APARC's Henry S. Rowen is featured in James Mann's new book, The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet, Viking Penguin: New York, 2004, pp 186-97, for his role in formulating the military strategy that the United States should employ in a war against Iraq. The book details the Cheney-Wolfowitz-Rowen war plan -- dubbed "Operation Scorpion" -- which proposed an invasion of Iraq from the west, through the country's empty desert regions toward the Euphrates River.

While campaigning for president in 2000, George W. Bush downplayed his lack of foreign policy experience by emphasizing that he would surround himself with a highly talented and experienced group of political veterans. This core group, consisting of Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, and Condoleezza Rice, has a long history together dating back 30 years in some cases. Dubbing themselves the Vulcans, they have largely determined the direction and focus of the Bush presidency. In this new book, Mann traces their careers and the development of their ideas in order to understand how and why American foreign policy got to where it is today.

The clearest evidence of the Iran link came in January 1990, when Pakistan's army chief of staff conveyed his threat to arm Iran to a top Pentagon official. Henry S. Rowen, at the time an assistant defense secretary, said Pakistani Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg issued the warning in a face-to-face meeting in Pakistan. "Beg said something like, 'If we don't get adequate support from the U.S., then we may be forced to share nuclear technology with Iran,'" said Rowen, now a professor at Stanford University. Rowen said former President Bush's administration did little to follow up on Beg's warning. "In hindsight, maybe before or after that they did make some transfers," Rowen said. Rowen said he told Beg that Pakistan would be "in deep trouble" if it gave nuclear weapons to Iran. Rowen said he was surprised by the threat because at the time Americans thought Pakistan's secular government dominated by Sunni Muslims wouldn't aid Iran's Shiite Muslim theocracy. "There was no particular reason to think it was a bluff, but on the other hand, we didn't know," Rowen said.

The national debate over human embryonic stem cell research -- one that has pitted religious objections against the promise of major scientific and therapeutic advances -- has been reawakened by a dramatic advance that could have been made in the United States, but wasn't. That's because on Aug. 9, 2001, President Bush announced that only stem cell lines obtained before that date could be used in research supported by federal funds. This has virtually halted a vital area of medical science here because development of an equivalent level of private support will require many years. And that's why the new excitement comes from South Korea, not from this country. The stakes are high. Stem cells, which can be obtained from human embryos otherwise discarded at fertility clinics in the course of assisted reproduction, are capable of forming all of the tissues of the adult human body under the right circumstances. They are of enormous potential advantage in the treatment of Parkinson's disease, spinal cord injuries, Alzheimer's disease and diabetes. So what's wrong with the dozen or so old cell lines we have? The problem is that most of the approved lines are unavailable, or otherwise guarded by murky intellectual property claims. The way they were made and their limited genetic diversity limit their therapeutic utility. More important, new technology has taken us beyond their capacity. The recent experiments performed in South Korea have produced a robust line of stem cells, derived from blastocysts that were produced by activating eggs taken from female volunteers with nuclei taken from body cells of the donor. This process, called somatic cell nuclear transfer, is viewed by some as akin to cloning people, which no one in the scientific community favors. Instead, it provides a way to explore the early processes of human development and develop novel ways of understanding the basis for genetic predisposition to late-onset diseases. It is essential research, and it is needed here. Yet if the congressional opponents of stem cell research have their way, a bill already passed by the House and now being considered in the Senate would make such work a crime. In South Korea, cloning for reproductive purposes is against the law. But this work, plainly aimed at scientific and therapeutic purposes, was encouraged and supported by the government. If we decide to discourage or even criminalize such experiments here, they will be done elsewhere -- and the benefits will be reaped by others. One option in this country is to approach a solution at the state level. Some states have passed laws that make cloning people illegal but allow cloning stem cells -- an important distinction that Congress has so far been unwilling to make. And some states have developed the means for raising funds to support the kind of research that now cannot be done with federal funds. A forthcoming ballot initiative in California would appropriate $350 million each year to support stem cell research. It would create a California Stem Cell Research and Cures Fund, to be distributed by an Institute for Regenerative Medicine, overseen by an independent citizens committee selected from academic and research institutions. The funding plan rests on the authorization of a $3 billion general obligation bond issue. For the first five years, a positive tax revenue stream generated by the initial expenditures will make it possible not to burden the state's general fund while it recovers from its present economic stress. The California experiment is an interesting one. As Californians and scientists, we hope for its success. But we also hope that it will be a signal for other citizens -- that there are domestic alternatives to a national policy that threatens to drive an important and valuable research activity overseas. A California resolution would be nice for us, and for the California economy. But if we can't find a solution that permits stem cell research at the federal level, the result will be costly for our national health.

• DAVID BALTIMORE is president of the California Institute of Technology;
• PAUL BERG is a professor of biochemistry at Stanford University;
• DONALD KENNEDY, former Stanford president, is editor-in-chief of Science magazine; and
• IRV WEISSMAN is a professor of cancer biology at Stanford. They wrote this column for the Mercury News.

Mexico's former foreign minister Jorge Castañeda spoke at Stanford Institute for International Studies (SIIS) on February 19, 2004 on "America and the World: Non-U.S. Perspectives -- A View from Mexico."

Castañeda, who served as Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs from January 2000 to January 2002 spoke in capacity as the Visiting Payne Distinguished Lecturer for winter 2004. He is currently a professor of international affairs at the National Autonomous University of Mexico.

During his lecture, Castañeda cited the United States' unilateral actions against Iraq and the Bush administration's unwillingness to discuss ratifications to NAFTA as reasons for rising anti-American sentiments in Mexico.

The Payne Lectureship is named for Frank E. Payne and Arthur W. Payne, brothers who gained an appreciation for global problems through their international business operations. Their descendants endowed the annual lecture series at SIIS.

ECONOMIC, POLITICAL TIES DISPLACING RIVALRY China's government has sentenced two of its citizens to life in prison for their role in securing prostitutes for hundreds of male Japanese visitors in the southern city of Zhuhai last autumn. The Chinese government is also pressuring Tokyo to turn over the Japanese businessmen who allegedly requested the prostitutes. This story made headlines around the world, and fits well with how the world press typically covers Sino-Japanese relations. Regrettably, such incidents recur with enough regularity to feed the media machine that continues to stir a nationalism rooted in conflicting historical memories. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine -- which is widely viewed as a symbol of Japan's former militarism -- is a conspicuous example of this. The publicity that the press gives to these visits has helped impede an invitation to Koizumi from China's leaders for a state visit. Recently, the discovery of mustard gas canisters left behind by Japanese forces during World War II has also served to keep memories of the Imperial Japanese Army's wartime conduct alive among older Chinese. Moreover, rival Sino-Japanese claims to the Senkaku (or Diao Yutai) Islands resurfaced last year when the Japanese government leased three islets in the chain from private parties. The action, purportedly undertaken to reduce the prospect of landings and demonstrations by Japanese right-wingers, set off a brief, though frenzied, reaction in China, as well as in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Meanwhile, differences over Taiwan also foster tensions periodically, such as when former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui sought to visit Japan for medical treatment. But this is not the whole story. Although such incidents reveal a troubling level of mistrust between the Chinese and Japanese that is not merely a product of media coverage, it is noteworthy that both governments have worked consistently, diligently, and with considerable success to resolve such problems and contain their political fallout. Of course, official relations between the two countries are marked by much political and economic competition -- some of it healthy, some of it a possible harbinger of future strategic rivalry. The competitive strain in Sino-Japanese relations is especially visible in energy politics. Demand for oil in Asia is growing rapidly, and with China and Japan increasingly dependent upon imports, each has naturally sought to improve its energy security by diversifying sources of supply. Both countries covet access to Russian reserves, especially those located in the Angarsk fields of Siberia. Last spring, China appeared to have locked up a Russian commitment to build a pipeline to service the China market at Daqing. Japan, however, raised the ante with new offers of financial incentives. Its bid for an alternative pipeline to Nakhodka to serve Japanese, Korean and other markets remains alive, creating another point of competitive friction. In their rivalry for leadership in promoting Asian regional cooperation, meanwhile, China has taken an early lead. Nearly two years ago, China trumped Japan by offering a Free Trade Agreement to the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, while front-loading its own tariff concessions. But this backdrop of contention and competition masks emerging collaborative aspects of Sino-Japanese relations that are profoundly important. For example, trade and investment flows continue to expand rapidly. Bilateral trade topped $100 billion in 2003, as Japan's exports to China increased by more than 10 percent, fueled by semiconductors, electrical equipment and automobiles. Meanwhile, China replaced the United States as Japan's biggest source of imports, and is now one of the few non-members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries with which Japan runs a trade deficit. Similarly, direct investment by Japanese firms is increasing as they relocate production facilities to China to capitalize on lower labor costs and high-quality engineering talent. Of course, there is no assurance that today's expanded commerce will preclude eventual strategic rivalry, or succeed in erasing lingering wartime animosity. But both countries now place a premium on extending their economic interdependence. Ultimately, the historical wounds that have long divided China and Japan, and the more current diplomatic flash points that the global media inevitably trumpet, tell only part of the Sino-Japanese story. There are economic and geopolitical rivalries between China and Japan that dwarf in importance the high-profile insults to national pride that make headlines. But there are also compelling economic and political inducements toward cooperation that prevent these rivalries from developing into full-blown crises. MICHAEL ARMACOST is a former U.S. ambassador to Japan and is a distinguished fellow at the Asia/Pacific Research Center of Stanford University. He wrote this article for Project Syndicate.