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The nuclear nonproliferation regime is "dysfunctional" and in serious need of repair, said Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in a lecture titled "The Nuclear Future" at Stanford's Memorial Auditorium. ElBaradei, who, with the IAEA he directs, received the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, spoke at FSI's Payne Lecture, with CISAC director Scott D. Sagan posing questions and moderating.

The nuclear regime in place since the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) took effect in 1970 is broken and needs to be fixed, the world's highest-ranking nuclear official told a half-full Memorial Auditorium in a wide-ranging lecture about the future of nuclear energy and weapons yesterday afternoon.

"We have a dysfunctional system -- system that cannot endure," said Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "We're reaching the fork in the road. Events in the last few years have made it clear that we need to change course."

The big news from ElBaradei's speech was his support for American entreaties to Iran. But the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize recipient also commented on North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iraq, terrorism, disarmament and the future of nuclear energy.

He said there are probably eight current nuclear states, excluding North Korea. He worried aloud that countries which can currently produce nuclear energy peacefully are only six months away from developing nuclear weapons for military purposes.

"Acquiring the technology to enrich uranium or reprocess uranium basically is the key to develop nuclear weapons as we have seen in Asia and Iran," he said. "They are virtually weapons states because in six months time if they decide for security reasons to develop their own weapon, they are there."

Iraq

While not a household name, ElBaradei was a prominent figure in the news as the lead weapons inspector in Iraq during the run-up to the 2003 American invasion. He said at the time that he could not find evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, but he would not conclude that there were no weapons in the country or that Saddam Hussein did not have a program.

ElBaradei asked for more time to complete inspections, but the Bush administration declined his request and decided to invade. The U.S. never found the nuclear and biological material that some had promised existed.

"Luckily...well I'm not sure luckily...we were proven right that there was no nuclear or any weapon of mass destruction in Iraq," he said. "But I hope that all of us have learned from the Iraq experience that we cannot just jump the gun. You have to be absolutely sure of the facts."

India

ElBaradei surprised observers when he supported the U.S. agreement with India earlier this year, which allowed the country to continue developing nuclear weapons and energy. He said the agreement with India did not endorse its proliferation activities but was indicative of the kind of outside-the-box thinking the international community needs when considering the spread of nuclear weapons and material.

"The end result is India coming closer and working with the rest of the world," he said. "It is not a perfect agreement, but it has a lot of advantages. From the safety, security and nonproliferation perspective, I see that agreement as a win-win situation."

Pakistan

Pakistan developed nuclear weapons as a response to India. Some have criticized Pakistan for its poor stewardship and control of the bomb, pointing out that weapons were almost fired during a skirmish over the disputed Kashmir region.

AQ Kahn, a senior nuclear scientist who helped Pakistan join the exclusive nuclear club, was caught selling compact discs and other information about bombs to several other countries.

"How much damage was done in the process we don't know," ElBaradei said.

The release of this nuclear material demonstrates the need for a "more robust verification system," he said, adding that Pakistan has come closer to the international community in recent years.

North Korea

Kim Jong Il expelled all IAEA inspectors in Dec. 2002, withdrew from the NPT in Jan. 2003 and announced in February 2005 that his military had a nuclear deterrent.

"North Korea is still a major problem," ElBaradei said. "We don't talk about it enough, but North Korea is declaring right now that they have a nuclear weapon. And the longer that they continue to be in that status, the more it is accepted in the collective conscious. This would be terrible because it will have a lot of negative ramifications in South Korea and Japan."

ElBaradei said ongoing negotiations are an important development but more needs to be done.

"What we see with the current six-party talks should have taken place years ago," he said.

Nuclear Proliferation

ElBaradei stressed that he understands the value of nuclear power, which produces much of the developed world's energy. Reducing its use would create more dependence on greenhouse gas-creating fossil fuels, he said.

"We need to use nuclear energy responsibly to maximize benefit and minimize risk," he said.

He said his "number one nightmare scenario" is a terrorist group acquiring nuclear technology since terrorists are not deterred by the possibility of reprisal.

In the post-Cold War world, ElBaradei said he could see no justification for the U.S. and Russia to maintain their nuclear arsenals on ready alert to fire with thirty minutes notice. He called on America to lead by example and continue to disarm its nuclear stockpile.

"Rather than pass judgment, I'd definitely like to say the U.S. should do more in leading by example in terms of nuclear disarmament," he said.

In September 2005, ElBaradei was reappointed to a third term as director general of IAEA. The United States had considered holding up his nomination but dropped its objections under pressure from European allies, who admire the former law professor from New York University.

Diplomat to the Core

The Egyptian native's sometimes broken English was interspersed with self-corrections and careful legalese nuance. ElBaradei answered questions posed by Political Science Prof. Scott Sagan, the director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

When Sagan made bold pronouncements about different country's nuclear activities, including the United States' "colossal failure" when North Korea violated the NPT, ElBaradei seemed careful not to point fingers, play the blame game or make enemies. Nonetheless, for a senior United Nations official, his speech was notably blunt.

"There's no international public servant whose integrity and work I admire more than yours," Sagan told ElBaradei.

Accompanied by his wife, ElBaradei spent the day at the University visiting with faculty and students. He spoke at a lunch sponsored by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and traveled to Sagan's home for a dinner with invited guests. He left the area at 8:30 p.m.

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Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an intergovernmental organization that is part of the United Nations system. He was appointed to the office effective December 1, 1997, and reappointed to a third term in September 2005.

Dr. ElBaradei was born in Cairo, Egypt, in 1942. He earned a Bachelor´s degree in Law in 1962 at the University of Cairo, and a Doctorate in International Law at the New York University School of Law in 1974. He began his career in the Egyptian Diplomatic Service in 1964. From 1974 to 1978 he was a special assistant to the Foreign Minister of Egypt. In 1980 he left the Diplomatic Service to join the United Nations and became a senior fellow in charge of the International Law Program at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. From 1981 to 1987 he was also an Adjunct Professor of International Law at the New York University School of Law.

In October 2005, Dr. ElBaradei and the IAEA were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for efforts "to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way." In addition, he has received multiple other awards for his work. These include the International Four Freedoms award from the Roosevelt Institute, the James Park Morton Interfaith Award, and the Golden Plate Award from the Academy of Achievement. Dr. ElBaradei is also the recipient of a number of honorary degrees and decorations, including a Doctorate of Laws from New York University and the Nile Collar - the highest Egyptian decoration.

Dr. ElBaradei is married to Aida Elkachef, an early childhood teacher. They have a daughter, Laila, a lawyer in private practice, and a son, Mostafa, a studio director with a television network, both of whom live and work in London, England.

Introduction by Professor John W. Etchemendy, Provost, Stanford University.

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Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency Keynote Speaker

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Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of DaedalusEthics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

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Sonja Schmid is a social science research associate at Stanford University. Having received her Ph.D. in Science & Technology Studies from Cornell University, she is now a science fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and affiliated with the Program in Science, Technology and Society at Stanford. Her research has focused on understanding complex decision-making processes at the interface between science, technology, and the state in the Cold War Soviet context, and is based on extensive archival research and narrative interviews with nuclear energy specialists in Russia. She is currently working on a book about reactor design choices and the development of the civilian nuclear industry in the Soviet Union. In addition, she is involved in an international research project on Cold War Technopolitics and Colonialism, where she works on Soviet technology transfer to Central and Eastern Europe. Her research interests also include risk communication, and the popularization of science and technology, subjects on which she has published in the past.

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Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei addressed the Stanford community on Wednesday, May 31, 2006 as part of the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Lecture Series.

"The Nuclear Future: A Conversation with Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei and Professor Scott D. Sagan," 4:30 p.m., Memorial Auditorium, Stanford University.

Introduction by Professor John W. Etchemendy, Provost, Stanford University.

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an intergovernmental organization that is part of the United Nations system. He was appointed to the office effective December 1, 1997, and reappointed to a third term in September 2005.

Dr. ElBaradei was born in Cairo, Egypt, in 1942. He earned a Bachelor´s degree in Law in 1962 at the University of Cairo, and a Doctorate in International Law at the New York University School of Law in 1974. He began his career in the Egyptian Diplomatic Service in 1964. From 1974 to 1978 he was a special assistant to the Foreign Minister of Egypt. In 1980 he left the Diplomatic Service to join the United Nations and became a senior fellow in charge of the International Law Program at the United Nations Institute for Training and Research. From 1981 to 1987 he was also an Adjunct Professor of International Law at the New York University School of Law.

In October 2005, Dr. ElBaradei and the IAEA were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for efforts "to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way." In addition, he has received multiple other awards for his work. These include the International Four Freedoms award from the Roosevelt Institute, the James Park Morton Interfaith Award, and the Golden Plate Award from the Academy of Achievement. Dr. ElBaradei is also the recipient of a number of honorary degrees and decorations, including a Doctorate of Laws from New York University and the Nile Collar - the highest Egyptian decoration.

Dr. ElBaradei is married to Aida Elkachef, an early childhood teacher. They have a daughter, Laila, a lawyer in private practice, and a son, Mostafa, a studio director with a television network, both of whom live and work in London, England.

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PESD fellow Nadeja Victor presented Global Natural Gas Market and Russian Gas Supply Presentation on March 14 during the "market mechanisms of energy market regulation and ways of improving them" roundtable chaired Anantoliy Yanovskiy, Director, Department of Fuel and Energy Complex, Ministry of Industry and Energy, RF. In the meeting of the Group of Eight energy ministers the following days, the chair's statement was the following:

1. G8 Energy Ministers met in Moscow on 15-16 March 2006 in order to discuss the matters of mutual interest related to global energy security.

2. The reliable energy supply plays a key role in development of worlds economies bearing in mind that the well-being, way and quality of life of people directly depend on access to energy.

3. Ministers are aware that the 21st century is sure to witness a significant increase of the global consumption of energy, primarily by dynamically developing economies. Despite the increased presence of alternative sources in the energy mix, the fossil fuels will remain the basis of the world energy industry for at least the first half of the 21st century.

4. Ministers discussed the challenges to the global energy security, issues related to promotion of market efficiency of the fuel and energy sector. We note that meeting energy security challenges will require reliance on market-oriented approaches aimed at increasing energy supply and stemming growth in demand, while encouraging market-based pricing, competition, energy efficiency, and conservation.

5. Ministers point out the importance of further development and strengthening of dialogue among energy producer, transit and consumer countries, including information exchange on the current situation as well as medium- and long-term plans and programmes of development of their respective energy sectors.

6. Ministers confirm our support for appropriate international initiatives such as the Joint Oil Data Initiative aimed at greater accessibility and transparency of data on reserves, demand and supply, stocks and production capacities.

7. Ministers note that a stable future of the international energy sector requires significant investment in the production, transportation and processing of energy resources. We recognize that to attract investment it is essential for countries to have open and favourable investment regimes including stable and predictable regulations, clear tax laws, and efficient administrative procedures as well as fair and reciprocal access to markets along the energy value chain.

8. Ministers favour the implementation of the Action plan adopted last year by our leaders in Gleneagles which includes a wide range of measures to promote innovations, increase energy efficiency and enhance environmental protection.

9. Ministers proceed from the fact that diversification of the energy portfolio in terms of energy sources, suppliers and consumers as well as delivery methods and routes will reduce energy security risks not only for individual countries but for the entire international community. Joint efforts of the G8 and other countries aimed at wider use of renewable and alternative energies, development and implementation of innovative energy technologies and development of low-carbon energy would contribute substantially to the solution of this strategic task. For those countries that wish, wide-scale development of safe and secure nuclear energy is crucial for long-term environmentally sustainable diversification of energy supply.

10. Ministers agree that continued international cooperation to develop the low carbon technologies of the future will be crucial. Facilitating development and deployment of innovative energy technology solutions will have longer term environmental, economic and energy security benefits and be key to a global sustainable energy future.

11. A significant reduction of the gap in energy supply between developed and undersupplied less-developed countries is a major aspect of global energy security.

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Victor's opinion piece supports India's move toward nuclear power as a means of meeting an ever increasing, economically-driven demand for electricity and displacing coal - the most carbon intensive of all fossil fuels-as the primary source of energy. However, care is still needed to tame the risks of proliferation and efforts need to be made to improve India's electricity sector.

Stanford, California - If the deal to supply India with nuclear technologies goes through, future generations may remember it for quite different reasons than the debate over nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear power emits no carbon dioxide, the leading cause of global warming. And India, like most developing countries, has not been anxious to spend money to control its emissions of this and other so- called greenhouse gases.

India is embracing nuclear power for other reasons - because it can help the country solve its chronic failure to supply the electricity needed for a burgeoning economy. But in effect, the deal would marry their interest in power with ours in protecting the planet.

India is growing rapidly. In recent years its economy has swelled at more than 7 percent per year, and many analysts believe it is poised to grow even faster in the coming decade.

The economic growth is feeding a voracious appetite for electricity that India's bankrupt utilities are unable to satisfy. Blackouts are commonplace. Farmers, who account for about two-fifths of all the power consumed, can barely rely on getting power for half of every day. In industrial zones, the lifeblood of India's vibrant economy, unstable power supplies are such trouble that the biggest companies usually build their own power plants.

So most analysts expect that the demand for electricity will rise at about 10 percent a year. (For comparison, U.S. power demand notches up at just 2 percent annually.)

Over the past decade, about one third of India's new power supplies came from natural gas and hydro electricity. Both those sources have been good news for global warming - natural gas is the least carbon- intensive of all the fossil fuels, and most of India's hydroelectric dams probably emit almost no greenhouse gases.

However, the bloom is coming off those greenhouse-friendly roses. New supplies of natural gas cost about twice what Indians are used to paying, and environmental objections are likely to scupper the government's grand plans for new hydro dams.

That leaves coal - the most carbon-intensive of all fossil fuels. Already more than half of India's new power supplies come from coal, and that could grow rapidly.

Traditionally, the coal sector was plagued by inefficiencies. State coal mines were notoriously dangerous and inefficient. Coal-fired plants in western provinces, far from the coal fields and vulnerable to the dysfunctional rail network, often came within days of shutting operations due to lack of coal.

All that is changing. Private and highly efficient coal mines are grabbing growing shares of the coal market. Upgrades to the nation's high-tension power grid is making it feasible to generate electricity with new plants installed right at the coal mines.

These improvements make coal the fuel to beat.

So the deal struck with President George W. Bush matters. At the moment, India has just 3 gigawatts of nuclear plants connected to the grid. Government planners envision that nuclear supply will grow to 30 GW over the next generation, but that will remain a fantasy without access to advanced nuclear technologies and, especially, nuclear fuels - such as those offered under the deal with the Bush administration.

By 2020, even after discounting for the government's normal exuberance in its forecasts, a fresh start for nuclear power could increase nuclear generating capacity nearly ten-fold.

By displacing coal, that would avoid about 130 million tons of carbon dioxide per year (for comparison, the full range of emission cuts planned by the European Union under the Kyoto Protocol will total just 200 million tons per year).

The effort, if successful, would eclipse the scheme under the Kyoto Protocol, known as the Clean Development Mechanism, that was designed to reward developing countries that implement projects to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases. The largest 100 of these CDM projects, in total, won't reduce emissions as much as a successful effort to help India embrace safe nuclear power.

The benefits in slowing global warming are not enough to make the deal a winner. Care is needed to tame the risks of proliferation, especially those connected from India's system of breeder reactors that make more weapons-capable fuel than they consume. And complementary efforts, led by Indians, are needed to fix the trouble in India's electricity sector that have so far discouraged private investors.

None of this will be easy. There are no silver bullets in cooling the greenhouse.

What is important is that the deal is not just a one-off venture, as the administration's backers, on the defensive, have suggested. It could frame a new approach to technology sharing and managing a more proliferation proof fuel cycle that, in turn, will multiply the benefits of a cooler climate.

Coal-rich China is among the many other countries that would welcome more nuclear power and whose emissions of carbon dioxide are growing fast - even faster than India's.

Quite accidentally, it seems, the Bush administration has stumbled on part of an effective strategy to slow global warming. Now it should marry that clever scheme overseas with an effective plan here at home.

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The newest member of the nuclear club will also gain a stake in nonproliferation, observes Pantech Fellow and San Jose Mercury News foreign affairs columnist Daniel C. Sneider

The nuclear deal reached during President Bush's recent visit to India unleashed a predictable wave of criticism. From editorial and op-ed pages to Congress, led by the left but supported on the right, the administration has been assailed for making a bad bargain.

Under the agreement, which still needs congressional approval, India would open much of its nuclear facilities to international inspections in return for gaining access to the world's supplies of uranium and U.S. nuclear expertise.

The attacks on the deal reflect the view of the nonproliferation lobby -- the experts and policymakers whose central concern is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. I share their aim. But American arguments against the India deal are misleading and only expose the deep contradictions, if not hypocrisy, of our own nuclear policies.

There are two main criticisms of the agreement: first, it undermines the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT, and second, it permits, even encourages, India to expand its nuclear weapons production.

The NPT issue is particularly sensitive at a time when the international community is trying to persuade Iran to give up certain nuclear technologies which many nations fear are part of a secret bomb program.

The NPT created two sets of global rules -- one for the five nuclear weapons powers it recognizes (China, the United States, Russia, Britain and France) and another for everyone else. The five, for example, allow only "voluntary'' international safeguards on their civilian nuclear facilities. They have no obligation to open their military programs to any kind of scrutiny. And the NPT places no real limits on their arsenals, other than a vague commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate all nuclear weapons.

The rest must open their nuclear energy programs fully to international inspection and agree never to build bombs. In exchange, they gain access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Iran -- and North Korea -- made that bargain and can be held to account for breaking the rules. But India consistently regarded that as an unequal trade-off and never signed the NPT; neither did Pakistan and Israel, two other nuclear weapons states.

India's nuclear program is the product of decades of largely indigenous effort; it did not result from secretive proliferation in violation of the NPT.

The deal with India turns the five into six. It treats India as a de facto member of the inner club. The deal would require changes in U.S. law to remove existing restrictions on the transfer of nuclear energy technology, changes that would allow India to be treated no differently from China.

That does not weaken the NPT -- it strengthens it. It brings it more into accord with reality and gives India a stake in a system it had previously rejected as unfair. It paves the way for India to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the international organization that controls nuclear exports.

The critics are right that the deal enables India to expand its production of fissile materials to make nuclear warheads. Eight of India's 22 power reactors will remain outside international controls, along with a new breeder reactor. The Indians fought for that exemption because they feel their nuclear arsenal may not be large enough to deter a nuclear first strike by Pakistan or China in the future. Critics fear that with increased access to uranium and limited inspections, India will set off an arms race in South Asia.

Again, the agreement simply treats India like the five. Nonproliferation experts claim that unlike India, however, the five have halted their production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that could be used to build new weapons. This is true, but misleading.

The five have massive stockpiles of fissile material built up during the Cold War. "If I've got a full pantry, it's easy for me to swear off trips to the supermarket,'' said Michael Levi, an arms-control expert at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Moreover, the United States has embarked on a new program to rebuild its nuclear weapons production capability, including creating new facilities to produce plutonium cores for warheads and to assemble them.

India has agreed to back a global pact to cut off fissile-material production. But the Bush administration does not support a treaty that would actually verify this is taking place. And the U.S. Senate has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that would permanently halt any new testing of nuclear weapons.

A Congress that can support those policies is hardly in a position to challenge the administration's agreement with India. Rather than block the U.S.-India deal, it makes more sense to improve it. This could include reaching agreements for cooperation between the two countries to ensure the safety and security of nuclear facilities, including those for military purposes, suggested Stanford Professor Scott D. Sagan, a leading expert on nuclear safety and nonproliferation. "Reducing the risk of terrorist theft of nuclear materials or weapons in India would also help protect the United States,'' argues Sagan.

Beyond that, the six acknowledged nuclear powers should begin to seriously fulfill their part of the NPT bargain -- to cap fissile-material production, to ban nuclear testing, and to eventually radically reduce stored arsenals of nuclear weapons and materials.

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The Japanese anti-nuclear movement has been characterized by the same kinds of political divisions as other popular movements, while it also reflects some uniquely Japanese features. Today, with the risk of use of nuclear weapons climbing towards levels not reached since the darkest days of the Cold War, the Japanese movement, led by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the aging "Hibakusha" (survivors), plays a key role in the global nuclear abolition movement, serving as its conscience and its inspiration. At the same time it is confronting new challenges at home. The Japanese government maintains an ambivalent relationship with nuclear weapons. While it rhetorically calls for global nuclear disarmament in the United Nations, it remains firmly situated under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella." Meanwhile, the U.S. is refurbishing and upgrading its still vast nuclear arsenal, and expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its national security policy. With an enormous civilian nuclear power program, and huge stocks of plutonium, Japan has the capacity to produce its own nuclear weapons, should it decide to do so - a fact that does not go unnoticed by its neighbors in the region, China, and the Koreas.

Japan's three nonnuclear principles of not possessing, not producing, and not allowing nuclear arms on its soil, and Article 9 of its 1946 post-war constitution, which renounces war and prohibits maintenance of armed forces, are under serious attack. In 2004, Japan, one of the U.S.'s closest allies, deployed 1000 members of its "Self Defense Forces" to Iraq - the first time Japanese troops have been sent into combat zone since World War II. According to some estimates, Japan is second only to the U.S. in its military spending.

On the 60th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombings of their cities, the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki declared August 6, 2005 until August 9, 2006 to be an international Year of Inheritance, Awakening, and Commitment.

Jacqueline Cabasso has served as Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation (WSLF) in Oakland, California since 1984. Founded two years earlier, the nonprofit WSLF seeks to abolish nuclear weapons as an essential step in making possible a more secure, just, and environmentally sustainable world. Since 1994, Ms. Cabasso has participated as an accredited non-governmental organization representative in 12 negotiating and review sessions of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1995, she co-founded the Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, which has grown to include more than 2000 organizations in over 90 countries, and she continues to serve on its international Coordinating Committee. Ms. Cabasso chairs the Coordinating Committee of the multi-issue Peoples NonViolent Response Coalition, located in the Bay Area, and formed in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks.

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Jacqueline Cabasso Executive Director Speaker the Western States Legal Foundation
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For almost 20 years the Energy Department has been investigating and developing Nevada's Yucca Mountain as the site for a deep underground repository to accept spent fuel from all the power reactors and high level waste left over from bomb programs. The future of US nuclear energy is widely thought to be tied to the success of the project. In 2002 Congress gave DOE the green light to take the next step to submit an NRC license application demonstrating compliance with applicable standards. DOE promised such an application in December 2004. It delayed and delayed and now DOE no longer has a date for submitting an NRC application, but it will be no earlier than 2008.

What's holding it up? What is the history of the project? What are its technical and managerial and legal problems? What has been the effect of Nevada's opposition? How will recent project changes and the administration's new nuclear policy (GNEP) affect Yucca Mountain? What are the prospects for project licensing and completion? Is Yucca Mountain the only option for dealing with the country's spent fuel?

Dr. Victor Gilinsky is a Washington, D.C.-based consultant on energy. He has been active on proliferation issues for many years, going back to his early work at RAND in Santa Monica, California. He joined RAND soon after receiving a PhD in physics from the California Institute of Technology in 1961. In 1971 he moved to the Atomic Energy Commission in Washington, D.C., where he was assistant director for policy and program review. From 1973 to 1975, he was head of the RAND Physical Sciences Department. From 1975 to 1984, he served on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), having been appointed by President Gerald Ford and reappointed by President Jimmy Carter. During his NRC tenure, Dr Gilinsky was heavily involved in nuclear-export issues. In 1982 he received Caltech's Distinguished Alumnus Award.

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