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David Straub
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When major political change in North Korea will occur is difficult to predict, but it is inevitable, suggests David Straub, associate director of the Stanford Korean Studies Program. In a March 21, 2011, Seoul Shinmun op-ed, Straub urges, "Since we cannot predict exactly when or how change will come to North Korea or what its nature will be, South Koreans and their allies and friends abroad need to begin to prepare now for many possibilities." English- and Korean-language versions of the text are both available. The op-ed is part of a continuing series on this issue.

Sooner or later, I believe, there will be major change in North Korea. The system may be very strong, but it is also very brittle. Without democratic electoral processes and free speech, smooth and gradual adjustments cannot be made to meet changing circumstances and the needs of the people.

-David Straub
Korean Studies Program
In the mid-1990s, after the death of Kim Il Sung, I heard many top U.S. officials, speaking privately, predict that the North Korean regime would collapse in a matter of just a few years, if not months. I was younger then and assumed they knew what they were talking about. They didn't. They didn't know much about North Korea. They simply compared it to the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where communist regimes had just collapsed, and thought the same thing would happen in the very different circumstances of North Korea. Everyone was saying it would happen, so it must true, people assumed. Americans don't like the North Korean regime, so wishful thinking also contributed to this consensus among Americans.

These days, as another leadership succession is underway in North Korea, many people again are speculating about the "collapse" of the Pyongyang regime. The fact of the matter is that no one, not even in Pyongyang, really knows what is going to happen there. I believe there could be dramatic change in the regime in North Korea even as you are reading this, but I also believe it is possible that the regime could last many decades more.

A former colleague, Bill Newcomb, recently compared the situation in North Korea to the buildup of pressure along a fault zone. No one, he noted, can predict when a particular earthquake will occur and how large it will be, but scientists today can say with confidence that a major earthquake will inevitably occur in a certain area eventually. Pyongyang is indeed like that.

Sooner or later, I believe, there will be major change in North Korea. The system may be very strong, but it is also very brittle. Without democratic electoral processes and free speech, smooth and gradual adjustments cannot be made to meet changing circumstances and the needs of the people.

Whether the political earthquake in Pyongyang occurs sooner or later, it is only prudent to prepare thoroughly. The United States and other countries will help the Republic of Korea when dramatic change occurs in North Korea, but it will be the Republic of Korea and the people of North and South Korea who, inevitably, will bear the most risk and stand to gain the most.

Since we cannot predict exactly when or how change will come to North Korea or what its nature will be, South Koreans and their allies and friends abroad need to begin to prepare now for many possibilities. I understand that some South Koreans are concerned that such a discussion will offend and anger Pyongyang and may cause its own problems. But the consequences of not preparing could be far worse. This should not be a matter of pushing for collapse, much less risking war, but for preparing prudently to meet real dangers and real opportunities.

South Koreans need to pool their wisdom and their resources, so that they will be able to respond quickly and effectively no matter what eventually happens in North Korea. There needs to be much more thorough study and debate, both within the government and among the citizenry, about how to deal with various possible crises on the Korean Peninsula, including unification.

I worked on German affairs in the U.S. State Department shortly after German unification, and observed as the government in Bonn, while making heroic efforts, made many serious mistakes. Policies regarding currency unification, wages and pensions, property claims and many other issues caused human suffering and national problems that linger today, twenty years later. How great is the understanding in South Korea among government officials and the public about these issues?

One of the things that many South Koreans seem to have concluded from German unification is that unification will be too risky and too costly. There certainly will be risks and the costs will be great when unification occurs. But unification may occur whether all South Koreans want it or not, and whether they are ready or not. And most costs, if carefully planned, will actually be investments. Moreover, there will not only be risks; there will be opportunities for enormous gain. Unified Korea could be stronger, safer, more prosperous, and happier, not just for the people of North Korea but for all Koreans.

We all remember the earthquake that hit a very poor and unprepared Haiti last year, killing at least 100,000 people and leaving a million homeless. The terrible earthquake that Japan has just experienced was 1,000 times more powerful. Just imagine the consequences if Japan had not prepared as well as it had. It is time for the Republic of Korea to begin to prepare seriously for the eventual political earthquake on the Korean Peninsula.


[나와 통일]4. 스트라우브 스탠퍼드대 부소장

1994년 김일성이 사망한 뒤, 나는 미국의 많은 고위관리들이 사견으로 북한 정권이 몇 개월내 혹은 몇년 내 붕괴할 것이라고 예측하는 것을 들었다. 그때 나는 그들 스스로가 무엇을 얘기하고 있는지 알고 있다고 추측했다. 그러나 그들은 몰랐다. 그들은 단순히 북한을, 공산주의 정권이 붕괴됐던 소련과 동유럽의 상황과 비교했고, 이 같은 상황이 매우 다른 환경의 북한에서도 발생할 것이라고 생각했다. 미국인들은 북한정권을 좋아하지 않기 때문에 (북한이 망할 것이라는) ‘희망적 생각'(wishful thinking)도 이런 일치된 예측에 기여했다.
▲ 데이비드 스트라우브 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소 한국학 부소장은 남북한의 통일 비용이 결국은 투자가 될 것이라고 강조했다.

요즘 북한에서 권력 승계가 진행되면서, 많은 사람들이 북한 정권의 ‘붕괴'에 대해 다시 추측하고 있다. 이 문제와 관련해 명확한 사실은, 누구도, 심지어 평양에 있는 사람도, 거기서 실제 무슨 일이 일어나고 있는지 정확히 모른다는 것이다. 나는 북한 정권에 상당한 변화가 있을 수 있지만, 그 정권이 수십년 더 지속하는 것이 가능하다고도 생각한다.

●北시스템 강한만큼 깨지기도 쉬워

전직 동료인 윌리엄 뉴콤(전 미 재무부 경제자문관)은 최근 북한 상황을 ‘단층대를 따라 고조되는 압력'에 비유했다. 그는, 누구도 어떤 특별한 지진이 언제 발생할 것이고 얼마나 클 것인지 예측할 수 없지만, 오늘날 과학자들은 대규모 지진이 불가피하게 어느 지역에서 결국 발생할 것이라고 확신을 갖고 말할 수 있다고 지적했다.

평양은 정말로 이런 상황과 같다. 나는 조만간 북한에 큰 변화가 있을 것이라고 생각한다. 북한의 시스템은 매우 강할 수 있지만 역시나 매우 깨지기 쉽다. 민주주의적 선거 과정과 표현의 자유 없이, 사람들의 수요와 변하는 환경을 충족시키기 위한 평탄하고 단계적인 조정은 불가능하다.

평양에서 ‘정치적인 지진'이 조만간 일어나든 아니든, 철저하게 대비하는 것이 현명하다. 미국과 다른 나라들은 북한에 극적인 변화가 일어날 경우 한국을 도울 것이다. 그러나 남한과 남북한 사람들이 불가피하게 가장 위험을 감수하고, 가장 많은 이득도 얻게 될 것이다.

우리는 변화가 언제 어떻게 올지, 그것의 모습이 무엇일지 정확하게 예측하기 어렵다. 때문에 남한 사람들과 동맹국들, 우방들은 지금부터 많은 가능성에 대해 준비해야 한다.

나는 일부 남한 사람들이 그런 논의가 북한을 화나게 할 것이고 북한 내 문제를 유발할 것이라고 걱정하는 것을 알고 있다.

그러나 준비하지 않는 것의 결과는 훨씬 나쁠 수 있다. 이것은 붕괴를 재촉하는 문제가 아니라, 실제로 맞닥뜨릴 위험과 기회에 대해 신중하게 준비해 나가야 하는 문제다.

남한 사람들은 북한에 결국 무슨 일이 발생하든 신속하고 효과적으로 대응할 수 있도록 지혜와 자원을 공유할 필요가 있다. 정부와 민간에서 통일을 포함, 한반도에서 발생 가능한 다양한 위기들에 대해 어떻게 대처할 것인지에 대한 더 많은 철저한 연구와 논쟁이 필요하다.

나는 독일 통일 직후 미 국무부에서 독일 담당 업무를 했다. 당시 독일 정부가 용감하게 노력했지만 심각한 실수를 많이 한 것을 관측했다. 화폐 단일화, 임금, 연금, 재산권 등과 관련된 정책들이 20년이 지난 오늘날에도 맴돌고 있는 국민 고통과 문제를 야기했다. 한국의 관료들과 대중 가운데 이런 문제들에 대해 얼마나 이해하고 있는가?

●신속 대응위한 지혜·자원 공유를

많은 남한 사람들이 독일 통일로부터 결론을 내린 것으로 보이는 것들 중 하나는, 통일은 매우 위험하고 비용이 많이 들 것이라는 것이다. 통일이 이뤄질 때 위험과 비용은 당연히 클 것이다.

그러나 통일은 남한 사람들이 원하든 원치 않든, 준비가 돼 있든 아니든 일어날 수 있다. 그리고, 대부분의 비용은, 주의 깊게 계획된다면, 실제로는 투자가 될 것이다. 게다가 위험만 있는 것은 아니다. 엄청난 이득을 위한 기회도 있을 것이다.

통일된 한국은 단지 북한 사람들뿐 아니라 모든 한국인들을 더 강하고, 안전하고, 번영하고, 행복하게 할 수 있다.

우리는 지난해 준비되지 않은 아이티를 강타한 지진의 엄청난 피해를 기억한다. 최근 일본의 대지진은 아이티 지진보다 1000배 강력했다. 일본이 준비하지 않았다면 어떤 결과가 발생했을지 상상해 보라. 이제 남한은 한반도의 정치적 지진에 대해 심각하게 준비해야 한다.

번역·정리 김미경기자 chaplin7@seoul.co.kr

●약력

▲57 세 ▲미 루이빌대·하버드대 박사과정 ▲주서독 미대사관 근무 ▲주한 미대사관 근무 ▲주일 미대사관 근무 ▲미 국무부 독일팀장 ▲주한 미대사관 공사참사관 ▲미 국무부 한국과장·일본과장 ▲미 존스 홉킨스대·서울대 강의 ▲현재 미 스탠퍼드대 아태연구소 한국학 부소장

 

 

 

 

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Mural depicting North Korean founder Kim Il Sung
Christopher Schoenbohm
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Warren M. Christopher, a highly respected attorney, former Secretary of State and former chair of the Stanford Board of Trustees died on March 18, 2011, at the age of 85.

A graduate of the University of Southern California, Warren Christopher attended Stanford Law School, where he was president of the Law Review and was a member of the Order of the Coif.

Upon graduation, Mr. Christopher joined the Los Angeles law firm of O'Melveny& Myers LLP. He would blend a highly regarded and very distinguished law career with an equally distinguished record of public service to several American presidents.

From 1997 to 1982, Mr. Christopher served President Jimmy Carter as Deputy Secretary of State of the United States. President Carter awarded him the Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian award, in January of 1981 for his role in negotiating the release of 52 Americans hostages in Iran. Mr. Christopher then rejoined O'Melveny & Myers in 1981, serving as chairman of the firm until 1992.

In 1991, Mr. Christopher was Chairman of the Independent Commission of the Los Angeles Police Department, which proposed significant reforms in the aftermath of the Rodney King incident. Mr. Christopher headed the search for a running mate for both Governor Clinton's and Vice President Gore's presidential campaigns and served as Director of the Presidential Transition Process for President Clinton.

Mr. Christopher was called on by President Clinton to serve as Secretary of State. He was sworn in as the 63rd Secretary in January of 1993 and served until January 1997. As Secretary of State, he helped bring peace to Bosnia and to parts of the Middle East. He rejoined his firm, O'Melveny & Myers, as its senior partner in 1997.

Mr. Christopher's activities have included service as President of the Board of Trustees of Stanford and as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Carnegie Corporation of New York. He has been a Director and Vice Chairman of the Board of the Council on Foreign Relations. He was also a co-chair, with James Baker, of the National War Powers Commission, convened to determine the respective roles of the president and the congress in taking the nation to war.

He authored four books: In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford, 1998), Chances of a Lifetime (Scriber 2001), Diplomacy, the Neglected Imperative (published privately in 1981) and Random Harvest (published privately in 2005).

"Warren Christopher was a distinguished attorney, an outstanding diplomat, an astute statesman and a wonderful person,"In 2008, O'Melveny & Myers and a number of its current and retired partners committed $1.5 million to endow the Warren Christopher Professorship of the Practice of International Law and Diplomacy, a joint appointment between Stanford Law School and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

"Warren Christopher was a unique and a very special person," said Law School Dean Larry Kramer. "He was brilliant and thoughtful, generous, modest, and unselfish to the core. In everything he said and did, he embodied what we mean when we talk of someone as classy.

 "Warren Christopher was a distinguished attorney, an outstanding diplomat, an astute statesman and a wonderful person," said Coit D. Blacker, Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies. "How appropriate it is to have a gift that lives on for the next generation of leaders and public servants that honors his talent, his prescience, his leadership and his remarkable career in both the law and diplomacy. We will miss him and his wise counsel."

 

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Earlier this year U.S. Secretary of Education Arne Duncan announced the appointment of 28 education advocates, civil rights leaders, scholars, and corporate leaders to the Department of Education's Equity and Excellence Commission. Among them: CISAC's Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar. He talked with CISAC about educational inequality, America's standing in the world, and the relationship between education and moral leadership.

CISAC: Can you give a little background about the commission and why it was convened?

Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar: Education inequity is growing, and is considered increasingly problematic, and people have different ideas about how to solve that problem. Several members of Congress as well as the administration decided it would be useful to have a group of people come together to think about the problem in the long term, to think hard about what the solutions might be, and to think about what the consequences would be if America fails to address the worsening problem of inequality in schools.

CISAC: You've been to one meeting so far. What were some of the initial thoughts or discussion points about what these problems are and how we might address them?

CUELLAR: It was a lively conversation from people who had very different views and perspectives but who came together around two basic propositions: One was that America cannot afford to ignore the problem of its educational system and how poorly it's performing relative to expectations. And two is that there's a link between equity and education. This is an important point because there are many schools in America in our K through 12 system that are performing quite well, that manage to prepare kids well, that manage to teach them what they need to learn, that manage to instill a sense of creativity and a capacity for learning. But there's an achievement gap that's affecting a huge proportion of the population. So if we think about the goal being our ability to train the next generation, and have a country that has the capacity to lead in the world, that achievement gap is really what's getting in the way.

CISAC: What is the ultimate goal of the commission? You'll make recommendations, ultimately, to Congress, to policymakers, and then what?

CUELLAR: We spent some time discussing exactly how to approach the goal. The challenge is that on the one hand, we all have a desire to affect this issue in the medium to short term because it's so urgent, and because we have the ear of the Department of Education and the administration, and many people in Congress. They want to know what can be done as soon as possible. That leads to the idea that as we prepare this report, which will take a year, that we should think hard about what can be done sooner rather than later. By the same token, the problem is so important and staggering in scope, and has such an historical context, that it's important to also think medium to long term. And in particular, given the constraints the country is facing fiscally, we want to make sure we can think about placing this in the broader arc of history. We want to make sure that part of the focus on the report is on steps that can be taken in the short term and part of it focuses on where we will want to be 20 to 30 years from now, and how we would get there.

CISAC
: Can you put in context where we are now versus some of the history you mentioned?

CUELLAR
: I'll mention three things: First, we can think about the capacity of the country to prepare people to go to college. Certainly for a very long time, America led the world in terms of college graduation rates. Now we're falling behind. Second, you can think about achievement in school districts and kids who are going through elementary school, junior high school and high school. Their achievement levels relative to their counterparts in the OECD have suffered. Third, you can think about the role of the federal government. Clearly the federal government is not the solution to every problem. But if you look at the share of education spending that comes from the federal government, that has declined fairly starkly, from a high of, I believe, 12 or 13 percent to as low as 6 percent. Now it's inching back up. But it's never gotten to the level that it was during the Nixon and Carter administrations.

CISAC: There are a lot of fiscal constraints right now in the state governments. How does what you're trying to do tie in or not tie in with that?

CUELLAR: We want to take a step back and ask the education-focused question: How do you get quality education in this country, and how do you make sure that people are not getting a better or a worse education on the basis of completely arbitrary factors? Obviously, any solution to the problem needs to be put in context of the broader fiscal situation of the country. But it's also helpful to have people who are asking the question based on what works for education, and what works in education. I should add that part of what I would like us to document is not only the cost of doing something, but what the costs of inaction are as well. Certainly money is not the solution to every problem in education, far from it, but it is important to recognize that if we fail to deal with this problem we will face a great deal of tangible and less tangible costs, including, and this is something that did come up several times in the meeting, the effect on America's ability to lead in the world.

CISAC: What is that effect?

CUELLAR: Let me start with the most basic: We have an all-volunteer army and we depend on people who are qualified and talented and willing to serve their country to assure our security. A recent report from the Education Trust documents that fully one-fifth of American high school students who took the exam to join the military are not even eligible to serve because they don't have the academic preparation to do so. It gets even more staggering if you look at the breakdown by race and ethnicity, where almost 40 percent of African Americans would be ineligible and 29 percent of Latinos.

Beyond that, we have an economy and a society that is based on our ability to grow our economy and innovate. It's hard to see how we can do so when the population is growing increasingly unequal in its education levels and its capacity to participate constructively in our economy. There's also the issue of what kind of a stake people feel they have in their country and whether they can share the American dream. This is not only important to give people a sense of ownership of the country, but it is also some of what enhances our soft power around the world. If we can offer a promising place in the American system to people who are part of our society we're better able to hold ourselves out to the world as a promising model. If we lose that, its very hard for us to exercise the kind of moral leadership we've all come to expect of the United States.

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In this sixth session of the Forum, former senior government officials and other leading experts from the United States and South Korea will discuss current developments in North Korea and North Korea policy, the future of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, and a strategic vision for Northeast Asia. The session is hosted by the Korean Studies Program at Shorenstein APARC in association with the Sejong Institute, a top South Korean think tank.

Bechtel Conference Center

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On March 1, the Program on Human rights welcomed David Pressman to the Stanford campus, where he spoke during the eighth installment of the Sanela Diana Jenkins Speaker Series. Pressman, the former Chief of Staff to the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, was recently appointed by Obama to serve as the first-ever Director for War Crimes and Atrocities on the National Security Council at the White House.

Drawing both from his experience as an advocate during the crisis in Darfur and from his current role as a government official, Pressman discussed the challenges of making the oft-quoted promise of  "never again" a reality. Pressman argued that the United States has begun to and must continue to adopt more proactive and preventative measures to respond to humanitarian crises as they happen.

Pressman discussed his efforts to create an established process to identify areas where diplomatic efforts of the United States could help prevent or mitigate atrocities. In such a system, the NSC would collect and compile data from NGO's and intelligence agencies to analyze indicators that could predict when and where mass atrocities are likeliest to occur. With this information, the United States could better allocate its resources and engage diplomatically with other states who may be better positioned or equipped to handle the mounting crises.

Speaking more broadly about the demands of his job, Pressman said that it is an extremely exciting time to be working in his position. He detailed the government's massive efforts to prevent the outbreak of violence in the wake of the recent referendum in Sudan, which he described as a marked shift in policy focus toward prevention from the typical reactive measures of the past. He described the recent referral of Muammi Qaddafi to the International Criminal Court as a "watershed moment" for the United States' relationship with the international community in terms of human rights enforcement.

Nevertheless, he mentioned the many areas around the world in which mass atrocities are widespread - Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Burma, among others -  and emphasized the need for continued progress toward a world where "never again" is more than a catch slogan.

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5 mm film screening (94 mins) followed by a Q&A session with the film director Florin Serban, and moderated by Steve Kovacs, Professor, Cinema Department at San Francisco State University.

Film Synopsis:

Silviu has only 5 days left before his release from the juvenile detention centre. But 5 days becomes an eternity when his mother returns from a long absence to take his younger brother away - a brother whom he raised like a son. Moreover, he has fallen in love with a beautiful social worker. With time running out and his emotions boiling over, Silviu closes his eyes... freedom, the wind, the road, his first kiss. Anything can happen to him now...

About the Director:
Florin Serban was born born in Resita, Romania in 1975. He studied philosophy at Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca earning a Master’s degree in Philosophy of Culture & Hermeneutics. He was accepted in the Film Program at the National University of Theatre and Film Arts in Bucharest where he studied film directing. In parallel, he also worked as producer/director for ProTv Bucharest and wrote, directed and acted in several short films. Florin continued his studies on a full scholarship at Colombia University in New York City and graduated five years later with a MFA in film directing. Upon his graduation, Serban returned to Romania and directed his first feature lengh film titled If I Want To Whistle, I Whistle, which premiered at the 2010 Berlin Film Festival, winning the Silver Bear and the Alfred Bauer Prize for innovation in filmmaking. Recently Florin Serban founded an acting school for people from different social and economic backgrounds including youth who have been through the correctional or penitenciary systems in Romania.

Co-sponsored by the Billie Achilles Fund; Bechtel International Center, Graduate Student Council, Romanian Student Association, Special Language Program, Drama Department, and The Europe Center, Stanford; ISEEES, UC Berkeley; IRC Bucharest, Romania; Romanian Honorary Consulate, San Francisco; Casa Romana, Hayward; Blue Collar Films, San Francisco; Coupa Cafe, Palo Alto

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Today nuclear negotiations with North Korea, begun twenty years ago, have returned to their starting point. The Geneva Agreement of 1994 collapsed as a result of North Korea’s clandestine uranium enrichment program, and the PRC-hosted Six Party talks have failed to halt nuclear tests by North Korea. Neither the engagement policy of the Clinton Administration nor the coercive policy of President Bush succeeded in resolving the North Korean nuclear conundrum. The North now claims it should be treated as a nuclear weapons state.

North Korea is currently waging a "peace offensive" to deflect criticism from the international community for its reckless military provocations against South Korea last year. The North may also need dialogue with the international community more than we do, to obtain economic assistance, since starving people would not support their regime and nuclear weapons cannot feed its people. The United States and South Korea agree, however, that under present circumstances, engagement with North Korea would be futile. They maintain that their refusal to resume talks with North Korea is a deliberate and strategic decision. Looking back on real-world experience, North Korea has consistently used provocations as "leverage" to arrive at negotiations on its terms. In most cases, it has gained considerable concessions, using its well-known brinkmanship tactics.

Now that North Korea has confirmed the existence of its uranium enrichment program and announced it will begin constructions of LWRs on its own, neighboring countries are deeply concerned about nuclear safety—not to mention nuclear security—in North Korea. This provides a reason for an unconditional dialogue with North Korea, apparently precisely the situation North sought. In this light, Mr. Yu will review the last twenty years of negotiations with North Korea to draw lessons for dealing with the regime in the future.

Mr. Yu is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea. He served as Korea's Ambassador to Israel, Japan and Philippines.

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2010-2011 Visiting Scholar
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Mr. Yu is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea. He served as Korea's Ambassador to Israel, Japan and Philippines.

Myung Hwan Yu former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, South Korea Speaker
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To begin his talk, Archon Fung poses the following question: why is there no "killer" ICT platform in politics? After all, there are highly disruptive platforms in social media, commerce and other realms. These so-called "killer" platforms tend to be characterized by three features: notably that many users adopt the ICT platform and abandon the old way of doing something; the new platform improves users' experience by changing how they do some activity; and the organizations using new killer platforms displace those that do not use them.

Fung proceeds to present explanations for this puzzle, following a brief clarification of the scope of his question. When Fung refers to politics, he is not referring to aspects like partisan mobilization, e-government or the public sphere; instead, he examines the potential for ICT platforms in the realms of decision-making, problem solving and accountability. While the typical level of resolution for discussion is on the macro effects of ICT as a social force, Fung's analysis stems from his narrowing in on ICT platforms (such as Facebook, Wikipedia, Ushahidi, and others) themselves.

The first argument Fung presents in answer to his initial question is that both the suppliers and the demanders are different in politics than in other areas (e.g. commerce). Politics is aggregative, characterized by collective action and results, not focused on "individual benefits and gratification" like commerce and social interaction might be.

Second, while it is possible to have parallel, collaborative production in some types of platforms (e.g. Wikipedia), production in politics is characterized by strategic action. Various examples can help illustrate that there are key differences between commerce and politics on the supply side. In commerce, Amazon's customers want books and Amazon wants to sell books. While citizens want influence in the public sphere, however, politicians and officials typically do not want to give citizens power to influence the public sphere. Although there are counterexamples, as in some cities (such as Belo Horizonte) in Brazil, where 10% of the electorate directly influences public spending online through the Participatory Budgeting process, these cases are few and far between.

Another important factor is that there are much more ambiguous benefits in politics than in other spheres. While it is well understood that amassing more Facebook, Amazon or Google users will result in more money or fame, it is less well know what the benefits of more public deliberation or accountability might be. Since the factors that explain platform success in other areas don't translate to politics, Fung concludes, there is less innovation in the supply side.

In order to understand cases in which ICT platforms have nevertheless become important on the local level, Fung and his colleagues carried out a large case study analysis of specific examples from Brazil, Chile, Kenya, India, and Slovakia. Through analyzing these cases, which include such examples as São Paolo's Cidade Democrática, Santiago's Reclamos, Nairobi's Budget Tracking Tool and others, the researchers arrive at three key conclusions.

  1. ICT platforms that have had success within the realm of politics that Fung is interested in have been characterized by the predominance of professionals and organizations among their users. The main users of Cidade Democratica, for example, are organizations and professionals.
  2. Second, ICTs do not necessarily act independently. Instead, journalism and media play an important role, and even make up the main base of users for platforms like Bratislava's Fair Play Alliance and Mumbai Votes. After all, ICT can help journalists reduce research costs and represents a neutral and credible source.
  3. ICT's do not go around or undermine traditional NGOs and government. Instead, at least in the cases examined, they are typically effective because they operate through these existing organizations. Kiirti in Bangalore is one example.

The bottom line from Fung's case study analysis is that getting context right can be more important for an ICT platform's success than getting the technology right. Typically, the uptake of a platform only occurs once all other pieces are in place.

In the final part of his talk, Fung addressed audience questions, many of which related to Fung's chosen standards for a killer platform. One audience member asked why Facebook could not be considered a killer platform, given its many uses for political purposes. After all, Facebook enables a kind of action to occur that would have occurred before, since it can often be accessed even in countries where public gatherings may be restricted. Another questioned why Wikileaks was not considered a killer platform. Fung replied that while Wikileaks does bring together people and information better, a killer platform would need to transform the nature of politics from group to individuals, which no existing platform has yet achieved.

 

 

 

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Each president of the United States enters office thinking he will be able to define the agenda and set the course of America's relations with the rest of the world. And, almost invariably, each confronts crises that are thrust upon him-wars, revolutions, genocides, and deadly confrontations. Neither Woodrow Wilson nor FDR imagined having to plunge America into world war. Truman had to act quickly, and with little preparation, to confront the menace of Soviet expansion at war's end. JFK, for all his readiness to "bear any burden" in the struggle for freedom, did not expect his struggle to contain Soviet imperial ambitions would come so close to the brink of nuclear annihilation. Nixon was tested by a surprise war in the Middle East. Carter's presidency was consumed by the Shah's unraveling and the Iranian revolution. George H.W. Bush rose to the challenge of communism's collapse and Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Clinton squandered the opportunity to stop a genocide in Rwanda and waited tragically too long before stopping one in Bosnia. George W. Bush mobilized the country to strike back after September 11, but, in the view of many, he put most of his chips in the wrong war.

In the eye of the historical storm, and in the absence of a challenge as immediate and overpowering as September 11, Pearl Harbor, or the Nazis' march across Europe, it is risky to identify any set of world events as game-changing. Yet that is what many analysts, including myself, believe the Arab revolutions of 2011 are. And a surprising number of specialists-including hard-eyed realists like Fareed Zakaria-have seized upon the crisis in Libya as a defining moment not just for the United States in the region but for the foreign policy presidency of Barack Obama as well.

To date, one could say that Obama has had a surprisingly good run for a foreign policy neophyte. He has revived the momentum for arms control with a new START treaty with Russia, while pressing the issue of human rights within Russia. He has managed the meteoric rise of China decently, while improving relations with India. He has not cut and run from Iraq-as most Republicans were convinced he would. And he has ramped up but at least set limits to our involvement in Afghanistan. As the Arab revolutions have gathered momentum, he has increasingly positioned the United States on the side of democratic change. His statements and actions have not gone as far as democracy promotion advocates (like myself) would have preferred, but they have overridden cautionary warnings of the foreign policy establishment in the State Department, the Pentagon, think tanks, and so on. Without Obama's artful choreography of public statements and private messages and pressures, Hosni Mubarak might still be in power today.

All of this, however, may appear in time only a prelude to the fateful choice that Obama will soon have to make-and, one fears, is already making by default in a tragically wrong way-in Libya. Why is Libya-with its six million people and its significant but still modest share of global oil exports-so important? Why must the fight against Muammar Qaddafi-a crazy and vicious dictator, but by now, in his capacity for global mischief, a largely defanged one-be our fight?

When presidents are tested by crisis, the world draws their measure, and the impressions formed can have big consequences down the road. After watching Jimmy Carter's weak and vacillating posture on Iran, the Soviets figured he'd sit on the sidelines if they invaded and swallowed Afghanistan. They misjudged, but Afghanistan and the world are still paying the price for that misperception. In the face of mixed messages and a long, cynical game of balance-of-power, Saddam too, misjudged that he could get away with swallowing up Kuwait in 1991. When the United States did not prepare for war as naked aggression swept across Asia and Europe, the Japanese thought a quick strike could disable and knock out the slumbering American giant across the Pacific. When Slobodan Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb allies launched their war of "ethnic cleansing," while "the West"-which is always to say, first and foremost, the United States-wrung its hands, many tens of thousands of innocent people were murdered and raped before President Bill Clinton finally found the resolve to mix air power and diplomacy to bring the genocidal violence to a halt.

If Muammar Qaddafi succeeds in crushing the Libyan revolt, as he is well on his way to doing, the U.S. foreign policy establishment will heave a sad sigh of regret and say, in essence, "That's the nasty business of world politics." In other words: nasty, but not our business. And so: not their blood on our hands. But, when we have encouraged them to stand up for their freedom, and when they have asked for our very limited help, it becomes our business. On February 23, President Obama said: "The United States ... strongly supports the universal rights of the Libyan people. That includes the rights of peaceful assembly, free speech, and the ability of the Libyan people to determine their own destiny. These are human rights. They are not negotiable. ... And they cannot be denied through violence or suppression." Yet denying them through murderous violence and merciless suppression-with a massacre of semi-genocidal proportions likely waiting as the end game in Benghazi-is exactly what Qaddafi is in the process of doing.

Barack Obama has bluntly declared that Qaddafi must go. The Libyan resistance, based in Benghazi, has appealed urgently for the imposition of a no-fly zone. Incredibly, the Arab League has endorsed the call, as has the Gulf Cooperation Council. France has recognized the rebel provisional government based in Benghazi as Libya's legitimate government-while Obama studies this all. Can anyone remember a time when France and the Arab League were ahead of the United States on a question of defending freedom fighters?

There is much more that can be done beyond imposing a no-fly zone. No one in their right mind is calling for putting American boots on the ground in Libya. But we can jam Qaddafi's communications. We can, and urgently should, get humanitarian supplies and communications equipment, including satellite modems for connection to the Internet, to the rebels in Benghazi, where they can be supplied by sea. And we should find a way to get them arms as well. Benghazi is not a minor desert town. It is Libya's second largest city, a major industrial and commercial hub, and a significant port. Through it, a revolt can be supplied. If Benghazi falls to Qaddafi, it will fall hard and bloodily, and the thud will be heard throughout the world.

Time may be running out. As the Los Angeles Times reported yesterday, "All that stands between Kadafi and rebel headquarters in Benghazi are disorganized volunteers and army defectors spread thinly along the coastal highway." They have passion and courage, but they lack weaponry, strategy, and training. Like so many rebel movements, they need time to pull these all together. Time is what a no-fly zone and an emergency supply line can buy them.

Libya's rebels are pleading for our help. "Where is America?" asked one of them, quoted in the L.A. Times, who was manning a checkpoint in Port Brega. "All they do is talk, talk, talk. They need to get rid of these planes killing Libyan people." The "they" he was referring to was the Americans, beginning with their leader-one would hope, still the leader of the "free world"-President Obama.

Many prudent reasons have been offered for doing nothing. It is not our fight. They might lose anyway. We don't know who these rebels really are. We have too many other commitments. And so on. The cautions sound reasonable, except that we have heard them all before. Think Mostar and Srebrenica. And we had a lot of commitments in World War II as well, when we could have and should have bombed the industrial infrastructure of the Holocaust. As for the possibility that the rebels might lose-a prospect that is a possibility if we aid them and a near certainty if we do not-which would be the greater ignominy: To have given Libya's rebels the support they asked for while they failed, or to have stood by and done absolutely nothing except talk while they were mowed down in the face of meek American protests that the Qaddafi's violence is "unacceptable"?

Oh yes. There is also the danger that China will veto a U.N. Security Council Resolution calling for a no-fly zone. Part of us should hope they do. Let the rising superpower-more cynical than the reigning one ever was-feel the first hot flash of hatred by Arabs feeling betrayed. Go ahead, make our day.

Presidents do not get elected to make easy decisions, and they certainly never become great doing so. They do not get credit just because they go along with what the diplomatic and military establishments tell them are the "wise and prudent" thing to do. This is not Hungary in 1956. There is no one standing behind Qaddafi-not the Soviet Union then, not the Arab League now, not even the entirety of his own army. That is why he must recruit mercenaries to save him. Qaddafi is the kind of neighborhood bully that Slobodan Milosevic was. And he must be met by the same kind of principled power. For America to do less than that now-less than the minimum that the Libyan rebels and the Arab neighbors are requesting-would be to shrink into global vacillation and ultimately irrelevance. If Barack Obama cannot face down a modest thug who is hated by most of his own people and by every neighboring government, who can he confront anywhere?

For the United States-and for Barack Obama-there is much more at stake in Libya than the fate of one more Arab state, or even the entire region. And the clock is ticking.

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