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Destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11th changed the lives of most Americans. It seems destined also to change the lives of most Pakistanis and Afghanis. Pakistan now finds itself in the middle, being squeezed on the one side by the United States and on the other by the Taliban faction in Afghanistan. No nation would choose to have either the U. S. or the Taliban as its enemy. Unless Pakistan is extremely lucky, it will have both.

I worked in Pakistan as an agricultural advisor during much of the 1960s, trying to help improve the productivity of the immense Indus River irrigation system. My travels took me into the catchment areas in the northernmost reaches of the country and into contact with the tribal groups and clans who are residents of that region. Although I no longer focus on Pakistan, I was not totally surprised to be contacted by a local television producer who was doing a feature story on that country. During the filming I was asked the question: "What is it that Americans just don't 'get' about the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan?" What follows is what I wish I had said in reply.

Most Americans do not know of, much less understand, the 2500 years of (unsuccessful!) invasions that have taken place in that part of the world. They cannot fathom the roughness of the terrain in the undefined border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan or the incredible fearlessness and toughness of the people of the region. Very few Americans understand the traditions, rights, and obligations within and among the local clans, many of whom migrate back and forth with the seasons across an invisible border. Nor can they really imagine the extent of poverty, especially in Afghanistan, where life expectancy is still only about 45 years.

At the regional level, most Americans do not understand the depth of the tensions that still exist between India and Pakistan, the continuing problem of Kashmir in that key south-Asia relationship, and the presumed military alliance between Pakistan and the Taliban in continuing scrimmages against India in Kashmir. They further do not understand the problems of governing Pakistan, a country with incredibly divisive regional tendencies, within the aegis of an Islamic Republic.

Finally, American do not grasp how the "on again-off again" nature of U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan relationships appears to many people on the other side--people who are literally born with inherited friends and sworn enemies. Within my professional lifetime, U.S. relationships have ranged from genuinely close cooperation, which prevailed during the time of Presidents J. F. Kennedy and Ayub Khan; to more distant cold-war relationships that generally pitted the U.S. and Pakistan against the U.S.S.R. and India; to the widespread American military and economic support given both Afghanistan and Pakistan during the U.S.S.R. invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s; to a post Cold War move away from Pakistan and toward India; to the virtual stoppage of all support following the recent atomic tests by both countries. In short, many Americans are ignorant about the culture and history of the region, and many Pakistanis and Afghanis are totally confused about America's loyalty.

I do not know whether the U.S. and its allies will "invade" this region in search of Osama bin Laden, or if that happens, whether the "war" will be massive or surgical. I hope, however, that the U.S. has distilled several lessons from the region's ancient and modern history.

First, the Afghani people will not be frightened into doing anything. They would not even understand the concept. The tribal customs and obligations with respect to enemies are unbending. The tribesmen are both fearless and patient--ask the British, who were defeated three times over the last two centuries, or the Russians who most recently met a similar fate within the past 20 years. No one should underestimate the Afghani's skills as fighters, especially on their home turf--which is mainly rocks and caves and hills and mountains. The dozens of foreign monuments honoring the dead along the Khyber Pass Road from Peshawar, Pakistan to Kabul, Afghanistan are a grim reminder of just how ferocious the frontier people have been to those whom they regarded as outsiders.

Second, the extreme fundamentalist groups within Islam are a minority that challenge moderate Muslims in the region even more than they challenge outsiders. Nevertheless, the U.S. and its allies will have only the narrowest range of military options against the extremists lest these actions put moderate Muslims into the camp of the fundamentalists.

Third, U.S.-Pakistan relations have never been more delicate than at this moment. By virtue of location, information, and capacity to infiltrate, Pakistan's potential contribution to a "bin Laden solution" cannot be overemphasized. How the U.S. gets Pakistan's cooperation without at the same time pushing the moderates into the welcoming arms of the extremists is a diplomatic, economic, and military problem of unbelievable proportions. Unfortunately, history provides no ready-made answer to this dilemma, and that is what truly worries me - not only for the U.S., but also for moderate Muslims throughout the world.

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Shorenstein APARC
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor of Sociology
William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea
Professor, by Courtesy, of East Asian Languages & Cultures
Gi-Wook Shin_0.jpg PhD

Gi-Wook Shin is the William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea in the Department of Sociology, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the founding director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) since 2001, all at Stanford University. In May 2024, Shin also launched the Taiwan Program at APARC. He served as director of APARC for two decades (2005-2025). As a historical-comparative and political sociologist, his research has concentrated on social movements, nationalism, development, democracy, migration, and international relations.

In Summer 2023, Shin launched the Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab (SNAPL), which is a new research initiative committed to addressing emergent social, cultural, economic, and political challenges in Asia. Across four research themes– “Talent Flows and Development,” “Nationalism and Racism,” “U.S.-Asia Relations,” and “Democratic Crisis and Reform”–the lab brings scholars and students to produce interdisciplinary, problem-oriented, policy-relevant, and comparative studies and publications. Shin’s latest book, The Four Talent Giants, a comparative study of talent strategies of Japan, Australia, China, and India to be published by Stanford University Press in the summer of 2025, is an outcome of SNAPL.

Shin is also the author/editor of twenty-seven books and numerous articles. His books include The Four Talent Giants: National Strategies for Human Resource Development Across Japan, Australia, China, and India (2025)Korean Democracy in Crisis: The Threat of Illiberalism, Populism, and Polarization (2022); The North Korean Conundrum: Balancing Human Rights and Nuclear Security (2021); Superficial Korea (2017); Divergent Memories: Opinion Leaders and the Asia-Pacific War (2016); Global Talent: Skilled Labor as Social Capital in Korea (2015); Criminality, Collaboration, and Reconciliation: Europe and Asia Confronts the Memory of World War II (2014); New Challenges for Maturing Democracies in Korea and Taiwan (2014); History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories (2011); South Korean Social Movements: From Democracy to Civil Society (2011); One Alliance, Two Lenses: U.S.-Korea Relations in a New Era (2010); Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia (2007);  and Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (2006). Due to the wide popularity of his publications, many have been translated and distributed to Korean audiences. His articles have appeared in academic and policy journals, including American Journal of SociologyWorld DevelopmentComparative Studies in Society and HistoryPolitical Science QuarterlyJournal of Asian StudiesComparative EducationInternational SociologyNations and NationalismPacific AffairsAsian SurveyJournal of Democracy, and Foreign Affairs.

Shin is not only the recipient of numerous grants and fellowships, but also continues to actively raise funds for Korean/Asian studies at Stanford. He gives frequent lectures and seminars on topics ranging from Korean nationalism and politics to Korea's foreign relations, historical reconciliation in Northeast Asia, and talent strategies. He serves on councils and advisory boards in the United States and South Korea and promotes policy dialogue between the two allies. He regularly writes op-eds and gives interviews to the media in both Korean and English.

Before joining Stanford in 2001, Shin taught at the University of Iowa (1991-94) and the University of California, Los Angeles (1994-2001). After receiving his BA from Yonsei University in Korea, he was awarded his MA and PhD from the University of Washington in 1991.

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Director of the Korea Program and the Taiwan Program, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Director of Stanford Next Asia Policy Lab, APARC
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Since the early 1990s the issue of how the Japanese remember World War II has been in the headlines over and over again. The most recent round of junior high school textbook revisions, for example, has created a firestorm of protest in Korea and China. But there is much evidence to belie the charge that the Japanese suffer from collective amnesia. War memory is not fixed but remains highly contested. Peter Duus, a historian of modern Japan, William H. Bonsall Professor of History at Stanford. He has written and edited several book on prewar Japanese imperialism, including The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910.

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Peter Duus William H. Bonsall Professor of History Speaker Stanford University
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Nearly a quarter-century has elapsed since the Khmer Rouge held power in Cambodia (1975-78). Yet Cambodians still are shadowed by that catastrophic experience, and by conflicting legacies from other parts of their country's past. Cambodians continue to struggle to come to terms with what the Pol Pot era meant, and with what has happened to them since. After centuries of relative isolation, they must also contend with changes in Cambodia's identity in what seems to be an ever faster moving world. Views of Cambodia's history and destiny, formed in colonial and Cold War times, no longer seem to fit. But new interpretations have not yet taken hold. Epitomizing this confusion is the issue of bringing surviving Khmer Rouge leaders to justice. Over the last decade or so, efforts toward this end have inched forward and bogged down, beset by clashing political priorities and notions of justice and culpability. Cambodians ask themselves: Should we insist on remembering, or allow forgetting? Why? And with what implications for the future? David Chandler is the leading English-language historian of Cambodia. He holds degrees from Harvard College, Yale University, and the University of Michigan. From l972 to l997 he taught Southeast Asian history at Monash University in Australia. Since then he has held appointments at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of Oregon, and Cornell University. His books include A History of Cambodia (3rd ed., 2000), Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot (2nd ed., 1999), and Voices from S 21: Terror and History in Pol Pot's Secret Prison (l999). His many other writings include coauthorship of the classic history text, In Search of Southeast Asia (1971), the 3rd revised edition of which should appear next year.

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David Chandler Adjunct Professor of Asian Studies Speaker Georgetown University
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The Kingdom of Bhutan, an independent country in the Himalayas, has designed its own theory and practice of socioeconomic development, which it calls "Gross National Happiness." Bhutan entered into relations with the outside world only in the early 1960s; since then it has pursued development in a way that is consonant with its own Buddhist values. An intrinsically interesting experiment in itself, Bhutan's experience now assumes broader relevancy as its pursuit of development must take account of the problems small nations and cultures confront in the face of the powerful impact of globalization. The Ambassador will discuss these problems and answer questions. His Excellency Om Pradhan, the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Bhutan to the United Nations, was born in 1946 and was educated in India, England, and Hawaii. As Minister for Trade, Industry, Power, and Tourism in the Royal Government of Bhutan, he has been a central figure in Bhutan's economic and social development. He has also served as Bhutan's Ambassador to India, Nepal, and the Maldives, has led the Bhutanese delegation in several rounds of boundary talks with the People's Republic of China, has been a member of the National Assembly of Bhutan, and has participated in innumerable international and regional conferences.

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Lyonpo Om Pradhan Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Bhutan Speaker United Nations
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Selections from Abernethy's The Dynamics of Global Dominance available in IIS library, 5th floor, Encina Hall East.

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David Abernethy Professor of Political Science Speaker Stanford University
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Separatism and terrorism, demonstrations and scandals, elite conflict and economic malaise ... With so much trouble on its hands, why should the Indonesian government willingly open up the Pandora's box that is the legacy of violence from the Suharto regime, especially since many of his associates remain politically active? Or is the risk of focusing on the past worth takingÑto administer justice and foster a humane consensus strong enough to ensure that such abuses do not recur? These difficult questions cannot be answered without taking local conditions into account: the sense of uncertainty and stagnation that hangs over the reform process; the widespread perception that in mysterious and powerful ways Suharto is still controlling events; and the apparent inability of Indonesian society to transform its recent history into a set of lessons that could generate momentum toward a better future. Mary S. Zurbuchen was based until recently in Jakarta, as the Ford Foundation's chief representative for Southeast Asia (1992-96) and Indonesia (1996-2000). She is the academic coordinator of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at UCLA, where she is teaching a course on Indonesia while continuing her research on the intersection of history and memory in that country. Her many publications on cultural and social change in Indonesia include The Language of Balinese Shadow Theater (1987).

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Mary S. Zurbuchen Visiting Professor, Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures Speaker University of California, Los Angeles
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Scott explores themes of state-craft, sedentarization, etc. as part of a critique of state-making and development. In particular, he analyzes the paradoxes of attempts by states to create a fiscally and administratively legible property regime and population despite the economic and ecological imperatives of physical mobility. He elaborates the Southeast Asian variant of this historical argument. One of the great cleavages permeating Southeast Asian history and politics is the tension between hill and valley peoples, between downstream and upstream in insular Southeast Asia. Roughly, this corresponds to the social division between comparatively dense populations in valleys and 'downstream' who are often organized hierarchically into states, on the one hand, and more peripheral, dispersed, and mobile peoples who live in more egalitarian settings, on the other. These divisions are not merely of historical interest; they animate a good deal of the intra-state tension in contemporary Southeast Asia which has been understood in ethnic or religious terms.

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James Scott Professor, Department Political Scence and Anthropology, Yale University Speaker Visiting Scholar, Center for Advanced Behavioral Studies, Stanford University
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