Cybersecurity
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For U.S. intelligence agencies, the twenty-first century began with a shock, when 19 al Qaeda operatives hijacked four planes and perpetrated the deadliest attack ever on U.S. soil. In the wake of the attack, the intelligence community mobilized with one overriding goal: preventing another 9/11. The CIA, the National Security Agency, and the 15 other components of the U.S. intelligence community restructured, reformed, and retooled. Congress appropriated billions of dollars to support the transformation.

That effort paid off. In the nearly two decades that U.S. intelligence agencies have been focused on fighting terrorists, they have foiled numerous plots to attack the U.S. homeland, tracked down Osama bin Laden, helped eliminate the Islamic State’s caliphate, and found terrorists hiding everywhere from Afghan caves to Brussels apartment complexes. This has arguably been one of the most successful periods in the history of American intelligence.

But today, confronted with new threats that go well beyond terrorism, U.S. intelligence agencies face another moment of reckoning. From biotechnology and nanotechnology to quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI), rapid technological change is giving U.S. adversaries new capabilities and eroding traditional U.S. intelligence advantages. The U.S. intelligence community must adapt to these shifts or risk failure as the nation’s first line of defense.

 

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Publication Type
Commentary
Publication Date
Journal Publisher
Foreign Affairs
Authors
Amy Zegart
Michael Morell
Michael Morell
Number
May/June 2019
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The Digital Transformation (DX) is a broad term describing the changes and innovations brought about by the introduction of information and communication technologies into all aspects of society. One such innovation is to empower bottom-up, self-governing socio-technical systems for a range of applications. Such systems can be based on Ostrom’s design principles for self-governing institutions for sustainable common-pool resource management. However, two of these principles, both focusing on self-determination, are vulnerable to distortion: either from within, as a narrow clique take control and run the system in their own, rather than the collective, interest; or from without, as an external authority constrains opportunities for self-organisation. In this chapter, we propose that one approach to maintaining ‘good’, ‘democratic’ self-governance is to appeal to the transparent and inclusive knowledge management processes that were critical to the successful and sustained period of classical Athenian democracy, and reproduce those in computational form. We review a number of emerging technologies which could provide the building blocks for democratic self-governance in socio-technical systems. However, the reproduction of analogue social processes in digital form is not seamless and not without impact on, or consequences for, society, and we also consider a number of open issues which could disrupt this proposal. We conclude with the observation that ‘democracy’ is not an end-state, and emphasise that self-governing socio-technical systems need responsible design and deployment of technologies that allow for continuous re-design and self-organisation.

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Journal Articles
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Springer, Cham
Authors
Jeremy Pitt
Ada Diaconescu
Josiah Ober
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Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/X_0mm8UkVOc

 

Abstract:  In the movie WarGames, a 1980s teenager hacks into a U.S. nuclear control program, almost starting a nuclear war.  This movie has become a common illustration for the dangers of increasingly digitized nuclear arsenals and reflects what many scholars and practitioners see as the most perilous implication of the rise of cyberattacks--instability to states' nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3).  Research conducted during the Cold War suggested that even the threat of serious vulnerabilities to states' NC3 could incentivize preemptive launches of nuclear weapons.  Despite this widespread concern about the destabilizing effects of NC3 vulnerabilities, there is almost no empirical research to support these conclusions.  In order to test these theories, this paper uses an experimentally-designed war game to explore the role that vulnerabilities and exploits within a hypothetical NC3 architecture play in decisions to use nuclear weapons.  The game, which uses 4-6 players to simulate a national security cabinet, includes three treatment scenarios and one control scenario with no vulnerabilities or exploits.  Players are randomized into the scenario groups and games are played over the course of a year in seven different locations with a sample of elite players from the U.S. and other nations. Together, a longitudinal analysis of these games examines the role that culture, cognitive biases, and expertise play in the likelihood of thermonuclear cyber war with significant implications for both cyber strategy and nuclear modernization.


Speaker's Biography:

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Dr. Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution and a non-resident fellow at the Naval War College’s Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute.  She researches the intersection of technology, national security, and political psychology with a special interest in cyber, unmanned technologies, and wargaming. Her work has appeared in a variety of outlets including Security Studies, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Strategic Studies, Foreign Affairs, Lawfare, War on the Rocks, Washington Post, and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.  She has a BA from Columbia University, a MA from Arizona State University, and a PhD from George Washington University.

Jacquelyn Schneider Non-resident Fellow Naval War College’s Cyber and Innovation Policy Institute
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This one day workshop will offered scene setters and allowed for discussion on technical, legal and policy considerations around end-to-end encryption.

Agenda

8:00-8:30Breakfast and Registration
8:30-9:00Introductions and Welcome Remarks
 Alex Stamos, Director, Stanford Internet Observatory
 Scene Setters: Equities, Proposals and Positions
9:00-9:30Industry
 Guy Rosen, Vice President of Integrity, Facebook
Jay Sullivan, Director of Messaging Privacy, Facebook
9:30-10:00Victim Safety Advocacy
 Travis Bright, Director of Product, Thorn
Brooke Istook, Director of Strategy and Operations, Thorn
Michelle DeLaune, Chief Operating Officer, National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
10:00-10:15Break
10:15-11:00

Civil Liberties Advocacy 
Jennifer Granick, Surveillance and Cybersecurity Counsel, ACLU
Erica Portnoy, Staff Technologist, Electronic Frontier Foundation
Kurt Opsahl, General Counsel, Electronic Frontier Foundation

  
11:00-11:30Government
 Crispin Robinson, Technical Director for Cryptanalysis, GCHQ
Darrin Jones, Assistant Director, Information Technology Infrastructure Division, FBI
11:30-11:45Hong Kong Observations
 Maciej Cegłowski, New Yorker/Pinboard
11:45-12:15Break
12:15-1:30Working Lunch - Discussion on equities, red lines and goal setting
1:30-3:30Break-Out Tracks
 The break-outs are to be conducted under Chatham House Rules.

Legal and Policy Track (Annenberg Room)
Chair - Riana Pfefferkorn, Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity, Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School

Technical Track (LHH Room 101)
Chair - Kate Starbird, Associate Professor, Human Centered Design and Engineering, University of Washington; Visiting Associate Professor, Cyber Policy Center, Stanford

3:30-3:45Break
3:45-4:30Summary presentations from track leads
4:30-5:00Discussion on next steps, potential collaborations, and moving forward

 

Stanford, CA

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Corruption of the information ecosystem is not just a multiplier of two long-acknowledged existential threats to the future of humanity—climate change and nuclear weapons. Cyber-enabled information warfare has also become an existential threat in its own right, its increased use posing the realistic possibility of a global information dystopia, in which the pillars of modern democratic self-government—logic, truth, and reality—are shattered, and anti-Enlightenment values undermine civilization around the world. 

 

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Authors
Herbert Lin
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4
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Prepared Written Testimony and Statement for the Record of Alexander Stamos, Director, Stanford Internet Observatory before The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism on June 25, 2019.

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Testimonies
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Alex Stamos
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This document is a memo from the "Global Populisms and their International Diffusion Conference" held at Stanford University on March 1-2, 2019.

This is a work in progress. DO NOT cite without checking with the authors first.


 

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Conference Memos
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Henry Farrell
Bruce Schneier
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Amy Zegart
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Commentary
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Thirty years ago this week, I watched the news from Beijing and started shredding my bedding. It was the night before my college graduation, I had been studying Chinese politics, and news had broken that college students just like us had been gunned down in Tiananmen Square after weeks of peaceful and exhilarating democracy protests—carried on international TV. In the iconic square where Mao Zedong had proclaimed the People’s Republic decades before, bespectacled students from China’s best universities had camped out, putting up posters with slogans of freedom in Chinese and English. A “goddess of democracy” figure modeled after the Statue of Liberty embodied their hopes—and ours—for political liberation in China.

On my campus back then were just a handful of students majoring in East Asian studies. Learning of the brutal crackdown in Beijing, we somehow found one another, gathered our friends, and stayed up making hundreds of white armbands for classmates to wear at commencement the next day. Grappling with the cold realities of the “real world” we were about to enter, we didn’t know what else to do. So we tore sheets and cried for what might have been.

The June 4, 1989, massacre was a horrifying spectacle that the Chinese government has sought to erase from national memory ever since. But, 30 years later, contemplating what might have been is more important than ever. In hindsight, Tiananmen Square serves as a continuing reminder about just how much China has defied, and continues to defy, the odds and predictions of experts. The fact is that generations of American policy makers, political scientists, and economists have gotten China wrong more often than they’ve gotten China right. In domestic politics, economic development, and foreign policy, China has charted a surprising path that flies in the face of professional prognostications, general theories about anything, and the experience of other nations.

Read the rest at The Atlantic

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Renée DiResta is the former Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She investigates the spread of malign narratives across social networks, and assists policymakers in understanding and responding to the problem. She has advised Congress, the State Department, and other academic, civic, and business organizations, and has studied disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of pseudoscience conspiracies, terrorism, and state-sponsored information warfare.

You can see a full list of Renée's writing and speeches on her website: www.reneediresta.com or follow her @noupside.

 

Former Research Manager, Stanford Internet Observatory
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Blogs
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"Being at Stanford is a unique experience... Over time I just became interested in how cyberspace is very realistically connected to our everyday life, and on a larger scale, national security." Read more on our FSI blog on how our MIP student, Maho Sugihara, is focusing on cyber policy and its security implications. #MIPFeatureFriday

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