The following is Part 2 of a two-article series on facilitating cross-cultural online learning. For Part 1, please go here.

Last month, I shared my reflections on a March 20, 2020 virtual class (VC) session that SPICE facilitated for high school students in Japan and the United States to engage in a cross-cultural online exchange. This online discussion engaged my U.S.-based students of the 2020 Reischauer Scholars Program and Waka Brown’s Japan-based students of the Spring 2020 Stanford e-Japan Program in a Zoom session, during which they talked and learned with and from one another on a range of topics, including the impact of COVID-19 within their respective communities.

During the main portion of the session, the 45 students were divided into six small breakout rooms to engage in 40 minutes of discussion. Each group had a designated volunteer student moderator and a notetaker/reporter; the latter was asked to share the key points of discussion from his or her small group when we reconvened towards the end of the 90-minute VC. All discussions were conducted in English, with the exception of one group, which was designated as a bilingual space for students who felt comfortable conversing in both English and Japanese.

Since this was the 2020 students’ first opportunity to meet (another joint VC on comparative education took place on April 10), we felt it important to preface the session by setting a few ground rules for discussion. Communication styles and norms—particularly in group settings—tend to be quite different in Japan and the United States. We have found it helpful, for example, to address these differences up-front to alleviate potential cross-cultural misunderstandings.

For assessment purposes, we also asked students to send feedback on their experiences in the session. Some of their comments are included below as we turn to the student perspectives on what they experienced in this joint online discussion. More specific points from our observations and students’ feedback fall into five areas.

First, the session provided a platform for students to talk openly about the COVID-19 pandemic and also to learn about perspectives from another country. Risako of Stanford e-Japan reflected, “I could … learn about the way American students perceive political issues and coronavirus through an absorbing discussion and was surprised to discover that their perspectives were much more similar to Japanese students than I had expected.” Alika of the RSP noted, “It was really interesting to me to see how different countries are coping with the virus. I was pretty surprised to hear that many Japanese people still use public transport/eat out at restaurants and go on with their daily lives in the face of the global pandemic.” She continued, “I think some of the e-Japan students were also surprised to hear that California has a ‘6 feet apart’ rule and that many restaurants have closed as a precaution.” Yasuyuki from Japan added, “It’s not difficult to look up the news to find out about what’s going on in America, but living in Japan, you hardly ever get the chance to talk with people in America and hear from the horse’s mouth.”

Second, the session underscored the importance of empathy at times like this. Kristie from the RSP commented, “I always enjoy finding commonalities between me and others, and I think our shared experiences with the coronavirus really allowed us to connect and understand one another. I think the most important thing I will take away from this experience is that youth in Japan and America are really no different—despite our varied experiences and interests we were able to communicate about issues facing our countries and relate to one another on a deeper level.” Similarly, Yuna of Stanford e-Japan noted, “Since I have had only [a] few opportunities to interact with American high schoolers, it was a precious time for me. It was wonderful especially because we both were interested in each other. Talking ... with them made me realize how [thin] the border between our minds actually are. We were, after all, just friends.”

Third, the session prompted students to reexamine their own culture. For example, Hiromu of Stanford e-Japan noted, “I feel very pleased to have such a wonderful opportunity to teach them [the RSP students about Japanese language] and, simultaneously, however, recognized how I lack information about Japanese culture. I think this integrated meeting is vital in that it provides us opportunities for looking back on our culture and broaden[ing] our narrow-minded thoughts.” Jin of the RSP added, “What’s more, they [the Stanford e-Japan students] all spoke fluent English. This made me reflect on the world languages education in the U.S. I think the U.S. should incorporate more global studies (both language and culture) in the education system. America-centric curriculum will cause the younger generation to lose a global vision, and become unaware of Japan as a major political and economic ally in East Asia.”

Fourth, the session shed light upon how diverse both countries are. Jin of the RSP noted, “I’ve always thought that Japan has a rather homogeneous population, but talking to e-Japan students has given me a new perspective on Japanese society. I encountered a student from Myanmar who is living in Japan currently, a Japanese student who used to live in NYC for four years, and a student from Singapore who has been studying abroad in Europe for a couple years.” Rinako of Stanford e-Japan reflected, “Up until now, even when I had the chance to communicate with people outside of Japan, it was usually done in English. However, this time, all three of the Reischauer Scholar students [in her small group] spoke fluent Japanese which made me very happy as we were able to use both English and Japanese.”

Fifth, we came to realize how invaluable international and cross-cultural dialog—especially during times of crisis—can be for students. Having a session during such an unprecedented time seemed to add special significance to the experience. Brandon of the RSP noted, “Overall, it was an extremely memorable discussion, and I hope that we can continue this kind of online cross-cultural connection throughout the rest of the program.” Many Stanford e-Japan students like Fuka also reflected upon the opportunity to discuss critical topics like the coronavirus at this time. She noted, “It gave me a chance to think about familiar issues not just with people of my own country but with people from all kinds of backgrounds.”

Students are among those most acutely experiencing the direct impact of this global pandemic. As they look into the future with confusion and uncertainty about their educational prospects and options, our students seemed to find comfort in this opportunity to connect with their like-minded peers across the Pacific. As they reflected upon their differences, they deepened their understanding of one another and forged what I hope become lasting friendships.

For more information about the Reischauer Scholars Program or the Stanford e-Japan Program, please visit our programs’ webpages at reischauerscholars.org and stanfordejapan.org. SPICE also offers other online courses to U.S. high school students on China (China Scholars Program) and Korea (Sejong Korea Scholars Program), and an online course to Chinese high school students on the United States (Stanford e-China Program).

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Related articles:

• Bridging “Social Distancing” Across the Pacific: 6 Tips for Facilitating Cross-Cultural Online Learning
• SPICE’s Stanford e-Japan Instructor Waka Takahashi Brown Honored with the Elgin Heinz Outstanding Teacher Award
• Stanford e-Japan: My Window to the Wider World
• Honoring High School Students from Japan and the United States: A Glow for Global Peace
• The RSP: A Stepping Stone in My Journey with Japan
• Yanai Tadashi Foundation and SPICE/Stanford University

WATARU FUKUDA
Chief Representative of the Shizuoka Prefectural Government in Singapore
Global Affiliates Program Fellow, 2014-16

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TSUYOSHI KOSHIKAWA
Chief Advisor, Japan International Cooperation Agency Expert for the Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Industry in Myanmar
Global Affiliates Program Fellow, 2014-15

I currently live in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, though I am originally from Japan. Naypyitaw is currently not under shelter-in-place, though the city of Yangon is. In Naypyitaw, restaurants are serving only take-out meals, and most amusement facilities like movie theaters, karaoke boxes, bars, and beauty salons have been closed. There are still a few big department stores open, as well as the public golf course and tennis courts.

At the time of this writing, the number of known COVID-19 cases in Myanmar is nearly 150, and I am worried about the potential risks because the healthcare and medical information systems here are not as organized as in countries like Japan, the UK, or the United States.

Anyone with a fever of 37.5 degrees C (99.5 F) or higher is being kept from entering Yangon. The Ministry of Health is taking all traveler’s temperatures at the airport, railways stations, and the exits of all highway interchanges throughout Yangon. Foreigners with a fever of 38 degrees C (100.4 F) have been told that they will not be permitted into private hospitals anywhere in Myanmar at present. Isolation wards in general hospitals will accommodate foreigners. The situation is frightening, but with frequent handwashing and hygiene, we are trying to take care of each other.

XIAOYUAN SHI
Deputy General Manager in the Internal Audit Bureau at the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
Global Affiliates Program Fellow, 2012-13

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Thankfully, our efforts have worked. The new confirmed cases are mostly coming in from foreign travel. Big cities like Beijing and Shanghai have low infection rates, and people feel much less stressed. Social life, work, and production are recovering, and the lockdown of Wuhan City has been lifted. Most schools will continue to use online classes for the time being and restaurants are still not fully open, but I think the most difficult time is behind us.

It’s impossible to spot all of the potential virus carriers, and therefore precautionary measures like avoiding going out unnecessarily, wearing masks in public, and handwashing are still recommended. I’ve not heard of COVID-19 cases or deaths among my acquaintances, thankfully, but the conditions here have proven that this virus is highly infectious and death is possible. I hope our practices here can provide some references for other places where it is spreading.

Early this year, Vladimir Putin had big plans for an excellent spring:  first, constitutional amendments approved by the legislative branch and public allowing him the opportunity to remain in power until 2036, followed by a huge patriotic celebration of the 75^th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.  Well, stuff happens—specifically, COVID-19.  Putin’s spring has turned out quite differently from what he had hoped.

Big Plans for the Spring

The president surprised Russians on January 15 in his annual speech to the Federal Assembly (the lower house of the Russian legislative branch).  He proposed amending the constitution to reduce the authority of the presidency, increase the power of the Federal Assembly, and provide a legal basis for a State Council.

The amendments prompted speculation that Putin, who likes to have options, sought to create ways to hold on to power after 2024, when term limits would require him to step down from the presidency.  He might become an empowered prime minister or head the State Council.

Then, on March 10, another surprise.  A Federal Assembly deputy proposed an additional amendment that would, in effect, allow Putin to run for president twice more, opening the possibility that he could remain in office until 2036.  He had consistently argued in the past against ending term limits.  However, according to the Kremlin spokesperson, Putin was so taken with the deputy’s justification that he changed his mind on the spot.

Things can move fast in Russia—especially when Putin wants them.  On March 11, the Federal Assembly approved the constitutional amendments by a vote of 383-0, and the Federal Council (Russia’s senate) gave its approval 160-1.  (Nothing like having a rubber-stamp legislative branch.)  Within two days, all 85 regional parliaments had approved the amendments.  The Constitutional Court worked over a weekend and, on March 16, unsurprisingly found the amendments consistent with the constitution.

All told, it took just six days to check the legal requirements for amending the constitution.  Putin, however, desired more.  He called in January for a nationwide referendum on April 22 to approve the package of amendments.  The constitution provides no requirement for such a vote.  Putin wanted it to further legitimize the changes to the constitution.  Popular endorsement would undercut any future challenge should he decide to run for reelection in 2024.

Topping off the spring would be the May 9 celebration of the 75^th anniversary of VE Day.  Putin has built this holiday up to rival New Year’s Day, traditionally the biggest holiday for Russians.  The celebration of World War II veterans and a large military parade on Red Square not only remind Russians of their country’s part in defeating Hitler, but they also play well to the themes of nationalism and Russia’s place as a great power on the world stage that Putin has embraced and perpetuated, particularly over the past eight years.

COVID-19 Intrudes

Alas for Putin, reality intruded.  The number of COVID-19 cases began to grow in mid-March.  As of April 21, the country reported over 52,000 cases, with more than half of those just in Moscow.  The number undoubtedly is understated—as in many countries—if for no other reason than some are asymptomatic or suffer mild symptoms.  There are also indications that local health authorities are underreporting cases.

Moscow’s mayor adopted a shelter-at-home policy, but with lots of exceptions.  While the mayor asserted that the city’s hospitals had sufficient capacity, medical staff described more difficult situations, and videos showed ambulances in line to wait hours to admit patients.  The health infrastructure outside of Moscow and other large cities is weaker, raising concern about the virus’s impact in rural areas.

Much like his American counterpart, Putin responded slowly to the mushrooming health crisis, leaving it to mayors and regional authorities to manage.  Sounding a lot like Donald Trump in February, Putin told Russians on April 19 (Orthodox Easter) “the situation is under full control.”  He has raised his public profile the past ten days, conducting videoconferences from his residence outside Moscow.  Russia, however, may be just beginning its COVID-19 trial.

As the number of cases grew in March, questions arose about the feasibility of the April 22 referendum.  Putin apparently very much desired it, and the Kremlin wanted a large turnout to bolster the referendum’s legitimacy.  Some suggested the referendum could be conducted over several days, allowing voters to space out visits to polling stations.  But the Kremlin bowed to reality and announced on March 25 that the referendum would be postponed.

Likewise, the Kremlin hoped that the May 9 commemoration could go forward, and troops began practicing for the military parade (one video showed thousands of soldiers in close formation with no masks).  However, the day’s heroes—World War II veterans now in their 90s—constitute an age-group very vulnerable to COVID-19.  Going forward with a celebration that could devastate their ranks hardly made sense.  On April 16, Putin announced a postponement.

The Economic Prognosis Looks Grim

Instead of a big public endorsement of his constitutional amendments and a patriotic gala on May 9, Putin faces a daunting challenge:  the combination of COVID-19 and an economy in trouble.  Under the virus’s impact, Russia’s already anemic economy is headed for recession.  The International Monetary Fund expects it to contract by 5.5 percent in 2020.

Complicating the economic picture for the Kremlin is continued application of Western sanctions due to Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its conflict with Ukraine in Donbas.  Economists estimate they cost Russia 1-1.5 percent of its gross domestic product.  While Russian officials downplay the effect, they miss few opportunities to ask for their removal.  For example, Putin used his intervention in the March 26 videoconference of G20 leaders to call for an end to all international sanctions.

COVID-19 has another negative impact on the Russian economy.  It has crashed global demand for oil, by far Russia’s most important export.  Perhaps not expecting the economic consequences of the virus, Russia on March 6 did not agree to an OPEC proposal to reduce production.  Igor Sechin, head of the Rosneft Oil Company and a close associate of Putin, reportedly wanted to drive the price down to push U.S. shale oil producers out of the market (their production has boosted the United States to supplant Russia and Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer).

The price dropped, more than Sechin might have anticipated.  Saudi Arabia responded to Russia’s refusal to cut production by boosting its own output and cutting the price.  On March 8, the price of oil fell 30 percent.  The resulting havoc hurt both sides.  On April 9, Russia and OPEC agreed to cut production by about 10 million barrels per day.

Whether that will suffice is uncertain.  The global economic slowdown has caused demand for oil to drop by 20-25 millions barrels per day.  On April 21, the price of a barrel of Brent oil fell below $20, a price not seen since 2002.  That was down from $74 one year earlier (the Russian government budget was designed to balance at a price of $42 per barrel).  The per barrel export duty collected by the Russian government fell to below $1, also the lowest since 2002.  Russia has to cut 2.5 million of barrels per day of production to meet its part of the April 9 agreement.  With oil storage facilities nearing capacity, there may well be further price drops before things turn around.

None of this is good news for the Russian economy, but how hard a hit it will take remains to be seen.  Thus far, the Kremlin has adopted a stimulus package to counter the COVID-19 economic consequences that is relatively modest, especially compared to programs being implemented by the United States, Germany, Britain and other industrial countries.

Managing the health crisis and its economic consequences, which could affect Putin’s approval rating—something to which the Kremlin pays extraordinarily close attention—is now the Russian president’s top preoccupation.  This is not anything like he anticipated three months ago.