Foreign Policy
-

About the Speaker: Omar Dajani is one of the nation's foremost experts on the legal aspects of the conflict in the Middle East.  His scholarly work explores the links between international law, legal and political history, and contract and negotiation theory.  He also has considerable experience advising governments and development organizations in the Middle East and elsewhere.  Professor Dajani joined the McGeorge School of Law in 2004.  Previously, he was based in the Palestinian Territories, where he served first as legal advisor to the Palestinian team in peace talks with Israel and, subsequently, as an advisor to United Nations Special Envoy Terje Roed-Larsen.  Prior to working in the Middle East, he clerked for Judge Dorothy Nelson on the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit and was a litigation associate at the Washington office of Sidley & Austin.  He received his Juris Doctorate from Yale Law School in 1997 and a Bachelor of Arts in American Studies, and Middle Eastern and Asian History from Northwestern University.

Omar Dajani Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific Speaker
Seminars
Authors
Roland Hsu
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

The Europe Center was pleased to host Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission (HRVP), at Stanford University on May 7th.  HRVP Ashton’s address to a capacity audience of Stanford senior scholars is part of the Europe Center’s program focused on European and EU regional and global relations.  The event co-sponsors - the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, the Hoover Institution, and the  - speaks to the esteem and the interest that multiple partners share in engaging the European Union’s highest foreign policy official.

The Europe Center’s director Amir Eshel opened the session, followed by President Gerhard Casper, director and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, who delivered a formal introduction of Ashton.  HRVP Ashton spoke at length and in considerable detail on the mission of the office of EU High Representative, and addressed a number of the critical foreign policy challenges that we face today. 

Three pillars of EU foreign policy
In her talk, Lady Ashton highlighted three pillars of EU foreign policy:

  1. Europe assumes primary responsibility for bringing and safeguarding peace in its “neighborhood”.  Ashton proposed that the European Union – in terms of its status as a foreign policy actor – should be judged by the record of its mission to foster post-conflict resolution, and promote long-term stability and growth throughout its own member states, and in neighboring regions of North Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, and Eastern and Baltic regions of former Soviet societies.
  2. European Union foreign policy should promote what Ashton termed “Deep Democracy”.  This includes reformed and transparent judiciary, police, and representative governing institutions that safeguard the well-being and individual emancipation of citizens, and women’s and human rights.
  3. European Union international relations prioritize effective and long-term cooperative missions with “strategic partners” beginning with the United States, as well as Russia and China.  Ashton emphasized that the EU also prioritizes long-term relations and strategic missions with regional and supra-national institutions beginning with the United Nations, and including the African Union, ASEAN, and the Arab League.

“Deep Democracy”: the long-term challenge
Of special note was Ashton’s significant elaboration on the priority for “deep democracy”.  When asked about the case of Mali, and what the vision was for what comes after the current French and European military intervention, she emphasized the following points of policy and tactics.

  • The EU views the military engagement against Jihadist forces in Mali, within a larger regional view of the “Sahel Arc”.  The EU is deeply engaged in the “Arab Awakening” movements – and the attendant security, political, and civil crises in each country of the region, and in terms of displaced populations across borders. 
  • In the case of Mali, the office of the EU High Representative invited the country’s leadership to Brussels for close coordination of policy. 
  • The EU foreign policy has been set to closely support the Malian government’s own road map for peace, territorial sovereignty, internal cohesion, and development.
  • In remote districts of northern Mali, residents have seen little evidence of the value of government.  The EU foreign policy of engagement in Mali includes programs to deliver primary health care (i.e. immunization and women’s reproductive health) and infrastructure (i.e. transportation and employment in local economic initiatives) to demonstrate the efficacy and value of state institutions.
  • The decision to commit troops from Europe to foreign soil remains, Ashton emphatically stated, the responsibility of the individual sovereign states, and of their democratically elected representatives who, in making such commitments, are ultimately responsible to their citizens.
  • Individual European nations are invited to meet with the governments and civil society leaders of countries undergoing transformations, to tell their distinct histories of democratic development.

Ashton delivered her insights in response to questions from the audience on a number of topics, including the growing magnitude of displaced regional refugees, EU-US military cooperation, and the support and criticism of the EU within European nations.  

Please visit the European Union website to learn more about HRVP Catherine Ashton.

 

All News button
1

China and the World

This multiyear project, coordinated by Thomas Fingar, Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow, at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, looks sequentially and systematically at China’s interactions with countries in all regions and across many issue areas. The project seeks to clarify China’s objectives and policies to achieve them, but it also seeks to identify and explain the goals and policy calculations of other countries that see opportunities and perils associated with China’s greater activism on the world stage.

Phase one of the project examined China’s engagement with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Scholars and foreign policy practitioners from China, Japan, the ROK, Russia, and the United Stated discussed these questions at a two-day workshop in Beijing in March 2012. Participants from several Southeast Asian countries also attended the workshop to ensure that questions explored were broad enough to facilitate comparisons and the search for patterns and learning across issues and areas at the follow-on regional workshop held in Singapore in November 2012.

The Singapore workshop, phase 2, discussed China's objectives and policies with respect to Southeast Asia, but focused primarily on the ways in which China's approach and actions are perceived by individual countries in the region and what regional countries seek to achieve with respect to China. Implicit in some of the presentations was the notion that China was trying to restore its traditional primacy in the region and to prevent any country inside or outside of Southeast Asia from exercising greater regional influence. Other participants emphasized material goals, including access to resources, markets for Chinese goods, and fostering economic dependence on China. Participants agreed that China's influence and impact are large and growing, and that states in the region are pursuing different strategies to advance their own interests and maximize their own freedom of action.

The third workshop, to be held at Stanford University on June 20-21, 2013, will examine China’s relationship with South and Central Asia. While there is a focus on the bilateral relationship between China and India, the largest and most powerful regional actor, the conference will also look at other key bilateral relationships, such as with Pakistan, and at interactions on a regional level, including in the economic sphere. The workshop will explore the management of cross border issues such as migration flows, water, and energy resource development. The sessions on Central Asia will offer broader understanding of China’s intersection with other powers such as Russia and India in that region.

Bechtel Conference Center

Conferences
Authors
News Type
News
Date
Paragraphs

On March 18, Congolese militia leader Bosco Ntaganda surrendered himself unexpectedly to the U.S. Embassy in Kigali, Rwanda asking for transfer to the International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague, where he was wanted for allegedly committing crimes against humanity. The apprehension of ICC indictees was one of the main challenges raised during the Program on Human Right's (PHR) Sanela Diana Jenkins Human Rights Speaker Series last quarter. Ntaganda’s voluntary surrender provoked reflection on the lessons learned from the seminar’s evaluation of the ICC’s impact on international justice as it marked its first decade and exploration of its mandate moving forward.

Featuring lectures from international experts, academics, and activists, the seminar addressed many of the current challenges and future hopes of the ICC, including competing notions of justice and peace, budgetary constraints, and victims’ rights.

The series was led by PHR Director Helen Stacy and UCLA Law Professor Richard Steinberg, also a visiting scholar at Stanford's department of political science. They both kicked off the series by presenting the history and structure of the ICC and concluded with a discussion on its impact, commenting on how the ICC has helped shape the narrative on mass atrocities.

“Reflecting Diana Jenkins' personal commitment to restoring dignity, prosperity, justice and hope to those who most need it, the human rights speaker series aims to engage students on the most pressing human rights issues of our time,” said Stacy. “The International Criminal Court's 10th anniversary invites careful thought about its role so far, and its future. Our speakers brought an extensive range of opinions on the Court, but everyone agreed that the very existence of the Court has advanced the dialogue on international justice.”

A wide array of positions were offered by the speakers, representing the nonprofit, academic and policymaking arenas. Citing some of the limitations facing the ICC, Human Rights Watch’s Director of International Justice Program Richard Dicker made a compelling case for the Court, highlighting the role of civil society in promoting the adoption of the Rome Statute - the treaty that established the ICC - by its 122 current signatories.

William Pace, convener of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court described the Rome Statute as “among the greatest advancements ever in international human rights law.”

Stanford political science Professor James Fearon questioned whether the Court can be effective in deterring mass atrocities while relying on states parties to turn over suspects without a police force of its own. He argued that the Court may in fact limit the liability of human rights abusers because it gives them a choice of whether (or not) to turn themselves over to the ICC for trial. This could potentially contribute to prolonged civil conflict if governments’ hands are tied in offering backdoor deals in exchange for an end to the conflict.

Many speakers proposed modifications to the current ICC structure and suggested the following measures to enhance the work of the Court:

  • Cherif Bassiouni, who led the drafting committee to launch the ICC, emphasized the need for the Court to appoint well-trained judges;
  • David Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, highlighted the tremendous diplomatic challenge of not having instruments of arrest or enforcement under ICC control and limited to pressuring states parties to follow through on their obligation to detain indictees of the Court;
  • Carla Ferstman, director of REDRESS, a human rights organization that helps torture survivors obtain justice and reparations, focused on the challenges presented by the ICC's distance from the home countries of those on trial and how victims might have a more significant role in the justice process.

Recognizing the ICC’s inevitable growing pains, Shamila Batohi, a senior legal advisor to the Office of the Prosecutor, offered a hopeful conclusion to the series, reminding students of the Court’s commitment to protecting the rights of the more than 2.3 billion people represented by the statute’s 122 states parties and ending impunity for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

“Over the course of these nine weeks, students, faculty, and our guest speakers collaborated to develop a range of policies that could potentially improve the ICC system,” said Richard Steinberg. “Though the colloquium took place here on the Stanford campus, the broader collaboration engaged 19,000 users in a fruitful discussion via an online forum.”

Following each lecture, Dr. Diane Steinberg led a dinner discussion for interested students to distill the speaker’s main points into a thought-provoking question to be debated by a global audience on the Human Rights & International Criminal Law Online Forum. Stanford students joined forum participants from around the world to discuss vital questions, such as: “How should the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council be changed, if at all, to advance international justice?” and “Assuming that the ICC chooses to retain victim participation in its processes, how can victims’ representation at the ICC be improved and victims’ rights be protected?”

The seminar left students with these provocative questions – and many more – to ponder while tracking the Ntaganda case and the future trial of Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya’s newly elected president wanted by the ICC for crimes against humanity following the 2007 presidential elections.

Stay tuned for more information on the 2014 Sanela Diana Jenkins Speakers Series, which will focus on the right to health and healthcare delivery.

Hero Image
RTR236IP logo
All News button
1
-
With a new government now in place, what are the prospects for financial reform in China, will interest rates become market-based, will the Renminbi become convertible, will banks begin to price capital economically? The talk explores these themes and discusses some of the obstacles to change that the new government faces.
 
At its core China's financial system is all about its banks. They are the provider of capital to all sectors of the Chinese economy, whether by outright loans or acting as both underwriter and principal investor in the country's growing bond markets. They operate now, as they have always operated, within the narrow framework of interest and currency rates set not by markets but by administrative fiat. For most of their history they have acted as simple conduits of capital based on an economic blueprint contained in a central plan. Some 15 years ago the entities then called specialized banks began to be restructured into what were meant to be commercial banks modeled after international, and particularly, US best practice. The outbreak of the global financial crisis not only called into question this ongoing effort, the massive economic stimulus had the effect of washing away the past decade long effort to transform what had been policy banks into more economically-oriented commercial banks. 
 
Please click here to download the talk slides. 
 
ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Dr. Carl Walter has contributed articles to publications including Caijing, the Wall Street Journal and the China Quarterly. He is also the co-author of Red Capitalism: The Fragile Financial Foundations of China's Extraordinary Rise (2012) and Privatizing China: Inside China's Stock Markets (2005).

Dr. Walter lived and worked in Beijing from 1991 to 2011, first as an investment banker involved in the earliest SOE restructurings and overseas public listings, then as chief operation officer of China's first joint venture investment bank, China International Capital Corporation. For ten years he was JPMorgan's China chief operating officer as well as chief executive officer of its China banking subsidiary.

Dr. Walter holds a PhD in political science from Stanford University, a certificate of advanced study from Peking University and a BA in Russian Studies from Princeton University.

 

McClelland M104
Knight Management Center
655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305

Carl Walter Speaker
Seminars
-

Catherine Ashton will be introduced by Gerhard Casper.

 

Co-sponsored by CISAC, Hoover Institution and CREEES.

CISAC Conference Room

Catherine Ashton High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union; Vice-President of the European Commission Speaker
Seminars
Authors
News Type
Q&As
Date
Paragraphs
Q&A with FSE visiting scholar and food aid expert Barry Riley.

President Barack Obama’s 2014 budget proposal promises significant food aid reform that will enable the United States to feed about 4 million more people without a significant increase of the current $1.8 billion spent on feeding the world's most hungry. Since the food aid program's inception in 1954, the U.S. has helped feed more than 1 billion people in more than 150 countries, and remains the largest provider of international food aid.

The intention of the reform is to make food aid more efficient, cost effective, and flexible. It aims to use local and regional markets to lower the cost of food and speed its delivery, and calls for the use of cash transfers and electronic food vouchers.

The proposed reforms would also end monetization—the sale of U.S. food abroad to be sold by local NGOs for cash. This practice has been criticized for hurting vulnerable communities by depriving local farmers of the incentives and opportunities to develop their own livelihoods. Several studies, including one by the Government Accountability Office, found monetization to be costly and inefficient—an average of 25 cents per taxpayer dollar spent on food aid is lost.

Barry Riley, a food aid expert and visiting fellow at the Center on Food Security and the Environment, discusses his perspective on the importance of these new reforms, their chances of passage, and the country's current role in international food aid.

Why is local procurement such an important addition to food aid reform?

An increase of funding for local and regional procurement is the most important programmatic element of the proposed reforms. It would help managers working in food security-related development programs to determine for each emergency what commodities are most appropriate and where they can be procured most quickly and inexpensively. Some studies have shown local and regional procurement of food and other cash-based programs can get food to people in critical need 11 to 15 weeks faster at a savings of 25-50 percent. Equally important, local procurement is less likely to disrupt local economic conditions, but rather promote self-sufficiency by increasing demand (often for preferred local staples) and incomes of local producers. The move to 45 percent local (and 55 percent tied) procurement is a BIG step, and one to face strong opposition from American commodity interests and U.S.-flag shippers. 

How difficult is it to ensure vouchers and electronic cash transfers are getting into the hands of people that really need the aid?

Vouchers (and similar urban coupon shops) have been used many times over the past decades as a food transfer mechanism (also sometimes used in food for work programs) enabling the recipient to trade the voucher(s) for foodstuffs when it is most convenient or when they are most needed. Electronic vouchers are new, and how well they work depends on local situations. In places like urban Latin America, Africa and India, it probably could be made to work quite well; the technology is evolving quickly that would enable this sort of transfer mechanism.  

Rural Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Malawi – probably not so well. I’m admittedly skeptical that electronic transfers of purchasing power to remote areas would be sufficient in most cases to motivate traders to move food to these hungry areas. Their risks are extremely high and, in my experience in Africa, traders will only deliver food to remote rural areas (inevitably over very bad roads) if they can command prices considerably higher than costs plus a high risk premium.

Why aren’t international food aid organizations more in favor of direct dollar support for local operating costs?

There is (and has long been) opposition among many of the NGOs to the President’s proposal to replace “monetization” with a promise of on-going direct dollar support for the local operating costs of NGO food security-related projects. They believe it will continue to be easier to get Congress to approve money to buy American food commodities to ship overseas than to get approval for dollars to ship overseas, particularly in light of tightening budgets. These NGOs have tended, over the years, to receive a sympathetic ear from Congress.

The proposal shifts oversight of the food aid program from the Agriculture Committees within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the Foreign Affairs/Relations Committees of the State Department’s U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). What is the likelihood of Congress approving this transfer?

The chance of that happening, in this of all Congresses, is about the same as winning the Power Ball Lottery. Crusty committee chair-people are extremely sensitive to reductions in their empires and the agriculture committees – especially in the Senate – are powerful committees. On top of that, there are so many elements in the overall 2014 federal budget creating heartburn on the Hill that food aid considerations are far, far, far down the line. The best the President is likely to get in the present divided Congress are hearings and a continuing resolution of some sort.

What did you wish to see in the food aid reform proposal that was not addressed in this budget?

Change, if it ever comes, will likely be incremental and halting. I’ll be happy to see any step, however small, in the right direction. The total end of tied procurement would be at the top of my wish list. Even more important, perhaps, iron-clad, multi-year commitments of funding to food security programs intended to overcome long-term institutional impediments to achieving enduring food security in low income food deficit situations…and sticking with such commitments for 15 years.

What role does food aid play in advancing American foreign policy goals?

Most importantly, by being the single largest source of food commodities to the World Food Program in confronting disaster and emergency situations. Food support to American NGOs has been under-evaluated over the past 40 years. I’ll be talking about this later in the book I am writing, but these small projects were all that kept agricultural development (and early food security efforts) going in many small countries during the “dark decades” when international finance institutions and bilateral donors were not financing agricultural development. There are valuable on-the-ground lessons in that NGO food-assisted experience still waiting to be assessed.

Let me add, given what we know about the onset of serious climate change in the decades to come, the need to supply large amounts of food to populations suffering severe food deprivation will probably grow in the future. Where will the food come from and who will pay for those future transfers?

While the U.S. remains the largest provider of food aid, what can the EU and Canada teach the U.S. about food aid policy?

Donors hate to think that other donors have something to teach them. But, of course, they always do. The Canadian and European experience with food aid is best summed up in the way their objective has come to be restated over the past 15 or so years: not “food aid” but “aid for food.” The purpose of assistance intended to improve food security is to improve either, or both, availability and access over the long term (leave nutrition aside for a moment).

European and Canadian assistance can be much more flexible in choosing the instruments – food, cash, technical assistance, training, institutional strengthening, public policy, public-private cooperation, etc. – required to achieve a realistic food security goal which I would describe as pretty good assurance that most people can get their hands on the food they need most of the time. Commodity food aid, in some form – or the promise of its ready availability when needed – will probably need to be part of the total array of inputs required for the several years needed in particular food insecure countries to achieve that “pretty good assurance.” Europe and Canada are closer to understanding this and have become appropriately flexible in concerting resources to get it done. That’s the lesson.

Hero Image
USAID wheat logo
All News button
1
Subscribe to Foreign Policy