Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
The fourth session of the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum, held at Stanford University on June 18, 2010, convened former senior South Korean and American West Coast-based policymakers, scholars, and regional and functional experts to discuss North Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance, and regional dynamics in Northeast Asia. Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center organized the Forum in association with its Korean partner, The Sejong Institute, of Seongnam, Korea. The Forum operates as a closed workshop under Chatham House Rule of confidentiality, allowing participants to engage in frank and in-depth exchanges on important and sensitive current issues. Meeting in the aftermath of the March 26 sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan, Forum participants focused on developments in North Korea, how the U.S.-ROK alliance should respond to North Korean challenges, and the role of China vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asia region.
In the past fifty years, two factors have led to global population aging: a decline in fertility to levels close to—or even below—replacement and a decline in mortality that has increased world average life expectancy by nearly 67 percent. As the population skews toward fewer young people and more elderly who live longer postretirement lives, demographic changes—labor force participation, savings, economic growth, living arrangements, marriage markets, and social policy—are transforming society in fundamental, irreversible ways.
Nowhere are these effects of aging and demographic change more acute—nor their long-term effects more potentially significant—than in the Asia-Pacific region. How will these developments impact the economies and social protection systems of Japan, South Korea, China, and, by extension, the United States?
To assess this question, Aging Asia showcases cutting-edge, policy-relevant research. The first section focuses on demographic trends and their economic implications; the second section approaches select topics from a global comparative perspective, including social insurance financing, medical costs, and long-term care.
Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.
The Economic and Social Implications of Rapid Demographic Change in China, Japan, and South Korea
This paper provides an understanding of the current copyright laws regarding software licensing in the United States and Europe. The concept of copyright under both the U.S. and EU legal regimes is to convey on the copyright owners the exclusive right to distribute their copyrighted software. In case of sales transactions, that right is expressly limited to statutory copyright law.
Sections 109 and 117 of the U.S. Copyright Act are the respective core provisions to apply to software transactions. It is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a work obtained at an authorized sale to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy. In addition, the owner of a copy of a computer program may, inter alia, create another copy of that program provided that the copy is made either as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or for archival or back-up purposes. Under U.S. case law the crucial question is whether a licensee of software can be deemed as an "owner" of a copy of the software and as such trigger the first sale immunities. The paper shows the different approaches taken by different courts on the so-called "sale versus license debate".
Article 4(c) of the Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs ("EC Software Directive") contains the European version of the first sale doctrine, the Community exhaustion doctrine. The first sale of a copy of a computer program by the copyright owners or with their consent shall exhaust the distribution right of that copy within the European Communities (EC) or European Economic Area (EEA). Contrary to the sale versus license debate in U.S. case law, European courts—with no greater argument—deemed software licensees subject to exhaustion. The courts have been more concerned to apply the doctrine of exhaustion in a way as to further the implementation of the fundamental freedom of free movement of goods and services in the EC.
On the basis of a transatlantic copyright analysis the paper will discuss, in a second step, the existence of a digital first sale doctrine (as called in the United States) or digital Community exhaustion doctrine (as known under EC law). The paper debates whether the first sale/exhaustion privilege is to apply also in the event of online-transmissions of software, i.e., when no tangible data carrier embodying the target software changes hands. In today’s world, copies of copyrighted works, including software, are bought with increasing frequency by electronically downloading them through networks, mostly the Internet, with no tangible copy of the target software provided. However, digital transmissions of copyrighted works over the Internet fit neither comfortably within the narrow concepts of first sale nor exhaustion. In discussing whether online distribution of software shall render sections 109 and 117 of the U.S. Copyright Act or Article 4(c) of the EC Software Directive applicable, the paper concludes that in the absence of persuasive case law in either jurisdiction on this matter, U.S. governmental authorities tend to protect software copyright owners, whereas the existence of a digital Community exhaustion doctrine may be based on the ground of free movement of information.
This research was published as TTLF Working Paper No. 6 at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/ttlf/#ttlf_working_papers.
Reaching everything from medicine to the food industry, biotechnology’s impact on society has become a major economic factor and is ever-increasing. In addition to its impressive potential benefits, biotechnology carries serious risks, especially regarding security and ethics. The European Patent Convention includes statutory restrictions regarding morality and public policy, while today’s U.S. laws in contrast, try to avoid morality restrictions in patenting biotechnology and U.S. agencies generally grant patents without regard to moral concerns. Not long ago, the U.S. Patent Act included a morality doctrine which had a restrictive effect on biotechnology.
The new U.S. approach applies to micro-organisms, plants, and animals where moral concerns were not considered at all before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. It is not clear, if the moral questions re-emerged referring to the Newman/Rifkin patent application, claiming an animal-human chimera, since the application was finally rejected on the grounds that human beings do not constitute statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This line of argumentation was a break from the developed case law concerning living matter. The attempt to keep ethical concerns out of the U.S. patent laws stands on very shaky grounds.
Another problem arises from the fact that both patent systems, in Europe and the U.S., are relying on the term “human” as a borderline for patentability but none of them define the term “human” which leads to ambiguities. An interesting approach came up, defining a human being not by its biological criteria but rather by its intellectual capabilities. However, this approach is still in its infancy.
The project is co-sponsored by the Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Technology Law Forum (TTLF, a joint initiative of Stanford Law School and the University of Vienna School of Law) and by Stanford University’s Forum on Contemporary Europe at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
How do military allies come to find each other more dependable on security issues, instead of less comfortable with mutual reliance? How do rival nations manage to build confidence and shared expectations for a collaborative future, rather than fall into a spiral of suspicions over each other's strategic intentions? Leif-Eric Easley, the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), addresses these key questions in his recently completed dissertation, Perceived National Identity Differences and Strategic Trust: Explaining Post Cold-War Security Relations Among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Examining post-1992 Northeast Asia, and drawing from a broad range of source materials in four languages, Dr. Easley argues that differences in how the policymaking elite in two countries perceive the national identity of one another determines the level of strategic trust between their governments. This ultimately affects patterns of cooperation on national and international security matters.
With a background in both political science and mathematics, and paying close attention to historical issues in East Asia, Dr. Easley earned his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 2010. While at Shorenstein APARC, he is revising his dissertation into a book and will teach a course about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. In a recent interview, Dr. Easley discussed his research and future plans.
What is one of the most interesting and timely case studies that you examined?
Japan and China have had
a very difficult time improving the level of strategic trust between them. The
reasons for this are numerous. There are, of course, the historical legacies of
Japanese colonialism, the Pacific War, and indeed hundreds of years of
disagreements between China and Japan.
Even though those were largely papered over in favor of normalizing relations
in the 1970s and then building up an economic relationship—China is now Japan's
largest trading partner—a lot of that historical baggage was not fully
unpacked. The Chinese say there are a lot of things the Japanese have not
apologized for. The Japanese say that Beijing tends to use anti-Japanese
nationalism for its own domestic purposes. At various points of time in the
post-Cold War era—whether it has to do with the way that textbooks are being
revised or how the Japanese prime minister periodically pays homage to Japan's
war dead at the Yasakuni Shrine—Chinese nationalism has found expression in
anti-Japanese protests.
My argument is that such historical antagonisms, among other things, bring to
light the perceptions of identity difference between the two sides. The more
severe the perceptions of difference, the more of a gap that elites in one
country see between their national identity and the national identity of the
other side, and the less trust the two sides are going to have. So these
historical issues really weigh down on the level of strategic trust between
Tokyo and Beijing. This is problematic—not just for dealing with pressing hard
security issues like North Korea or trying to advance regional security
architectures like the ASEAN Regional Forum—but also because strategic trust is
very important for facilitating cooperation and avoiding conflict. Without a
decent measure of trust, you do not have much margin for error when some
unforeseen things happen, such as the recent incident over the Senkaku/Diaoyu
Islands.
Based on your dissertation, what steps
would you recommend for governments to build strategic trust?
A lot of work in both academic and policy circles has pointed to mechanisms
like increasing exchanges and trying to cooperate on so-called "easy" issues to
establish a pattern of cooperation. Meanwhile, politicians and diplomats tend
to be concerned with different forms of political theater to produce positive
headlines.
My theory suggests that if trust-building efforts do not actually change the
deeply-held perceptions that each side maintains about the other's national
identity, then you are not going to see a meaningful and lasting effect on the
level of strategic trust. That is not to say that exchanges and trying to rack
up points on easy issues is not worth doing or will not ultimately have some
positive effect. But the sorts of events and actions that really change
perceptions and then can allow for meaningful changes in strategic trust are
those that help redefine the relationship or the way that one side looks at the
other.
For example, if Japan were to have an entirely different memorial site where
its leaders could remember and honor Japan's veterans, separate from a shrine
that has a certain view of history associated with it that is very
objectionable to its neighbors, this could be something that would help change
perceptions. Contrast that to a carefully worded speech by a prime minister.
Japan has actually apologized dozens of times and yet the problem is still
there. Those apologies, as well-meaning as they may be, have not significantly
changed identity perceptions and hence we do not see much improvement in
strategic trust between Beijing and Tokyo.
Another example would be dealing with some of the recent maritime disputes. If
the China-Japan relationship had more strategic trust, it might be able to
encapsulate those issues and not let them derail the relationship. But this is
not yet the case. Coming to a greater level of agreement about how to deal with
economic zones and how to pursue joint development of underwater gas deposits
could really do a lot to improve perceptions on both sides. This would ameliorate Japanese
perceptions of an aggressive Chinese identity, and help resolve a hot-button
nationalist issue between the two populations. Real improvement in identity
perceptions, such that each side thinks better of the other's international
role and national characteristics, would allow Japan and China to realize a
more stable, trusting relationship.
What is the course that you will offer at Stanford and what approach will you
take to teaching?
The course will be about
nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. I am hoping to engage
these issues with some fresh perspective. What I want to do is provide students
with background on the different forms of nationalist conflict in Northeast
Asia to help them understand where these historical legacies and identity
frictions come from. These are really contemporarily relevant issues. I will
ask students to write on a very specific topic—a nationalist issue of their
choice—and develop not only their own analysis, but also some of their own
suggestions. This is a lot to expect, but I anticipate that the students are
going to be up to the challenge. The students will probably come from different
fields—including political science, history, sociology, and Asian studies. I
think that with their diverse backgrounds, they will benefit from the
environment here at Shorenstein APARC.
Shorenstein APARC is really special among centers—nationally and even
internationally—in the way that it brings together academic rigor, policy
relevance, and policy experience. We have top-flight academics, and we also
have very distinguished policymakers, who bring a wealth of experience to the
table. With more exchange between the academic and the policymaking
communities, both sides stand to benefit tremendously. Shorenstein APARC is one
of the few places that is doing this, and doing it so well.
Do you hope to work in academia or
government, or serve in both fields?
I plan to pursue an academic career, but at the same time to produce
research and publications with policy relevance. Teaching is incredibly
important because there is more and more demand among students with interest in
Asia, and increasing demand across sectors for people who have expertise in
Asian history and political economics. Teaching is an opportunity, not only to
help prepare the next generation of experts, but also to improve my research
and writing through interaction with students. Likewise, being able to take a
sabbatical to serve in an advisory role at the U.S. Department of State, the
Pentagon, or National Security Council would be a great opportunity to have
real-world impact on the incredibly pressing issues in U.S.-Asia relations.
Policy work is also a chance to expand one's own skillset and basis of
research.
Take for example, Thomas Christensen of Princeton University and Victor Cha of Georgetown University. Both are strong academics, who publish in top academic journals and produce academic books. They also served in the State Department and National Security Council respectively. After making positive contributions on the policy side, they returned to their universities with firsthand knowledge of the complex relationship between theory and practice. I hope to one day have an opportunity for public service and then return to academia with experience that is of value to my research and of value to my students.
Susan Hyde is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Yale University, where she is affiliated with the MacMillian Center and the Institute for Social and Policy Studies. She earned her Ph.D. from the University of California, San Diego in 2006, and has held fellowships at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. and Princeton University's Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. Her research interests include international influences on domestic politics, elections in developing countries, international norm creation, election manipulation, and the use of natural and field experimental research methods. Her current research explores the effects of international democracy promotion efforts, and her research has been published in World Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Perspectives on Politics, the Journal of Politics. She has recently completed a book entitled The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm. She has served as an international observer with several organizations for elections in Albania, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Pakistan and Venezuela, and has worked for the Democracy Program at The Carter Center. She teaches courses on international organizations, democracy promotion, the global spread of elections, and the role of non-state actors in world politics.
CO-SPONSORED BY COMPARATIVE POLITICS
Encina Ground Floor Conference Room
Purpose of SSIPI
From 2007 to 2010, a financial and economic crisis gripped the United States, Europe and the world. 7 million Americans lost their jobs, 10 million were pushed below the poverty line, thousands of families lost their homes, and many lost their savings. Somewhat lower numbers were reported from Europe, although the structural mechanisms behind the crisis were seemingly similar, eventually affecting not only the West, but the whole world. It is foreseen that the effects of the crisis will last for years, and it is still uncertain if a full recovery will be possible.
Given that a variety of highly speculative practices put into place by the banking and finance sector during the "neoliberal“ decades between the early 1990s and 2007 allegedly played a role in triggering the crisis, the request for more down-to-earth and sustainable ways of dealing with money and finance has surfaced to international attention. Particularly in Europe, social banks were among the most successful financial institutions during the crisis years, with annual growth rates of up to 30%, factually doubling their assets between 2007-10. This unprecedented success was supposedly due to the fact that many European savers shifted their assets from mainstream banks to social banks, driven by the hope that the latter would handle their money in less abstract and egoistic, and more realistic and community oriented ways. In recent years, social banks have forged influential global networks such as the Global Alliance of Banking on Values and the International Association of Investors in the Social Economy, which pursue the ambitious strategy of reaching out to 1 billion people by 2020.
Given that, not least as a result of the crisis, increasing numbers of people are improving their financial literacy and are taking a growingly critical stance towards the mainstream international banking and finance sector as we knew it before the crisis, the seminar poses the questions of whether (and how) social banking and social finance may concretely contribute to improving the current financial system, and how they might help to restore confidence in capitalism by providing “best practice” examples in selected fields.
The seminar will try to provide some answers to these questions by examining the pros and cons of contemporary social finance and by outlining perspectives of structural complimentarity and cooperation between speculative and sustainable finance.
Audio Synopsis:
In his seminar, Professor Roland Benedikter argues that too little has been done to reform the banking and financial sectors in the wake of the recent crisis, then presents social banking and social finance as an alternative system. First, he argues that the widespread bank bailouts of the past few years have "saved the wrong system" and points out that many of the largest US banks, for example, have actually grown since the crisis despite calls by the Obama administration for these banks to downsize or break in to smaller pieces. He acknowledges that new measures initiated by both the Obama administration (establishing a consumer protection bureau; imposing limits on fees by financial intermediaries) and by European countries (banning high-risk transactions in Germany; reducing public liability for private bank bailouts) are steps in the right direction. He adds his own suggestions, including increased regulation, better international agreements on regulating capital flows, a fee on high-risk speculative transactions, and a preventative tax on banks to protect against future crises. Many of these reforms, however, have faced enormous opposition from the major players in the banking and finance sectors in Britain, the United States, and China. Progress seems to have stalled, with popular figures like Niall Ferguson, who once led calls for dramatic reform, now insisting that the system is too resistant to change, and that simpler goals such as a new hippocratic oath for the financial sector will suffice.
Benedikter then presents social banking and social finance as an answer to the seemingly intractable problems of the traditional system. He first describes the industry in terms of what it is not. Traditional banks, he argues, made three major mistakes leading up to the crisis: irresponsibility (loans that were too high, too much derivative investment); lack of transparency; and unsustainability (by participating in speculation and contributing to market bubbles). The current economy, he explains, is based on a tripolar system: a "real" economy of manufacturing and tangible goods; and two "side economies" of real estate and financial derivatives, which have steadily drawn capital away from the real economy since 1989. A breakdown of this unsustainable system was predicted by multiple think tanks before 2007, based partly on the frantic growth of the derivatives market (from $100 trillion to $516 trillion annually between 2001 and 2006 - for perspective, Benedikter cites the annual world GDP figure of approximately $50 trillion).
Social banks, on the other hand, invest 100% of their capital toward responsible, transparent, and sustainable ventures such as green technology and social initiatives. Banks emphasize knowing their customers, which requires them to operate on a smaller scale than traditional banks, and conversely customers know where their money is invested and can even participate in making investment decisions. These decisions are meant to take the potential social as well as financial return on an investment into account. Benedikter describes this as a "Triple Bottom Line" approach, emphasizing profit, people, and the planet.
A discussion period following the presentation addressed questions including: What are the mechanisms available to enforcing the triple bottom line approach in social banking and social finance? Are social banks guided by a common charter? What are the details of the proposed high-risk transaction fee? Why have some US social banks been successful while others have struggled?
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room