The faculty and staff of Stanford's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, as well as the undersigned alumni of the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program, wish to protest the completely unjustified arrest and pending trial of the researcher Tatiana Kouzina on June 28, 2021 by Belarusian authorities. Ms. Kouzina now faces unspecified criminal charges that could lead to her extended detention.

Following a fraudulent presidential election in August 2020, there have been ongoing peaceful protests and demonstrations in opposition of the Belarusian government and President Alexander Lukashenko. During this time, the government has unjustly arrested thousands of activists and protesters. Waves of repression reached politicians, civil society organizations, media, the research community, and ordinary citizens. The arrest of Ms. Kouzina is another in a series of troubling steps that the Belarusian government has taken against its people. We call for the release of Ms. Kouzina and other political prisoners currently being held in Belarus.

Ms. Kouzina is a highly respected Belarusian expert who was the co-founder, teacher, and researcher at the School of Young Managers in Public Administration (SYMPA) and the Belarusian Institute for Public Administration Reform and Transformation (BIPART). In this capacity, she conducted substantial research in the field and contributed to numerous policy and research documents, including as part of SYMPA's participation in EU-STRAT, an international research project implemented by a consortium of the leading European universities (including the Free University of Berlin and Leiden University, Netherlands) and think tanks in 2016-2019. As a long-time recognized member of the Belarusian research community, Ms. Kouzina has contributed immensely to its development and sustainability. From 2010-2015, she was the Executive Director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) and has cooperated with the Belarus Research Council (BRC), other Belarusian think tanks, and civil society organizations throughout her career.

Ms. Kouzina's arrest is a shocking example of the current Belarusian regime's repressive policies that have attacked other members of the Belarusian research and expert community. As researchers ourselves and members of the broader global democratic community, we strongly protest this arbitrary arrest and demand that Ms. Kouzina be released immediately.

Signed,

Francis Fukuyama, Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, USA

Michael McFaul, Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, USA

Olga Stuzhinskaya, international affairs and development expert, founder and former director of the Office for a Democratic Belarus in Brussels, CDDRL alumni 2006

Victor Liakh, East Europe Foundation, Ukraine

Hoi Trịnh, Board Member, VOICE, USA

Anna Dobrovolskaya, Memorial Human Rights Center, Россия

Mahdi Al Hajat, free journalist, Iraq

Haykuhi Harutyunyan, Corruption prevention commission, Armenia

Ruby Tetteh, Deputy Director, MOTI, Ghana

Denis Volkov, CDDRL alumni, Russia

Dmytro Potekhin, CEO, Factology.Systems, Ukraine

Abbas Milani, Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies, Stanford University, USA

Sasha Jason, Program Manager, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, USA

Professor Donald Emmerson, Senior Fellow Emeritus, Stanford University, USA

Jamie O'Connell, Lecturer in Residence, Stanford Law School, and CDDRL affiliated faculty, USA

Belinda Byrne, Program Administrator, Stanford University, USA

Katherine Welsh, Administrative Associate at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Stanford University, USA

Amr Hamzawy, Senior research scholar, Stanford University, USA

Erik Jensen, Professor of the Practice of Law, Director, Rule of Law Program, Stanford Law School, USA

Anna Grzymala-Busse, Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of International Studies, Stanford University, USA

Marcel Fafchamps, Senior Fellow, CDDRL, Stanford University, USA

Yusmadi Yusoff, People's Justice Party (KEADILAN), Malaysia

Olga Aivazovska, Head of Board, Civil Network OPORA, Ukraine

Befekadu Hailu, Center for Advancement of Rights and Democracy (CARD), Ethiopia

Varvara Pakhomenko, Consultant, Russia

Olena Sotnyk, Human rights defender, Ukraine

Elsa Marie DSilva, Red Dot Foundation, India

Laila Kiki, The Syria Campaign, Syria

Alla Kos, Austria

Nino Evgenidze, EPRC, Georgia

James D. Fearon, Professor, Stanford University, USA

Nino Chichua, Georgia Healthcare Group, Georgia

Janaína Homerin, Draper Hills Summer Fellow, Brazil

David Smolansky, Mayor in Exile, Venezuela

Hadeel AlQaq, Jordan

Eka Kemularia, Director, Green Line, Georgia

Yuriy Bugay, Independent consultant, NGO activist, Ukraine

Lauren Weitzman, Program Manager CDDRL, Stanford University, USA

Steve Luby, Professor of Medicine, Stanford University, USA

"Haley's thesis is a critical analysis of the human rights discourse on North Korea. She notes that the human rights abuses are indisputable; but she finds a degree of tone-deafness around human rights activism that she traces to an absence of definition of terms," says Dafna Zur, Associate Professor, Korean Literature and Culture and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies. “Her inquiry led to two threads of analysis: the first is a deconstruction of some of the assumptions made by human rights' actors (and her exposure of their sometimes contradictory approaches); and the second is her reading of North Korean fiction as a way of understanding the relationship between the individual and the state. Haley's thesis brings a fresh perspective on what is typically a highly charged topic, and leaves room for possible policy adjustments.”

In Gordon's own words: "My thesis explores the contentious conversation surrounding North Korean human rights. If there is widespread agreement that North Korea’s human rights situation is appalling, then why is there still such heated disagreement over how best to improve it? What exactly are we talking about when we say ‘human rights’ in the context of North Korea? By way of answering these questions, I argue that the various governments, NGOs, activists, and international bodies that have a stake in the human rights conversation prioritize different historical goals and motives—denuclearization, reunification of the Korean Peninsula, regime change, etc.— that then shape their approaches to human rights.”

“I argue that it is also important to examine how human rights are conceived of within North Korea, in order to better understand—although not condone—the country’s ongoing abuses.” Gordon comments, “In the absence of an open and honest rights dialogue within the DPRK, I analyze state-sanctioned works of fiction, looking at how human rights, as manifested in the relationship between the state and individual, are presented to the North Korean populace. These stories illuminate a concept of human rights that prioritizes the right to survival of the North Korean nation itself; one that is very much at odds with the goals of other stakeholders."

Sponsored by the Korea Program and the Center for East Asian Studies, the writing prize recognizes and rewards outstanding examples of writing by Stanford students in an essay, term paper or thesis produced during the current academic year in any discipline within the area of Korean studies, broadly defined. The competition is open to both undergraduate and graduate students.

Past Recipients:
9th Annual Prize (2020)
8th Annual Prize (2019)
7th Annual Prize (2018)
6th Annual Prize (2017)
5th Annual Prize (2016)
4th Annual Prize (2015)
3rd Annual Prize (2014)
2nd Annual Prize (2013)
1st Annual Prize (2012)

In collaboration with Global:SF and the State of California Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development, the China Program at Shorenstein APARC presented session five of the New Economy Conference, "Navigating Chinese Investment, Trade, and Technology," on May 19. The program featured distinguished speakers Ambassador Craig Allen, President of the US-China Business Council; David K. Cheng, Chair and Managing Partner of China & Asia Pacific Practice at Nixon Peabody LLP; James Green, Senior Research Fellow at the Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues at Georgetown University; and Anja Manuel, Co-Founder and Principal of Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. The session was opened by Darlene Chiu Bryant, Executive Director of GlobalSF, and moderated by Professor Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics and director of the APARC China Program.

U.S.-China economic relations have grown increasingly fraught and competitive. Even amidst intensifying tensions, however, our two major economies remain intertwined. While keeping alert to national security concerns, the economic strength of the United States will depend on brokering a productive competition with China, the world’s fastest growing economy. Precipitous decoupling of trade, investment, and human talent flows between the two nations will inflict unnecessary harm to U.S. economic interests--and those of California.  

Chinese trade and investments into California have grown exponentially over the last decade. But they have come under increasing pressure following geopolitical and economic tensions between the two nations, particularly in the science and technology sectors. Ambassador Craig Allen, David Cheng, James Green, and Anja Manuel explored the role of Chinese economic activity in California in the context of the greater US-Chinese relationship. Watch now: 

This commentary by Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Charles Crabtree was originally published in The Hill.

The recent White House summit meeting between President Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga signaled to the world, and especially to China, that the U.S.-Japan alliance is strong and ready for intensifying competition in Asia.

For the first time in more than 50 years, the Japanese and American leaders mentioned Taiwan in their joint statement. China immediately responded with strong words, as expected, but since has moderated its tone. Furthermore, Chinese leader Xi Jinping participated in the U.S.-organized Leaders Summit on Climate the week after the Biden-Suga meeting and took a collaborative stance, a hopeful sign that competition will not eliminate the possibility of some collaboration and that climate change is an area where Beijing, Tokyo and Washington can work together.

But the U.S. and Japan still have at least three concerns about China: Beijing’s continued posturing on Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands; its significant leverage in economic relations; and its repression of human rights in Xinjiang, Hong Kong and beyond. How should the alliance handle these important issues? 

On the security front, America’s return to multilateralism under Biden is a welcome development for Japan and other like-minded states in the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is obviously central in the coalition of democratic nations concerned about China’s ambitions. The primary goal of these countries ought to be walking the thin line between demonstrating their resolve to counter any aggressive behavior by China with force and avoiding any unnecessary provocation against China. 

Toward that end, the most promising framework is the Quad that includes India and Australia in addition to Japan and the U.S. The first-ever leader-level meeting in March elevated the Quad’s status significantly. While it still is a long way from becoming a NATO-like security apparatus — and it’s not even clear if that’s the consensus goal — it could help stabilize the region by creating a credible counterweight to check China’s territorial ambitions.

Beyond the Quad, the inclusion of other like-minded stakeholders such as South Korea and ASEAN countries on security matters is important. With South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s visit to Washington planned in late May, a good first step for the Biden administration would be to invest some diplomatic capital in mending fences between Japan and South Korea. A full-scale reconciliation between the two regional powers is unlikely this year; Suga faces elections in the fall, for which he needs to consolidate the conservative base, and Moon is a lame duck with limited political power. But some reconciliation would be welcome for the U.S. as it seeks to resurrect the trilateral alliance with Japan and South Korea to complement the Quad in deterring China’s ambitions and addressing the threat posed by North Korea. 

In the economic domain, China is arguably even more difficult to contain, being the largest trade partner for virtually all the countries in the region. Decoupling from China was a key theme at the Biden-Suga summit, but this is a task that has proven much easier said than done. From semiconductors to rare earth minerals, the battle for key materials for the 21st century economy will only intensify, and China’s grand scheme in the Belt and Road Initiative needs to be countered by a similarly grand long-term strategy that would flesh out the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.

In this regard, the U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience Partnership can be quite consequential. In addition to pledging cooperation on “sensitive supply-chain” issues, it outlines the agenda for technological innovation that cuts across security and economic domains, making it a critical tool in the competition with China. This is because whoever develops an edge in transformational technologies — such as artificial intelligence, 5G infrastructure, and outer space development — will enjoy diplomatic and military advantages as well as economic profits. The combined $4.5 billion investment in the partnership is a good first step to ensuring that the U.S. and Japan retain an innovation advantage. Additional expenditures likely will be necessary, though, considering China’s commitment in these areas.

On human rights, Japan and America take different approaches. While the U.S. has called the situation in Xinjiang a genocide and imposed sanctions there, as well as in Myanmar following the military coup, Japan has taken a more subdued stance. This is a standard approach for Tokyo, which prefers to emphasize engagement with violating governments.

The Biden administration seems to accept Suga’s strategy of engagement, and perhaps the diplomatic channel that this approach provides can be useful in negotiating some kind of settlement. However, the strategy of engagement that has produced some benefits in countries such as Thailand and possibly Myanmar is unlikely to be as effective with China. Furthermore, several Western corporations are facing boycotts in China for taking a stand against forced labor in Xinjiang. If Japanese corporations avoid paying the price and continue business as usual, Tokyo might face greater pressure to take some action. Given the central importance of the Chinese market for Japanese businesses, this could give rise to significant tension between Tokyo and Washington. 

On all these dimensions, for Japan and the U.S. to be effective in countering China, both Biden and Suga would have to consolidate domestic support. Biden’s first 100 days generally were seen as successful, with COVID-19 vaccine distribution going smoothly and Congress passing ambitious spending bills. Besides, Biden has at least until the midterm elections in November 2022 to move things forward.

The timetable is less friendly for Suga, who needs to win the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election in September and hold a House of Representatives election by October. His fate will be shaped in large measure by his government’s pandemic response and how that influences economic fortunes, and to a lesser extent the success of the Tokyo Olympics. Most Tokyo insiders predict that he will remain in office past October, citing weak opposition both in and outside of the ruling LDP. If, however, COVID-19 vaccine distribution does not move forward by the fall, as projected by the government, and the economy continues to slide, that could still trip him up.

Only with domestic political stability and economic prosperity can Tokyo and Washington take the next steps in projecting strength vis-à-vis China, and that is the best deterrent against China’s expansionist ambitions and toward ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific area.