Semiconductors: The Limits of Containment?
The conference returned repeatedly to America’s use of export controls—and whether they are working. The verdict was nuanced. Philip Wong, the Willard R. and Inez Kerr Bell Professor of Electrical Engineering at Stanford, argued that in the semiconductor space the strategy has plainly backfired. By cutting China’s firms off from American chip-making equipment and advanced logic chips, the controls created a large captive domestic market for China’s equipment suppliers who previously had no customers. “It basically enabled the indigenous supply chains to have a wonderful set of customers within China,” Wong said, “and so they were able to climb up the learning curve really quickly, much more quickly than before.” Other speakers suggested that may be a tolerable cost as long as export controls allow the US to reach certain frontier capabilities first—as has been the case with Anthropic’s Mythos model.

Wong pushed back on both alarmism and dismissiveness about China's broader technological rise. China, he argued, has genuine world-class talent and infrastructure across multiple sectors—a peer competitor, not a pretender. "If you are among the best athletes, sometimes you win, sometimes other people win. That happens all the time." To treat any given Chinese breakthrough as proof of American collapse, or to wave it away as a fluke, both miss the point: China is, in his words, "a bona fide good athlete."

Wong’s recommended alternative to export controls was direct: rather than trying to slow a competitor, the United States should focus on “how do we make ourselves run faster.” That sentiment echoed throughout the day, particularly after he noted that the National Science Board had recently been dismissed and that American R&D funding continues to be primarily focused on defense-oriented research. 

Biotech: From Follower to Leading Force
Physician-scientist Chenjian Li, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, offered striking data on China’s advancement in biotech. In the active pharmaceutical ingredients that form the basis of medicines taken by hundreds of millions of Americans daily, China has achieved near-total global dominance—some categories are 100% Chinese-sourced. “Medicine, be it advanced experimental drugs, high-end prescriptions or just daily over-the-counter pills, are actually much more impactful than weapons of mass destruction,” Li said, “because they affect 80% of the United States and global population.”

At the cutting edge of drug discovery, the picture is more nuanced but equally notable. Chinese biotech startups are increasingly producing competitive "me-too, me-better" drugs that improve on existing treatments, and pushing into "first-in-class" drugs—the crown jewels of pharmaceutical innovation. Major multinational corporations (MNCs) are paying billions to acquire them. The fact that Pfizer, Merck, and Eli Lilly are spending at this scale, Li argued, says something important: “The MNCs buy those new therapeutic assets because they are solid and unique, and because the MNCs don’t think that they can be as fast and as good in those lines.”

Economist Ruixue Jia of UC San Diego connected this pharmaceutical surge to China’s education system, which has spent decades steering enormous numbers of students toward engineering and STEM fields, including biology and life sciences. The founder of one of last year’s biggest biotech deals—a $5.6 billion transaction—fit a pattern Jia’s research keeps finding: educated in China, PhD in Canada, postdoc in the United States, returned to China in 2008. “It’s not just a success story of Chinese education,” she noted. “It’s also a success story of North American education.”

Fragmentation and the AI Race
A central tension runs through the broader debate: what do the world’s two largest economies actually gain or lose from their escalating technological confrontation?

Tsinghua economist Hong Ma argued that, measured by its own goals, the American trade war has largely failed. US import dependence on Chinese value-added has remained roughly constant despite years of tariffs, as goods simply reroute through third countries. Beyond tariffs, he warned of a longer-term cost: fragmentation into two separate innovation ecosystems, neither large enough to fully benefit from the other. The US would lose access to the Chinese market, Chinese engineering feedback, and the scale that sustains rapid innovation. “On both sides,” he said, “this is not the optimal equilibrium.”

Panelists pointed to China’s open-weight AI models as evidence of a different kind of competition playing out below the frontier. China’s models from Alibaba, Moonshot AI, and others are being used across the globe—often simply because they are cheaper and good enough for most applications. In this way, big US labs may be ahead on raw benchmarks, but that advantage does not automatically translate into leading global adoption.

Impressive Achievements, Costly Failures
Another useful synthesis came from Scott Kennedy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Kennedy’s “bumpy success” framework holds that China’s innovation trajectory is clearly positive—it now ranks tenth globally on the Innovation Index, ahead of Japan in the Asia-Pacific—but deeply uneven across sectors. He described China as a “slow tech dragon”: vast misallocation of resources produces genuine breakthroughs alongside enormous waste, and that waste is a real drag on the broader economy. Commercial aviation was one such example—despite being a signature priority for China’s leadership and the single largest recipient of state investment, the result is, in Kennedy’s words, “an American plane with Chinese paint.” The lesson is not that China cannot innovate, but that state-directed industrial policy produces highly variable results.

That framework—impressive achievements, structural waste, uneven outcomes—runs as a quiet undercurrent through the broader debate. Structural challenges remain: a domestic market that cannot yet absorb the premium prices of cutting-edge drugs; an education system optimized for solving known problems rather than identifying unknown ones; and an economy in which the benefits of technological investment are not yet reaching ordinary households.

The picture that emerges resists easy predictions, but carries a clear message: the old frameworks—China as technological follower, export controls as sufficient means to maintain America’s remaining technological edge, global supply chains as something susceptible to political redirection—often no longer fit the evidence. The task now is building better ones.
 

Discover more from the 2026 SCCEI China Conference. 
 

How do nations build and sustain economic power? While the rise of Asia-Pacific economies has drawn significant scholarly attention, these nations' divergent paths to success remain less understood. Stanford University's Gi-Wook Shin, the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea in the Department of Sociology, argues we need a new lens to account for cross-national variation in how countries mobilize talent to develop their workforces and achieve growth.

In his recent book, The Four Talent Giants, Shin introduces Talent Portfolio Theory, a framework that explains how four strikingly different Asia-Pacific nations – Japan, Australia, China, and India – became economic powerhouses through distinct human resource development strategies. Each nation tailored its approach to education, migration, and global networks in ways shaped by unique historical, cultural, and geopolitical contexts.

Shin – a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the director of the Korea Program and the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL) at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) – joined host Sydney Seiler on the Center for Strategic and International Studies' video podcast, The Impossible State, to discuss that framework, how the four Asia-Pacific "talent giants" developed, attracted, and retained talent, and what other countries, including the United States, can learn as they face new risks and opportunities in a globalized, AI-driven economy.

The Four Talent Giants, published by Stanford University Press, is part of the SUP-APARC joint monograph series, Studies of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. The book draws on research conducted as part of SNAPL's Talent Flows and Development research track.

Slowing Growth, Thriving Tech
Despite slowing economic growth, China’s industrial and tech strength remains formidable. Its economy is ~75% the size of the U.S. in dollar terms, but China accounts for 33% of global manufacturing value-added, projected to rise to 49% by 2050. “China is very strong in all sorts of advanced manufacturing... in many cases it is almost entirely a Chinese concern.”

The gap is vast, according to another panelist: in 2023, China had 1,500 commercial ships under construction; the U.S. had three. Non-state firms drive export growth, crowding out for shrinking shares of foreign-led exports (60% to 30%). “There is plenty of profitable activity going on, especially in the non-state sector.”

Meanwhile, Made in China 2025 has paid dividends. “At a first approximation, it looks like a pretty good success,” said one panelist, citing EVs, clean tech, and automation, but admitted that weaknesses persist in sectors like semiconductors and aerospace. Nevertheless, China’s highly competent manufacturers, tech companies, and deep reservoir of human capital ensure that despite costly and inefficient industrial policies, China still has “a good amount of fuel left in the tank.”

Rather than stagnating like Japan in the 1990s, panelists agreed China would more closely resemble a “Leninist Germany”—an authoritarian state with a globally competitive, export-driven, tech-intensive economy.

An Enduring Value Proposition for the World, but Pushback is Growing 
Around the world China is embedding itself in local production ecosystems. Several panelists described how Chinese firms have established smartphone assembly plants in Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Indonesia. EV assembly and battery processing plants have followed, particularly in Zimbabwe and the DRC. In practice, countries receiving China’s investment often express more concern about being left behind by the West than overwhelmed by China.

China’s outbound investment is not just commercial; it is also strategic. As one panelist put it, this “industrial diplomacy” steers capital toward geopolitically friendly or economically useful countries—especially those with preferential trade access to the U.S. or E.U., like Mexico and Morocco—and away from places perceived as hostile, such as India.

This strategy has helped China rebuild global supply chains with itself at the center, creating new production ecosystems around batteries, robotics, AI, and advanced manufacturing. As one expert noted, firms like BYD, Xiaomi, and Huawei are at the core of “interlocking industrial ecosystems” that tie together multiple cutting-edge sectors across borders.

Yet pushback is growing. In 2023, 117 of 198 World Trade Organization complaints against China came from low- and middle-income countries. These nations aren’t rejecting Chinese investment, panelists pointed out—they’re renegotiating harder, hedging more, and believing less.

The conference underscored a world in flux—one where China’s industrial and technological dynamism continues to reshape global supply chains even as its assertive statecraft provokes growing resistance. While some panelists warned of the breakdown of integrationist hopes, others saw opportunity in a more defined and stable strategic rivalry, even if it takes the form of a new cold war. A key takeaway was the paradox of China’s global role: it remains an important source of growth and innovation, yet inspires distrust that is prompting nations to pursue more reciprocal, conditional partnerships. In navigating this uncertain era, both China and the West appear to be groping toward a new equilibrium—messy, complex, and decidedly post-unipolar.

Discover more from the 2025 SCCEI China Conference. 
 

Beijing, May 30, 2024 — Earlier this month, the Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) hosted former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi and his former Chief of Staff who delivered his remarks on "The Role of European Variables in U.S.-China-Europe Relations," and engaged in a roundtable discussion with faculty and students from Stanford and Peking University. The event underscored SCPKU's capacity as a catalyst for cross-cultural collaboration and intellectual exchange in advancing global dialogue, bringing together global thought leaders, policymakers, and academic luminaries.

A Confluence of Expertise and Vision

The roundtable centered on ​Romano Prodi, who served as a distinguished professor both before and after his time as Prime Minister, and who to this day prefers the title “professor.”  Prof. Prodi has been hailed as an architect of EU integration and a global advocate for multilateralism. Joining him were ​Dr. Daniele De Giovanni, the Italian Chief of Staff during Prodi's term, and ​Dr. Qinghong Wang, Executive Director of Peking University’s China-Europe Philanthropy Innovation Research Center (CEPIRC). The discussion included contributions from Stanford scholars Professors Andrew Walder, Matthew Kohrman, Xueguang Zhou, and Jean Oi. Professor Oi chaired the session.

SCPKU as a Platform for Global Discourse

18 Stanford undergraduates from the Bing Overseas Study Program China Studies in Beijing program and 20 Peking University students joined the roundtable dialogue, which explored Europe’s strategic influence in bridging transatlantic frameworks. Topics spanned economic interdependence, climate collaboration, and the EU’s evolving role in mitigating great-power competition.

In his opening remarks, ​Prof. Prodi emphasized the urgency of multipolar dialogue. His perspective resonated with SCPKU’s mission to cultivate transnational academic partnerships. The center’s role in hosting such high-level exchanges—spanning academia, governance, and civil society—was lauded as a model for fostering meaningful dialogue in an era of complex geopolitics.

Bridging Scholarship and Policy

The discussion highlighted SCPKU’s commitment to bridging academic scholarship with real-world policy implications. ​Dr. Wang underscored CEPIRC’s work in advancing Sino-European philanthropic innovation, stating, “Our collaboration with Prodi and Stanford underscores the power of interdisciplinary networks to reimagine global solidarity.” Meanwhile, Stanford scholars shared comparative analyses of EU-China-U.S. trade ecosystems and technological interoperability.

About the Stanford Center at Peking University
Located on the Peking University campus in Beijing's vibrant Haidian District, the Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) is a focal point for building academic and educational networks throughout East Asia. The tri-level center offers collaborative spaces, offices, event support services, and funding for innovative research and education. SCPKU brings together established researchers and a new generation of young scholars to create a dynamic hub of intellectual exchange and collaboration.