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One effect of the new Obama administration's global charm is that America could be let out of the environmental doghouse. The Obama plan to restart the economy is stuffed full of green incentives, and the new president has earned global cheers for his promise to cut the gases that cause global warming. But hope and change are not easy to implement in Washington, and the first big disappointment is likely to come later this year when the world's governments gather in Copenhagen to replace the aging and ineffective Kyoto treaty.

On climate issues America is less a nation than 50 different states, moving wildly at different speeds.

Pundits have been talking down the Copenhagen summit on the theory that the current financial crisis makes 2009 a tough time for governments to focus on costly and distant global goals like protecting the planet. In reality, the greenish tinge on nearly every economic recovery plan, even China's, show that this crisis offers green opportunity. The real reason Copenhagen will be a disappointment is that the new Obama administration can't lead until it first learns what it can actually implement at home. And delivering greenery in the American political system is harder than it looks-even when the same left-leaning party controls both the White House and Congress.

On environmental issues, America is barely a nation. Under a single flag it uneasily accommodates a host of states pushing greenery at wildly different speeds. In the 1970s and 1980s, this multispeed environmentalism propelled America to a leadership position. The key was truly bipartisan legislation, which allowed Washington to craft a coherent national approach. In fact, most of the major U.S. environmental laws did not arise solely from the environmental left but were forged by centrist Republican administrations working closely with centrist and left-leaning Democrats. Republican President Nixon created America's pathbreaking clean air and water regulations; Republican George H.W. Bush updated the air rules to tackle acid rain and other pernicious long-distance pollutants. In his more moderate second term, Ronald Reagan was America's champion of the ozone layer and helped spearhead a treaty-probably the world's most effective international environmental agreement-that earned bipartisan support at home and also pushed reluctant Europeans to regulate the pollutants.

Ever since the middle 1990s-about the time that the U.S. government was shut down due to a partisan budget dispute-such broad coalitions supporting greenery have been rare. In the vacuum of any serious federal policy, for nearly a decade the greener coastal states devised their own rules to cut warming gases. The United States as a whole let its green leadership lapse. (At the same time, the project to create a single European economy has shifted authority in environmental matters from individual member states into the hands of central policymakers in Brussels, where a coterie of hyperrich and very green countries have set the agenda. Europe, long a laggard on environmental issues, is now the world leader.)

The normal multispeed script was playing out on global warming as the Obama administration took power. Industry, worried about the specter of a patchwork of regulations, has lobbied for a coherent national strategy. But the Obama administration's first major policy on global-warming policy went in precisely the opposite direction: he reversed the Bush administration's decision that blocked California from adopting its own strict rules on automobile efficiency.

Today's challenge, which won't be solved by Copenhagen, is for Obama to stitch these many state environmental efforts together. That's no easy task. Global-warming regulation will probably have a larger impact on the nation's economy than any other environmental program in history, and any plan will have to allow enough room for some states to move quickly while also satisfying industry's well-founded need for harmony. Obama's Democratic Party controls both the White House and Congress, but that does not guarantee success. It will be difficult to craft a national policy that earns broad and bipartisan support while also taking the big bite out of the emissions that the rest of the world is hoping Obama will promise to the Copenhagen treaty. The difficulties aren't just in dragging along wary conservative Republicans. In fact, the most important skepticism about an aggressive national strategy has been from a coalition of centrist Democrats who fear the impact on jobs and economic growth.

One key to success will be crafting a deal with China and other developing countries to show that they, too, are making an effort. But serious efforts on that front are still in their infancy.

The big challenge for Copenhagen will be to find a way to allow negotiations to stretch beyond the unrealistic 2009 deadline while still keeping momentum. America's slowness in getting serious about global warming should be welcome because it is a contrast to its rushed behavior in negotiating the Kyoto treaty. At Kyoto, Bill Clinton's administration promised deep cuts in emissions without any plan for selling them at home, which is why the Bush administration could so easily abandon the treaty. Repeating that mistake would be a lot worse than waiting a bit for America to craft real leadership. If that's why Copenhagen falls short of the mark, then that's good news-real greenery, rather than fakery.

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Policy Briefs
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Newsweek International Edition
Authors
David G. Victor
Authors
David G. Victor
News Type
Commentary
Date
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David G. Victor says a comprehensive, national-level climate change policy with bi-partisan support is necessary in the U.S. before engaging, seriously, with other nations. Although the Democrats control both the White House and Congess, previous landmark environmental legislation were authored under centrist Republican administrations. Furthermore, the Administration needs time to carefully construct a national policy that considers current, more stringent, policies at the state-level while balancing the economic crisis.

One effect of the new Obama administration's global charm is that America could be let out of the environmental doghouse. The Obama plan to restart the economy is stuffed full of green incentives, and the new president has earned global cheers for his promise to cut the gases that cause global warming. But hope and change are not easy to implement in Washington, and the first big disappointment is likely to come later this year when the world's governments gather in Copenhagen to replace the aging and ineffective Kyoto treaty.

In reality, the greenish tinge on nearly every economic recovery plan, even China's, show that this crisis offers green opportunity.

Pundits have been talking down the Copenhagen summit on the theory that the current financial crisis makes 2009 a tough time for governments to focus on costly and distant global goals like protecting the planet. In reality, the greenish tinge on nearly every economic recovery plan, even China's, show that this crisis offers green opportunity. The real reason Copenhagen will be a disappointment is that the new Obama administration can't lead until it first learns what it can actually implement at home. And delivering greenery in the American political system is harder than it looks-even when the same left-leaning party controls both the White House and Congress.

On environmental issues, America is barely a nation. Under a single flag it uneasily accommodates a host of states pushing greenery at wildly different speeds. In the 1970s and 1980s, this multispeed environmentalism propelled America to a leadership position. The key was truly bipartisan legislation, which allowed Washington to craft a coherent national approach. In fact, most of the major U.S. environmental laws did not arise solely from the environmental left but were forged by centrist Republican administrations working closely with centrist and left-leaning Democrats. Republican President Nixon created America's pathbreaking clean air and water regulations; Republican George H.W. Bush updated the air rules to tackle acid rain and other pernicious long-distance pollutants. In his more moderate second term, Ronald Reagan was America's champion of the ozone layer and helped spearhead a treaty-probably the world's most effective international environmental agreement-that earned bipartisan support at home and also pushed reluctant Europeans to regulate the pollutants.

Ever since the middle 1990s-about the time that the U.S. government was shut down due to a partisan budget dispute-such broad coalitions supporting greenery have been rare. In the vacuum of any serious federal policy, for nearly a decade the greener coastal states devised their own rules to cut warming gases. The United States as a whole let its green leadership lapse. (At the same time, the project to create a single European economy has shifted authority in environmental matters from individual member states into the hands of central policymakers in Brussels, where a coterie of hyperrich and very green countries have set the agenda. Europe, long a laggard on environmental issues, is now the world leader.)

The normal multispeed script was playing out on global warming as the Obama administration took power. Industry, worried about the specter of a patchwork of regulations, has lobbied for a coherent national strategy. But the Obama administration's first major policy on global-warming policy went in precisely the opposite direction: he reversed the Bush administration's decision that blocked California from adopting its own strict rules on automobile efficiency.

Today's challenge, which won't be solved by Copenhagen, is for Obama to stitch these many state environmental efforts together. That's no easy task. Global-warming regulation will probably have a larger impact on the nation's economy than any other environmental program in history, and any plan will have to allow enough room for some states to move quickly while also satisfying industry's well-founded need for harmony. Obama's Democratic Party controls both the White House and Congress, but that does not guarantee success. It will be difficult to craft a national policy that earns broad and bipartisan support while also taking the big bite out of the emissions that the rest of the world is hoping Obama will promise to the Copenhagen treaty. The difficulties aren't just in dragging along wary conservative Republicans. In fact, the most important skepticism about an aggressive national strategy has been from a coalition of centrist Democrats who fear the impact on jobs and economic growth.

One key to success will be crafting a deal with China and other developing countries to show that they, too, are making an effort. But serious efforts on that front are still in their infancy.

The big challenge for Copenhagen will be to find a way to allow negotiations to stretch beyond the unrealistic 2009 deadline while still keeping momentum. America's slowness in getting serious about global warming should be welcome because it is a contrast to its rushed behavior in negotiating the Kyoto treaty. At Kyoto, Bill Clinton's administration promised deep cuts in emissions without any plan for selling them at home, which is why the Bush administration could so easily abandon the treaty. Repeating that mistake would be a lot worse than waiting a bit for America to craft real leadership. If that's why Copenhagen falls short of the mark, then that's good news-real greenery, rather than fakery.

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Abstract: The expected increasing world energy demand makes it necessary for us to seriously and urgently study the questions of global warming due to greenhouse gas effect emissions and the depletion of fossil resources. This clearly means producing more energy, while emitting a minimum amount of CO2, and keeping the costs under control and acceptable for the user.

A growing number of prospective studies thus envision that nuclear energy, because it is carbon-free, will play an important and essential role in the world energy mix of the 21st century.

However, the increased use of nuclear power to generate electricity brings with it, threats to regional and global security - specifically, increased risks of nuclear weapon proliferation and nuclear terrorism: nuclear power reactors inevitably produce plutonium as a by-product, plutonium that could be used by countries or terrorist groups to fabricate nuclear weapons. Several states still have not signed the NPT, while others have not clarified their real intentions.

Even though this aspect should by no means be neglected, the issue of nuclear energy expansion should be examined globally, accounting for the context, the current needs, as well as all kinds of concerns.

The context is the one described above, characterized by growing energy demand and climate change: nuclear energy is unanimously recognized as a solution well adapted to such a context. Its overall assets are numerous, it is a clean and competitive source of energy, which has very good safety records, with more improvements to come, it contributes to security of energy supply. All these assets should not be swept away for reasons solely linked to proliferation concerns. As a matter of fact, intensive works are being carried out, to improve even more nuclear energy's track record, by ensuring its sustainability: waste minimisation, increased safety, competitiveness, economy of uranium resources, resistance to nuclear proliferation, and application to fields wider than shear electricity production.

Jacques Bouchard is Special Adviser to the Chairman of the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA). In 2006, he was appointed Chairman of the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for 3 years.

Born in 1939, Jacques Bouchard holds an engineering degree from the "Ecole Centrale de Paris", and specialized in reactor physics.

Mr. Bouchard joined the CEA in 1964 and became Head of the Experimental Physics unit in 1973, then head of the Nuclear Engineering Department in 1975. In that capacity, the work he conducted was mainly in support of pressurized water reactor technology, and he also led studies in physics for fuel cycle applications.

In 1982, he became head of the Fast Neutron Reactor Department in Cadarache. In 1990, he was appointed head of the CEA's Nuclear Reactor Division, then, from 1994 to 2000, he became the Director of CEA's military application division.

From 2000 to 2004, he was in charge of the entire nuclear energy sector in CEA.

Since 2005, he is Special Adviser to the Chairman of the CEA.

Jacques Bouchard was also the President of the French Nuclear Energy Society from 2001 to 2003 and professor at the reknown "Ecole des Mines de Paris". He has serve on the board of directors of several companies working in the nuclear field, and he is member of many advisory committees to national and international nuclear organizations.

If you would like to be added to the email announcement list, please visit https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/stsseminar 

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Jacques Bouchard Special Adviser to the Chairman of the French Atomic Energy Commission Speaker
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Postdoctoral scholar
hollygibbs.jpg PhD

Holly Gibbs is a David H. Smith Conservation Research Fellow in the Center on Food Security and Environment.  Her research focuses on quantifying the ripple effects of globalized economic drivers on tropical forest conservation and food security.  Dr. Gibbs develops statistical and GIS models to quantify and predict shifting drivers, patterns and consequences of tropical deforestation and agricultural expansion.  In particular, she is working to better integrate land use science and economics to quantify and map the indirect effects of U.S. biofuels and climate policies.  Much of this research aims to reconcile forest conservation, climate change and food security through improved policy and economic incentives.

She earned her Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in the Center for Sustainability and the Global Environment (SAGE) where a DOE Global Change Environmental Fellowship supported her studies.  Her dissertation research quantified shifting pathways of tropical land use and their implications for carbon emissions.  Throughout her Ph.D. she worked closely with policy makers, business leaders and environmental groups in support of the UNFCCC initiative to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD).  Prior to moving to Madison, Dr. Gibbs worked as a Post-Masters Research Associate in Oak Ridge National Laboratory's Environmental Sciences Division where she led remote-sensing and GIS research for global carbon and water cycle projects.  She received a B.S. of Distinction in Natural Resources and M.S. in Environmental Science from The Ohio State University.

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Ambassador Eliasson sets out the current status of Europe-US relations and acknowledges the wide range of daunting problems the world must face today. He emphasizes the need for an enhancement of the transatlantic relationship, as well as the need for multilateral cooperation. Mr. Eliasson also reinforces the importance of a continued awarenesss of the economy, the environment, and ethics.

Synopsis

Although unsure whether there will in fact be a new transatlantic agenda, Ambassador Eliasson repeatedly highlights that it is crucial that it does happen if we are to challenge the ‘huge’ issues of today. Mr. Eliasson notes the current financial climate and its possible effects on the social and political spheres as worrying. He also expresses particular concern at what he calls ‘fortress building,’ which involves protectionism and intolerance. Mr. Eliasson goes on to explain that as it stands, current US-Europe relations are dominated by mutual interest on security and the economy. However, to Mr. Eliasson, this relationship is marred by several issues. Inside the EU, democracy is in a predicament with politicians being accountable nationally while the issues are international. Moreover, Mr. Eliasson feels that the nature of the US and Europe relationship is not representative of the responsibility it should carry by being the most prosperous regions of the world.

How is this transatlantic relationship to move forward? If we are to arrive at what Mr. Eliasson describes as ‘scenario 1,’ which involves long term thinking, regulation, an emphasis on ethics, and a realization of interdependence in an internationally cooperative system, then Mr. Eliasson argues this requires reform. Mr. Eliasson argues it is urgent not to separate politics and economics. In dealing with a financial crisis, we must employ a multilateral approach and learn lessons for the future, particularly not fearing international regulation in a globalized economy. Mr. Eliasson also explains we can avoid this protectionist ‘fortress building’ by embracing ‘multipolarity.’ Mr. Eliasson underscores the importance of tolerance and good governance as central to progress. In addition, Mr. Eliasson reinforces that the problems of today are on such a massive scale that they must be dealt with internationally, as well as regionally and in the private sector.

Dealing with such issues, which involve collective engagement in Afghanistan and a cooperative approach in Africa, is what Mr. Eliasson believes must be added as a ‘third pillar’ to the US and Europe’s relationship. Mr. Eliasson also stresses concrete action on poverty by the US and Europe as central to this effort. In particular, he places emphasis a program for education of women and the establishment of clean water access. Mr. Eliasson believes that such efforts, which would add a pivotal ethical dimension to the transatlantic agenda, would enhance the reputation of democracy across the globe through concrete action.

In engaging with the audience in a question-and-answer session, one of the most emphasized subjects was diplomatic standards for international relations. Mr. Eliasson strongly reinforced the notion that the transatlantic agenda should stand with clear ethical standards. Other issues addressed included Iran's nuclear capabilities, religion, and the role of Russia.

About the Speaker

Ambassador Jan Eliasson was until July 1, 2008 Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Darfur. Previously, Jan Eliasson was President of the 60th session of the United Nations General Assembly 2005-2006. He was Sweden’s Ambassador to the United States, 2000-2005. Mr. Eliasson was Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden in 2006.

Mr. Eliasson served from 1994 to 2000 as State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a key position in formulating and implementing Swedish foreign policy. Earlier, 1988-1992, he was Sweden’s Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. During this period, he also served as the Secretary-General’s Personal Representative for Iran/Iraq.

In 1992, Mr. Eliasson was appointed the first United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and was involved in operations in Somalia, Sudan, Mozambique and the Balkans. He also took initiatives on landmines, conflict prevention and humanitarian action.

1980-1986, Mr. Eliasson was part of the UN mediation missions in the war between Iran and Iraq, headed by former Prime Minister Olof Palme. In 1993-94 Mr. Eliasson served as mediator in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). He has been Visiting Professor at Uppsala University and Göteborg University in Sweden, lecturing on mediation, conflict resolution and UN reform.

During his diplomatic career, Mr. Eliasson has been posted to New York (twice) Paris, Bonn, Washington (twice) and Harare, where he opened the first Swedish Embassy in 1980. He served as Diplomatic Adviser to the Swedish Prime Minister 1982-1983, and as Director General for Political Affairs in the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1983-1987.

Mr. Eliasson has authored and co-authored numerous articles and books and is a frequent lecturer on foreign policy and diplomacy. He is recipient of honorary doctorate degrees from i. a. American University, Washington, D.C., Uppsala University and Göteborg University, Sweden. He has been decorated by a number of Governments.

He is the Chairman of the Anna Lindh Memorial Fund of Sweden and is Member of the Advisory Group to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva.

Born in Göteborg, Sweden, in 1940, Mr. Eliasson was an exchange student in the United States 1957-1958. He graduated from the Swedish Naval Academy in 1962 and earned a Master’s degree in Economics and Business Administration in 1965.

Oksenberg Conference Room

Jan Eliasson Former Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Darfur; Former President of the United Nations General Assembly; Former Minister for Foreign Affairs for Sweden Speaker
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School of International and Public Affairs
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Visiting Scholar
wolfram.jpg

Wolfram Schlenker was a former Cargill Visiting Fellow at FSE. His research interests include the economics of climate change, water rights, and their impact on agricultural output, as well as models of exhaustible resources with endogenous discoveries.

Schlenker is currently Professor ineconomics at Columbia University.  He holds a PhD in agricultural and resource economics from the University of California, Berkeley (2003) and a Master of engineering and management sciences from the University of Karlsruhe, Germany (2000), as well as a Master of environmental management from Duke University (1998).

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Geographic information systems (GIS) present new opportunities for empirical agronomic research that can complement experimental and modeling approaches. In this study, GIS databases of irrigation practices for more than 4000 fields were compared with wheat yields derived from remote sensing for five growing seasons in the Yaqui Valley of Northwest Mexico. Significant yield effects were observed for both number and timing of irrigations, but not for reported water volumes, suggesting that proper timing is more important to yields than total water amounts. In most years, yield losses were observed when the second irrigation occurred more than 60 d after preplant irrigation, with an average loss of 11 kg ha-1 for each day above this value. Overall, we estimate that optimal timing and number of irrigations for all fields in Yaqui Valley could increase average yields by roughly 5%. Results varied by year, in part because of variability in growing season rainfall and in part because of variations in water allocations. Interactions with soil types were also evident, with greater yield variability attributed to irrigation on soils with higher clay contents. The results of this study provide new insight into specific causes of yield losses in farmers' fields, which can inform future field experiments, management, and water policy in this region. In general, empirical studies of large GIS databases can help to improve crop management, and meet the dual needs of higher yields and improved water use efficiency.

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Agronomy Journal
Authors
David Lobell
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Expansion of irrigated land can cause local cooling of daytime temperatures by up to several degrees Celsius. Here the authors compare the expected cooling associated with rates of irrigation expansion in developing countries for historical (1961-2000) and future (2000-30) periods with climate model predictions of temperature changes from other forcings, most notably increased atmospheric greenhouse gas levels, over the same periods. Indirect effects of irrigation on climate, via methane production in paddy rice systems, were not considered. In regions of rapid irrigation growth over the past 40 yr, such as northwestern India and northeastern China, irrigation's expected cooling effects have been similar in magnitude to climate model predictions of warming from greenhouse gases. A masking effect of irrigation can therefore explain the lack of significant increases in observed growing season maximum temperatures in these regions and the apparent discrepancy between observations and climate model simulations. Projections of irrigation for 2000-30 indicate a slowing of expansion rates, and therefore cooling from irrigation expansion over this time period will very likely be smaller than in recent decades. At the same time, warming from greenhouse gases will likely accelerate, and irrigation will play a relatively smaller role in agricultural climate trends. In many irrigated regions, therefore, temperature projections from climate models, which generally ignore irrigation, may be more accurate in predicting future temperature trends than their performance in reproducing past observed trends in irrigated regions would suggest.

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Journal Publisher
Earth Interactions
Authors
David Lobell
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The response of air temperatures to widespread irrigation may represent an important component of past and/or future regional climate changes. The quantitative impact of irrigation on daily minimum and maximum temperatures (Tmin and Tmax) in California was estimated using historical time series of county irrigated areas from agricultural censuses and daily climate observations from the U.S. Historical Climatology Network. Regression analysis of temperature and irrigation changes for stations within irrigated areas revealed a highly significant (p < 0.01) effect of irrigation on June–August average Tmax, with no significant effects on Tmin (p > 0.3). The mean estimate for Tmax was a substantial 5.0°C cooling for 100% irrigation cover, with a 95% confidence interval of 2.0°–7.9°C. As a result of small changes in Tmin compared to Tmax, the diurnal temperature range (DTR) decreased significantly in both spring and summer months. Effects on percentiles of Tmax within summer months were not statistically distinguishable, suggesting that irrigation’s impact is similar on warm and cool days in California. Finally, average trends for stations within irrigated areas were compared to those from nonirrigated stations to evaluate the robustness of conclusions from previous studies based on pairwise comparisons of irrigated and nonirrigated sites. Stronger negative Tmax trends in irrigated sites were consistent with the inferred effects of irrigation on Tmax. However, Tmin trends were significantly more positive for nonirrigated sites despite the apparent lack of effects of irrigation on Tmin from the analysis within irrigated sites.

Together with evidence of increases in urban areas near nonirrigated sites, this finding indicates an important effect of urbanization on Tmin in California that had previously been attributed to irrigation. The results therefore demonstrate that simple pairwise comparisons between stations in a complex region such as California can lead to misinterpretation of historical climate trends and the effects of land use changes.

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J. Climate
Authors
David Lobell
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