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It’s a quintessential Silicon Valley scene. A group of tech-savvy Stanford students are delivering a passionate pitch about a product they hope is going to change the world, while a room full of venture capitalists, angel investors and entrepreneurs peppers them with questions.

But there’s a twist. This Stanford classroom is also packed with decorated military veterans and active duty officers. And a group of analysts from the U.S. intelligence community is monitoring the proceedings live via an iPad propped up on a nearby desk.

These Stanford students aren’t just working on the latest “Uber for X” app. They’re searching for solutions to some of the toughest technological problems facing America’s military and intelligence agencies, as part of a new class called Hacking for Defense.

A student team briefs the class on a wearable sensor they're developing for an elite unit of U.S. Navy SEALs – a product they're pitching as "fitbit for America's divers." A student team briefs the class on a wearable sensor they're developing for an elite unit of U.S. Navy SEALs – a product they're pitching as "fitbit for America's divers."
“There’s no problems quite like the kind of problems that the defense establishment faces, so from an engineering standpoint, it has the most powerful ‘cool factor’ of anything in the world,” said Nitish Kulkarni, a senior in mechanical engineering.

Kulkarni’s team is working with an organization within the US Department of Defense to devise a system that will provide virtual assistance to Afghan and Iraqi coalition forces as they defuse deadly improvised explosive devices.

“At Stanford there’s a lot of opportunities for you to build things and go out and learn new stuff, but this was one of the first few opportunities I’ve seen where as a Stanford student and as an engineer, I can go and work on problems that will actually make a difference and save lives,” said Kulkarni.

A 21st century tech ROTC

That’s exactly the kind of “21st century tech ROTC” model of national service that Steve Blank, a consulting associate professor at Stanford’s Department of Management Science and Engineering, said he had in mind when he developed the class.

“The nation is facing a set of national security threats it’s never faced before, and Silicon Valley has not only the technology resources to help, but knows how to move at the speed that these threats are moving at,” said Blank.

MBA student Rachel Moore presents for Team Sentinel, which is working with the U.S. 7th Fleet to find better ways to analyze drone and satellite imagery. MBA student Rachel Moore presents for Team Sentinel, which is working with the U.S. 7th Fleet to find better ways to analyze drone and satellite imagery.
The students’ primary mission will be to produce products that can help keep Americans and our allies safe, at home and abroad, according to Blank.

Former U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel Joe Felter, who helped create the class and co-teaches it with Blank, said the American military needs to find new ways to maintain its technological advantage on the battlefield.

“Groups like ISIS, al–Qaeda and other adversaries have access to cutting edge technologies and are aggressively using them to do us harm around the world,” said Felter, who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and is currently a senior research scholar at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

“The stakes are high – this is literally life and death for our young men and women deployed in harm’s way. We’re in a great position here at Stanford and in Silicon Valley to help make the connections and develop the common language needed to bring innovation into the process, in support of the Department of Defense and other government agencies’ missions.”

Startup guru Steve Blank shares a light moment with a group of students. Startup guru Steve Blank shares a light moment with a group of students.
The class is an interdisciplinary mix of undergraduate and graduate students, from freshman to fifth year PhD student.

“It’s like a smorgasbord of all these people coming together from different parts and different schools of Stanford, and so I think that’s just a really cool environment to be in,” said Rachel Moore, a first-year MBA student.

Moore’s team includes electrical and mechanical engineering students, and they’re working together to develop a system to enable the Navy’s Pacific Fleet to automatically identify enemy ships using images from drones and satellites.

Tough technological challenges

Months before the course start date, class organizers asked U.S. military and intelligence organizations to identify some of their toughest technological challenges.

Class co-teacher Pete Newell throws his hands up to celebrate a student breakthrough. Class co-teacher Pete Newell throws his hands up to celebrate a student breakthrough.
U.S. Army Cyber Command wanted to know if emerging data mining, machine learning and data science capabilities could be used to understand, disrupt and counter adversaries' use of social media.

The Navy Special Warfare Group asked students to design wearable sensors for Navy SEALs, so they could monitor their physiological conditions in real-time during underwater missions.

Intelligence and law enforcement agencies were interested in software that could help identify accounts tied to malicious “catfishing” attempts from hackers trying to steal confidential information.

And those were just a few of the 24 problems submitted by 14 government agencies.

Developing Solutions

The class gives eight teams of four students 10 weeks to actively learn about the problem they are addressing from stake holders and end users most familiar with the problem and to iteratively develop possible solutions or  a “minimum viable product,” using a modified version of Steve Blank’s “lean launchpad methodology,” which has become a revered how-to guide among the Silicon Valley startup community.

Rachel Olney, a graduate student in mechanical engineering, tries on a military-grade dry suit on a visit to the 129th Rescue Wing at Moffett Field. Rachel Olney, a graduate student in mechanical engineering, tries on a military-grade dry suit on a visit to the 129th Rescue Wing at Moffett Field.
A key tenet of Blank’s methodology is what he calls the “customer discovery process.”

“If you’re not crawling in the dirt with these guys, then you don’t understand their problem,” Blank told the class.

One student team, which was working on real-time biofeedback sensors and geo-location devices for an elite team of Navy SEALS (a project they were initially pitching at “fitbit for America’s divers”), earned a round of applause from the class when they showed a slide featuring photos from a field trip they took to the 129th Rescue Wing at Moffett Field to find out what it felt like to wear a military-grade dry suit.

Rachel Olney, a graduate student in mechanical engineering, said the experience of squeezing into the tight suit and wearing the heavy dive gear gave her a better appreciation for the physical demands that Navy SEALs have to deal with during a mission.

“They’re diving down to like 200 feet for up to six to eight hours…and during that time they can’t eat, they can’t hydrate, they’re physically exerting a lot, because they’re swimming miles and miles and miles at depth and they can’t see and they can’t talk to each other,” Olney said.

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“It’s probably one of the most extreme things that humans do right now.”

Another group came in for some heavy criticism from the teaching team for failing to identify and interview enough end users.

But the next week, they were back in front of the class showing a video from a team member’s visit to an Air Force base in Fresno, where he logged some time inside the 90-pound bomb suit that explosive ordinance disposal units wear in the field.

“You can’t address a customer issue unless and until you really step into the shoes of the customer,” said Gaurav Sharma, who’s a student at Stanford's Graduate School of Business.

“That was the exact reason why I went to Fresno and wore the bomb suit, to get into the shoes of the end customer.”

Navigating the defense bureaucracy

Active duty military officers from CISAC’s Senior Military Fellows program and the Hoover Institution’s National Security Affairs Fellows program act as military liaisons for the class and help students navigate the complex defense bureaucracy.

Colonel John Cogbill, U.S. Army“[The students] have really just jumped in with both feet and immersed themselves in this Department of Defense world that for so many civilians is just very foreign to them,” said U.S. Army Colonel John Cogbill, who has spent the last year as a senior military fellow at CISAC.

“I think they will come away from this experience with a much better appreciation of what we do inside the Department of Defense and Intelligence community, and where there are opportunities for helping us do our jobs better.”

Cogbill said he hoped that some of the inventions from the class, like an autonomous drone designed to improve situational awareness for Special Forces teams, could help the troops on his next combat deployment, where he will serve as the Deputy Commanding Officer of the U.S. Army’s elite 75th  Ranger Regiment.

“It’s not just about making them more lethal, it’s also about how to keep them alive on the battlefield,” said Cogbill.

Students also get support from their project sponsors and personnel at the newly established Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) stationed at Moffett Field.

Tech saves lives on the battlefield

Another key member of the teaching team is Pete Newell, who was awarded the Silver Star Medal (America’s third-highest military combat decoration), for leading a U.S. Army battalion into the Battle of Fallujah, where he survived an ambush and left the protection of his armored vehicle in an attempt to save a mortally wounded officer.

Class co-teacher and Silver Star Medal recipient Pete Newell explains some of the classic reasons why military products fail in the field. Class co-teacher and Silver Star Medal recipient Pete Newell explains some of the classic reasons why military products fail in the field.
Newell said he saw first-hand the difference that technology can make on the battlefield in his next job, when he served as director of the U.S. Army’s Rapid Equipping Force, which was tasked with creating technological solutions to the troops fighting in Afghanistan.

“What I realized is that the guys on the front edge of the battlefield who were actually fighting the fight, don’t have time to figure out what the problem is that they have to solve,” Newell said.

“They’re so involved in just surviving day to day, that they really don’t have time to step back from it and see those problems coming, and what they needed was somebody to look over their shoulder and look a little deeper and anticipate their needs.”

One of the first and most urgent problems Newell faced on the job was responding to the sudden spike in IED attacks on dismounted infantry.

The Army was still using metal detector technology from the ‘50s to find mines, but the new breed of IEDs, which were often hidden inside buried milk jugs, were virtually undetectable to the outdated technology.

Former U.S. Army Colonel Pete Newell demystifies some military jargon for the class. Former U.S. Army Colonel Pete Newell demystifies some military jargon for the class.
“They could create an improvised explosive device and a pressure plate trigger…by using almost zero metal content,” Newell said. “It was almost impossible to find.”

Newell’s solution was a handheld gradiometer, the kind of technology used to find small wires in your backyard during a construction project, paired with a ground penetrating radar that can see objects underground.

But by the time the new technology reached troops in the field last summer, more than 4,000 had been wounded or killed in IED attacks.

Newell said he hoped the class would help get life-saving technology deployed throughout the military faster.

“I think it’s important to enable this younger generation of technologists to actually connect with some of the national security issues we face and give them an opportunity to take part in making the world a safer place,” Newell said.

Tom Byers, an entrepreneurship professor in Management Science and Engineering and faculty director of the Stanford Technology Ventures Program, rounds out the teaching team and brings his experience in innovation education and entrepreneurship to the classroom.

Inspiring the next generation

Students said the opportunity to find solutions to consequential problems was their primary inspiration for joining the class.

“When I first came to Stanford, the hype around entrepreneurship was very much around, ‘go out, make an app, do something really fun and cool, and get rich’,” said Darren Hau, a junior in Electrical Engineering.

Students share a laugh during a class break. Students share a laugh during a class break.
“In Hacking for Defense, I think you’re seeing a lot of people bring that same entrepreneurial mindset into a problem statement that seems a lot more impactful.”

Felter said he was humbled that so many students were willing to serve in this way.

“It’s encouraging to find out that students at one of our top universities are very interested and highly motivated to work very hard and use their skills and expertise and talent and focus it on these pressing national security problems,” said Felter.

The teaching team said they planned on expanding their class to other universities across the country in the coming years, to create a kind of open source network for solving unclassified national security problems.

For military officers like Cogbill, who will likely soon be leading U.S. soldiers into combat, that’s welcome news.

“Every time you run a course, that’s eight more problems,” Cogbill said.

“If this scales across 10, 20, 30, 40 more universities, you can imagine how many more problems can be solved, and how many more lives can potentially be saved.”

 

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Influential startup educator Steve Blank (center) gives advice to Stanford students working on tough national security problems, while retired U.S. Army Colonels and class co-teachers Joe Felter (right) and Pete Newell (left) listen in.
Influential startup educator Steve Blank (center) gives advice to Stanford students working on tough national security problems, while retired U.S. Army Colonels and class co-teachers Joe Felter (right) and Pete Newell (left) listen in.
Rod Searcey
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Abstract: The disclosure of software vulnerabilities has stirred controversy for decades among security researchers and software vendors, and more recently governments. Despite increasing interdependency of software and systems (e.g., the Internet of Things) and resulting complexity in vulnerability disclosure and coordination, no unified norms have yet emerged.

This talk addresses the development of norms that (attempt to) govern the disclosure of software security flaws in relation to structural changes of the software industry and the Internet. This includes new forms of private, but monetarily rewarded disclosure on markets and through bug bounty programs, as well as government efforts to prohibit proliferation of knowledge and technology through export controls. Recently, governments acknowledged the withholding of vulnerability information on the grounds of national security and law enforcement needs, trading off against the need for defensive security of civilian computers and networks.

The talk outlines pressing policy issues and connects them to recent developments (e.g., Apple vs. FBI). It concludes by making the case for why norms on vulnerability disclosure are an essential component in shaping cybersecurity governance.

About the Speaker: Andreas Kuehn is a Ph.D. Candidate in Information Science and Technology at Syracuse University. He joined CISAC as a Zukerman Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow in October 2014. Prior, he was a visiting graduate student at Cornell University’s Department of Science & Technology Studies. He holds a M.Sc. in Information Systems from the University of Zurich, Switzerland.

In his dissertation, Andreas examined the historical, organizational, and institutional developments of software vulnerability and exploit markets as they are shaped by the perennial controversy on vulnerability disclosure. His qualitative, empirical research on emerging technologies and governance is informed by Science and Technology Studies and Institutional Theory.

Cybersecurity Predoctoral Fellow CISAC, Stanford University
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Abstract: For four years running now, the Director of National Intelligence’s Worldwide Threat Assessment to Congress has led with cyber threats to national and international security.  Under statute, the several National Intelligence Officers constitute the most senior advisors of the US Intelligence Community in their areas of expertise.  This discussion with the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues will begin by highlighting the technology trends that are having a transformational change on cyber security and the future of intelligence.  It will then assess strategic developments in international relations and their implications for deterring malicious activity in cyberspace.  The analysis will focus on the (in)applicability of existing arms control mechanisms and deterrence principles to modern information and communication technologies.

About the Speaker: Sean Kanuck was appointed as the first National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues in May 2011.  Mr. Kanuck came to the National Intelligence Council after a decade of experience in the Central Intelligence Agency’s Information Operations Center, including both analytic and field assignments.  In his Senior Analytic Service role, he was a contributing author for the 2009 White House Cyberspace Policy Review, an Intelligence Fellow with the Directorates for Cybersecurity and Combating Terrorism at the National Security Council, and a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on international information security.

Prior to government service, Mr. Kanuck practiced law with Skadden Arps et al. in New York, where he specialized in mergers and acquisitions, corporate finance, and banking matters.  He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and his academic publications focus on information warfare and international law.  Mr. Kanuck holds degrees from Harvard University (A.B., J.D.), the London School of Economics (M.Sc.), and the University of Oslo (LL.M.).

Sean P. Kanuck National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues (until April 2016) Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Seminars
The Critical Infrastructure Initiative builds the cyber-resilience of critical infrastructure through methodologically diverse outputs-oriented research and engagement with end users and homeland security practitioners. The initiative was launched in 2016 in the recognition of the need to address growing threat that cyber-incidents pose to the functioning of the basic infrastructure that societies depend upon. For this initiative, Stanford has partnered with 11 other institutes to found the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute (CIRI), an institute focused on research and education to designed enhance the resiliency of the nation’s critical infrastructures. CIRI is led by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and funded by the Department of Homeland Security.
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Stanford cyber-security innovators Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, who brought cryptography from the shadowy realm of classified espionage into the public space and created a major breakthrough that enabled modern e-commerce and secure communications over the Internet, are being honored with the Association for Computing Machinery's 2015 A.M. Turing Award.

The award is often referred to as the "Nobel Prize of computing" and comes with a $1 million prize funded by Google.

The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) made the official announcement this morning at the RSA conference in San Francisco – one of the largest gatherings of cryptographers working on Internet security.

[[{"fid":"222241","view_mode":"crop_870xauto","fields":{"format":"crop_870xauto","field_file_image_description[und][0][value]":"Martin Hellman (left) and Whitfield Diffie (right), winners of the 2015 Association for Computing Machinery's A.M. Turing Award, are shown in this 1977 photo.","field_file_image_alt_text[und][0][value]":"Martin Hellman (left) and Whitfield Diffie (right), winners of the 2015 Association for Computing Machinery's A.M. Turing Award, are shown in this 1977 photo.","field_file_image_title_text[und][0][value]":"Martin Hellman (left) and Whitfield Diffie (right), winners of the 2015 Association for Computing Machinery's A.M. Turing Award, are shown in this 1977 photo.","field_credit[und][0][value]":"Chuck Painter / Stanford News Service","field_caption[und][0][value]":"Martin Hellman (left) and Whitfield Diffie (right), winners of the 2015 Association for Computing Machinery's A.M. Turing Award, are shown in this 1977 photo.","field_related_image_aspect[und][0][value]":"","thumbnails":"crop_870xauto"},"type":"media","attributes":{"alt":"Martin Hellman (left) and Whitfield Diffie (right), winners of the 2015 Association for Computing Machinery's A.M. Turing Award, are shown in this 1977 photo.","title":"Martin Hellman (left) and Whitfield Diffie (right), winners of the 2015 Association for Computing Machinery's A.M. Turing Award, are shown in this 1977 photo.","width":"870","style":"width: 450px; height: 693px; margin-left: 15px; float: right;","class":"media-element file-crop-870xauto"}}]]Diffie and Hellman's 1976 paper "New Directions in Cryptography" stunned the academic and intelligence communities by providing a blueprint for a revolutionary new technique that would allow people to communicate over an open channel, with no prearrangement, but keep their information secret from any potential eavesdroppers.

They called it public-key cryptography.

They also showed how, by reversing the order of operations, it was possible to create a "digital signature." Like a written signature, this has to be easy for the legitimate signer to create and for everyone else to verify. But it has to be difficult – preferably impossible – for anyone else to sign new messages. Unlike a written signature, which looks the same even if it's taken from a $1 check and forged onto a $1,000,000 check, a digital signature can only be used with the specific message that was signed.

Digital signatures and the "digital certificates" or "certs" they can produce are critical components in the modern security architecture. They allow your browser to know that your bank is really who it claims to be, and they allow iPhones to only run software signed by Apple.

"Their 1976 invention is widely viewed as the birth of modern cryptography," said Dan Boneh, Stanford professor of computer science and electrical engineering and co-director of the Stanford Cyber Initiative.

"Simply put, without their work, the Internet could not have become what it is today," Boneh said. "Billions of people all over the planet use the Diffie-Hellman protocol on a daily basis to establish secure connections to their banks, e-commerce sites, e-mail servers, and the cloud."

Threat of jail time

It was a feat made even more impressive by the fact that little serious academic scholarship on cryptography existed at the time of their invention outside the realm of classified research conducted under the purview of secretive government agencies such as the National Security Agency. Hellman said academic colleagues had tried to discourage him from pursuing his interest in cryptography early in his career because of the NSA's virtual monopoly on the subject.

 

Martin Hellman explains the principles of encryption in a Stanford classroom in this photo taken in the late '70s. Martin Hellman explains the principles of encryption in a Stanford classroom in this photo taken in the late '70s.

"They said, 'You're wasting your time working on cryptography because the NSA has such a huge budget and a several-decades head start," said Hellman, Stanford professor emeritus of electrical engineering. "How are you going to come up with something they don't already know? And if you come up with something good, they'll classify it.'"

 

Diffie and Hellman clashed with the NSA over their publications, including one that claimed that the agency had pressured IBM to weaken the National Bureau of Standards' Data Encryption Standard (DES) by limiting the key size to 56 bits instead of a stronger option of 64 bits or higher.

After the publication of "New Directions in Cryptography" and another paper on the DES key size, the conflict intensified as the NSA waged a concerted campaign to limit the distribution of Diffie and Hellman's research.

An NSA employee even sent a letter to the publishers warning that the authors could be subject to prison time for violating U.S. laws restricting export of military weapons.

These skirmishes became known as the first of the "crypto wars."

Ultimately, the NSA failed to limit the spread of their ideas, and public key cryptography became the backbone of modern Internet security.

"Cryptography is the one indispensable security technique," said Diffie, who was a part-time researcher at Stanford at the time he and Hellman invented public-key cryptography. "There are lots of other things needed, but if the government had succeeded in blocking people from having strong cryptographic systems … it would have meant you could not have had security on the Internet."

Cryptography's starring role

Diffie and Hellman said the U.S. government's recent demands that Silicon Valley companies build so-called back doors into their products so law enforcement and intelligence agencies could access encrypted messages reminded them of the first crypto war. As then, the government did not have a workable proposal for how to create those back doors without undermining the security of those products.

Diffie and Hellman both said they sided with Apple in the current legal standoff over the FBI's request that Apple provide access to an iPhone belonging to one of the San Bernardino terrorists by writing software to bypass some of its security features.

"All the computer security experts that I talk with – I don't think there's been one who believes that we should do what the government wants," Hellman said. "While in this one case it might not do much harm, it establishes a dangerous precedent where Apple is then likely to be inundated with thousands upon thousands of requests that they'll have to either fight or comply with at great risk to the security of the iPhone system."

Diffie said giving in to the FBI's request would also make it harder for Apple to resist similar requests from foreign governments who want to spy on their citizens and crush internal dissent.

Whitfield Diffie (right) listens to former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz (left) during an event at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Whitfield Diffie (right) listens to former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz (left) during an event at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.
"We do not wish to support the ability of totalitarian regimes to do this kind of thing when they are persecuting people for their free speech," Diffie said.

Diffie and Hellman are both currently affiliated with Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), where they regularly attend seminars on a diverse range of national security issues and mentor young pre- and postdoctoral fellows on issues of cyber security.

"What's great about both Whit Diffie and Marty Hellman is the way in which they contribute to the ongoing intellectual discourse of the Center," said CISAC co-director David Relman. "Both of them think broadly and deeply far outside the bounds of their formal training and the areas of accomplishment for which they are now being recognized by this prize."

Persis Drell, dean of Stanford's School of Engineering, said the award, and the work behind it, exemplified the caliber and tone of research for which the school's faculty are noted.

"Engineers want to have a positive impact on our world, and we are enormously proud to have Marty Hellman as an emeritus member of the Stanford Engineering faculty," Drell said.

Boneh, whose main area of research is applied cryptography, said Diffie and Hellman's work continued to inspire a new generation of cryptographers.

"Beyond the practical implications of the work, their groundbreaking 1976 paper 'New Directions in Cryptography' introduced new concepts and opened up new directions that were previously thought to be impossible," Boneh said.

"It introduced number theory into the realm of cryptography and launched an entire academic discipline to further develop the area of public-key cryptography. By now there are thousands of researchers and tens of thousands of research papers building on their work. The field of cryptography would be a pale image of what it is today without the work of Diffie and Hellman."

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Martin Hellman (center) and Whitfield Diffie (right) the inventors of public-key cryptography are shown in this 1977 photo.
Martin Hellman (center) and Whitfield Diffie (right) the inventors of public-key cryptography are shown in this 1977 photo.
Chuck Painter / Stanford News Service
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On Wednesday, February 24, CDDRL, in partnership with the Center for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), hosted...

Posted by Stanford Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) on Friday, February 19, 2016

On Wednesday, February 17, The Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at Stanford, The Center for International Governance Innovation, and the Research Advisory Network of the Global Commission on Internet Governance will present an all-day conference entitled "New Alliances in Cybersecurity, Human Rights and Internet Governance." The conference will discuss the challenges of creating a regime of internet governance that pays attention to security and human rights in the digital context. 

Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister & Foreign Minister of Sweden, and Chair of the Global Commission on Internet Governance (GCIG) and Marc Andreessen, co-founder of Netscape and Andreessen Horowitz are the scheduled keynote speakers. Other speakers for the event include Michael McFaul (Director FSI), Eileen Donahoe (Human Rights Watch/FSI), Sir David Omand (former Director, GCHQ, UK), Michael Chertoff (former Secretary of Homeland Security, USA) and Marietje Schaake (Member of the European Parliament.)

 

Admission will be closed at 120 guests - only those who have sent an rsvp will be admitted. 

 

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616 Serra Street, Stanford, CA 94305

Carl Bildt Former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Sweden Keynote speaker Global Commission on Internet Governance
Marc Andreessen Founder, Andreessen Horowitz Keynote speaker Founder, Andreessen Horowitz
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The world remains perilously close to a nuclear disaster or catastrophic climate change that could devastate humanity, according to Stanford experts and California Governor Jerry Brown, who were on hand to unveil the latest update to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ “doomsday clock” on Tuesday.

The symbolic clock was created in 1947 when Albert Einstein and Robert Oppenheimer (the father of the U.S. nuclear program) founded the publication.

The closer the minute hand gets to midnight, the closer their Board of Science and Security predicts humankind is to destroying itself.

“I must say with utter dismay that it stays at three minutes to midnight,” said Rachel Bronson, the publication’s executive director and publisher, in a bi-coastal teleconference carried live from The National Press Club in Washington D.C. and the Stanford campus.

Despite some positive development over the past year, such as the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate accords, the doomsday clock is now the closest it’s been to midnight since the peak of Cold War hostilities in the mid 1980s.

Stanford experts, including former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and former Secretary of State George P. Shultz, said they agreed with the dire assessment.

“The danger of a nuclear catastrophe today, in my judgment, is greater than it was during the Cold War…and yet our policies simply do not reflect those dangers,” said Perry, who is a faculty member at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Perry said he was especially concerned that the U.S. and Russia were engaged in new arms race, with both countries working to rapidly modernize their nuclear arsenals.

“Whatever we need to do for deterrence, it does not require rebuilding what we did during the Cold War era,” he said.

Perry urged President Barack Obama not to give up on the goal of nuclear disarmament during his last year in office, and to push for a breakthrough deal to control fissile material at the upcoming Nuclear Summit in Washington D.C.

“These summit meetings have been quite significant, and if he can use this last summit meeting to establish international standards for fissile control, which fifty heads of state sign up to, that would be a real achievement,” Perry said.

Shultz said the U.S. needed to offer a new version of the bold plans and decisive actions that legendary American statesmen George Marshall and Dean Acheson pursued after World War II.

“We have to be engaged, because when we don’t give leadership, nobody does,” said Shultz, a distinguished fellow at the Hoover Institution.

The doomsday clock was initially designed to communicate the threat from nuclear weapons, but has since been expanded to include cyber and biosecurity and the dangers of unsustainable climate change.

California Governor Jerry Brown described climate change as a “daunting threat,” with many similarities to nuclear dangers.

“Climate change and nuclear accident or nuclear war or nuclear sabotage or nuclear terrorism, they’re tied together,” Brown said.

“Climate change is moving slowly, but tipping points are around the corner and you don’t know when you’ve reached one, and beyond a tipping point, we may not be able to come back.”

Brown said he was dismayed at the lack of political action to address climate change and nuclear threats.

“I’ve been around politics all my life, and I can see an obviously broken process, a democratic system that has turned more into spectacle than getting the job done,” Brown said.

“In order to have the political leaders deal with this, they have to first acknowledge it.”

When a high school student in the audience asked what he could personally do to tackle the threat of nuclear weapons, Perry said the most important step was to educate himself about the issues, so he could educate others.

“If you can get ten people interested in talking about this problem, and each of those ten can get ten people interested in talking about this problem, it builds up in a geometric progression,” Perry said.

“I think once the public understands the dangers, they will galvanize our Congress and our leaders into action.”

 

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Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry (center) speaks at a press conference announcing the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists' latest "doomsday clock" estimates, as former U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz (left) and California Governor Jerr
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry (center) speaks at a press conference announcing the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists' latest "doomsday clock" estimates, as former U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz (left) and California Governor Jerry Brown (right) look on.
Christian Pease
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Deborah Lee James U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James speaks at a roundtable on cyber policy at Stanford University on January 6, 2016.

 

The U.S. military needs to train and recruit more “cyber warriors,” and improve its offensive and defensive capabilities in cyberspace, Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James said during a visit to Stanford University last week.

“Today we’re not sufficiently strategizing, organizing, training or equipping to be cyber warriors,” James said at a roundtable discussion on cyber policy. “We’ve made progress over the last year or two, but it’s not good enough. We need to do more, to be open to different ways of bringing people on and retaining people so we can bring the best and brightest into our ranks.”

She called on Silicon Valley to “move past the debate over Edward Snowden and the debate over encryption” and help the military combat cyber threats to U.S. national security. “Particularly here in Silicon Valley, how can we get better access…and work better with some of the great innovations here in Silicon Valley?” she asked.

Deborah Lee James U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James (left) meets with former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry (second from right) and former Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and George P. Shultz (far right) during a visit to Stanford University on January 6, 2016.

Stanford University was just one of the stops on James’ schedule, which also included meetings at Google, Facebook, FireEye and In-Q-Tel (the investment arm of the U.S. intelligence community).

James said she’d come to Silicon Valley to “listen and learn” and search for “the next big thing” – from drones to big data.

“We’re actively on the hunt for what will be our next advantage as the military,” she said.

She said the military was working to streamline its procurement process so it could move more quickly fund new technological development using what she called “rapid acquisition.”

“You can’t build the next fighter aircraft under this, but you can build smaller types of technological products and get something under contract within 30 days,” she said.

Protecting networked weapons systems and critical infrastructure at military bases were two top priorities for the Air Force, James said.

It is also working to develop better defensive capabilities to protect satellites and other assets in space, and prevent adversaries from disabling critical missile warning and global positions systems, James said.

“Space had been a fairly tranquil, uncontested area,” she said.

“Nowadays, space is much more contested and congested. There are many more companies and countries up there.

“If a conflict on earth bleeds into space in some way, how do we defend our constellation?”

Military operations centers will need to integrate more cyber capabilities in order to create more options for defense and offense, James said.

“What we need in future is a multi-domain operations center where we’re fully plugged in terms of cyber and space...so that a commander at every turn has military options that go beyond bombing a target,” she said.

“The President, the Secretary of Defense, everybody is pressing, ‘We want more options. We want more targets.’.”

But James acknowledged that even digital conflict could cause collateral damage in the physical world.

“Let’s say we take out a power grid to shut down a particular part of a country to stop a military action,” she said.  “Maybe you’d shut off power to a hospital and people would die.”

That’s why cyber operations would continue to be governed by the law of armed conflict.

“Before a cyber target would be hit, there would be a legal decision with other parts of the government,” James said. “It’s not solely [up to] a commander on the scene.”

In an indication of the growing importance of cyber operations, political and military leadership in Washington are considering elevating U.S. Cyber Command from under U.S. Strategic Command to become its own unified command, James said.

The Air Force currently has around 1,700 personnel working directly on cyber offense and defense, spread among the National Guard, Reserves and active duty. And it recently established a new Cyber College at Air University on Maxwell Air Force base in Montgomery, Alabama to train more internal talent.

But military leaders are also looking for other ways to scale up their cyber forces, James said.

“Maybe leveraging the private sector and leveraging Silicon Valley can help us,” she said.

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Deborah Lee James
U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James speaks at a roundtable on cyber policy at Stanford University on January 6, 2016.
Rod Searcey
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Abstract: Faster evolving technologies, new peer adversaries, and the increased role of non-government entities changes how we think about decisions to develop and adopt new technology. Uncertainties about technology “shelf life,” adversary intentions, and dual uses of technology complicate these decisions. This seminar will discuss the use of mathematical models and optimization methods to provide insight on technology policy issues. These issues include: balancing risk and affordability during technology research and development; timing technology adoption; and understanding adversary responses to new technologies. Examples will be discussed from offensive cyber operations and synthetic biology. We will conclude by discussing implications for how policy analysts and policy makers think about technology and security.

 

About the Speaker: Philip Keller is a National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellow at Stanford. He is completing his PhD in Management Science & Engineering. He studies technology policy problems posed by new technologies. His research is highly interdisciplinary, drawing on methods from engineering risk and decision analysis, game theory, and operations research. His professional experience includes conducting studies and analysis for the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security at RAND and the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute. Previous study topics include unmanned aircraft operations; nuclear terrorism; offensive cyber operations; and military force structure. Philip holds a BS in Mathematics and an MS in Defense and Strategic Studies.

Predoctoral Fellow CISAC
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Abstract: Cybersecurity depends heavily on civilian cyber defense, which is decentralized, private, and voluntary. Although the structure of this field stands to have a profound impact on national and international security, its history is rarely subject to critical or comparative analysis. Why is civilian cyber defense organized this way? There are at least three plausible explanations for the origins and evolution of cyber defense as an organizational field: technology, bureaucracy, and ideology. I examine the influence of each factor during the formative years of the Internet in the United States. From the beginning, malware was described in terms of infectious disease (viruses and worms), so I use public health to provide comparative context for cyber defense. I find that technological determinism explains far less about the genesis of this field than often assumed. Bureaucratic politics are also insufficient. Therefore, I argue that the American ideology of anti-statism is necessary to explain civilian cyber defense, and this family of ideas has important implications for security cooperation at home and abroad.

About the Speaker: Frank Smith is a Senior Lecturer with the Centre for International Security Studies and the Department of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney. His teaching and research examine the relationship between technology and international security. His book, American Biodefense, explains why the U.S. military struggled to defend itself and the country against biological warfare and bioterrorism. His current research examines cyber security cooperation; he is also analyzing the potential impact of quantum computing on international relations. Previously, Smith was a visiting scholar with the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, a research fellow with the Griffith Asia Institute, and a pre-doctoral fellow with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He has a Ph.D. in political science and a B.S. in biological chemistry, both from the University of Chicago. 

Frank Smith Senior Lecturer Speaker Centre for International Security Studies; Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney
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