The Development and Future of China's Semiconductor Industry
China's integrated circuit market is the fastest growing in the world, increasing from 7 percent of the world in 2000 to 20 percent in 2004. China's State Council has set the ambitious goal of having domestic production satisfy most of this demand, while closing the technology gap with developed countries.
Mr. Yu, President of the China Semiconductor Industry Association and former chief engineer of the Ministry of Electronics, is uniquely positioned to review the past decade's transition of the Chinese semiconductor industry from state controlled enterprises to growing companies responding to market forces. Mr. Yu will also provide his insights on the future of China's high tech development and its ramifications for trade relations with the U.S.
Mr. Yu Zhongyu has been engaged in semiconductor research and management for many years and is one of the leaders of China's integrated circuit (IC) industry. He has engaged in research and design of IC products and was honored with the National Science and Technology Award. Having joined the government in 1988, he was responsible for organizing and leading the IC project during "7th five-year plan" and "8th five-year plan"; he acted as a member of the leading group for the National "908" project and headed the construction leading group of the Huahong factory in the "909" project. These projects made important contributions to China's IC industry development. Mr. Yu has been the President of the China Semiconductor Industry Association since 2001.
Philippines Conference Room
Indonesia's Yudhoyono: A Strong Leader At Last?
After more than 30 years under the strong leadership of Suharto, Indonesians saw three weak and not always legitimate presidents come and go: B. J. Habibie (1998-99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), and Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004). Democratization went forward. Yet Indonesians increasingly longed for a stronger
government that could deliver on its promises, including economic development. In 2004 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) won the country's first-ever direct presidential election by a landslide. During the campaign he promised, above all, an effective
government. Looking back on his first year, how has he performed? Has he broken the string of weak leaders? Will he grow in his job to become more effective? More
broadly, are weak leaders good for democracy but bad for development? Or does Indonesia illustrate some other relationship between national leadership, political
openness, and economic progress?
Hadi Soesastro is currently a visiting professor in the Weatherhead Institute of East Asian Studies at Columbia University. He has been with CSIS since 1971. His research interests include the political economy of development, regionalism, and trade, and energy issues, topics on which he has published and lectured widely. Recent writing on Indonesia includes an essay in Economic Recovery and Reform (2004). Dr. Soesastro chairs the International Steering Committee of PAFTAD (Pacific Trade and Development) and serves as an adjunct professor at the Australian National University in Canberra. In Indonesia he has served as a member of the National Research Council and the National Economic Council. He earned his PhD from the RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, California.
Daniel I. Okimoto Conference Room
A Dynamic Model of the Demand for the Rule of Law in Post-Communist Economies
We investigate the demand for the rule of law in post-Communist economies after privatization under the assumption that theft is possible, that those who have "stolen" assets cannot be fully protected under a change in the legal regime towards "rule of law," and that the number of agents with control rights over assets is large. A demand for broadly beneficial legal reform may not emerge because the expectation of a legal vacuum increases the expected relative return to asset-stripping, and strippers may gain from a weak, corrupt state. The outcome can be inefficient even from the narrow perspective of the asset-strippers.
Encina Basement Conference Room
Avner Greif
Department of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Avner Greif is Professor of Economics and Bowman Family Endowed Professor in Humanities and Sciences at Stanford. His research interests include European economic history: the historical development of economic institutions, their interrelations with political, social and cultural factors and their impact on economic growth. Some of his publications are: Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge University Press (March 2006); Impersonal Exchange without Impartial Law: The Community Responsibility System, Chicago Journal of International Law (2004); How Do Self-enforcing Institutions Endogenously Change? Institutional Reinforcement and Quasi-Parameters (with David Laitin), the American Political Science Review (2003); Analytic Narratives, Oxford University Press, 1998. Avner Greif received his Ph. D. in economics from Northwestern University, and his B.A. in economics and history - from Tel Aviv University.
Gideon Maltz
N/A
Gideon Maltz is studying the role of presidential term limits in advancing democracy, strategies for more effectively enforcing term limits, and the question of term limits in the context of parliamentary systems. Gideon has worked as a Junior Fellow in the Democracy & Rule of Law program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and as a Business Analyst at McKinsey & Company. He has also spent time working on comparative constitutionalism as a part-time consultant at the National Endowment for Democracy, on Sudan and Zimbabwe at the International Crisis Group, and on international trade at the law firm of Hogan & Hartson.
Gideon graduated with a B.A. in Ethics, Politics & Economics from Yale and is currently a third-year student at Stanford Law School. He is also a graduate fellow at the Stanford Center for International Conflict and Negotiation (SCICN).
Julia Gray
N/A
Her dissertation research focuses on the role of international institutions in economic development. Specifically, the dissertation looks at which international institutions - including trade agreements and international treaties - give credibility to developing countries in the eyes of financial markets as well as contribute to the success or failure of domestic policy reform. She has previously worked in Prague for Transitions magazine which covers all 27 post-communist countries, as well as in Budapest for Freedom House as the program officer for the Regional Networking Project.
China's Rural Public Finance: The Village Perspective - Annex 7
This report provides a preliminary examination of changes in village fiscal affairs between 2000 and 2004. The basis for this assessment is a survey of 101 villages in 50 townships in 25 counties in 5 provinces in China that was carried out between March and April of 2005. The provinces include Jilin, Hebei, Shanxi, Sichuan and Jiangsu. In each province, the counties, townships and villages were selected to provide a representative cross-section. Our village survey was complemented by an investigation into fiscal changes in each of the 50 townships. In this report, we focus on the revenue and expenditure implications of these changes at the village level. We provide an overall assessment for all 100 villages, but also examine village-level differences across provinces, as well as differences between villages in the richest and poorest quintiles of our sample.
Afghanistan at Halftime
Afghanistan held its landmark legislative elections this Sunday. Almost exactly four years after 9/11, and the invasion that followed, Afghanistan will have, for the first time in its history, a democratically elected constitutional government. That is something remarkable, and cause to celebrate - but only in the way that one cheers hopefully during a tough game at halftime.
Everything we know about democracy promotion and post-conflict reconstruction tells us that Afghanistan is far from out of the woods. Even after significant international intervention, many failed states remain unstable, or relapse into conflict and chaos. Remember Haiti? The United States invaded in 1994 and oversaw reconstruction and elections in 1995 and 2000, as international forces slowly withdrew. By 2004, U.S. and United Nations Forces were dispatched to the troubled island again. Haiti is not an outlier. World Bank studies show that countries coming out of civil war are forty percent likely to return to war within five years. It took one horrific hurricane to turn New Orleans to chaos. Imagine the effects of 25 years of war.
One of the main reasons failing countries continue to fail is economic. Economic recovery after war provides one of the best measures of the likelihood of long-term stability. International assistance can play a key role in jump-starting the economy and paying for basic government services, but it can take a generation to return to pre-war standards of living. The problem is that donor countries tend to be most generous in the first few years of the crisis - when local capacity to do something with those funds is limited. And just when the government starts to get on its feet - usually around the four-year mark - the assistance dries up.
The Afghan economy has seen remarkable growth rates over the last four years, but that is only half good. There is a truly free market now in Afghanistan - free from the rule of law. Much of the growth has come from the booming opium trade and other smuggling operations. While a strong economy is necessary to rebuild state and society, a criminal economy will necessarily destroy them both.
Politically, Afghanistan is getting its first taste of real elections - but it is far from being a stable democracy. There were more than 5,000 candidates in the legislative elections this Sunday, violence was relatively low, and turnout decent - all signs that political participation is blossoming. But nobody knows who will run the new parliament, or how it will function. It has no building and no staff. The only other parliament in Afghanistan's history, from 1965 to 1973, is widely blamed for increasing the polarization that led to civil war there. Since armed warlords still dominate many parts of the country, they will undoubtedly be strongly represented in the new legislature. As we have seen in places like Liberia and Serbia, post-conflict elections can produce quite undemocratic leaders.
What does this mean for Afghanistan? First, it means that the next four years will be as important there as the last four. Afghanistan's leaders, elected and otherwise, must put the cause of their nation before their factional, ethnic and venal interests. For our part, the United States and its allies must continue to support Afghanistan, financially and militarily, until it gets out of the danger zone. That means the same level of support for at least another four years.
Second, it means we have to shift our mentality there from short term to long term. If the United States has one overarching goal, it must be to build a legitimate Afghan state that is strong enough to survive and competent enough to deliver results. The Afghan police and legal system remain in shambles. Afghanistan's school system was rated the worst in the world last year by the United Nations Development Program. More international support needs to go to education, training a capable Afghan government, and supporting the rule of law.
Finally, it means something a little more intangible: continued political attention. If Afghanistan falls off the policy agenda in Washington, London and Berlin, the dangers that lurk there will prosper. Lagging reconstruction is already creating support for the ongoing Taliban insurgency. An unchecked opium trade keeps warlord armies well fed.
On this anniversary, we must remember the true cause of those grim attacks four years ago: Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had free reign of a failed state in chaos. We may not be able to find bin Laden, but we know where Afghanistan is located.
Jeongsik Ko
Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Jeongsik Ko is a visiting scholar at Shorenstein APARC. Since 1998, he has been a professor in the Department of China Studies at Korea's Paichai University. He has also held senior positions at the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (Beijing branch), the Modern Chinese Association of Korea, and the Northeast Asian Economic Association of Korea. Professor Ko has published a number of books and articles on economics, politics, and trade competitiveness between China and Korea. He received his PhD in economics from Yonsei University.