U.S.–Japan relations (Stanford e-Japan).

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Related articles:

• Stanford e-Oita: Distance Learning Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic
• Stanford e-Kawasaki: Arches and Pillars of Support During an Unstable Time
• Stanford e-Tottori: Reflections
• Stanford e-Hiroshima, SPICE’s Newest Online Course for High School Students: Sharing Cranes Across the Pacific

President Trump’s newly named envoy for arms control, Marshall Billingslea, gave a lengthy interview last week on the administration’s approach to nuclear arms negotiations. He stressed bringing in China, struck a pessimistic note about the sole treaty constraining Russian and U.S. nuclear forces, and offered no ideas for getting Moscow to discuss non-strategic nuclear arms.

Unfortunately, the interview reinforces the view that the Trump administration is unlikely to achieve a nuclear deal…or even develop a serious proposal.

Read full article at Defense One