Donald Trump’s decisive victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election has reignited debates about the United States' role in a world increasingly defined by geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, and democratic recession. The return of Trump to the White House will have profound implications for Asia. To assess the stakes for the region, APARC convened a panel of experts who weighed in on the potential risks and opportunities the second Trump administration’s policies may pose for Asian nations and how regional stakeholders look at their future with the United States. Another panel, organized by APARC’s China Program, focused on what’s ahead for U.S.-China relations.

High Stakes for the Asia-Pacific

APARC’s panel, The 2024 U.S. Presidential Elections: High Stakes for Asia, examined how the return of Trump’s political ideology and the macroeconomic effects of his foreign policy will affect Asia.

“We are witnessing the solidification of Trumpism as an influential political ideology,” stated APARC and Korea Program Director Gi-Wook Shin at the opening of the discussion, “one that has begun to transcend traditional  American conservatism. Trumpism — marked by a blend of economic nationalism, nativism, and a strongman approach to leadership —could have a huge impact not only in American society but also on the liberal global order.”

According to Shin, Trump’s policies, particularly his focus on unilateralism and economic self-interest, could significantly alter the political and economic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region.

Political scientist Francis Fukuyama, the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, argued that Trump’s victory was no longer an anomaly but part of a larger trend of working-class voters shifting allegiance from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Fukuyama expressed concerns about Trump’s aggressive economic policies, including imposing broad tariffs on allies and adversaries alike, and warned that such policies could result in inflation, trade tensions, and long-term economic instability. In addition, he asserted that Trump’s reluctance to engage in foreign conflicts could undermine the United States’ commitments to security alliances, particularly in Asia.

APARC Deputy Director and Japan Program Director Kiyoteru Tsutsui emphasized the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s policies, noting that Trump’s "America First" approach could further erode the international liberal order. He suggested that Japan would face significant challenges navigating the unpredictability of Trump’s foreign policies. According to Tsutsui, “There might be greater pressure to line up with the United States in dealing with China economically, which would  put a great deal of strain on the Japanese economy.” Such an alignment might also muddle Japan’s own diplomatic and security interests.

Gita Wirjawan, a visiting scholar with Stanford's Precourt Institute for Energy and former visiting scholar at APARC, focused on the stakes for Southeast Asia. Wirjawan argued that Trump’s economic policies, such as protectionism and prioritizing economic growth over democratic principles, could embolden right-wing populist movements in Southeast Asia. He suggested that parts of Southeast Asia could be a natural beneficiary of a reallocation of financial capital from the U.S. as companies diversify supply chains by establishing operations outside China in response to Trump’s planned tariffs. Yet, growing economic inequality in Southeast Asia, particularly in urban areas, could fuel the rise of similar nationalist policies, undermining efforts to promote inclusive, democratic development.

Shin highlighted the challenges South Korea might face under a second Trump presidency. Trump will likely demand higher defense payments from South Korea, potentially straining the U.S.-ROK alliance. This could put President Yoon in a tough spot, especially as trilateral U.S.-Japan-Korea cooperation has been progressing well but faces uncertainty. Economically, South Korean firms may struggle if U.S. policies like the Inflation Reduction Act and CHIPS Act are rolled back, as subsidies were crucial for their investments in the U.S. On North Korea, Shin noted that Trump may resume summit diplomacy with Kim Jong Un, leaving South Korea sidelined and potentially sparking an arms race in Northeast Asia. 

The panelists all emphasized that Asia, with its diverse political landscapes, would need to navigate a new era of economic nationalism and geopolitical unpredictability, with potential challenges to economic stability and democratic norms.

A Focus on U.S.-China Relations 

The second panel, "Crossroads of Power: U.S.-China Relations in a New Administration," focused specifically on the evolving dynamics of U.S.-China relations in the wake of the election. Moderated by APARC China Program Director Jean Oi, the discussion featured Shorenstein APARC Fellow Thomas Fingar, and Peking University's Yu Tiejun, the APARC's China Policy Fellow during all 2024. The panelists analyzed the potential trade, security, and diplomacy shifts between the two global superpowers, particularly in light of D.C.’s bipartisan consensus on China. 

Central to the discussion was the continuity of U.S. policy toward China under the first Trump administration and the Biden administration. Examples of this continuity included recent tariff increases on Chinese imports, a new U.S. Department of the Treasury program to screen U.S. outbound foreign investments in key sectors, and tighter export controls on critical technologies like quantum computing and advanced semiconductors. The panelists explored the economic and strategic ramifications, noting that these policies could disrupt existing trade patterns. 

Another area of concern was China’s uneven implementation of the 2020 Phase One  trade deal it negotiated with the U.S., in which China had committed to domestic reforms and $200 billion of additional U.S. imports. This failure could buttress the new administration’s plan to increase tariffs, complicating diplomatic efforts between Washington and Beijing. Fingar noted that while China has made efforts to diversify its supply chains, these changes might not be enough to shield it from the effects of U.S. economic policies, which could include escalating tariffs or additional restrictions on Chinese exports. 

The conversation also touched on broader geopolitical considerations, particularly concerning China’s role in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The panelists discussed the potential for cooperation or de-escalation in U.S.-China relations, with China’s positioning on the war serving as both a point of contention and a possible avenue for diplomatic engagement. 

Underscoring the deepening complexities in U.S.-China relations post-election, the panelists highlighted the uncertainty surrounding U.S. foreign policy under a second Trump administration, particularly regarding the role of people-to-people exchanges in fostering mutual understanding.

Both events emphasized the multifaceted consequences of Trump’s return to power for Asia and the global international order. While the discussions highlighted the challenges posed by the rise of economic nationalism, trade tensions, and shifting security priorities, they also pointed to potential areas of cooperation and the evolving dynamics of global diplomacy.

In the Media

From Center Fellow Oriana Skylar Mastro:

What a Second Trump Term Means for the World
OnPoint – WBUR, Nov 12 (interview)

Race to the White House: How the US Election Will Impact Foreign Policy
UBS Circle One, October 23 (interview)

From Visiting Scholar Michael Beeman:

On Korea-U.S. Economic Cooperation in the Era of Walking Out
Yonhap News, Nov 20 (featured)

Trump Looking for Trade 'Reset' with Most Countries: Ex-USTR Official
Nikkei, Nov 16 (interview)

How Southeast Asia Can Weather the Trump Trade Typhoon
The Economist, Nov 14 (quoted)

The United States remains a leader in the global economy, yet over the past decade, it has taken a sharp turn away from its traditional support of free, rules-based trade. Since 2016, Washington has withdrawn from international trade agreements it once championed, opting for a more unilateral approach and pivoting from many of the obligations and norms it had shaped and insisted others honor to make trade fair, equitable, and mutually beneficial. How did the United States arrive here, and what steps should it take to leverage its strengths in the global trade system moving forward?

APARC visiting scholar Michael Beeman addresses these questions in his new book Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond (published by APARC, distributed by Stanford University Press). As a former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC, Beeman brings an insider’s perspective to the recent transformation of U.S. trade policy. He provides a timely analysis of the forces driving this shift, examines its implications for America’s role in the global economy, and offers prescriptions for a robust U.S. trade policy that still serves American interests while allowing for compromise among competing ones.

Join Dr. Beeman on campus for our book launch event on October 17. Reserve your spot today >

Beeman joined APARC Communications Manager Michael Breger to discuss his new book. Listen to the conversation on our SoundCloud or YouTube channels. You can also download a transcript of the conversation.

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A Departure From the Norm

In Beeman's analysis, the tactic of "walking out" as a means to renegotiate international agreements reflects a fundamental shift in U.S. trade policy, marked by a rejection of established conditions, obligations, and norms that had previously facilitated global trade and reduced conflict. This shift has had significant repercussions, as Washington has increasingly distanced itself from the principles it once championed, such as non-discrimination, transparency, openness, and reciprocity in trade. The change represents more than the inability to agree to a specific trade deal. According to Beeman, it is a rejection of Washington's long-held principles in pursuit of new goals.

Beeman attributes the collapse of the decades-long bipartisan consensus supporting free trade to a domestic political climate, where “the emergence of America’s zero-sum-centered politics [is] the new, defining feature of its political system.” In this new system, trade is viewed not as mutually beneficial but as a competition for limited resources. This transformation began gaining traction during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which galvanized new political movements, like the Tea Party and the so-called New Right, that simultaneously criticized free trade agreements.

Acknowledging the effects of domestic politics on trade policy, Beeman explores how the current political landscape, marked by extreme division, shapes trade decisions and reflects broader societal tensions. The author draws parallels between historical trade policy and the contemporary environment, noting that just as the 1930s saw dramatic swings in U.S. tariff policies, today’s new political geometry is “forged from extreme new levels of domestic political division [...] On trade, it is a geometry of acute angles and no longer one of curves and tangents.”

This political backdrop has resulted in an increasingly politicized trade policy that hampers efforts to find consensus. Beeman emphasizes that the transformation of U.S. trade policy is not merely a reflection of external pressures but a byproduct of internal political dynamics that redefine the goals and assumptions underpinning U.S. trade strategy.

Trade Policy Tensions
 

Among the many trade agreements that the U.S. has recently abandoned was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). According to Beeman, internal divisions regarding the TPP's stringent rules and demands — especially concerning auto manufacturing — highlighted a rift between America's expectations of its trading partners and its willingness to accept compromise.

Various rules and regulations dictated by the TPP stoked domestic contention and “had scrambled the usual pathways to achieve the vote margins needed for these agreements. [They] also revealed the sharp new tension between what America expected and wanted from others and what it was willing to agree upon and accept for itself.” The Biden administration's decision to abandon its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) trade agreement in late 2023 further illustrated ongoing tensions in U.S. trade policy, underscoring a lack of coherent strategy following the TPP's collapse.

The book explores how the Trump and Biden Administrations have grappled with the contradictions in their trade policies. While Robert Lighthizer, the former trade representative under Trump, embraced a confrontational approach, Beeman criticizes the fallout from these decisions, arguing they often left established commitments unfulfilled and damaged international relationships. But Beeman also maintains that the Biden Administration's attempts to repair and redefine trade relationships have resulted in a series of inconsistent policies, reflecting internal domestic tensions yet to be resolved.

“As a set of social values and domestic priorities in search of a means to express themselves through America’s external trade policies, [the Biden] Administration attempted to explain its approach in ways that often only raised contradictory distinctions.” Once these “became harder to explain and justify, [it] began developing what amounted to a new theory of global trade disorder and dysfunction in an attempt to more convincingly frame its decisions.”

According to Beeman, disruptions from Covid-19 were a “helpful backdrop,” but, he argues, “if set against the vastly more immense challenges of the late 1940s and early 1950s, when America made an intentional policy choice to work with other countries to commit to open, rules-based trade to lead the world out of crisis, the problems of 2020-21 were challenges that policymakers from that time undoubtedly would have preferred.”

Barriers to Progress
 

The current political landscape has made it challenging for Congress to reach a consensus on trade issues. The failure to renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which provided tariff relief to developing countries, exemplifies the paralysis in U.S. trade policy. Beeman remarks upon how, “after the bipartisan mainstream that advanced open and freer trade […] was swept away by America’s New Right and progressive Left, their shared interest in adding new and ever more conditions to America’s imports was insufficient to overcome their sharp disagreements over which conditions to add.” For Beeman, the inability to agree on new conditions for trade reflects broader ideological divides that hinder progress.

Ultimately, Beeman warns that America’s zero-sum approach to trade may lead to a cycle of self-inflicted isolation. He argues that this shift is not solely a reaction to China’s rise but represents a deeper ideological rift in American politics. “International trade adds a foreign, or external, dimension to zero-sum thinking that has facilitated a surprising degree of alignment between the New Right and the progressive Left,” he writes, specifically the “zero-sum belief that America is made worse off by freer trade, which benefits ‘them.’” Such an alignment has created an environment where bipartisan support for trade agreements has eroded, complicating efforts to establish a coherent and effective trade policy moving forward.

An essential read for anyone interested in the international political economy of trade and the future of America’s role in the global economy, “Walking Out” highlights the urgent need for the United States to reconcile its domestic divides to reestablish its role in the global economy. The current trajectory, characterized by a rejection of its foundational principles, risks fostering new conflicts with allies and adversaries alike, contradicting the original goals of the international trading system.

When I arrived at Stanford in September 2022, I’d just stepped out of a product manager role at a large government contractor. My career had focused on providing policymakers with the best open-source information possible around a myriad of foreign policy issues. Over the preceding years, that work had become increasingly intertwined with artificial intelligence (AI), not just as a subject of analysis but as a critical tool in the analytic process. In enrolling in the Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy (MIP) program, situated in the heart of Silicon Valley, I hoped I could better understand AI and how it would reshape geopolitics. 

My timing was serendipitous. Just as I settled in, OpenAI unveiled ChatGPT, and the world changed. It was a whirlwind period of wild speculation, anxiety, and excitement. To cut through the noise, I sat in on an advanced course on machine learning and enrolled in the Computer Science department’s core course, Programming Abstractions, to build my programming skills. Blending my policy framework development in MIP courses with technical study at Stanford’s renowned Computer Science department was exactly what I hoped Stanford would provide. 

What I didn’t expect, however, was how differently I was starting to think about my future after the program.

The Entrepreneurial Leap

The original plan for MIP was to get smart and then apply what I learned within an established organization, like my former employer or the government. I began to wonder if, rather than providing information to decision-makers as I had previously in my career, I could combine my product management experience and burgeoning CS competency in a different way. Could I attack the same problems I’d been working on for years, but from the bottom up? Could I use technology to empower the broader public to become more resilient to misinformation and polarization?

The approaching summer seemed like the opportunity to test my product ideas and the possibility of starting a business around them. MIP’s summer funding made it feasible to take advantage of that opportunity while still paying my rent. It also added helpful structure to my plan, requiring me to record my hours and find a mentor to oversee my progress.

My former colleague, David, with whom I have a strong relationship built on trust and shared vision, agreed to be my mentor. He had recently launched his own company in a related space and was able to share a wealth of experience and insights.

The Summer of Coding and Discover

Summer came, and I dove headfirst into coding, dedicating countless hours at the corner desk of my Hoskins apartment to building something tangible that embodied my vision. I also began immersing myself in the Bay Area’s tech ecosystem - attending AI seminars, venture capital events, and networking with founders.

The results of those first weeks were encouraging. I prduced a working prototype that used AI to identify misleading information online and, by referencing trusted sources, provide missing context and corrective information to the reader. It was real progress toward a world where we no longer rely on ineffective fact-checking after readers are exposed to misleading information and form their opinions. Instead, AI could help every news reader spot deceptive content in real-time - during the opinion formation process.

Despite my progress, I realized that if I were going to keep up with the pace of the hyper-competitive AI startup field, I would need a partner.

Finding a Co-founder 

With a working prototype of my Critical Reader Google Chrome extension, I felt ready to seek out an experienced partner who could help scale my vision. Y Combinator’s co-founder matching platform was my arena. It was a whirlwind of meetings and ideas, but eventually, I connected with the former CTO of a successful startup, who shared my commitment to revolutionizing digital information sharing.

We hit it off and decided to test our partnership with a 30-day trial. We examined my prototype critically and decided to pivot towards a simpler, more marketable product. In a few weeks, we had a minimum viable product ready and began user testing. As expected, the feedback was a mixture of praise and criticism, but it was energizing to have the critical data we needed to iterate and improve.

Beyond coding, we invested considerable effort into refining a mutual vision and business strategy. We began exploring non-profit frameworks and various hybrid business models that could achieve the scalability of a for-profit enterprise while preserving the principles that motivated us.

Renewed Vision 

In a few short months, my curiosity had evolved into a venture with real users and a business model. I had also changed. The experience developing financial forecasts and strategic plans significantly enhanced my professional toolkit and gave me first-hand experience with the reality of starting a business. 

Now, as I enter my penultimate quarter at Stanford, I am able to develop products and explore partnerships with a newfound clarity of purpose. My summer of entrepreneurship added a new dimension to my MIP experience and has set the stage for what comes after the program ends.

My goal of spending the summer of 2023 working in the Global South came to fruition, courtesy of the Environment for Development - Makerere University Centre (EfD - MaK), the  Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and the Stanford Sustainable Finance Initiative (SFI). Being on the ground in Uganda to work on green finance seemed the right call. I have spent four years in the Global North, primarily in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, working on European Union (EU) international economics issues, which included green finance. One of the biggest challenges I encountered was the conflict of interest between donors and the projects they prioritized and the beneficiaries and the projects they prioritized. In this aspect, disagreements about green financing were especially pronounced.

In my first year at Stanford, I participated in a series of learning, unlearning, and relearning experiences to understand better how to make economic decisions work well for both developed and developing countries. I was excited about a summer fellowship that would allow me to leverage my expertise from the Global North and newly acquired knowledge from Stanford to contribute toward addressing the economic development challenges of the Global South. Fortunately, the EfD - MaK Center in Uganda awarded me a fellowship opportunity, and with the funding of FSI and SFI, I was able to spend 12 weeks working in Uganda. Being in Uganda was not a novel experience for me. I was born and had previously worked there both as a development consultant and as a research assistant on different randomized controlled trial experiments.

Working in Uganda, however, and becoming immersed in the Global South perspective of green finance was new. My duties as a Visiting Fellow at EfD - MaK made the Fellowship an entirely unique and rewarding experience. I conducted policy analysis on green finance, collaborated with stakeholders from the public sector, civil society, private sector, and academia, contributed to high-level policy dialogues, and took part in some of the ongoing projects on energy financing. This work gave me an understanding of the distinctive nature of the energy and climate environment in Uganda. Accomplishing development objectives, such as eliminating poverty and promoting prosperity for all, requires energy sources to be available. Ensuring essential levels of energy supply is also of mutual interest to donors and country beneficiaries.

In Uganda, green finance is particularly important in addressing the energy poverty problem and allowing the country to meet Uganda’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). UBOS- Uganda Bureau of Statistics’ 2018 National Electrification Survey shows that 66% of Ugandans are multidimensional energy poor, measured by access, cooking solutions, and end-use technology. In its NDCs, Uganda has pledged to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, most of which are from agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU), by 24.7% before 2030. These commitments call for green financing approaches that promote access to clean and affordable energy for most Ugandans who are currently either underserved or unserved. Climate finance is essential to help vulnerable communities deal with the prevalent consequences of climate change. Uganda now faces a $28.1 billion climate financing gap and has been able to mobilize only $4 billion. Boosting green financing from all players, local or international, public, private, for-profit or not-for-profit, will help the country build climate resilience and adaptability and meet its broader green growth objectives, as specified under the NDCs.

International donors have helped Uganda make some progress towards meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goal - SDG 7 - Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all. The National Planning Authority reports that Uganda’s electricity access has increased from 24% in 2018/2019 to 57% in 2021/2022, and its grid reliability from 90% to 98%. However, a lot still needs to be done. Uganda’s biomass usage, primarily for household cooking, is still at 80% despite efforts to reduce it to 50%. Ugandan household emissions are estimated at 30 tons of carbon per year compared to five tons for the United Kingdom.

There are serious issues related to energy affordability. Uganda’s level of income inequality is high, with a Gini Index of 0.427.¹ The Borgen Project reports that Uganda’s richest 10% receive 35.7% of the national wealth. In comparison, the poorest 20% receive only 5.8%. This indicates that a larger share of the population cannot afford clean energy. Even though policy dialogues sponsored by government officials have resulted in progress in reducing electricity costs, electricity remains unaffordable for many economically disadvantaged individuals.

This summer experience taught me that conditions within Uganda are similar to those of many countries of the Global South, particularly sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), that experience energy poverty. International Energy Centre (IEC) research has shown that the COVID-19 pandemic worsened energy poverty. IEC also projects that about 560 million people from SSA will still have no electricity access in 2030. My experience at EfD-Mak taught me that addressing country technical gaps and prioritizing green projects in planning, programming, and budgetary processes could enable countries to bridge the energy gaps.

There is also a need to leverage the private sector, entrepreneurs, and financiers to invest in and contribute to Uganda’s green growth agenda. However, this necessitates that the government implement an enabling business climate to attract local and international players. Coordinated efforts are also essential to combat dependency on biomass, which increases greenhouse gas emissions and poses health risks to the populace. From the policy dialogues I participated in, ministries, departments, and agency officials emphasized the government’s commitment to reducing biomass usage. All players around the table, including the private sector, civil society, and communities themselves, must participate to accomplish biomass reduction.

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Spending the summer in Uganda met my expectations for an on the ground experience. It gave me a better understanding of the working environment in a developing country and elevated my grasp of several international development issues. I also acknowledge that countries are rarely the same, making it vital to gain direct exposure to the on the ground reality instead of relying on studies and external generalizations.

By and large, I am very thankful to the EfD Director, Professor Edward Bbaale, for allowing me to work on these issues and for his invaluable mentorship. I also enjoyed working with a team of experts, which included Dr. Peter Babyenda, Mr. Fred Kasalirwe, Mr. Gyavira Ssewankambo, and Ms. Jane Anyango, to mention just a few. Above all, I am thankful to FSI and SFI at Stanford University, whose collaboration with EfD-Mak Uganda made my summer fellowship both a priceless experience and a great opportunity to be home again.