An increasing number of Chinese internet companies are whetting U.S. investors’ appetite in China’s burgeoning technology industry. Eight Chinese companies have already successfully listed on a U.S. exchange so far in 2014—including the largest ever offering by a Chinese internet firm from JD.com Inc., which raised $1.78 billion when it IPOed on May 22.

As CEOs who have gone through the process of taking a Chinese company public in the U.S., Chenchao (CC) Zhuang of Qunar and David Xueling Li of YY Inc. shared what they view as the biggest advantages and challenges post IPO for their respective companies. YY and Qunar went public on NASDAQ in 2012 and 2013 respectively.

Although there are many advantages enjoyed by public companies, including an enhanced reputation and expanded opportunities when it comes to financing and growing the business, both Zhuang and Li commented that continuing to be innovative and a disruptive force was the greatest challenge faced by their businesses post IPO.

Fritz Demopoulos, Founder of Queen's Road Capital, moderated the panel "Post-IPO: The Next Vanguard" featuring Li and Zhuang at the 2014 China 2.0 Forum in Beijing hosted by Stanford Graduate School of Business on April 11. 

 

In a rare and exclusive interview in the Tehran Times, CISAC and FSI Senior Fellow Siegfried Hecker tells Iranian journalist Kourosh Ziabari that the only way forward for the country’s nuclear program is transparency and international cooperation.

The interview comes during an unprecedented period of rapprochement between Washington and Tehran. Several days after his inauguration last August, President Hassan Rouhani called for the resumption of negotiations with the so-called P5+1, a group of six world powers using diplomatic efforts to monitor Iran’s energy program.

In September, President Barack Obama called Rouhani, marking the highest-level contact between the United States and Iran since 1979 hostage crisis.

The P5+1 and Iran are drafting a comprehensive nuclear agreement to ensure that Tehran is not building a nuclear bomb, but trying to expand its nuclear energy program. The International Atomic Energy Agency has given Iran until Aug. 25 to provide more details about the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program.

In the interview, Ziabari did not pull any punches with Hecker.

“You’ve argued that Iran doesn’t possess sufficient uranium reserves like Japan, and its uranium enrichment program is not cost-effective,” Ziabari asks. “However, you know that Iran’s nuclear program was first launched in 1950s as part of the U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program. At that time, the United States thought that it’s beneficial to help Iran with its nuclear energy program, because Iran was an ally, but now, Iran is a foe, and does not need nuclear power anymore. Is it really like that?”

You can read Hecker's response and the entire the Q&A in its entirely on Ziabari’s website.

In Feburary, the Iranian government republished an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists by Hecker and Abbas Milani, director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University. The story ran in Farsi on at least one official website. That could reflect, the scholars say, a genuine internal debate in Tehran regarding the future of its nuclear program.

“I like school. I can’t wait to go to class.”

Zeng Lei is sitting on the steps of the old classroom building. He is 15 minutes early. But, Zeng Lei is not alone. Nine of his fourth-grade classmates are crowded around the front door, unable to keep still. Eagerly they scan the schoolyard for the teacher-supervisor to come over and open the door. They can’t wait. 

Are these the school’s top, fast-track students? Are they meeting with their teacher to prepare for the Math Olympics? Are Zeng Lei and his classmates the young, motivated geniuses that are ready to lead China into the 21^st century?

Actually, these are not the best students. Only three of ten will graduate from high school. If these fourth grade students took a math test that was also given to a group of second grade students from an urban public school, the second grade city kids would outscore Zeng Lei and his friends. Easily. In fact, there are many first graders in China’s cities that would outscore these rural fourth graders in math, Chinese and English.

So what is Zeng Lei waiting for? Why are these children—who have never been especially interested in school before—so anxious to get into the classroom?

Computers, games, learning and more

Zeng Lei and his friends are in our Computer Assisted Learning program. All of the fourth graders in his school are part of the program. We call Computer Assisted Learning “CAL” for short. It is one of the most prominent initiatives of our research group, the Rural Education Action Project (or REAP).

CAL is a game-based remedial tutoring program. Each week, twice a week, all fourth graders in a CAL school attend a 45-minute session in a computer room. Some of the computer rooms are new. We set them up. Some of the computer rooms were already there. We got them into shape for the CAL program.

But CAL is more than just hardware. On each of the computers, there are two pieces of software that REAP has created to help students in poor rural schools catch up and stay caught up. The software is calibrated to the curriculum that is being taught in the classroom. The software reviews the material taught during the week and then provides—in a game format—targeted review questions. Lots of review questions. Lots of games. Music and rhymes and riddles and challenges.

So, are we talking about a complicated new technology that is technically difficult to deliver and maintain? In fact, nothing can be further from the truth. The CAL program is made up of two simple pieces of software. One of the programs cost REAP less than US$5000 to develop. A group of Tsinghua University undergraduate computer majors created the software in six weeks during the summer of 2009. It is not copyrighted. Any one can have it. It can fit on any USB drive. The other piece of software can be purchased online for around 50 yuan. It takes about 5 minutes to install. Even I can install it—and I am a 58-year-old technology caveman. Simple. Attractive. Using off-the-shelf, low-powered computers as tutors to drill students in a way that they think is fun. 

Each class has a teacher-supervisor but with only one simple job. In Zeng Lei’s school, she speaks to the math teacher before the CAL session to find out what lesson the class covered during the week and then tells the students which icon to click. And that is about it.

So how much impact does this simple program have? We conducted a little test to find out. We picked 148 schools in 3 provinces and randomly selected half of those schools to receive the CAL program (our “CAL schools”) and half to receive no intervention at all (our “control schools”). And with such a simple intervention, the results were really nothing short of amazing.

We found that after just one year of using CAL, test scores of the students in the CAL schools were significantly higher than the students in control schools (who had no CAL program). And we conducted four more studies—a total of five separate, large-scale field experiments. In all of these studies our results were the same. Test scores rose for CAL students in migrant schools in the suburbs of Beijing. Test scores rose for CAL students in rural mountainous schools in the Qingling Mountains of southern Shaanxi. Test scores rose for CAL students from minority community schools in Qinghai. In all of these environments, test scores went up in math. Test scores also went up in Chinese. Scores on scales measuring mental health (especially anxiety) improved. Students became more confident in problem solving. All of this from two 45 minute sessions per week.

Remember, the ONLY difference between the CAL treatment schools and the control schools was the CAL program. When we ran the program for a second year—we were afraid that the initial effect of CAL might be the result of short-term student excitement rather than true change in learning behavior—we found that CAL continued to improve student learning. CAL did not eliminate the gap between urban and rural students. But the CAL program did reduce the gap significantly. 

And according to the REAP studies, students in CAL schools gained something even more important. They started to like school. During the baseline, only about 25% of students said that they liked school (in both the CAL schools and the non-CAL control schools). At the end of the school year, after several months of CAL, more than 60% of the CAL students said that they “liked” school. There was no significant change in the control schools. With the addition of just two CAL classes per week!

So, this is why Zeng Lei lined up early outside the CAL classroom on CAL day. He could not wait to get on the computer. He could not wait to play the CAL games and answer the questions. He could not wait to learn. And for maybe the first time in his life, he really liked going to school.

China’s digital divide: The widest in the world

In this article, we are not pushing CAL. Hey: we believe every child in rural China could benefit from CAL. But, the real reason for our column is to discuss some of the fundamental structural problems of China’s rural education system. Let’s use CAL as a lens to examine some of the problems that are plaguing rural schools today.

Why is it that such simple computer games can make such a difference? There are many reasons. First and foremost, we believe it is due in large part to the simple fact that computers are new and novel for these students. The engaging and effective way in which a computer can convey information is something most of these kids have simply never experienced. Unfortunately, most rural children still do not have access to computers or other electronic technologies.

In a paper that REAP wrote and published last year, we documented that the digital divide is wider in China than in any other country in the world. In the city, just about every student has access to computers and software and other electronic learning devices. In poor rural areas, almost no student has this access.

Here are the facts: According to data on more than 10,000 students in Beijing, Shaanxi and Qinghai, we can convincingly show that the gap in computer access between urban students and rural students in Western China ranges between 13:1 and 36:1. In China’s largest cities, 80% of children have computers at home and 73% of children have Internet. In poor areas of Western China only 6% of children have computers and only 2% have Internet at home. We can find no country in the world with such a wide digital divide.

And in schools, access to computers and Internet and educational software is even more skewed: Every child in China’s cities has access to modern ICT technology in their schools; almost no students in remote rural areas do. The digital divide in China is wide indeed.

And, this digital divide has consequences for learning. As REAP has shown with its CAL programs, if you give children access to the technologies of the 21^st century—equipped with simple, fun and relevant learning software—they learn. And they have fun doing so. If they do not have access to computers, the Internet and relevant software, they miss out on that opportunity.

 

 

Lots of hardware; an absence of learning

This is a story of opportunity lost.  It is disheartening. If incompetence and institutional failure irk you, do not read any further.

The good news: In the same REAP paper that documents the digital divide, we also demonstrate that there are easy, effective ways for rural public schools to moderate the digital divide. When schools install computers; keep them maintained; have teachers that know how to use them; and teach structured, learning-based material during computer class, the students in those schools overcome part of the disadvantage of not being able to afford a computer or Internet access at home.  

The bad news: There are almost no schools in rural areas that have invested in all of the components that are needed for a successful computing program. And, there are even fewer that use modern technologies to deliver quality, learning-based curriculum that helps students learn.

Why is this the case? Why aren’t rural schools able to deliver quality educational learning to students? The answer is complicated. Certainly it is not an absence of hardware. In the current five-year plan, billions of dollars are being spent on equipping rural schools with computer rooms. In China’s poorest areas, much of the funding is allocated by the central government. Beautiful new facilities are being equipped with new, perfectly adequate computers. Over the past five years since we have been working on CAL, we have seen rows and rows and rows—literally miles of rows—of new computers. And new desks, lots of screens and plenty of other hardware. Could this mark the end—or at least the beginning of the end—of China’s formidable digital divide?

Unfortunately not. While this hardware is important, the support from above appears to stop there. There is almost nothing else provided. The new machines may have Microsoft Office Suite installed. Students are able to learn Powerpoint, Word and Excel. There are typing programs on some machines. The third most common piece of software is one that teaches students how to program in Basic. Never mind that Basic is a computer programming language that was out of date in the 1990s. But there is almost no educational software. There are almost no learning applications. One of the most common ways that computers are used in junior high schools in Northwest China is to give students a way to watch DVDs, usually the latest movies or old reruns of popular TV series. And that’s about it.

Even if there were educational software or other learning tools loaded onto these shiny new computers, it would not necessarily help. In almost no school in rural China is there a professional, trained staff member that is charged with maintaining and managing the computers. We have collected budgets from thousands of schools in Western China. There is almost never a budget for using, maintaining or replacing computers once they break down. As we all know, computers—especially those in a busy school computer room—inevitably break down or stop working. It is natural. It happens all of the time to me. It happens all of the time to all of us. When it happens, of course, we fix it. In many rural schools, however, when computers break down, they stay broke. There is no one to fix them. There is no budget to fix them with. There is no intention to fix them. The national government pays for the initial hardware. After that, the schools are left on their own. And the local bureau of education does not have the resources (or are not willing to spend the resources) for staff or maintenance.

How bad is it? In a recent project, we ran a contest: let REAP implement CAL in one set of 30 schools (the REAP schools); let educators from local bureaus of education implement CAL in another set of 30 schools (the government schools). The schools were randomly assigned—half became REAP schools; half became government schools. And there was no other difference between these schools at the outset. We were interested to find out: Which set of students would learn more? By this point we knew that CAL worked… now the question was, would CAL still work if implementation were turned over to local government?

So who won? Well, it is safe to say that REAP won before the competition started. The reason is that when many of the computers in the government schools did not work, they made no effort to fix them (at least initially). They simply did not have any budget to do so. It is difficult to run Computer Assisted Learning programs if the computers do not work. On top of that, the teams from the government did not even bother launching the program in a number of their assigned schools.

Meanwhile, before REAP launched its CAL program in the REAP schools, we had two teams of two students spend less than a week repairing and fine-tuning the computers. That’s all it took. Some computers were beyond repair; most were not. And we fixed all we could. In the end, REAP implemented the CAL program in 28 of the 30 schools that were assigned to us. We spent only around 2000 yuan or so on repairs and about 15 days of technician time. The result? 28 working computer rooms ready to educate excited rural kids.

A call for remaking computer management in rural schools

Lots of hardware. No learning software. No maintenance funds. No trained computer staff. That is the state of China’s rural computer programs today.

This is a failure of program design from the national government. The Ministry of Education should not spend any more money on hardware without first making sure the entire package is complete—computers; software; maintenance; staff. There needs to be national curriculum set up for installing effective, fun and accessible learning software in computer classes. We have shown over and over that these programs work: simple, game-based software packages are effective in raising test scores, in improving mental health, in building confidence and in making learning fun. Otherwise, buying more hardware is little more than showmanship. And a tragically wasted opportunity.

“Ask me. I will tell you I like school”

Just ask Zeng Lei. He will tell you. Since CAL came around, he loves school.

Where can you find Zeng Lei? Where is Zeng Lei? Oh, that is easy. You do not have to look very hard. He is standing in line outside the CAL computer room squirming in anticipation. He has 15 minutes to tell you all about it. He is always 15 minutes early.

 

About this series:

REAP co-directors Scott Rozelle and Linxiu Zhang are writing a ten-part series for Caixin Magazine titled, "Inequality 2030: Glimmering Hope in China in a Future Facing Extreme Despair." See below for more columns in this series:

> Column 1: Why We Need to Worry About Inequality

> Column 2: China's Inequality Starts During the First 1,000 Days

> Column 3: Behind Before They Start - The Preschool Years (Part 1)

> Column 4: Behind Before They Start - The Preschool Years (Part 2) 

> Column 5: How to Cure China's Largest Epidemic

> Column 6: A Tale of Two Travesties

>Columns 7 & 8: China's Widest Divide

> Column 9: China's Most Vulnerable Children

> Column 10: Why Drop Out?

> Column 11: The Problem with Vocational Education

> Column 12: Reforming China's Vocational Schools (in Chinese)

Nearly forty-four percent of Indonesia’s population is living on less than $2 a day, making it near impossible for some to seek proper health treatment. One way to improve this situation is through Indonesia’s conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, Margaret Triyana says.

The CCT program, first piloted by the World Bank in 2007 and expanded from 2009–10, encourages Indonesia’s most destitute to pursue health-seeking behaviors by reducing barriers to health care through cash incentives. Payment is given for receiving treatments at a local clinic. Essentially, the poor are reimbursed simply for “showing up” for health services.

Triyana, a Jakarta native and postdoctoral fellow in the Asia Health Policy Program, has been in residence at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies studying the effects of the CCT program on Indonesia’s poor. She has been evaluating the household CCT program’s two-year implementation, focusing on the maternal and child health initiatives.

She plans to produce multiple papers that focus on issues related to CCT interventions and its impact on mothers and children. Triyana will continue this research after leaving Shorenstein APARC this July, accepting an academic teaching position at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. 

Recently, Triyana discussed her research with Shorenstein APARC. 

What types of health initiatives does the CCT program sponsor, and for whom?

The CCT program targets Indonesia’s most poverty-stricken by selecting approximately the bottom 30 percent of the poorest households, with preference toward households with pregnant women or school-aged children. Eligibility depends on socioeconomic factors per district such as expenditure, education and asset ownership. The program stretches the rural-urban divide, covering people in and off Java (this is the main island where 60 percent of the population resides). Many initiatives in the household CCT program are focused on child and maternal health. For mothers, they include a series of prenatal care visits, an iron tablet prescription, childbirth assistance and postnatal care. For children, they cover vaccinations, monthly height and weight measurements at the clinic and vitamin A pills. Overall the CCT program is a combination of poverty reduction and human capital investments, attempting to induce good behavior that instills long-term health in low resource settings.

Who is the typical primary care provider in Indonesia?

The primary care provider is often a midwife. This is because Indonesia doesn’t have enough trained doctors to support the growing demand. Clinics operate at the sub-district level, which comprise of 10-15 villages each. Every village is assigned one midwife. Midwives can perform most procedures just short of surgery. For example, midwives offer typical delivery services but refer patients to a district-level hospital for a Caesarean section. This system, for the most part, functions well, but midwives do have an expanded scope of care that can be unsettling. Children have their cuts taken care of by midwives; adults can get antibiotics through them. This diffused system is perhaps more efficient, but it can call into question the legitimacy of their authority. Midwives receive only three years of training for their certification. This is something the Indonesian government intends to inspect and will likely restructure.

What behavior changes do you see as a result of the CCT program?

My initial findings show there is increased utilization of health care programs. The CCT program incentivizes certain behaviors – attending the clinic for a test or retrieving medication – which then, in theory, leads to better health. “Showing up” doesn’t automatically correlate with improved health, but if we think about the population at hand, it would in most cases. People who weren’t using health services before now are. Everyone that was offered the program signed up. Monthly attendance to CCT-linked programs is reported at a rate of 85 percent. In particular to maternal health, I noted a 10 percent increase in delivery fees. This trend follows what we would expect to see – because of increased utilization, there is a natural rise in price for the service. On the demand-side, I found a 40 percent increase in the use of midwives, and a rise in fees paid to providers for maternal and child services. These factors indicate with a high level of certainty that the CCT program lowers barriers to health care. 

Since health is effectively its own market, will increased demand for services cause a rise in price?

Yes, health care is its own market so the supply-demand relationship is relevant. My research looks at the local market because it depends upon the price being offered at the local clinic. Indonesia’s health care system is a public-private mixture, therefore public fees are regulated while private fees are less so. Indonesia now offers universal care, but people can pay a few for services beyond basic coverage. I saw a change in the private domain in terms of demand for services. The “demand shock” caused a bit of a higher price for services. It costs about $80 to meet all of the program requirements. Payment to midwives increased, while a slight decrease occurred for traditional birth attendants. I find no significant change in birth outcomes, and the quality provided by midwives does not appear to be affected by the program. These outcomes are exactly what we’d expect to see; it is consistent with the puzzle in the literature and economics, showing more women and children in the CCT program are seeking care from health care providers, but no change in health outcomes.

Can we expect increased utilization of health services in the long-run?

I anticipate there will be long-term increased utilization. The CCT program seeks to create habit formation by focusing on youth and pregnant mothers. For example, we can see this when expectant mothers attended the clinic for prenatal care, delivery assistance and postnatal care. With cost and travel barriers eliminated or reduced, participants should find it easier to initially come and then return. I did see repeat visits in my research as a positive outcome of the CCT program. A technique used to encourage commitment is a public education program as part of the program. Participants get a group briefing on how the program works, so that they are fully introduced to the incentives and guarantees of the program. 

Does Indonesia plan to extend this into a national program?

Yes, the CCT program is planned to go national later this year. The research shows that the benchmark of high attendance was met, program participants did “show up.” Next steps are to analyze health outcomes in maternal and child health, and then look at policy implications. Indeed, the Indonesian government is seeking ways to better target and deliver health services; it will be interesting to see the long-term effects of this program.

At the May 13-15 symposium on Fisheries and Food Security in China, 27 leading scientists and scholars from around the world gathered in Beijing to share research on the role of ocean fisheries, aquaculture, and marine ecosystems for improving food security in China.

Given China’s demographic changes, evolving nutritional requirements and dominant role in global fisheries, the key question of the symposium was whether marine ecosystems can be managed adequately to support the country’s future vision for domestic food security.

The symposium highlighted new research on the provision of wild fish for human consumption and for animal feeds. Scholars also shared insights on China’s aquaculture sector, including the tradeoffs involved in using wild fish in aquaculture feed.

The three-day meeting focused on critical questions about the future of fisheries and food security in China:

• How will China's seafood consumption evolve with a population that is growing in both size and wealth?
   
• How can China manage its seafood industry to maximize its own food security now and in the future?
   
• Can aquaculture take pressure off of wild fisheries, or does the inclusion of wild fish in aquaculture feed put more pressure on wild fish stocks?
   
• Can marine ecosystems be managed to protect both ocean health and food security?
   
• How does the global fish trade, including demand for luxury and medicinal seafood products, shape China's fish production industry, and vice versa?

Among the 26 participants were researchers and policy experts from Stanford University, Ocean University of China, University of Stirling, Shanghai Ocean University, University of Maine, South China Sea Fisheries Research Institute (CAFS), Yellow Sea Fisheries Research Institute (CAFS), Sustainable Fisheries Partnership, Stony Brook University, Xiamen University, Hainan University, Shandong University, Asia Pacific Fish Watch, Hong Kong University, International Institute of Sustainable Development, James Cook University, China Policy, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and University of British Columbia Fisheries Centre.
 

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In between meetings held at the Stanford Center at Peking University, participants traveled to Beijing's largest fish market, where they observed local offerings and discussed trends in the global seafood trade with fish vendors. 

The symposium, funded by the Lenfest Ocean Program and chaired by FSE director Rosamond Naylor, kicks off a multi-year series of research papers and international meetings aimed at advancing the science around Chinese fisheries and food security. This ongoing international project will be coordinated by Professor Naylor and by Dr. Ling Cao, a postdoctoral fellow at FSE.

 

 

 

President Barack Obama announced this week that the United States would complete its pullout of troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2016, leaving 9,800 troops by the end of this year and cutting that in half by 2015. A small force will remain to protect the U.S. embassy in Kabul and help with local security. The president said this would free up combat troops for emerging terrorism threats in the Middle East and North Africa and effectively put an end to the longest war in U.S. history.

Ret. U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who was U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2009-2011, answers a few questions about the way forward. Eikenberry is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at CISAC.

Critics say the drawdown is too dramatic and rapid and could seriously diminish the progress NATO and its allies have made in the country. What is your view?

I think the drawdown schedule is militarily sound and responsible. First, the commander on the ground has indicated his support for the timelines. Second, by the end of 2016 – the announced target date for completion of the military drawdown – our armed forces will have operated in Afghanistan for over 15 years. It will be time for the Afghan government, with continued U.S. and international material and security assistance support, to take full responsibility for the defense of its country. In fact, the president's announcement represents the culmination of combined U.S., NATO, and Afghanistan planning that began in 2010.

Third, militant extremists in distant lands often effectively exploit the presence of U.S. armed forces serving in their county to rally support for their cause. At some point, large scale U.S. military deployments can become counterproductive, undermining efforts to develop accountable responsible governance and security forces.     

 

Are the Afghans ready to take over the security operations in their country?

U.S. and NATO military forces have been complimentary about the performance of the Afghan National Army and Police since they began in 2012 to assume greater responsibility for securing their country. Certainly, the Afghan security forces did well protecting the recent April 5th presidential election. Their major challenges will be ensuring adequate international monetary support (perhaps $3 billion a year for some years to come) and adapting to a tactical environment in which they will not have access to U.S. and NATO firepower, logistics, communications, and intelligence. Combat against the Taliban will be more equal contests.

There are concerns that the Taliban is sitting in the wings, just waiting for the withdrawal of American troops. Are those concerns valid?  

I have heard this argument since I first served in Afghanistan in 2002. I don't buy it. By 2016 we'll be in the 15^th year of a military mission that began in 2001. Will another 15 years be adequate to prove we can "wait them out?" It is time for the Afghans to take charge of their own destiny. Furthermore, the Taliban are not a cohesive movement; there is not a centralized Taliban command "waiting in the wings." Last, the Taliban are not the primary threat to Afghan stability.The greater challenges are Pakistan's policies towards Afghanistan, Afghanistan national political reconciliation, and massive government corruption. 

What is the legacy that the United States leaves behind?

Most Afghans have told me over the years that the greatest U.S. legacy will be democracy and all that has brought. If Afghanistan is able to strengthen its political institutions and stabilize the country in the years after foreign forces return to their homes, I would agree that the introduction of democracy will be what we are remembered for. 

 

Sociologist Xueguang Zhou is no stranger to Stanford. He studied here as a doctoral student and returned to campus in 2006. He is now the Kwoh-Ting Li Professor in Economic Development and a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Zhou says it is a joy to be teaching in the very place he himself was intellectually trained. Recently, he spoke with the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center about his route to the Farm and his research focus on China’s urbanization and bureaucracy. 

How did you come to Stanford and the Center?

I completed my PhD in sociology at Stanford so it was a very easy and natural decision to come back as a professor. After graduating, I went to Cornell University and Duke University as well as spending two years in Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, but I always missed the exciting intellectual environment at Stanford. I have a lot of admiration for the faculty and research that takes place here. In 2006, the sociology department and Shorenstein APARC recruited me. I began to focus on China as a major research area after I had completed my Ph.D. My dissertation was actually centered on American universities. My joint appointment as a professor and as a senior fellow at Shorenstein APARC has been very complimentary. I teach in my trained area of sociology and explore my substantive interests in Chinese bureaucracy. I combine my teaching and research nicely to bridge the two sides. Additionally, this year, I will teach a summer graduate seminar at Stanford Center at Peking University.

What are the most pressing issues of China’s urbanization?

Urbanization processes in China have been underway for the last 10-20 years, in particular, the government is pushing very hard to accelerate this process. Suddenly, people have been pushed from rural to urban areas. Many are being forced to abandon their land and assume a new life away from their farming activities. This process raises many important questions, and is a main area of what I study. Chinese culture (way of life, organization, problem solving) is heavily drawn from rural tradition. Inherently urbanization has created tensions between tradition and the modern idea of Chinese society. Now we see a lot of contentious politics in China. Resistance, revolt and social movements are in part caused by this disruption of the social norms and tradition that had historically held the Chinese society together. Patterns of interaction between social groups have changed. So, what does this mean for society? And further to that, what is the new governance structure that emerges out of this? In rural China, governance in the past was based on kinship and local institutions, but the future is unclear. We need to research and understand the emergent governance structure in China. 

What impact has recent bureaucratic restructuring had on Chinese society? 

Right now, it is hard to say what effects the recent changes put forth at the Third Plenum will have on society. It is too soon to see any major effects on the long-term trend. My research focuses on the fundamental basis of Chinese structures and bureaucracies. Over the past two years, I have pursued analyzing Chinese bureaucracy through a historical lens. If we take a step back and observe these recent policy shifts in a greater timeline, we can see that local-level fluctuations are only temporary phenomena. For example, China’s new leadership recently launched a huge anti-corruption campaign. As a result, people in local-level bureaucracies have suddenly become much more careful about their behavior. But, how long will this behavior last? It is unlikely to last for very long. If we look at it from a longer perspective, we can see clear policy rhythms between centralization and decentralization over time. There may be short-term policy efforts to strengthen the central authority, but systematic institutional shifts are less likely.

Can you tell us about your methods and approach to your research on Chinese personnel structures?

I analyze archival data and conduct fieldwork in China to understand changes in bureaucracy. A primary way I conduct my fieldwork is participatory observations in a township-level government in China. When I visit this township government, I stay in a guestroom in the government building, and interact with local officials on a daily basis, observe their work and eat meals with them. Basically, I get to know them, their views and way of life. I also go to the nearby villages to interact with locals to gather their opinions about bureaucracy and the policy implementation processes. I also meet with other Chinese colleagues who conduct research on government behaviors, and we share and discuss our observations. Often times, they take me to different localities to visit government bureaus and to chat with local officials. All of these interactions give me great opportunities to learn about the Chinese bureaucracy. Close observations are key for me to identifying current issues in governance and bureaucratic structures, which I then compare to the historical legacy. This line of research is also connected to a project in collaboration with graduate students, analyzing the flow of bureaucrats in an entire province using public data. 

Tell us something we don’t know about you.

One aspect of my personal experience that I cherish is that, like many in my generation, I was sent to work in rural China after high school during the Cultural Revolution.  There I became a “team leader” in a village, responsible for organizing collective activities of over 200 villagers (about 50 households) and several hundreds “mu” of farming land, when I was only 17. This experience gave me a much deeper understanding of rural life in China.

The Faculty Spotlight Q&A series highlights a different faculty member at Shorenstein APARC each month giving a personal look at his or her scholarly approaches and outlook on related topics and upcoming activities.