Thank you Chairman Dorgan, Senator Domenici and distinguished
members of the Committee for giving me the opportunity to comment on the National
Nuclear Security Administration's Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs and
its 2009 budget request. I have a written statement that I would like to submit
for the record.
This morning I will summarize the three main points in
my statement. My opinions have been shaped by 34 years at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory and nearly 20 years of practicing nonproliferation with my
feet on the ground in places like Russia, China, India, North Korea and
Kazakhstan. Much of this I have
done with the strong support and encouragement of Senator Domenici.
1) The
proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons capability is growing. Today, we
face a nuclear threat in North Korea, nuclear ambitions in Iran, a nuclear
puzzle in Syria, recently nuclear-armed states in Pakistan and India, and an
improved, but not satisfactory, nuclear security situation in Russia and other
states of the former Soviet Union. The danger of nuclear terrorism is real.
This is not a fight the United States can win alone. We cannot simply push the
dangers beyond our borders. It is imperative to forge effective global partnerships
to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Meeting these challenges requires diplomatic initiative and technical
cooperation. The United States must lead international diplomacy and DOE/NNSA
must provide technical leadership and capabilities. The NNSA has done a commendable
job in nuclear threat reduction and combating nuclear proliferation. However,
funds to support these activities are not commensurate with the magnitude or
the urgency of the threat.
2) CTR
began with Nunn-Lugar followed by Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation directed at
the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. We must stay engaged with
Russia and the other states of the Soviet Union. Much progress has been made,
but more needs to be done. We have to change the nature of the partnership to one
in which Russia carries more of the burden.
We
should expand the cooperative reduction programs aggressively to other
countries that require technical or financial assistance. The nuclear threat
exists wherever nuclear materials exist. These materials cannot be eliminated,
but they can be secured and safeguarded. We should more strongly support the
International Atomic Energy Agency and provide more support to countries that
try to implement UNSCR 1540 to prevent nuclear terrorism, for example.
We
should enlist other nations such as China, India, and for that matter, Russia,
to build a strong global partnership to prevent proliferation and combat
nuclear terrorism. China and India have for the most part sat on the sidelines
while the U.S. has led the fight. Russia has not engaged commensurate with its
nuclear status. These efforts are particularly important if nuclear energy is
to experience a real renaissance.
3)
The hallmark of all of these efforts must be technology, partnership and
in-country presence. The DOE/NNSA has in its laboratories the principal nuclear
expertise in this country. It should be applauded for sending its technical
experts around the world, often in very difficult situations (I met up with the
DOE team in North Korea on a bitterly cold February day). However, both for
structural reasons and budgetary shortfalls, that technical talent is slowing
fading away. We do not have in place the necessary personnel recruitment or the
working environment in the laboratories or the pipeline of students in our
universities to replenish that talent. I strongly support the NNSA's Next
Generation Safeguards Initiative, which is aimed at tackling this problem.
Mr.
Chairman, when I first visited Russia's secret cities in 1992 shortly after the
fall of the Soviet Union, I feared that its collapse may trigger a nuclear
catastrophe. The fact that nothing really terrible has happened in the
intervening 16 years is in great part due to the DOE/NNSA programs that your
are considering today. We must now be just as innovative and creative to deal
with the changing nuclear threat today.
In my
statement I also mention the implications of my recent trips to North Korea and
to India. However, since I am out of time, I will need to leave those for your
questions.
Thank you for your attention.
