This report reviews Chinese participation in the international negotiations for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva and provides background for China’s decision-making procedures during the negotiations.

The CTBT negotiations marked the first important international negotiations for a multilateral disarmament treaty in which China participated from beginning to end. They were the first important international negotiations in which China, as a nuclear power, had great influence. The Chinese delegation to the CD assumed a serious and responsible attitude during the entire course of the negotiations. In part to increase international confidence that it would sign the CTBT by 1996 as scheduled and in part to indicate its intent to adapt itself to the world trend toward increased international cooperation and nuclear arms reduction, China announced during the latter stage of the negotiations that it would suspend nuclear testing.

As an example of successful multilateral negotiations, the conclusion and signing of the treaty, although long postponed, is an important achievement in arms control. As the sole declared nuclear-weapon state of the Third World at that time and the last among the five nuclear-weapon states (P5) to cease nuclear testing, China’s stance toward the CTBT negotiations was the object of world attention and concern. The population of China accounts for nearly one-quarter of the world’s total; China’s positive position on the CTBT and its contributions toward this end has a major worldwide impact now and in the future.

Prior to the commencement of the CTBT negotiations in Geneva, China declared on October 5, 1993, that while supporting an early conclusion of the treaty it would “take an active part in the negotiating process and work together with other countries to conclude this treaty no later than 1996.” China kept its promise.

China pursued a fair, reasonable, and verifiable treaty with universal adherence and unlimited duration. During the negotiations, China presented many working papers, non-papers, and suggestions regarding the CTBT draft text (including a number of revisions), and dealt with a series of critical issues in the Preamble, Basic Obligations, Organization, Verification, and Entry into Force sections of the treaty. The Chinese delegation played an active role at the conference table, and contributed positively to the weekly P5 consultations that ran in parallel with the CTBT talks.

China adhered toughly to its positions on two issues in the latter stage of the CTBT negotiations. One concerned potential abuses of the on-site inspection procedures. The other was that all nuclear-test-capable states (assumed to be the P5, India, Israel, and Pakistan) must accede to the treaty in order for it to enter into full legal force. Although China was not entirely satisfied with the final draft CTBT, it accepted the treaty. It agreed to sign the CTBT in the belief that the treaty text represented the best achievable result of the negotiations of the preceding two and a half years, reflected by and large the state of the negotiations, and was in general balanced.

Signing the CTBT was in line with China’s consistent stand in support of “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.” This was one of the major reasons China supported an early conclusion of the treaty. Of course, China’s desire to meet the trend of the modern world also motivated it to sign. Because economic development had long been Beijing’s top priority, China needed a peaceful security environment in order to devote itself completely to the modernization of the nation. To this end, its defense buildup had been steadily subordinated to national economic development. Beijing’s decision on the CTBT negotiations stemmed also from its self-defense and no-first-use nuclear policies. China had established an effective nuclear force for self-defense.

China is now making preparations for the treaty to enter into force. After the conclusion of the CTBT, China will continue efforts in pursuit of world peace, development, and cooperation. Meanwhile, China will continuously ensure the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons without nuclear testing.

Russia's current strategic nuclear force will become obsolete shortly after the turn of the century. Strategic modernization is therefore essential if Russia is to remain a nuclear power on a par with the US. But modernization will be extremely difficult because of the country's economic and political turmoil. Russia can probably maintain slightly more than 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads under the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I Treaty - roughly half of what the United States could, in theory, deploy. Under START II, Russia's strategic force will likely contain between 1,800 and 2,500 warheads, compared to 3,500 for the US. Hence, the easiest - perhaps the only - way for Russia to recover rough parity with the United States would be through a START III Treaty that limits both sides to 2,000-2,500 warheads.

The majority of Russia's current strategic nuclear force will become obsolete shortly after the turn of the century. Hence, Russian strategic force modernization is essential if Russia is to remain a nuclear power on a par with the United States. Numerous uncertainties, especially financial uncertainties, prevent accurate estimates of Russia's future strategic force structure. Nevertheless, under the START I Treaty, Russia can probably maintain a force with slightly more than 4,000 strategic nuclear warheads over the next two decades-about half the number of the United States. Under START II, Russia is likely to maintain a strategic force of between 1,800 and 2,500 warheads, compared to 3,500 warheads for the United States. Therefore, Russia's main interest in ratifying the START II Treaty would be to pursue a START III Treaty that limits both sides to between 2,000 and 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads. This is the least expensive way to retain rough parity with the United States. Several reasons have been educed for why Russia should not ratify the START II Treaty, namely, because the Treaty allows a U.S. advantage in reconstitution capability and prompt hard-target-kill capability. However, these advantages are neither so great nor so consequential that Russia should reject the START II Treaty for these reasons alone. If Russia ratifies the START II Treaty, and presumably a follow-on START III Treaty, Russia's future strategic nuclear force will appear a lot different than its Soviet predecessor due to the reduced emphasis on land-based ICBMs. Nevertheless, the Russian force should remain a highly survivable, stable force-assuming Russian leaders allocate sufficient resources to ensure that their ballistic missile submarines, mobile ICBMs, and bombers can survive all plausible counterforce threats.

Nuclear war is generally believed to bring risks of destruction out of proportion to any gain that may be secured by the war, or to any loss that may be averted, except perhaps for the loss of national independence and group survival. Nuclear-armed states, however, continue to project military force outside their own territory in order to carry out rivalries for power and influence. Will these rival power projections lead to war, as they often did in the past? If not, how will they be resolved? This paper makes the case that, because of the recognized destructiveness of nuclear weapons, rivalries among major nuclear-armed states for power and influence outside their own territory are not likely to lead to central war among them, but that definite lines separating zones of exclusive security influence, such as prevailed during the Cold War, will reappear where circumstances prevent
other compromises. This conclusion does not hold in the case of nuclear powers that are centrally vulnerable to conventional attack from each other: in that case, nuclear deterrence is less likely to be stable. Where lines are established, they may facilitate rather than prevent cooperation in dealing with the next century's global problems.

Based on interviews with participants and research in newly opened archives, the book reveals how the American atomic monopoly affected Stalin's foreign policy, the role of espionage in the evolution of the Soviet bomb, and the relationship between Soviet nuclear scientists and the country's political leaders.

This study of the naval-training system grew out of our larger project on the development of China's strategic weapons. After completing work on the history of Beijing's nuclear weapons program, we began research on Project 09, China's development program for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. This research brought to light important new materials on the overall growth of China's navy and led to interviews with Chinese naval specialists. The new data suggested important insights into questions related to military professionalism and the long-range strategy for Chinese military power. This review of the history of Chinese naval training thus illuminates larger issues of Chinese defense planning and security goals. It also provides a baseline for assessing the missions of the navy and its readiness for carrying out those missions.

When the United States was the only nuclear power in the world, we thought one was too many. Efforts since then to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries have resulted in widespread agreement this year on a nonproliferation treaty. This commentary will describe the background of the treaty, summarize its main provisions, and discuss some questions of interpretation which have arisen.