Nuclear Energy

The Nuclear Risk Reduction initiative engages technical and policy experts to reduce nuclear risks by promoting collaboration between the United States and Russia, China and Pakistan. To achieve this, NRR conducts academic research on issues such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and hosts events to encourage expanding scientific collaboration around nuclear materials security and accountability, diversion scenarios of nuclear materials and emergency response to nuclear terrorism.

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William J. Perry, former secretary of defense, and Siegfried S. Hecker, former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, have joined forces to launch the Nuclear Risk Reduction initiative to address the changing nuclear threat following the end of the Cold War and the rise of international terrorism. The project is based at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), which Hecker co-directs.

"I have worked with Sig for many years, both inside and outside government," Perry said. "I am particularly pleased to have such an able collaborator on this effort, which I have said is the work to which I will dedicate the rest of my career."

Hecker said he is excited to work with Perry to reduce the global nuclear threat. "Our primary objectives will be to work toward a world with fewer weapons, to have fewer fingers on the nuclear trigger and to keep nuclear weapons and materials out of the wrong hands," he said. "Time is of the essence both because of the urgency of the threat and because of the renewed hope that major powers are willing to take serious steps to realize these goals."

Hecker and Perry, both giants in the field of nuclear defense and security, plan to bring their considerable experience and associations with the U.S. and international policy, military and scientific communities to achieve these objectives.

The Nuclear Risk Reduction initiative (NRR) builds on the work of the Preventive Defense Project (PDP) that was established at Stanford and Harvard 13 years ago under the leadership of Perry and Ashton B. Carter, a former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. The two men, during their time in government, tackled some of the most important security issues following the breakup of the Soviet Union through promoting the concept of preventive defense, which seeks to diminish the possibility of potential threats escalating into actual threats and conflict. Carter is serving currently in the Obama administration as undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics.

Hecker, as director of Los Alamos, was instrumental in creating the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War environment without nuclear testing. He also helped reduce the nuclear threat posed by Russia and other republics in the chaotic years that followed the breakup of the Soviet Union. At Stanford, he has expanded his activities to include work in Northeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East.

NRR's three-prong approach for making the world a safer place:

1. Working toward a world free of nuclear weapons

Perry, along with former secretaries of state George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, and former Sen. Sam Nunn, launched a joint effort in 2007 to refocus world attention on the critical need to eliminate nuclear weapons, starting with practical measures to make the world a safer place. President Obama, who has embraced this vision, has begun to adopt policies that will move the United States in this direction. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), signed April 8, 2010, by Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, reduces the number of strategic arsenals in each country to 1,550 warheads. Now Perry and Hecker, through NRR, are conducting a risk/benefit analysis of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), another critical piece of legislation linked to nuclear weapon reductions. They will also explore with Russian colleagues deeper cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals along with engaging other nuclear weapons states on such critical issues.

2. Preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons

Perry and Hecker believe the risk of using nuclear weapons increases as more countries acquire them. Much of their focus is on the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, both of which threaten international peace and stability. In addition, as more states possess nuclear weapons and materials, it will become increasingly likely that fissile materials for an improvised nuclear device could fall into the hands of sub-national groups or terrorists.

Meanwhile, if there is to be a global renaissance of nuclear power, nations must learn how to manage potential proliferation risks associated with nuclear reactors and their fuel cycles. This is particularly critical if nuclear power spreads to developing countries that have expressed interest in this form of energy, since many have neither the requisite technological basis nor political stability to guarantee security.

3. Preventing nuclear terrorism

The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C. highlighted the importance of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. As President Obama stated, "It is increasingly clear that the danger of nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global security-to our collective security." Despite this, some nations view the terrorist threat with less alarm. NRR plans to engage the technical and military leadership in key countries to promote a common understanding of the dangers posed by such threats and what steps are needed to mitigate them.

President Obama also warned, "Nuclear materials that could be sold or stolen and fashioned into a nuclear weapon exist in dozens of nations." Harvard's Graham Allison stated if countries could, "Lock down all nuclear weapons and bomb-usable material as securely as gold in Fort Knox, they [could] reduce the likelihood of a nuclear 9/11 to nearly zero." During the Nuclear Summit, Obama announced a goal to "lock down" all nuclear materials by 2014. This is a laudable objective, but Perry and Hecker know it will require much more than physical security to protect nuclear sites worldwide. The two men will work toward a cooperative, global effort to help countries develop modern, comprehensive nuclear safeguard systems that can provide proper control and accounting, along with physical protection.

Hecker has experience regarding such work. In 1994, he initiated a nuclear materials protection, control and accounting program (the lab-to-lab program) with Russia's nuclear complex. Perry and Hecker, through NRR, plan to reinvigorate and broaden the scientific cooperation that existed between the United States and Russia in the 1990s. Moreover, they plan to collaborate with the technical, military and policy communities in key countries to realize NRR's ambitious agenda of making the world a safer and more secure place.

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Thirteen fellows, including three first-time Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows, will be in residence at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) during the 2010-2011 academic year.

Fellows and their research topics include:

  • Alexander Betts, a post-doc from Oxford University. "Global Migration Governance: Multiple and Contested Institutions."
  • Edward Blandford, a post-doc from the University of California at Berkeley. "Scaling of Hierarchical Engineered Systems."
  • David Blum, a Stanford pre-doctoral candidate. "Probabilistic Early Warning Systems for National Security Crises."
  • John Downer, a post-doc from the London School of Economics. "Administering Aircraft: The Security Implications of Technological Ecosystems." Zukerman Fellow.
  • Matthias Englert, post-doc, CISAC. "Managing the Proliferations Risks of Gas Centrifuges-Analysis in View of Possible Solutions."
  • Katherine D. Marvel, post-doc, CISAC. "Understanding the Regional Consequences of Global Climate Change" and "Game Changers for Nuclear Energy."
  • Aila Matanock, a Stanford pre-doctoral candidate. "Reformed or Reconfigured? Explaining why Militant Groups Participate in Elections."
  • Brenna M. Powell, pre-doc from Harvard. "Normalizing Security after Conflict: Jobs for the Boys and Justice for the Hoods."
  • Jan M. Stupl, post-doc, CISAC. "Controlling the Spread of Ballistic Missiles."
  • Michael Sulmeyer, D.Phil candidate, Oxford University; law student, Stanford Law School; teaching assistant for CISAC Honors Program. "Weapons under Fire: Terminating Major Weapons Contracts for the U.S. Military."

Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows and their research areas include:

  • Anne Harrington de Santana, a post-doc from the University of Chicago. "The Fetishism of Force: Nuclear Weapons as a Currency of Power."
  • Gaurav Kampani, a Cornell pre-doctoral candidate. "The Weaponization Paradox: Why some Emerging Nuclear Weapons Powers Delay Building Operational Forces."
  • Riqiang Wu, a pre-doc from Tsinghua University in China. "How to Establish and Maintain an Asymmetric Deterrence: China-U.S. Strategic Relations."
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Sponsored by the Center for Russian, East European, & Eurasian Studies

Jeff Richardson recently retired after 35 years at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  At LLNL he held a variety of program management positions, including Division Leader of Chemistry and later of Proliferation Prevention.  He spent two tours in Washington DC, supporting NNSA in Nonproliferation R&D and DoD in the USAF Directorate of Nuclear Operations, Plans and Requirements.  His most recent paper, Shifting from a Nuclear Triad to a Nuclear Dyad, explores an alternate future strategy for the US nuclear arsenal.  At CISAC he will focus on science diplomacy, using science as a tool for international engagement and promoting regional security. He will also be working on developing the concept of cyber openness (i.e., how the information revolution will change international security).

Jeff earned his BS degree in chemistry from CalTech and his PhD in organic chemistry from Stanford University.  His work at LLNL including chemical and materials science research, energy research, materials development for nuclear weapons programs, radiation detection for border security, nuclear materials protection, and proliferation detection, science cooperation for international security, and support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Bekhzod Yuldashev is a CISAC Visiting Scholar. He served as a consultant-advisor at the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2006-2007. Prior to that, he was director-general of the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Uzbekistan Academy of Science from 1990 to 2006. From 1984 to 1990, he served as head of the laboratory in the Physical Technical Institute in Tashkent, where he had been a senior researcher since 1972.

Yuldashev has published about 300 scientific papers dedicated to various subjects of particle and nuclear physics in the wide range of primary energies. His experimental research has revealed or proven important concepts in nuclear energy, and he holds more than 20 patents on nuclear applications.

He is a full member of the Academy of Science of Uzbekistan and served as the academy's president from September 2000 through November 2005. In 2000-2004 he was elected a Member of Parliament of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and in 2004-2005 was elected a Senator.

He is a fellow of Islamic Academy of Sciences, a member of the American Physical Society. From 1992 to 2002, he was an elected member of the Scientific Council of the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, in Dubna, Russia, one of two international nuclear centers in the world. He is also a member of the IAEA's Standing Advisory Group for Nuclear Applications, a fellow of the Islamic Countries Academy, and foreign member of the National Academy of Kazakhstan. He is an honorary professor of Samarkand State University and honorary doctor of the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research (2004). He won the 2004 Economic Cooperation Organization's excellence award in science and technology and the 1983 Uzbekistan State Prize for Science and Technology.

Yuldashev graduated from Tashkent and Moscow Universities in 1968. He earned his PhD in physics and mathematics from the Joint Institute of Nuclear Research, Dubna, Russia, in 1971.

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Jeff Richardson is an affiliate and former visiting scholar at CISAC. He came to CISAC after a 35-year career at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. At LLNL he held a variety of program management positions, including Division Leaders of Chemistry and later of Proliferation Prevention. He spent two tours in Washington DC, supporting NNSA in Nonproliferation R&D and DoD in the USAF Directorate of Nuclear Operations, Plans and Requirements. He recently completed 4-year assignment working for CRDF as the U.S. Science Advisor for the ISTC program, administered by the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, State Department. At CISAC he is focused on science diplomacy, using science as a tool for international engagement and promoting regional security.

Jeff earned his BS degree in chemistry from CalTech and his PhD in organic chemistry from Stanford University. His work at LLNL included chemical and materials science research, energy research, materials development for nuclear weapons programs, radiation detection for border security, nuclear materials protection, and proliferation detection, science cooperation for international security, and support for the Chemical Weapons Convention. He has authored over 100 papers. More recent papers include LLNL and WSSX, a contribution to Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian scientists joined forces to avert some of the greatest post-Cold War nuclear dangers, and Shifting from a Nuclear Triad to a Nuclear Dyad, which explored an alternate future strategy for the US nuclear arsenal.

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Jeffery H. Richardson CISAC VIsiting Scholar; former Division Leader of Proliferation Prevention, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Speaker
Bekhzod Yuldashev CISAC Visiting Scholar; Professor, Institute of Nuclear Physics, Uzbekistan Speaker
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Leaders or representatives from 47 countries recently attended the nuclear security summit in Washington. By holding a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama and delivering an important speech at the summit, Hu Jintao highlighted China's positive image for people across the globe and helped reverse the deterioration of US-China relations.

Obviously, it takes a long path toward establishing a global mechanism to counter nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Many of these leaders were not quite sure whether they would come away from the summit empty-handed.

However, they decided to attend the summit mainly to respond positively to Obama, who had launched a number of initiatives to build a nuclear-free world. The same is true for Hu Jintao and his decision to attend the summit.

Hu's visit to Washington will help lead the bilateral relations toward a positive direction. Although some disputes continue between the two countries, Hu's visit to Washington will no doubt contribute to lowering U.S. hostility toward China.

Earlier, the rapid increase in GDP had stimulated some Chinese diplomats to take blind pride in dealing with their foreign counterparts. Now, it is time to rethink whether it is necessary to adhere to the well-established principle of keeping a low profile in handling Sino-American relations.

China's GDP will soon become the second largest in the world. Who is the greatest beneficiary from the pursuance of this principle over the past three decades? Needless to say, it is China.

Now, China is just halfway through its course of "peaceful rise." In the foreseeable future, the United States will remain the No. 1 power in the world. Two decades from now, who will become the greatest beneficiary if China, as the biggest developing country, is able to maintain stable relations with Washington? Obviously, the answer is China.

In his opening statement at the summit, Obama pointed out that in today's world, the world has reduced the risk of a nuclear war between big powers, but the threat of nuclear terrorist assaults is increasing. He is right. Terrorists can penetrate all places throughout the world without leaving a trace.

It is difficult for all major powers, especially the United States, to detect and prevent them from launching assaults including sudden attacks with "dirty bombs" as weapons. As such, the whole world faces the most serious security challenge.

Such a strategic assessment prompted Obama to convene the nuclear security summit as well as his earlier initiative of "a world free of nuclear weapons." Preoccupied by this assessment, he has spared no effort to promote the campaign of countering nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

To fight nuclear terrorism, the summit focused on establishing an international nuclear security mechanism. The United States and many countries face the threat of nuclear terrorism. China is no exception.

In case the East Turkistan separatists consider the timing is mature to intensify conflicts with Beijing, they will no doubt take whatever means necessary to penetrate nuclear facilities or acquire "dirty bombs." Moreover, the large-scale construction of nuclear power plants in China introduces more security challenges. China will be in the peak period of building such plants in the next two decades.

The ongoing construction of such plants scattered in coastal areas would expose the nation to threat. A terrorist attack on even one plant would result in consequences more serious than that of detonating a nuclear bomb over a city. Taking this into account, Beijing has adopted various measures to strengthen nuclear security in recent years.

As a positive response from China to the international community, Hu Jintao made the decision to attend the summit, which reflects that Beijing and Washington actually are sharing common interests by making joint efforts to establish a global mechanism for countering nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

This action indicates that Beijing regards nuclear terrorist assaults as a huge threat to national security interests and it hopes to strengthen international cooperation to limit or even eliminate this type of threat.

Also, this decision has indeed enabled China to avert a head-on collision with the United States and helped reverse a deterioration of U.S.-China relations. Based on this, we can suppose that Beijing is able to conduct strategic adjustment at a critical moment and formulate appropriate foreign policies.

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CISAC Affiliate Leonard Weiss responds to a March 22, 2010 article by New Yorker Senior Editor Hendrik Hertzberg

Hendrik Hertzberg writes that the end of the Cold War and the coming of global warming have brought about increased support for nuclear power, even among some environmentalists (The Talk of the Town, March 22nd). But many of us who work on nuclear-proliferation issues are dismayed by the growth of nuclear energy. Expanded nuclear power in industrial countries will inevitably mean expanded nuclear exports to less developed countries as manufacturers try to recoup their investments in a limited domestic market by selling abroad. It can be shown statistically that countries that receive nuclear assistance are more likely to build nuclear weapons, especially when they perceive threats to their security. India, Pakistan, and Israel started their nuclear programs with the importation of research reactors carrying peaceful-use requirements; with help from other countries, they were able to then realize their desire for weapons. Iran appears to be heading in the same direction. Given the documented interest in nuclear materials of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, and given the questionable assumptions that nuclear-energy economics is fraught with, it makes little sense to push nuclear power at a time when protections against proliferation are still so problematic. Improved energy efficiency is a safer, greener, and cheaper alternative.

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Hendrik Hertzberg writes that the end of the Cold War and the coming of global warming have brought about increased support for nuclear power, even among some environmentalists (The Talk of the Town, March 22nd). But many of us who work on nuclear-proliferation issues are dismayed by the growth of nuclear energy. Expanded nuclear power in industrial countries will inevitably mean expanded nuclear exports to less developed countries as manufacturers try to recoup their investments in a limited domestic market by selling abroad. It can be shown statistically that countries that receive nuclear assistance are more likely to build nuclear weapons, especially when they perceive threats to their security. India, Pakistan, and Israel started their nuclear programs with the importation of research reactors carrying peaceful-use requirements; with help from other countries, they were able to then realize their desire for weapons. Iran appears to be heading in the same direction. Given the documented interest in nuclear materials of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, and given the questionable assumptions that nuclear-energy economics is fraught with, it makes little sense to push nuclear power at a time when protections against proliferation are still so problematic. Improved energy efficiency is a safer, greener, and cheaper alternative.

 

Leonard Weiss

National Advisory Board, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Palo Alto, Calif.

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Kate Marvel is a CISAC postdoctoral fellow working on energy security and nuclear nonproliferation.  She received a PhD in theoretical physics at the University of Cambridge, where she was a Gates Scholar and a member of Trinity College. She chaired Cambridge University Student Pugwash and is a member of the Executive Board of International Student/Young Pugwash. Kate holds a BA in physics and astronomy from the University of California at Berkeley and has worked at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, California, and the African Institute for Mathematical Sciences in South Africa.   She is active in outreach work and has lectured in settings as diverse as a community center in Lesotho, a physics institute in Tehran, and the Secret Garden Party Festival in the UK.

Tom Isaacs serves as the Director for the Office of Planning and Special Studies at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.  During his sabbatical leave he will be in residence at CISAC, focusing his research on several interconnected sets of challenges to the effective management of the worldwide expansion of nuclear energy.  He will also play an important role in a collaborative project with CISAC and the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, Global Nuclear Future Initiative.

Tom's career spans more than two decades with the Department of Energy including managing policies and programs on the advancement of nuclear power and issues associate with security, waste management, and public trust.  He has degrees in Engineering, Applied Physics, and Chemical Engineering from Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania.

Michael May is Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000. May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988, with some brief periods away from the Laboratory. While there, he held a variety of research and development positions, serving as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971. May was a technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council on International Policy, and a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards. His current research interests are in the area of nuclear and terrorism, energy, security and environment, and the relation of nuclear weapons and foreign policy.

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Tom is Co-Principal Investigator for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Developing Spent Fuel Strategies (DSFS) project coordinating international cooperation on issues at the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle with emphasis on spent fuel management and disposal in Pacific Rim countries. Participants include senior nuclear officials from Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Canada, and the United States.

Tom advises national nuclear waste programs on facility siting, communications, stakeholder engagement, and public trust and confidence. He has worked with the Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) for 15 years.

Tom was recently named as the Chair of the recently formed Experts Team to support Southern California Edison  at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

Previously Tom was a Consulting Professor at CISAC, lead advisor to the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, Member of the National Academy of Sciences Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board, Director of Planning at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and long time senior executive at the Department of Energy where he led the siting of Yucca Mountain as the nation’s candidate site for a geologic repository.

He has degrees in Engineering, Applied Physics, and Chemical Engineering from Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania.

 

Thomas Isaacs CISAC Consulting Professor Speaker
Katherine D. Marvel CISCA Postdoctoral Fellow Speaker
Michael M. May Professor of Management Science and Engineering, Emeritus; FSI Senior Fellow; CISAC Faculty Member Speaker
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Introduction

With the recent attention to new nuclear power, the challenge of managing the spread of nuclear technology has increased. At the same time, the growth of interest in nuclear power can serve as an important opportunity to improve the related safety, security, and nonproliferation regimes. One such opportunity arises in the context of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the concern over how to mitigate the spread of enrichment and reprocessing, as well as how to store and ultimately dispose of spent nuclear fuel.

The first essay in this collection, "The Key Role of the Back-End in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" by Charles McCombie and Thomas Isaacs, has been reprinted from the Winter 2010 issue of Daedalus on the global nuclear future. It focuses on the proliferation concerns that arise from enrichment and reprocessing as well as on the opportunities at the back-end of the fuel cycle for regional and international initiatives that may help to assuage energy, security, and waste concerns. Managing the emerging nuclear order will require the development of a clear set of goals, in which the issues surrounding the back-end of the fuel cycle must be included and satisfactorily addressed. This essay seeks to contribute to those efforts.

It is followed by four new papers whose authors were invited to reflect on this issue and to share their thoughts on this topic. These new papers reflect a diversity of sources and opinions, in keeping with both the global importance of these questions and the benefits of developing an international perspective on how they might be addressed. The authors focus on various aspects of the challenges raised by the back-end of the fuel cycle and offer possible options for addressing these challenges.

This volume also includes an edited version of remarks made by Ellen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security, at a January 2010 conference at the Hoover Institution. Tauscher's remarks underscore the shared sense of the importance of addressing the back-end of the fuel cycle, in government as well as within academic and other non-governmental circles. This importance cannot be overstated when considering the growth of nuclear power. As Tariq Rauf observes in his essay, most of the spent fuel around the world is kept at the nuclear power plants that have generated it. All of the authors, however, support the idea of moving from the current status quo toward some form of multinational or international approach to dealing with spent fuel, including the possibility of the establishment of international spent fuel repositories. Although Rauf notes the likelihood of strong public opposition to international repositories (based on the traditional resistance even to national repositories), Frank von Hippel observes that communities in Finland and Sweden that host nuclear power plants have actually volunteered to host underground repositories, suggesting that it may be possible for public opposition--even toward international repositories--eventually to be overcome.

Two of the authors (Frank von Hippel and Atsuyuki Suzuki) suggest that the United States should be the first to serve as a host for an international repository and take spent fuel from other countries with small programs, as a way both to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and to increase nuclear safety and security worldwide. Suzuki asserts that such an approach, by the United States, would serve as an "epoch-making opportunity for the [Obama] administration to take the leadership" on this issue.

The essays in this collection engage with the challenge of the back-end of the fuel cycle in very different ways, whether through a cross-comparison of the programs of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia, or through a focus on the history and current role of international organizations in this area. All, however, are linked by a recognition that the back-end of the fuel cycle has often been overlooked in discussions of the anticipated nuclear renaissance. They also share a general support, in principle, for international approaches to the backend of the fuel cycle, although, as Noramly Bin Muslim points out, such approaches "by no means constitute a ‘magic bullet' that can solve nonproliferation problems."

This publication thus stands as the continuation of the conversation begun both by the special issues of Daedalus on the Global Nuclear Future and by a meeting sponsored by the Academy in Abu Dhabi on nuclear power in the Middle East. With a growing desire for development, and a reliable energy supply, comes the need for a global expansion in nuclear power. A serious discussion of all aspects of this expansion is necessary if it is to be managed safely and securely.

We hope that the papers contained herein contribute to that discussion and help to build the basis for a more sustainable international nuclear order.

Leslie Berkowitz
CEO, American Academy of Arts and Sciences

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