This week, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov unveiled a new foreign policy doctrine for Russia. As a written document, the doctrine underscores all the right themes. Two themes stand out. First, Russian policymakers plan to follow a rational and realistic foreign policy that will serve Russian economic and political interests. Such a strategy includes active engagement with the West. Second, Russian leaders see an intimate relationship between domestic and foreign policy. The document stresses the need to use foreign policy to help solve Russia's domestic problems, including first and foremost Russia's economic woes.

Like no other international crisis of the last decade, NATO's bombing campaign against Yugoslavia threatens to undermine support for Western-oriented reforms in Russia and isolate Moscow from the West internationally. Siding with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and thwarting liberal reforms at home do not serve the long-term interests of Russia as a world power or Russians as a people. In the passion of the moment, however, Russian leaders may be tempted, or feel compelled to take drastic measures to assist Serbia, which, in turn, could precipitate a passionate anti-Russian response in the West. The resulting strain in U.S.-Russia relations would give new meaning to the term "collateral damage."

Although few in Washington have noticed, US-Russian relations have entered a new era with the NATO bombing of Serbia.

The Clinton Administration was right to reject Slobodan Milosevic's cease-fire proposal -- entering into negotiations now with Serbia, which has largely achieved its military goals in Kosovo before NATO has achieved much of anything, would be an admission of defeat.

When presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin meet in Moscow next month, issues such as

START II, NATO expansion, trade with Iran and Iraq, and Russia's new draconian law on

religion are likely to dominate the agenda. To historians of US-Soviet relations, this agenda

should sound familiar as arms control, European security, regional conflicts, and human rights were the main components of most summit agendas between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This old agenda suggests that the promise of a new post-communist strategic partnership between the United States and Russia has not been realized. Especially as Russia continues to struggle in reforming its economy, many in the US have now concluded that engagement with this "basket case" is not worth the trouble--better to walk away from the failing project of internal reform and prepare instead to contain future external aggression.

The improvement in Russian-American relations is one of the few positive factors in the muddled picture of international relations today. Russian President Vladimir Putin's support for the American struggle against international terrorism has elevated communications between two former enemies to a new level. The upcoming November summit will be yet another sign of this. Politicians on either sides of the ocean are even calling the US and Russia "allies." Noting the decisiveness with which President Putin supports the US and Washington's extremely positive reaction to this, many Russian politicians and public figures have began speaking openly of Russia's entry into Western organizations and unions. Membership in the World Trade Organization is discussed in Moscow as an obvious reward Russia should receive for supporting American military actions; entry into the European Union is brought up as a relatively near goal, and so forth. The hopes are great, but do they reflect reality? Inflated expectations and skewed assessments of the speed and character of Russia's integration into the West are dangerous.

In the West, Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov is often described as "wily," "pragmatic," and "a realist" who seeks to carve out a place for Russia as a major player in the global game of balance-of-power politics. Usually these descriptions point to the turn in Russian foreign policy away from the "naive," Western-oriented approach taken by his predecessor in the Foreign Ministry, Andrei Kozyrev. Expressed support for Serbia in the most recent NATO showdown with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic over Kosovo is presumably yet further evidence of these so-called clever foreign policy maneuvers.