In 1975Ð76 the fall of Saigon was followed by national reunification and the establishment of the Socialist Republic. Access to the Mekong Delta was widely expected to facilitate rapid neo-Stalinist industrialization and the appearance of a powerful military threat to capitalist SEA. But this did not happen. By 1981 partial reforms had permitted all state enterprises to operate in markets and some degree of agricultural decollectivisation. In the second half of the 1980s there was a clear de-Stalinization of everyday life. And by 1989Ð90 a recognizable market economy had emerged. Since then the Vietnamese Communist Party has, with some success, negotiated a major opening-up of the country to foreign contacts. Vietnam has joined ASEAN, and has seen the emergence of land, labor, and capital markets, and the confused processes by which classes form. Fundamental economic and political change has therefore occurred. Growth has been rather fast and the use of state violence minimal. Politically, for the still-Leninist VCP, the shift from Plan to Market has been a great success. What is the political economy basis for this? Despite emergent capitalist classes and a market economy, the political economy of "post-transition" Vietnam is heavily marked by its recent history, and remains very different from other ASEAN members. Notwithstanding revolutionary change, dualities common to both the traditional and modern political economies have offered great potential for political restructuring. In this sense "development doctrines" are perhaps less exotic and more indigenous than elsewhere in SEA. This facilitates relatively harmonious political adaptation and is the key to understanding change. For example, wide rural land access, with a collective tinge in the most densely populated areas, has a strong and pervasive effect upon the macro political economy. "Voice and exit" are enhanced. Thus we see rather high levels of migration, and risk bearing be farmers. Rural GDP has grown fast through the 1990s. Also, real wages in urban areas tend to be higher and the labor regime less brittle. What are the political implications of such a land regime? At the end of the day, one reason for the lack of extensive state violence against the population seems to be that the party/state has sufficient sources of support and power for tense economic issues in the rural areas to be fought out without property rights needing violence to enforce them. These issues are fought out locally (within cooperatives and communes) and in macro contexts (access to world markets). But in the rural areas the state does not, apparently, need to support particular economic interests for its survival. One reason for this is that the "land issue" has been addressed through the adaptation of socialist models, so that large-scale land property is not (yet?) a major issue. Dominant groups in the rural areas do not depend upon land access for their incomes. Adam Fforde is a development economist. He holds an Oxford MA (Engineering Science and Economics), a London MSc (Economics) and a Cambridge PhD (Economics). He studied Vietnamese in Hanoi during 1978/79 and was a visiting scholar at the National Economics University (Hanoi) in 1985Ð86. He lived in Vietnam from 1987 to 1992 while working as an advisor to the Swedish aid program, and in Australia from 1992 to 1999, where he was a visiting fellow at the ANU and Chairman of Aduki Pty Ltd (Consultants). He is now senior fellow at the SEA Studies Programme, National University of Singapore. He has published on topics including the economic development of north Vietnam prior to 1975, agricultural cooperatives, and the transition from plan to market. He is currently working on class formation and the emergence of factor markets in the 1990s, industrial reform since the early 1960s, and Vietnamese development doctrine.

Resulting in part from the end of the Cold War, the study of international security has been infused with innovative approaches to international history and organizational theory. The MacArthur Consortium workshop brings together participants primarily from three scholarly communities: political scientists and sociologists who have studied organizational issues in security-related problems; historians, particularly those interested in international, diplomatic, and military history; and organizational theorists concerned with institutional origins, evolution, and learning. Our goal is to review recent innovative scholarship in these fields and to develop an inter- and multidisciplinary research agenda that will be of interest to scholars in all three communities. The workshop encourages political scientists to take the historical dimension of their work more seriously, enrich the study of international history by exploring problems that might be studied using insights from organizational theory, and encourage organizational theorists to think about and investigate international security problems. Anthropologists and others interested in international organizations or organizations that can have an impact on the outbreak of deadly conflict or its resolution are also very welcome. The workshop draws on recently completed work or work in progress. Discussion focuses on the problems being investigated, the arguments being made, the broader class of problems being addressed, new questions being raised, and research issues among various disciplines.

John Wilson Lewis, William Haas Professor Emeritus of Chinese Politics at Stanford University, is one the founders of the field of contemporary China studies. After receiving a doctorate from UCLA, he taught at Cornell University before coming to Stanford in 1968. He founded and directed Stanford's Center for East Asian Studies, as well as the Center for International Security and Arms Control, and the Northeast Asia-United States Forum on International Policy (now Shorenstein APARC). He currently directs the Project on Peace and Cooperation in the Asian-Pacific Region. Professor Lewis has written widely about China, Asia, and security matters. Many of his works have long been required reading for students of Chinese politics, especially his still often cited Leadership in Communist China. His edited volumes include: The City in Communist China, Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China, Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia, and Next Steps in the Creation of an Accidental Nuclear War Prevention Center. His history of the Chinese nuclear weapons program, China Builds the Bomb, written with Xue Litai, is published both in English (by Stanford University Press), and, in Chinese, by the Atomic Energy Press in Beijing. He has also co-authored Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War and China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age. In addition to his work at Stanford, John Lewis has served on the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences, the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council, and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. He has been a consultant to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Department of Defense, and is currently a consultant to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. He has made numerous visits to the People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation.

A pioneering Japanese-English simultaneous interpreter will entertain and enlighten you with the tales of some delightful events where humor has successfully transcended cultural barriers, or some embarrassing ones when the speakers and/or interpreters fell flat on their face. A product of the U.S. occupation of Japan and American tax-payers money later, Muramatsu has served countless international conferences and encounters by any other name, including the first nine G-7 Summit meetings of heads of state and government. (The first, in 1975, at Rambouillet, was G-6; guess who wasn't invited to the dinner.) Meticulously avoiding divulging any state secret or materials for tabloids, he has written essays, books, and given lectures on fascinating episodes that make us laugh and then think the tricks in breaking linguistic and cultural barriers. Born in Tokyo in 1930; worked first as a clerk-typist and then as an interpreter for the U.S. military in Tokyo 1946 through 1955; trained as one of the first eight Japanese simultaneous interpreters by the U.S. State Department, serving some thirty Japanese productivity study teams that toured the U.S. 1956-1960. Tried a new career as an economic researcher with the U.S.-Japan Economic Council in Washington, DC predecessor to the Japan Economic Institute of America). Went back to professional interpreting by returning to Japan in 1965, relinquishing his green card, and established Simul International, Inc., the first professional organization of, by and for interpreters in Japan. After 33 years as its president, then chairman, and also president of the Simul Academy, semi-retired into an advisory, albeit full-time, status in 1998. His clients include Pres. Reagan, Pres. Kennedy, Sen. Kennedy, Professors Milton Friedman, Paul Samuelson, John Kenneth Galbraith, Peter Drucker,Japanese prime ministers from Tanaka to Nakasone, India's Prime Minister Rajif Gandhi, Britain's Prince Charles, Jeffrey Archer, Arthur C. Clarke, Ralph Nader, Betty Friedan, and Yasser Arafat.

Inside Burma, the armed forces have established a chokehold on political power unrivalled in the world. The latest incarnation of junta rule emerged in 1988 following the bloody repression of a nationwide pro-democracy movement. Yet despite international revulsion, today's generals have barely been touched by its effects: the suspension of international economic assistance; the imposition of an arms embargo; and bans on new investment in Burma by Western firms. Over four decades of military rule, there have been rumors of in-fighting among officers, and of mutinies and desertions by foot soldiers. Many have concluded from such reports that the regime must inevitably fall. So far, however, such thoughts have been wishful. While elsewhere in Southeast Asia authoritarian regimes have crumbled, in Burma the junta has endured. How have Burma's generals managed to sustain their dominance for so long? Why hasn't the country's democratic opposition been able to wrest power from this regime? And why have international sanctions and prodding so utterly failed to break the stalemate in Rangoon? Mary Callahan is Assistant Professor at the University of Washington's Jackson School of International Studies. She received her PhD in Government at Cornell University in 1996. Among her many writings are chapters civil-military relations in Burma scheduled to appear in Soldier and State in Asia (Stanford University Press, 2000) and Burma: Strong State/Weak Regime (Crawford House, 2000). Fluent in Burmese, Prof. Callahan also teaches, lectures widely, and serves as a consultant to the United Nations on political conditions in Burma.