The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies has been selected to join the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, Stanford Law School, the University of Virginia School of Law, and William & Mary School of Law, as partnering institutions in the Miller Center of Public Affairs' newly constituted National War Powers Commission, it was announced on February 28, 2007, by Gerald L. Baliles, director of the University of Virginia's Miller Center and former governor of Virginia. The commission will be co-chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, a graduate of Stanford Law School and former President of the Stanford University Board of Trustees. The commission has ten distinguished public members: former U.S. Senator from Washington Slade Gorton, former Representative from Indiana and Iraq Study Group Co-Chair Lee H. Hamilton, former U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills, former Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr., former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Abner J. Mikva, former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet J. Paul Reason, former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, the Dean of Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Brookings Institution President and former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot.

Co-directed by John C. Jeffries, Jr., dean of the University of Virginia School of Law, and W. Taylor Reveley, III, dean of William & Mary School of Law, the commission will seek a practical and constitutional consensus on how the three branches of government - the President, Congress, and the Courts - are to exercise their respective prerogatives to shape American war and peace. As the conveners note in their initial brief, "For over two centuries war powers issues have bedeviled a host of Presidents, Congresses, and at times the Courts." Competing claims to war powers have remained more unsettled than almost any other issue of American constitutional law. The country lacks a consensus about how the President and the Congress are to make decisions about war and peace, and whether and to what extent the Courts should resolve disputes or adjudge the uses of war powers by the President and Congress. Consequently, they note, "Presidents, members of Congress, Courts, scholars and pundits continue to debate which branch should set policy concerning (1) the initiation of conflict, (2) how conflict is to be conducted once begun, and (3) when and how conflict is to be terminated."

As the conveners state, "we badly need a consensus on how the President and Congress are to share their overlapping powers to shape American war and peace, about who should decide what, and when each must participate meaningfully in shaping national policy." In addition, the practical and constitutional consensus the commission seeks to reach, "should comport with not only the text of the Constitution and the intent of its Framers, but also the experiences of our history." Members of the War Powers Commission were selected on the basis of their diverse and impressive experiences, and bipartisan backgrounds, in the hope that they can recommend "a process, formula or result that could be embraced by future administrations or Congresses." The commission intends to release a report reflecting its views, and emphasizes that the recommendations it expects to issue will be entirely prospective in nature and not intended to apply to the current administration or the present Congress.

For those seeking a new national consensus, the National War Powers Commission has been born at a propitious time. "During this time of war, as the nature of war changes, and as Congress and the President demonstrate a capacity for both contention and agreement," the conveners state, "the Commission will be well-poised to contribute to a resolution that has eluded the country for well over two hundred years. America's policymakers need it, America's voters deserve it, and now make be an auspicious time to seek it."

For more information, please visit the Miller Center's website, www.millercenter.org, or contact Lisa Todorovich, Assistant Director of Communications at the Miller Center, 434-924-4096, or by e-mail, ltodorovich@virginia.edu.

Growing economic ties and a new interest in cultural exchanges are bringing the countries of Northeast Asia closer together. Yet wounds from past wrongs -- committed in times of colonialism, war, and dictatorship -- are not fully healed. All nations have some sense of victimization -- Japan vis-à-vis the United States and Russia, and China and Korea vis-à-vis Japan -- and often blame others, rather than taking responsibility.

As with many other cases around the world, reconciliation between countries in the region first occurred between governments. Japan established diplomatic rapprochement with countries it had once invaded or colonized: with the Republic of China in 1952, with the Republic of Korea in 1965, and with the People's Republic of China in 1972.

Yet Northeast Asian nations have failed to come to terms with the past. Japan paid no reparations to its former colonies -- though it gave "grants and aid" to South Korea for normalizing their relations -- and China and Korea were excluded from the

San Francisco Treaty that settled Japanese war crimes and atrocities. Historical issues such as disputed territories and Japan's colonial rule were largely swept under the rug in the Cold War system.

The failure to address historical injustice and to reconcile differing views of the past has strained Sino-Japanese relations and friction between Japan and South Korea over Japan's colonial past remains intense. Even South Korea and China are sparring over the history of the ancient kingdom of Goguryeo. In addition, Taiwan is immersed in a reexamination of the past. The history question touches upon the most sensitive issues of national identity and now fuels the fires of nationalism in Northeast Asia.

In Korea, nationalism has offered a framework for dealing with victims of historical injustice such as the comfort women and forced laborers. It forces issues to be framed in binary opposition -- victims vs. aggressors -- and leaves little room for any alternative. Koreans are reluctant to acknowledge their atrocities during the Vietnam War, but readily criticize similar acts committed by the U.S. during the Korean War. Disputes over the kingdom of Goguryeo reflect lingering irredentist Korean nationalism as well as China's rising nationalism.

In Japan, uncertainties and anxieties created by the post-Cold War security environment and a decade of economic stagnation provided a fertile ground for nationalist politics. Nationalist scholars are making headway in producing textbooks to "make Japanese proud of themselves." Increased official use of such symbols as the flag and the national anthem used by imperial Japan are part of Japan's quest to become a "normal nation." The goodwill generated by Prime Minister Abe's visit to China and South Korea soon after taking office, suggesting a conciliatory policy toward Asia, has been undermined by his recent remarks on the comfort woman issue. If there is any difference between Korea and Japan, it is that the left in Korea -- as opposed to the right in Japan -- is at the forefront of nationalist politics.

China is promoting nationalism to bolster social and political cohesion. Beijing needs a new unifying force to mobilize the nation in pursuit of common goals, such as economic modernization, and the "glue" is nationalism. In the post-Tiananmen era, the Chinese leadership appealed to nationalism (patriotism) to shore up their tainted legitimacy. Nationalism also underpins Chinese foreign policy, both in the region and elsewhere. Territorial disputes, human rights issues, nonproliferation issues -- all of these touch the nationalist nerves of Chinese leaders in Beijing. They do not want to jeopardize relations with their Asian neighbors, but neither do they want to lose face.

Thus, despite increased intra-Asian trade, cultural exchanges, and talk about an East Asian community, Korea, Japan, and China all still find politics of national identity appealing. After all, nationalism is not only about ideology, but also thrives on narrowly defined "national interests." Disputed territories always serve as symbols of national sovereignty that cannot be compromised. The mutual suspicion of Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and other territorial waters, as well as the recent escalation of Japan-Korean tension over Dokdo/Takeshima are but two potent reminders.

There is widespread recognition of the need for reconciliation and the final resolution of historical injustices. But there is a fundamental obstacle to reconciliation -- the existence of divided, even conflicting, historical memories. All of the nations involved are bound by very distinct perceptions of history, often contradictory and separated by different accounts of the past and of the context of events. These perceptions are deeply imbedded in public consciousness, transmitted by education, popular culture and through the mass media.

The most daunting task is coming to a common understanding of the past. Whereas a shared view of the past (World War II at least) served to unify (Western) Europe after two devastating wars, history still divides these three close Asian neighbors. Reconciliation has been "thin," and the history issue continues to mar regional cooperation. To achieve a "thicker" reconciliation, they need to move beyond nation-state-oriented, binary victim/aggressor concepts and approaches, and understand reconciliation as a mutual, interactive process. Citizens' groups, NGOs, victim-activist groups -- be they domestic, transnational, or international, and regardless of political orientation -- should be more actively involved.

Second, Northeast Asian nations must recognize that elements in their shared past may contribute to promoting regional reconciliation. China, Japan, and Korea often argue over history, but it is nonetheless true that elements in their past may also contribute to a regional identity. Coping with Western influence since the 19th century is but one area of common ground. Their experience of building modern nation-states and economies is another example. There exist ample cases and instances of common experiences that can be readily used to formulate a shared view of Northeast Asia's modern history.

Third, we need to encourage and teach critical and independent thinking to young Asians about their respective pasts. In particular, we need to cultivate a mutually acceptable, new national history of each country, resituated in a shared regional identity. Nationalism, regionalism, and internationalism will always coexist, but they need not contradict one another. In this critical time of change and desire to cultivate a shared view, we need to redefine these mutually reinforcing ideologies beyond a narrow, exclusive sense of nation.

Ultimately, building a vision for Northeast Asia's future beyond narrow national and political interests requires enlightened political leadership. Unfortunately, until now, the region has not seen such a visionary leader who is committed to cultivating regional reconciliation. On the contrary, many leaders have politicized the history problem for domestic, nationalist consumption. Interpretations of the past are unavoidably political, producing divided memories, and there is strong temptation to politicize the process for current ideological purposes. However tempting, politically convenient, and even psychologically satisfying it may be to blame others, such an approach will neither heal past wounds nor provide a foundation for the future. We need political leadership that can build public support for sometimes unpopular policies aimed at regional reconciliation.

Reprinted with permission from the Korea Herald.