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The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role, writes Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and a retired US Foreign Service officer.

The Biden administration sees arms control as a tool that can advance security and stability. It will seek to engage Russia on further nuclear arms reductions and other measures. Arms control in the 2020s will reflect continuity with earlier efforts—nuclear arms reductions will remain a bilateral matter between Washington and Moscow—but also contain new elements. That reflects the fact that strategic stability has become a more complex concept.

Start with Strategic Stability

Donald Trump was the first American president in 50 years to reach no agreement in the area of nuclear weapons. President Biden sees arms control as an important policy tool. On his first full day in office, he agreed to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years. His administration plans to do more. On February 3, Secretary of State Blinken said Washington would “pursue with the Russian Federation, in consultation with Congress and US allies and partners, arms control that addresses all of its nuclear weapons.”

This will not happen immediately. The administration needs to get its team in place. It will conduct a review of US programs and doctrine, which may be broader than the nuclear posture reviews conducted by past administrations.

The first serious US-Russian engagement on nuclear arms issues will likely occur in strategic stability talks. The classic definition of strategic stability is a situation in which neither side has an incentive, in a severe crisis or conventional conflict, to use nuclear weapons first. For five decades beginning in the 1960s, strategic stability was based largely on comparing US and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear forces. If each side had the ability, even after absorbing a massive first strike, to retaliate with devastating consequences, neither had an incentive to use nuclear weapons.

Today’s strategic stability model is more complex. Instead of a two-player model based just on strategic nuclear forces, today’s is multi-player and multi-domain. Third-country nuclear forces such as China need to be factored in. In addition to nuclear weapons, the model should take account of missile defense, precision-guided conventional strike, space and cyber developments.

US-Russian strategic stability talks should address all these factors. They should also address doctrine. Case in point: escalate-to-deescalate. Most Russian experts assert that this never became official Russian doctrine. However, the Pentagon believes it has, and that influenced the 2018 US nuclear posture review. At the least, each side appears to believe that the other has lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons. That should leave no one comfortable.

Nuclear Arms

Formal nuclear arms negotiations will, for the foreseeable future, remain a bilateral US-Russian matter. That is due to the disparity in numbers. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the United States has about 3,600 nuclear warheads in its active stockpile, while Russia has about 4,300. No third country has more than about 300.

The Trump administration tried to bring China into a US-Russia negotiation, but it never articulated a plan for doing so. That is no surprise. Washington and Moscow would not agree to reduce to China’s level, nor would they agree to legitimize a Chinese build-up to their levels, and China would not accept unequal limits.

New START caps the United States and Russia each at no more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and nuclear-capable bombers and no more that 1,550 deployed strategic warheads. Those limits will remain in force until February 2026.

However, New START’s limits do not cover 60-65 percent of the active nuclear stockpiles of the two countries. Reserve (or non-deployed) strategic nuclear warheads, and non-strategic nuclear warheads—whether deployed or non-deployed—are unconstrained.

After the Cold War, the United States dramatically reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons, eliminating all sea-based and land-based systems. Today, the only US non-strategic nuclear weapon is the B61 gravity bomb. Russia, on the other hand, maintains a large number and variety of non-strategic nuclear warheads—close to 2,000 for land-, sea- and air-based delivery as well as for defensive systems. This raises concern that Russia might be postured to use such weapons in a conflict.

The US military maintains more reserve strategic warheads. This reflects a desire to hedge against technical surprises or adverse geopolitical developments. The US military has implemented New START reductions in a manner that would allow it, should the treaty collapse, to add or “upload” warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs that now carry fewer than their capacity. As Russia modernizes its strategic ballistic missiles, it also is expanding its upload capacity.

The logical next step for the United States and Russia would entail negotiation of an agreement with an aggregate limit covering all their nuclear warheads. (Retired but not yet dismantled warheads could be dealt with separately.) An aggregate limit could offset reductions in Russia’s numerical advantage in non-strategic nuclear warheads with reductions in the US numerical advantage in non-deployed strategic warheads.

For a notional agreement, assume an aggregate limit of no more than 2,500 total nuclear warheads. Within that aggregate, there could be a sublimit of no more than 1,000 deployed strategic warheads on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and any new kinds of strategic systems with deployed warheads—the weapons most readily launched. This approach would treat bomber weapons as non-deployed, since they are not maintained on board aircraft. Ideally, all nuclear weapons other than those on deployed strategic delivery systems would be kept in storage. A new agreement could also lower the New START limits on deployed delivery systems and deployed and non-deployed launchers.

This would be ambitious. That said, it would leave each nuclear superpower with eight times as many nuclear weapons as any third country. Even if the agreement did not entail such dramatic reductions, the structure would, for the first time, capture all US and Russian nuclear warheads.

Such an agreement could enable the United States and Russia to begin to deal with third-country nuclear weapons states, and here is where nuclear arms control in the 2020s might get into new territory. Washington and Moscow could ask China, Britain and France to undertake unilateral commitments not to increase their nuclear weapon numbers as long as the United States and Russia were reducing theirs and agree to limited transparency measures to provide confidence that they were abiding by those commitments.

This US-Russian agreement would require new verification measures to monitor numbers of nuclear weapons in storage. That likely will make both sides’ militaries uncomfortable. But both have adjusted to uncomfortable monitoring measures in the past.

Some arms control experts assess that an agreement limiting all nuclear weapons, particularly non-strategic nuclear arms, is too ambitious and have suggested alternative approaches. One would expand New START’s limits to capture systems such as intercontinental ground-launched boost-glide missiles and nuclear-powered torpedoes, ban other new kinds of strategic systems, and reduce the ratio of deployed strategic warheads to deployed strategic delivery systems, but would not attempt to constrain non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Another alternative would require that non-strategic nuclear weapons be relocated away from bases with associated delivery systems to a small number of storage sites, with monitoring activities designed to verify the absence of nuclear weapons at the bases housing delivery systems, not at confirming or monitoring the number of weapons in storage. While originally suggested for Europe only, it could be broadened to apply on a global basis.

A third alternative would simply seek to lower New START’s limits. Hopefully, however, the US and Russian governments will demonstrate greater ambition.

Other Possible Issues on the US-Russia Agenda

Arms control may enter new territory in the 2020s on issues and types of weapons that, while not nuclear arms, still affect strategic stability. They could be discussed in US-Russian strategic stability talks. If a mandate were agreed, they could be spun off into separate negotiations.

One set of issues concerns missile defense. The US ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) system is designed to defend against rogue states, such as North Korea, not against a Russian or Chinese ballistic missile attack. Russian officials in the past have nevertheless indicated an interest in constraining missile defenses. Whether they will insist on negotiating on missile defense in connection with a next round of nuclear arms negotiations remains to be seen.

US missile defenses now and for the foreseeable future pose no serious threat to Russian strategic ballistic missiles, a point Russian officials sometimes appear to acknowledge. (China, with a much smaller strategic force, has greater grounds for concern, though the performance of GMD system has not been particularly good.) On the other hand, it would not seem difficult to craft an agreement covering strategic missile defenses such as the GMD system and Moscow missile defense system that would apply constraints but still leave the United States room for capabilities to defend against a North Korean ICBM attack. What would prove difficult would be the Washington politics, where Republicans oppose any limits on missile defense.

Another issue is precision-guided conventional strike weapons. In some cases, these can fulfill missions that previously required nuclear weapons. Air- and sea-launched cruise missiles have been in the US inventory for decades and now in the Russian inventory. Both sides are developing hypersonic weapons. With the demise of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, there is the 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile and likely other future intermediate-range missiles. It would be difficult to devise an arrangement that constrained all such weapons, but US and Russian officials might consider whether a subset poses a particular threat to strategic stability and should be subject to negotiation.

One possibility would seek to ban nuclear-armed intermediate-range missiles. Another possibility, though it has drawbacks, would build on the Russian idea for a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe, provided that it would mean relocation of 9M729 missile systems out of Europe.

Operations in space—used for early warning, command, control and communications and other purposes—also can affect strategic stability. A broad agreement banning the militarization of space is difficult to envisage. However, US and Russian officials might explore more limited measures, such as keep-out zones around certain declared satellites, a ban on anti-satellite tests that generate orbital debris and a ban on emplacing weapons in space designed to strike targets on the Earth.

As for the cyber domain, traditional arms control measures appear ill-suited. Washington and Moscow might pledge not to interfere in the other side’s nuclear command, control and communication systems, but neither could be certain the pledge was being observed.

In contrast to nuclear arms reductions, which will remain a US-Russia issue in the 2020s, some related issues might be considered on a broader basis. For example, China increasingly appears a peer competitor with the United States and Russia in space operations. Moreover, China has many intermediate-range missiles. It remains in the US interest to engage China in strategic stability talks. At some point, trilateral or multilateral discussions might be appropriate.

The agenda for nuclear arms control and related issues in the 2020s is a broad one. As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role. There is much that could be done to enhance stability and strengthen global security. Washington and Moscow will have to overcome the mistrust created by violations of earlier arms control agreements and take an innovative approach, even if certain problems prove insoluble, at least in the near term. But they have an opportunity, and an obligation, to try.

 

Originally for Valdai Discussion Club

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As the United States, Russia and others figure out how to maintain and enhance strategic stability in a multi-player, multi-domain world, Washington and Moscow will continue to have a central role, writes Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and a retired US Foreign Service officer.

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ABSTRACT:
Despite major international conferences and milestones fast approaching, the peace process in Afghanistan is unlikely to end soon. Referring to the many interdependent and intractable issues to negotiate, the lead U.S. negotiator conceded that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” Even if ongoing diplomatic efforts yield agreements, such deals – like the February 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement – will likely be difficult to implement, verify, and enforce. Underlying core concerns, like the presence of transnational terrorist networks and Kabul’s weak institutional capacity, will persist regardless of the diplomatic process. This event will explore the status and prospects of the current peace process and its implications for U.S. policy. It will consider the long-term political competition between the Taliban and the Kabul government, the role of U.S. forces, and the constructive and disruptive roles that regional actors may play.

SPEAKERS:
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Asfandyar Mir
Dr. Asfandyar Mir is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His research is on the international security of South Asia, US counterterrorism policy, and al-Qaeda, with a regional focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. Some of his research has appeared in peer-reviewed journals, such as International Security, International Studies Quarterly, and Security Studies, and his commentary has appeared in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, H-Diplo, Lawfare, and the Washington Post Monkey Cage. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and a BA and MA from Stanford University.
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Dipali Mukhopadhyav
Dr. Dipali Mukhopadhyay is an associate professor at the Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota. Her research focuses on the relationships between political violence, state building, and governance during and after war. She is currently serving as senior expert on the Afghanistan peace process for the U.S. Institute of Peace. She is the author of Good Rebel Governance: Revolutionary Politics and Western Intervention in Syria (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) with Kimberly Howe, and Warlords, Strongman Governors and State Building in Afghanistan(Cambridge University Press, 2014). Prior to joining the Humphrey School, Mukhopadhyay was on the faculty at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs from 2012 to 2020. She holds a PhD from Tufts University and a BA from Yale University.
 
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Arzan Tarapore
Dr. Arzan Tarapore is the South Asia research scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, where he leads the newly-restarted South Asia research initiative. He is also a senior nonresident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research. His research focuses on Indian military strategy and contemporary Indo-Pacific security issues. He previously held research positions at the RAND Corporation, the Observer Research Foundation, and the East-West Center in Washington. Prior to his scholarly career, he served as an analyst in the Australian Defence Department, which included an operational deployments to Afghanistan. Arzan holds a PhD in war studies from King’s College London.

This event is co-sponsored by: The Center for South Asia
Via Zoom webinar. Please register at:  https://bit.ly/3cOcabZ
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/L04_-G6N7Go

 

About the Event: What can wargames tell us about the ethics of decision-making under the threat of nuclear escalation? The “Cold War Game” (CWG) that took place from 1954-1956 at the RAND Corporation offers insights into the origins of deterrence and the dilemmas of contemplating the possible futures of war with rare events or little empirical data through the method of gaming. Based on extensive archival research at RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA, this project identifies the methodological and epistemological issues faced by early systems analysts and social scientists in attempting to link political and economic issues to traditional military wargaming in the nuclear era. The CWG sought to both quantify the non-rational or social dimensions of nuclear decision-making as well as develop psychological insights, to recognize the ways that propaganda and psychology were used as techniques of warfare alongside the quantitative and rational analytics of game theory. I argue that discussions of the ethics of nuclear weapons were sidelined throughout the Cold War for nuclear strategists and my questions examine how ethics functioned even it its absence of explicit discourse. Nevertheless, a kind of ethical restraint became implicit throughout the CWG that tempered even the most bellicose players through the process of physical play by forcing strategists to face the weight of their decisions. Differing epistemological approaches to the game from the social science division and the mathematics/economics division at RAND offers a unique empirical test to compare qualitative and quantitative approaches to wargaming operating within the same context of uncertainty in the early Cold War period. The conclusions of this study offers insights for contemporary dilemmas of AI and wargaming the future of war today. Ultimately, the project offers both an in-depth look at the origins of the political-military wargames and interjects with the larger questions of how abstraction and technostrategic language enables and constrains the acceptable discourse for decision-making in the face of nuclear brinksmanship.

 

 

About the Speaker: John R. Emery is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Irvine and then became a Tobis Fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center for the Scientific Study of Ethics and Morality at UC Irvine. His research agenda is at the intersection of security studies, ethics of war, and science and technology studies. His previous work on drones, ethics, AI, and counter-terrorism has been published in Law & Policy, Critical Military Studies, Ethics & International Affairs, and Peace Review. His current research agenda explores issues of human-machine interaction in the U.S. national security context analyzing both historical and contemporary cases.

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John R. Emery is an Assistant Professor of International Security at the University of Oklahoma in the Department of International and Area Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Irvine. His research focuses broadly on the intersection of ethics of war, security studies and technology. His work on 1950s nuclear wargaming at the RAND Corporation and the impact of wargames on ethical intuition has been published in Texas National Security Review. Previous work on drones, ethics, counter-terrorism, and just war is published in Critical Military Studies, Ethics & International Affairs, and Peace Review. In 2017-2018 he was awarded the NSF-funded Technology, Law and Society Fellowship to undertake an interdisciplinary study of the impact of AI, Big Data, and blockchain on law and society scholarship.

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Two weeks ago, President Joe Biden affirmatively responded to George Stephanopoulos’s question, “Vladimir Putin. You think he’s a killer?” Russian commentators voiced outrage, while some American observers foresee a new or intensified ice age in U.S.-Russia relations.

The Russian president is a big boy though. He surely did not like Biden’s answer, but it is difficult to imagine that he would refuse to engage when he sees doing so in his or Russia’s interest.

Biden could and should have used more diplomatic language in replying to Stephanopoulos: “Look, there is a tightly controlled system over there. Certain things do not happen without the approval of the guy at the top.” Still, was his assessment incorrect? 

Russia has carried out a conflict against Ukraine in eastern Donbas that has taken more than thirteen thousand lives and has no discernible motive other than to destabilize Kyiv. Putin-opponent Alexei Navalny was poisoned last summer, apparently by a special unit of the Russian Federal Security Service. In 2018, a Russian military intelligence hit team traveled to Britain, where it tried to poison Sergei Skripal, a busted double-agent who wound up in London after a spy swap.

Over twenty years, Putin has built a “power vertical” that concentrates authority in the Kremlin. It strains credulity to think the Donbas conflict or failed attacks on Navalny and Skripal would have occurred without his knowledge and consent.

It’s true that a comment like Biden’s is not usual between Washington and Moscow.  Recall, however, that Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” whose leaders “reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat.”  He poured Stinger missiles and other weapons into Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet army.  Mikhail Gorbachev nonetheless chose to deal with Reagan, and the two recorded major successes for relations between Washington and Moscow.

While Biden intends to push back against Russian overreach, his administration has also indicated readiness to cooperate where U.S. and Russian interests coincide.  On his first day in office, Biden agreed to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty until 2026, essentially accepting Putin’s offer from 2019.  His officials plan to talk to Russian officials on a range of strategic stability issues. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has a channel to his Russian counterpart. U.S. ambassador to Russia John Sullivan (no relation) is the rare Trump political appointee kept in place after Biden took office.  The Russians presumably noticed all this.

Dr. Julie Newton, an associate professor at the American University of Paris, recently expressed concern that Biden’s comment will fuel Russian grievances. Not to say that the deterioration in U.S.-Russia and West-Russia relations is solely the Kremlin’s fault, but Russian officials have a long list of grievances that often seem to boil down to “everyone is mad at us, what’s wrong with everyone?” They show no sign of having asked themselves whether invading neighboring states, cyber hacks against Western governmental and private institutions, and assassination attempts on the streets of European cities contribute to the problem.

Newton seems to believe Biden’s comment could make Putin less prepared to engage on issues that matter to Washington. Perhaps, but Putin calculates costs and benefits. Russia, like the United States, has an interest in keeping the nuclear arms competition bounded. While a nuclear Iran might pose a bigger problem for Washington, Moscow certainly would not welcome it. The Kremlin has an interest in a stable Afghanistan; if things go badly there, it’s much closer to Russia. Climate change poses challenges for Russia. Moscow and Washington can benefit from cooperation on these questions. Would Putin forgo that? Indeed, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov on March 29 listed a number of issues for U.S.-Russian engagement.

Additionally, Newton appears to suggest a double standard. She notes that Biden has not sanctioned Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman. That is not exactly true. The White House has indicated that Biden will deal with the Saudi king, not Mohammed bin Salman. Putin and the Saudi king, not MbS, have invitations to Biden’s virtual climate summit in April.

Biden’s comment shocked those in Moscow, where they had become used to Donald Trump. Trump rarely, if ever, criticized Putin or Russian misbehavior. He also did not produce a single positive achievement in U.S.-Russia relations. Under Biden, New START extension got done in two weeks. To be sure, that does not mean a reset for U.S.-Russia relations, but in contrast to his predecessor, Biden is a serious interlocutor. Putin may not like being called a killer—who would? However, when he sees engagement with Biden can advance his goals, he will engage.

Steven Pifer, a fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy and also affiliated with the Brookings Institution and Stanford University, is a retired Foreign Service officer. 

Originally for National Interest

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Putin may not like being called a killer—who would? However, when he sees engagement with Biden can advance his goals, he will engage.

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The REDI task force invites you to a second keynote featuring Dr. Nita Mosby Tyler. This presentation takes participants on a journey of “deconstructing” the real meaning of equity, inclusivity and diversity. Participants will learn fascinating facts and insights that help us shift from learning and exploring to doing. The keynote is designed to inspire, intrigue and energize us during a complex time in history. We will explore everything from definitions, history, imposter syndrome, and begin to name and break down the fences which can stand in the way of developing equitable systems. 

 

 

Speaker's Biography:

Dr. Dwinita “Nita” Mosby Tyler is the Chief Catalyst and Founder of The Equity Project, LLC – an organization designed to support organizations and communities in building diversity, equity and inclusion strategies and The HR Shop, LLC - a human resources firm designed to support non-profits and small businesses. She is the former Senior Vice President and Chief Inclusion Officer for Children’s Hospital Colorado – the first African American woman to hold that position in the organizations 100+ year history. She is also the former Executive Director of the Office of Human Resources for the City and County of Denver – the first African American woman to hold that position in the 63+ year history of the agency. Dr. Mosby Tyler, a consultant accredited by the Georgetown University National Center for Cultural Competence and recipient of the Cornell University Diversity & Inclusion certification, is nationally recognized for her equity work with non-profit, community, government and corporate organizations.

Dr. Mosby Tyler holds a doctorate in the field of Organizational Leadership, a Master of Arts degree in Management and a Bachelor of Science degree in Education.

Note: This is event is accessible current Stanford students, staff, and faculty.

Online via Zoom

REGISTER

Dr. Dwinita Mosby Tyler Chief Catalyst and Founder The Equity Project, LLC
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this is how they tell me the world ends event at cyber policy center

On Wednesday, May 26 at 10 am pacific time, please join Andrew Grotto, Director of Stanford’s Program on Geopolitics, Technology and Governance, for a conversation with Nicole Perlroth, New York Times Cybersecurity Reporter, about the underground market for cyber-attack capabilities.

In her book This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends: The Cyberweapons Arms Race,” Perlroth argues that the United States government became the world's dominant hoarder of one of the most coveted tools in a spy's arsenal, the zero-day vulnerability. After briefly cornering the market, in her account, the United States then lost control of its hoard and the market.

Perlroth and Grotto, a former Senior Director for Cybersecurity Policy at the White House in both the Obama and Trump Administrations, will talk about the development and evolution of this market, and what it portends about the future of conflict in cyberspace and beyond.

This event is co-sponsored by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Cyber Policy Center.

Praise for “This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends”: “Perlroth's terrifying revelation of how vulnerable American institutions and individuals are to clandestine cyberattacks by malicious hackers is possibly the most important book of the year . . . Perlroth's precise, lucid, and compelling presentation of mind-blowing disclosures about the underground arms race a must-read exposé.” —Booklist, starred review

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Andrew Grotto

Andrew J. Grotto is a research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University.

Grotto’s research interests center on the national security and international economic dimensions of America’s global leadership in information technology innovation, and its growing reliance on this innovation for its economic and social life. He is particularly interested in the allocation of responsibility between the government and the private sector for defending against cyber threats, especially as it pertains to critical infrastructure; cyber-enabled information operations as both a threat to, and a tool of statecraft for, liberal democracies; opportunities and constraints facing offensive cyber operations as a tool of statecraft, especially those relating to norms of sovereignty in a digitally connected world; and governance of global trade in information technologies.

Before coming to Stanford, Grotto was the Senior Director for Cybersecurity Policy at the White House in both the Obama and Trump Administrations. His portfolio spanned a range of cyber policy issues, including defense of the financial services, energy, communications, transportation, health care, electoral infrastructure, and other vital critical infrastructure sectors; cybersecurity risk management policies for federal networks; consumer cybersecurity; and cyber incident response policy and incident management. He also coordinated development and execution of technology policy topics with a nexus to cyber policy, such as encryption, surveillance, privacy, and the national security dimensions of artificial intelligence and machine learning. 

At the White House, he played a key role in shaping President Obama’s Cybersecurity National Action Plan and driving its implementation. He was also the principal architect of President Trump’s cybersecurity executive order, “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure.”

Grotto joined the White House after serving as Senior Advisor for Technology Policy to Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker, advising Pritzker on all aspects of technology policy, including Internet of Things, net neutrality, privacy, national security reviews of foreign investment in the U.S. technology sector, and international developments affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. technology sector.

Grotto worked on Capitol Hill prior to the Executive Branch, as a member of the professional staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He served as then-Chairman Dianne Feinstein’s lead staff overseeing cyber-related activities of the intelligence community and all aspects of NSA’s mission. He led the negotiation and drafting of the information sharing title of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which later served as the foundation for the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act that President Obama signed in 2015. He also served as committee designee first for Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and later for Senator Kent Conrad, advising the senators on oversight of the intelligence community, including of covert action programs, and was a contributing author of the “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program.”

Before his time on Capitol Hill, Grotto was a Senior National Security Analyst at the Center for American Progress, where his research and writing focused on U.S. policy towards nuclear weapons - how to prevent their spread, and their role in U.S. national security strategy.

Grotto received his JD from the University of California at Berkeley, his MPA from Harvard University, and his BA from the University of Kentucky.

Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation
Director, Program on Geopolitics, Technology, and Governance
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advertistement for future of tech in indo-pacific event

The Indo-Pacific will be the locus of global conflict and growth in the realm of critical and emerging technologies in the new decade. The region is home to the largest, most rapidly growing internet user bases in the world, accounting for just over half of the world’s internet users. At the same time, the US–China trade war during the Trump administration and the digital dependencies underscored by the pandemic have led some Indo-Pacific countries to rethink their own technological dependence on global supply and value chains, in favor of greater regional connectivity and resilience. There is now a sharp focus on the need for a coherent grand strategy for a “Digital Indo-Pacific”. What are the building blocks for a secure, prosperous and resilient Digital Indo-Pacific? How can the Quad, ASEAN, and other regional stakeholders cooperate to tackle broader issues relating to cybersecurity, emerging technology norms, diversifying and securing supply chains, hybrid operations and other emerging threats?

On April 22nd at 9 am PST, join Kelly Born, Director of the Cyber Initiative at the Hewlett Foundation and former Director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, in conversation with Trisha Ray of India’s Observer Research Foundation’s Technology and Media Initiative, and Martijn Rasser, Senior Fellow in the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).

Kelly Born
Martijn Rasser
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/sFsmjTf9xUg

 

About the Event: Contemporary global politics are marked by a renewed debate over the significance and limits of state sovereignty. In the eyes of many, the COVID-19 pandemic has reasserted the importance of territorial sovereignty as well as of national identity and citizenship. Populations have become more acutely conscious of their rights and responsibilities as members of a particular political community, and their ultimate reliance upon their governments to protect them from the virus. Well before the outbreak of this pandemic, however, many scholars, policy-analysts, and state officials had already been highlighting the ‘return’ of sovereignty, often in juxtaposition to either the transnational economic forces of globalization or liberal international norms. Powerful economic and political trends (including protectionism and populism) were casting doubt on the reach and impact of liberal ideals such as free movement and economic interdependence. In part, these trends reflected a structural shift in international order in which the relative position of the United States was declining, and the standing of non-Western powers with attachment to what is loosely referred to as “Westphalian” sovereignty was increasing. Although some IR scholars have argued that today’s great powers (Russia, China and the US) are espousing and practicing a new form of “extra-legal sovereignty” (Paris 2020), the former two states - in order to garner wider support for their respective world views - regularly appeal to an understanding of sovereignty that underscores long-standing principles of territorial integrity and political independence.

This book project takes a step back, to more critically analyse the period preceding our current debate. Before we can address the question of whether and how Westphalian sovereignty has returned to shape contemporary global order, we should examine more deeply why sovereignty was alleged to have been transformed in the first place. In other words, what was the nature and reach of the post-Westphalian order that was proclaimed by so many in the first decades of the post-Cold War period?  While analysts and commentators have pointed to several manifestations of this changed understanding of sovereignty, I focus on the liberal idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, which, inter alia, seemingly underpinned the articulation in 2005 of the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’. According to this liberal understanding, sovereignty can no longer be conceived as unrivalled control over a delimited territory and the population residing within it – ‘sovereignty as authority’ – but rather as a status and set of rights which are conditional upon certain behaviours and capacities of states. Sovereignty is thus not solely the right of the state to be “undisturbed from without” but the responsibility to perform certain roles and tasks within its frontiers.

The central aim of this study is to examine the rise, contestation, and potential fate of what some have called this “revolutionary” understanding of sovereignty.  I ask three more specific questions. The first is conceptual and draws upon the history of ideas relating to sovereignty. Was the post-Cold War articulation of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ really so novel? Or was it juxtaposing itself to a very particular historical period, during which non-intervention was championed by newly decolonized states? The second set of issues is empirical. How has sovereignty been understood in the post-Cold War period, particularly through practices of intervention and state recognition? Have the key actors in international society spoken and acted in ways consistent with the liberal understanding of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’? And the final set of questions is normative. Is it desirable to understand sovereignty in this way? What are the benefits and limitations of viewing sovereignty as deeply connected with responsibility?

While the book project is organized around these three central themes, my presentation will focus in, for purposes of illustration, on the ‘responsibility to protect’ (RtoP). This chapter assesses the degree to which ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has been widely accepted and practiced by states in their interpretation and implementation of this principle and, in so doing, seeks to both account for and analyse the nature and impact of the contestation that surrounds RtoP.  The chapter’s findings suggest that a conditional understanding of sovereignty was not necessarily shared or practiced across international society, even during the height of liberal internationalist ‘moment’ of the post-Cold War period - thereby posing a challenge not just to the proponents of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, but also to some of its fiercest critics, who overstate its negative effects on international politics.

I begin by arguing that while the 2005 Summit Outcome Document (SOD) was a significant intergovernmental agreement that provided greater precision about the source, scope, and bearer of the responsibility to protect, its particular formulation indicates that the logic of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was not fully embraced.  Instead, the text reflected a horizontal logic, associated with respect for sovereign equality and positive international law, rather than a vertical logic that places the international community in a position of authority over states. While the notions of sovereignty and responsibility did come together, they did so in a way that did not override or replace sovereignty in situations of humanitarian emergency, but rather aimed to reinforce sovereignty and support states in protecting their populations.

In a second step, the chapter analyses the types of contestation that have accompanied RtoP’s development, which relate both to procedural matters (such as the appropriate intergovernmental body that should ‘own’ RtoP’s development) and to substantive elements of the principle – including, most notably, the relationship between national and international responsibility. I suggest that RtoP is particularly susceptible to contestation, given its complex structure and inherently indeterminate nature. I also argue that, far from establishing an independent international authority that specifies and enforces state responsibility, the most that RtoP creates within its so-called third pillar is a responsibility to consider a real or imminent crisis involving atrocity crimes - what in legal literature is sometimes called a ‘duty of conduct’.

In the final section of the chapter, I contend that the contestation surrounding RtoP can be better understood by giving greater attention to the normative underpinnings of contemporary critiques of the principle, most notably those which stress the importance of sovereignty equality. Given that RtoP has continued to be associated – rightly or wrongly – with the use of military force, it has frequently generated sharp debate among states about the meaning of sovereignty, and efforts to assert the continuing power of the principle of non-intervention. The result of this contestation, and the reshaping of RtoP by non-Western states such as China, has been a dampening of the original cosmopolitan roots of the principle and an increased focus on maintaining strong and capable states. In short, while RtoP has created a linkage in international discourse and practice between sovereignty and responsibility, it has not given effect to the liberal understanding of sovereignty as responsibility.

 

 

 

About the Speaker: Jennifer M. Welsh is the Canada 150 Research Chair in Global Governance and Security at McGill University. She was previously Professor and Chair in International Relations at the European University Institute and Professor in International Relations at the University of Oxford, where she co-founded the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. From 2013-2016, she served as the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, on the Responsibility to Protect.

Professor Welsh is the author, co-author, and editor of several books and articles on humanitarian intervention, the evolution of the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ in international society, the UN Security Council, norm conflict and contestation, and Canadian foreign policy.

Virtual Seminar

Jennifer Welsh Research Chair in Global Governance and Security McGill University
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/5616166186207/WN_Zdzl0PrwR7CXSPoASOs5Xg

 

About the Event: Conventional wisdom on proxy warfare exclusively focuses on explaining governments’ provision of military, logistical, and financial support to rebel groups involved in conflict abroad. In reality, foreign militant groups play a much larger role in these partnerships than recognized: foreign militants often provide government partners with intelligence, logistical support, access to their military infrastructure, and send elite units to train and supplement their state partner’s troops. Because armed non-state actors are smaller and face greater difficulties accessing resources, the fact that they provide any type of support – let alone deploying their forces to conduct joint combat operations with state armed forces abroad – is puzzling. In this presentation, I provide insights into the strategic benefits that foreign militants receive from supporting states, identify factors that influence the types of support foreign militants provide to government partners once the decision to provide support has been made, and highlight how foreign militants can constrain and influence their government partners’ future behavior. To do so, I conduct an in-depth examination of the overtime trends in the various types of support that Shia paramilitary groups from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan provided to the Syrian regime and Russian forces throughout the course of the decade-long Syrian conflict.

 

 

About the Speaker: Melissa Carlson is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Center for International Security and Cooperation’s Middle East Initiative. She received her PhD in Political Science from UC Berkeley. Her research examines cooperation between states and non-state actors in conflict, and her book manuscript explains variations in the types of support that governments and foreign militants provide to each other. Previously, Melissa has worked with the International Organization of Migration’s Missions in Jordan and Iraq to examine relations between refugees, host governments, and aid organizations.

Virtual Seminar

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Dr. Melissa Carlson is currently working with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation unit, where she promotes rigorous standards of measuring the effectiveness of the U.S.'s security cooperation and assistance programming. During her tenure at CISAC, she was a postdoctoral research and teaching fellow. She received her PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, specializing in international relations, comparative politics, and methodology. Dr. Carlson's primary research examines the factors that influence the variation and intensity of partnerships between governments and foreign militant groups with a focus on the recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Her book-style dissertation project finds that, when foreign militant groups and state armed forces share similar organizational characteristics, they are more likely to deploy forces to conduct joint combat operations and provide each other with advanced weapons systems. In other research, Dr. Carlson examines the factors that influence informal and secret security cooperation between states and how misinformation and rumors influence refugees' relationships with host governments, service providers, and smugglers. Her research has been published in the American Political Science Review, the Review of International Organizations, and International Studies Quarterly, among other outlets. Outside of academia, Dr. Carlson has worked as a consultant for the International Organization for Migration's Iraq and Jordan Missions.

Affiliate
CISAC Postdoctoral Fellow Stanford University
Seminars
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/t4xteN7N99U

 

About the Event: In The State from Below, we seek to understand democracy through ground-up knowledge of the state. We use a new technology and civic infrastructure, Portals, to initiate conversations about policing in communities where these forms of state action are concentrated.  Portals are virtual chambers where people in disparate communities can converse as if in the same room.  Based on over 850 recorded and transcribed conversations across fourteen neighborhoods in five cities – the most extensive collection of first-hand accounts of the police to date – we analyze patterns in political discourse.  We reveal four currents that challenge liberal-democratic framings of political life:  that an arrangement of distorted responsiveness characterizes the relationship between policed communities and the state; that the political desire of policed communities is not for greater engagement and responsiveness but for political recognition – to be known by the state; and that in contrast to prevailing wisdom about uninformed electorates, these citizens have too much knowledge of and too little power vis-à-vis state representatives.  Finally, we observe among policed communities an “ethics of aversion” in their political responses, a belief that power is best achieved by receding from state institutions in the short term and forging their own collective, community autonomy in the long term. At a broader level, we observe that it is not exclusion from democratic institutions that characterizes political inequality in our time, but inclusion in what we call racial authoritarianism, and the experience of misrecognition that results.

 

 

About the Speaker: Vesla Mae Weaver is the Bloomberg Distinguished Associate Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Johns Hopkins University and a 2016-17 Andrew Carnegie Fellow. 

She has contributed to scholarly debates around the persistence of racial inequality, colorism in the United States, the causes and consequences of the dramatic rise in prisons and police power for race-class subjugated communities. She is co-author with Amy Lerman of Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control, the first large-scale empirical study of what the tectonic shifts in incarceration and policing meant for political and civic life in communities where it was concentrated. Weaver is also the co-author of Creating a New Racial Order: How Immigration, Multiracialism, Genomics, and the Young Can Remake Race in America (with J. Hochschild and T. Burch). She is at work on a new book, The State From Below, based on the largest archive of policing narratives using an innovative civic infrastructure called Portals (https://www.portalspolicingproject.com).

Virtual Seminar

Vesla Weaver Bloomberg Distinguished Associate Professor of Political Science and Sociology Johns Hopkins University
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