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As the inaugural meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank sets to convene, Stanford researcher Thomas Fingar discusses findings from his new book that seeks to study China’s objectives and methods of engagement with other countries. Much of China’s behavior is determined by its own cost-benefit analysis of the perceived effect engagement would have on its security and development.

As China has pursued modernization over the past 35 years, patterns have emerged that shed light on the government’s foreign policy decision-making, according to new research by Thomas Fingar, a Stanford distinguished fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC).

Since 1979, China’s foreign policy has been underscored by two priorities – security and development. Knowing those priorities, analysts can attempt to better study and anticipate China’s relations with other countries even in the wake of unforeseen events in the global system.

“China’s increased activity around the world has elicited both anxiety and admiration in neighboring countries eager to capitalize on opportunities but worried about Beijing’s growing capabilities. Yet as is the case with all countries, what China can do is shaped by global and regional developments beyond its control,” said Fingar, the editor of The New Great Game: China and South and Central Asia in the Era of Reform.

The book, which has a total of 13 authors, is the first in a series published by Stanford University Press that examines China’s changing relationships in Asia and with other portions of the world. It is also an outcome of the research project “China and the World.” Fingar, who heads the project, draws upon his experience from five decades working on Asia and more than 25 years in U.S. government, including as chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

Framework to analyze China’s foreign policy

One dimension of the research project examines how China’s policies and priorities are shaped by China’s perceptions about how much a country threatens or addresses China’s security concerns; a second dimension examines China’s perceptions about how much a country can contribute to China’s pursuit of sustained economic growth and modernization.

To explore these relationships, Fingar developed a framework for analysis using a matrix that displays, on one axis, China’s perceptions about the threat to China’s security posed by a country or region, and on the other axis, China’s perceptions about a country or region’s capacity to contribute to China’s development.

By comparing the position of a given country or region from one period to another, the matrix both predicts the character of China’s policies and reveals a pattern over time. The figure below illustrates China’s views in 1979 and 2016.


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In 1979, India and countries in Central Asia figured high on the threat axis because of their relationship with the Soviet Union and low on capacity to provide the resources China needed to jumpstart its economy, Fingar said.

At that time, China sought to address both its priority security concerns and developmental goals by improving ties with Europe, Japan and the United States. South and Central Asia were afforded lower priority, he said.

In the 1990s, however, China’s perceptions shifted as a result of the demise of the Soviet Union and a decade of economic success in China, Fingar explained. Shown in the matrix, China’s policies toward Central Asia changed as the region transitioned to a more favorable security position by 2000 and as China required additional resources (energy, technology, training, etc.) to fuel its growing economy.

Fingar said China’s increased engagement with South Asia was buttressed by a need for markets and investment opportunities, and furthered along by a reduction in the threat environment as India altered its relationship with Russia and Pakistan became a less valuable security partner.

Calculating who China will engage with and how has become much clearer, yet in some ways it has also become more complicated, according to Fingar.

“The countries that can do the most for China today often pose the greatest perceived long-term threat, namely the United States and its allies,” he said. “Conversely, China’s proclaimed closest friends—North Korea and Pakistan—can do little to assist China’s development and pose increasing danger to its security.”

Current policy applications

Over the past three years, Chinese President Xi Jinping has embarked on numerous projects with neighbors and other countries around the world, such as the “new Silk Road,” a trans-continental trade route that will link countries together, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank that plans to lend money to poorer parts of Asia for building infrastructure.

The objectives of both initiatives are consistent with the China’s prioritization of security and development, Fingar said. The AIIB and Silk Road initiative indicate that China assumes there are gains from economic integration, and this is largely due to the fact that China has already benefited from past projects.

In 2001, the Chinese government launched concerted efforts to improve its relationships with Central Asian countries because of China’s concern that the United States was seeking to “contain” China, he said. Outcomes have included newfound markets for China’s manufactured goods and increased stability in separatist areas near or on its borders.

“By taking such a big stake in building infrastructure, China has changed the dynamic of the region,” he said. “Anybody can use a road, railroad or bridge. China has helped stitch together the economies of different countries in ways they have never been before.”

For China, the AIIB and the Silk Road initiative are also a form of “soft power,” said Fingar. The approach by the Chinese government evokes memories of U.S. “dollar diplomacy” early in the last century and Japanese “yen diplomacy” when financial assistance was extended to developing countries.

But Fingar doubts that “buying friends by building infrastructure” will be a major contributor to China’s quest for security and development. Going forward, the Chinese government must face the growing paradox between its foreign infrastructure projects and its principle of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, he said.

“When working in other countries, China cannot afford to dismiss internal stability, governance, rule of law,” he said. “Those facets are the baseline for building infrastructure.”

Related links:

The Diplomat - Q&A on Chinese diplomacy in the 21st century

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A British exit from the European Union would slow economic growth, reduce Europe's impact in world politics, and strengthen regimes such as Russia's that prefer a weaker, less united Europe, Stanford expert Christophe Crombez says.

The United Kingdom would lose more than it would gain if it left the European Union, a Stanford scholar said.

So would other European nations, and the real winners would be countries that seek to divide European unity, said Christophe Crombez, a consulting professor in Stanford’s Europe Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Britain is holding a referendum on June 23 to decide whether the country should leave or remain in the European Union.

“It would bring but an illusion of sovereignty,” said Crombez, who studies European Union politics, parliamentary systems, political economy and economic analysis of political institutions. He is an economist from Belgium.

The Stanford News Service recently interviewed Crombez on the upcoming vote, known as “Brexit.”

What is Brexit?

The term Brexit refers to the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union allows member states to withdraw.

What are the arguments for and against Brexit?

The campaign for the UK to leave the EU uses the following main arguments: leaving would save UK taxpayers money, since the UK is a net contributor to the EU budget; the UK would no longer have to comply with EU laws it does not want, whereas currently it can be outvoted in EU institutions and forced to adopt laws it opposes; and it would allow the UK to better control migration, whereas EU citizens are currently free to move and work throughout the EU.

These three arguments can easily be refuted, however. The UK does indeed contribute to the EU budget, but the benefits it derives from being part of the EU market far outweigh the budgetary contributions. Moreover, (if Britain were to withdraw) the EU would require the UK to pay into its budget, if it wants to remain part of the EU’s internal market, as it has done with Switzerland and Norway.

Also, about half of UK exports are destined for the EU. If the UK were to leave, it would no doubt want to continue to trade with the EU. UK products would have to conform to EU rules for them to be sold in the EU. UK companies that want to export to the EU would thus continue to comply with EU rules. The difference would be that the UK would no longer be involved in setting those EU rules. Post-Brexit, the rules would thus be less to the UK’s liking than prior to it, and UK companies would comply to these less advantageous rules.

Finally, the EU would impose requirements on immigration and free movement of people on the UK in exchange for free trade with the EU, as it has with other countries in similar situations, such as Norway and Switzerland. Moreover, member states may no longer feel inclined to stop refugees from moving on to the UK if the UK were to leave, which may lead to higher rather than lower immigration.

In addition to these arguments, the Britain Stronger in Europe campaign (which supports the UK remaining in the EU) argues that Britain carries more weight in world politics as part of the EU than on its own, in trade negotiations as well as on security issues, and that a united Europe is better at dealing with (Russian President Vladimir) Putin and other authoritarian rulers, terrorist threats and international crime.

What do you think is the best decision for the United Kingdom to make on this vote?

I see no advantages to leaving the EU. It would bring but an illusion of sovereignty – consider the points above. The vote would have a negative impact on growth in the UK and the rest of the EU and, in fact, the world, and it would weaken the UK, the EU and the West in world politics.

What happens economically to Britain if the country leaves the European Union?

Trade and hence gross domestic product would be negatively affected, especially in the short term. Uncertainty would reduce investment and trade. The UK and the EU would be consumed with the negotiations on the break-up for years. This would prevent both the UK and EU from tackling more important economic and security issues. In the long term, the economy would readjust, but the result would be suboptimal.

What happens to the EU if Britain leaves?

The EU is less dependent on trade with the UK than vice versa. There would be an economic impact, but it would be less substantial. The effect would be more significant for a few countries that trade more with the UK, such as Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Brexit would, however, deliver a major blow to the idea of European unification. It would weaken the EU impact in world politics and strengthen such rulers as Putin and (Turkish President Recep Tayyip) Erdogan in their dealings with the EU.

Could a British exit open up a Pandora’s Box of other EU countries exiting or spark other regional independence movements, like  Catalonia?

That is quite possible. A number of other countries may want to hold referendums on the EU. Moreover, Brexit is likely to lead to a break-up of the UK. Scotland would likely hold another referendum and decide to leave the UK in order to stay in the EU. The same may be true for Northern Ireland in the long run. Scottish secession may then give other EU regions, such as Catalonia, further incentives to secede.

 
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9:30-12:00 Session 1: Inequality of Human Capital and Labor Market Outcomes
Location: Goldman Conference Room, Encina Hall East (4th floor)
 
The Health and Nutrition Roots of China's Human Capital Crisis
Speaker:Scott Rozelle, Stanford University, US
 
Trade Liberalization, Social Policy Development and Labour Market Outcomes of
Chinese Women and Men in the Decade after China’s Accession to the World Trade
Organization
Speaker:Xiaoyuan Dong, The University of Winnipeg, Canada
 
Mismatch of the Boston Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese College Admission
Speaker:Binzhen Wu, Tsinghua University, China
 
12:00-1:00 Lunch
Location: Philippines Conference Room, Encina Hall (3rd Floor)
 
1:00-3:00 Session 2: Determinants for Labor Market Outcomes
Location: Philippines Conference Room, Encina Hall (3rd Floor)
 
Does Informal Employment Push college graduates into Low Income Trap?
Speaker:Xiaoying Li, Sun Yat-sen University, China
Cognitive Skills, Noncognitive Skills, and School-to-Work Transitions in Rural China
Speaker:Qiuqiong Huang, University of Arkansas, US
Institutional Labor Market Segmentation and Public Sector Reform in China
Speaker:Xiaohua Li, Chinese Academy of Personnel Science, China

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Abstract

Taiwan’s domestic politics, particularly presidential elections, has been the main driver of the island’s relations with China for two decades. The 2016 elections, in which the Democratic Progressive Party, led by Dr. Tsai Ing-wen, won both the presidency and majority control of the Legislative elections, promises to be no exception. Although PRC intentions under President Xi Jinping are far from certain, some change from the state of play under the current Ma Ying-jeou administration seems fairly certain, with implications for U.S. policy.

 

Bio

Richard Bush is a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Director of its Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, and the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. He came to Brookings in July 2002 after nineteen years working in the US government, including five years as the Chairman and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan. He is the author of a number of articles on U.S. relations with China and Taiwan, and of At Cross Purposes, a book of essays on the history of America’s relations with Taiwan, published in March 2004 by M. E. Sharpe. In the spring of 2005, Brookings published his study on cross-Strait relations, entitled Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. In 2013, Brookings published his Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations.

 

This talk is co-sponsored by the Taiwan Democracy Project in the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law and the U.S.-Asia Security Initiative in the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

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Richard C. Bush Senior Fellow and Director, Center for East Asian Policy Studies Brookings Institution
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This half-day symposium will bring together scholars and practitioners to reconsider Taiwan's prospects for entry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership in light of the conclusion of negotiations in October 2015 and the election of a new president and legislature in Taiwan in January 2016. It will revisit the themes and conclusions of the Taiwan Democracy Project's 2013 annual conference.

9:00-9:15am: Introductions

9:15-11:00am. Panel 1: The Politics of Trade and Development in Taiwan

Stephen Tan, Vice President of the Cross-Strait Policy Association, Taipei

Kristy Hsu, Director, Taiwan ASEAN Studies Center, Chung Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei

Chung-ming Kuan, Chair Professor, Department of Finance and Director of CRETA at National Taiwan University, and former Minister of the National Development Council

Hung-mao Tien, President of the Institute for National Policy Research, and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan

11:00-11:15. Break

11:15-12:45. Panel 2: International Perspectives on the TPP: Implications for Regional Development and Geopolitics

Vinod Aggarwal, Professor of Political Science and Faculty Affiliate of the Center for East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley

Nicholas Hope, Director of the China Program at the Stanford Center for International Development

Thomas Gold, Professor of Sociology and Faculty Affiliate of the Center for East Asian Studies, UC Berkeley

 

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Abstract 
Based on first-hand participant-observation, this talk will examine the culture, politics, and spatiality of the Sunflower Movement. Taiwan's most significant social movement in decades, the Sunflower Movement not only blocked the passage of a major trade deal with China, but reshaped popular discourse and redirected Taiwan's political and cultural trajectory. It re-energized student and civil society, precipitated the historic defeat of the KMT in the 2014 local elections, and prefigured the DPP's strong position coming into the 2016 presidential and legislative election season.
 
The primary spatial tactic of the Sunflowers-- occupation of a government building-- was so successful that a series of protests in the summer of 2015 by high school students was partly conceived and represented as a "second Sunflower Movement". These students, protesting "China-centric" curriculum changes, attempted to occupy the Ministry of Education building. Thwarted by police, these students settled for the front courtyard, where a Sunflower-style pattern of encampments and performances emerged. While this movement did not galvanize the wider public as dramatically as its predecessor, it did demonstrate the staying power of the Sunflower Movement and its occupation tactics for an even younger cohort of activists.
 
The Sunflower Movement showed that contingent, street-level, grassroots action can have a major impact on Taiwan's cross-Strait policies, and inspired and trained a new generation of youth activists. But with the likely 2016 presidential win of the DPP, which has attempted to draw support from student activists while presenting a less radical vision to mainstream voters, what's in store for the future of Taiwanese student and civic activism? And with strong evidence of growing Taiwanese national identification and pro-independence sentiment, particularly among youth, what's in store for the future of Taiwan's political culture? 
 

Speaker Bio

Ian Rowen in Legislative Yuan Ian Rowen in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan during the Sunflower Student Movement protest.

Ian Rowen is PhD Candidate in Geography at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and recent Visiting Fellow at the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan, Academia Sinica’s Institute of Sociology, and Fudan University. He participated in both the Sunflower and Umbrella Movements and has written about them for The Journal of Asian Studies, The Guardian, and The BBC (Chinese), among other outlets. He has also published about Asian politics and protest in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers (forthcoming) and the Annals of Tourism Research. His PhD research, funded by the US National Science Foundation, the Fulbright Program, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, has focused on the political geography of tourism and protest in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. 

 

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Ian Rowen Doctoral Candidate University of Colorado Dept of Geography
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