As China is gradually integrated into the international economic, security, and politics system, the tension between technological self-reliance and the need to build its technological enhancement on what is available in international market, will inevitably increase. Reflecting this tension, China's encryption policy was thrust into the international limelight in late 1999 and the first half of 2000. The early encryption regulations were announced and later were clarified. A wide range of international media has covered controversies related to the encryption policy. For every nation in the world, encryption's multifaceted nature requires a painstaking effort balancing potentially competing interests. It is even more so for China, the country which will officially join the WTO at the end of 2001. The concerns of multiple stakeholders about the future of encryption technology and its impact have raised policy questions about the management and control of encryption technology. Among the questions Chinese decision makers face are the following: --How to evaluate China's current encryption policy from an international perspective? --How to justify the toughness of the original encryption regulations and the relaxation afterwards in China's complex and rapidly changing domestic and international context? The purpose of Dr. Yuan's study is to assist Chinese policymakers in analyzing the status quo of the policy, objectives, and factors affecting encryption policymaking and to offer suggestions for the future. It provides an integrated assessment of how encryption policy decisions can and might affect diverse military, commercial, and political interests in China and suggests how those interests might be balanced most effectively.

Fidel Ramos' term as President of the Philippines was marked, among other things, by the highest economic growth since the Republic's independence, massive investments in infrastructure, and a peace agreement with the Southern Muslim secessionist movement. In 1998 he was awarded the UNESCO Peace Award for his role in promoting stability in the Southeast Asian region. Following his term of office, Mr. Ramos has continued to exercise a significant influence on Filipino politics. In January 2000 he led a pivotal march demanding the resignation of his successor, Joseph Estrada, which occurred two days later. A graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, he now serves as Special Roving Ambassador for the current president, Gloria Arroyo.

Aaron Belkin's paper is available in the IIS Library--5th floor of Encina Hall East.

Lieutenant General Paul J. Kern is the senior military adviser to the Army Acquisition Executive and the Army Chief of Starr on all research, development and acquisition programs and related issues. He supervises the Program Executive Officer system, and serves as the Director, Army Acquistion Corps.

After a brief description of historical legacies, Dr. Katahara looks at changes and continuities in the patterns and contents of civil-military relations through an exploration of the jurisdictional boundaries in the two areas: the structure of political domination; and national security policy making. This study is part of East-West Center's project on the State and the Soldier in Asia, directed by Muthiah Alagappa. Dr. Eiichi Katahara teaches Japan's diplomatic history and international relations in Asia and the Pacific in the Faculty of Law at Kobe Gakuin University, Japan (1992~). He held a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (1991-1992) and at the Australian National University (1989-1991), lectured in Japanese Politics in the Department of Political Science and was a research fellow in the Australia-Japan Research Center. He has published articles on topics related to Japan's security policy, and security affairs in the Asia-Pacific region. His recent publications include "Japan's Plutonium Policy: Consequences for Nonproliferation" (The Nonproliferation Review, Vol.5, No.1, 1997); "Japan's Concept of Comprehensive Security in the Post-Cold War World" (in S. Shirk & C. Twomey eds. Power and Prosperity: Economic and Security Linkages in Asia-Pacific, 1996). He has also written background chapters on Japan for Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1998 and Asia Pacific Security Outlook 1999 (forthcoming) (edited by Charles Morrison).

The talk will highlight the economic and social development of India and Pakistan and how this has been affected by the high level of military expenditures. It will trace the likely consequences of the emergence of a nuclear race on the two economies arising both from the short-run impact of economic sanctions and the costs in the long-run of increased sophistication of military technology. Before becoming the managing director of the SPDC in Pakistan, Dr. Hafiz Pasha was Advisor to the Prime Minister on Finance and Economic Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, with status of federal minister. Earlier, he was Vice Chancellor of the University of Karachi, Dean and Director of the Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, and Professor and Director of the Applied Economics Research Centre, University of Karachi. Dr. Pasha's publications cover the fields of public finance, urban and regional economics and economics of social sectors. He has been involved with high-level policy making in Pakistan and has taken on numerous research assignments for international bilateral and multilateral agencies.

Like a double-edged sword, the recent conflict in East Timor challenged Indonesia and the international community alike. For Indonesia, the crisis and its resolution offered a chance for military reform, yet threatened national unity. For international donors, the chance to defend human rights and implement self-determination carried a risk of provoking nationalist resentment against foreign intervention for democratic change.This talk will focus on the international community and its donor countries and agencies. How did they react to the conflict in East Timor? What were their strategies? How did their actions affect Indonesia -- not only its East Timor policies but also the course of its own democratic transition? Looking back on them now, do the crisis and its outcome lessons for the feasibility of foreign intervention to achieve domestic political reform? If so, what are they? If not, why not? And what do the answers to these questions imply for the democratic prospect in developing countries more generally?