On November 1, 2005, SPRIE invited Jimmy Lee, Vice President and General Manager, Timing Solutions, Integrated Device Technology (IDT) to speak at SPRIE's seminar series on the rise of China in innovation. Lee shared his experience in running a full-blown integrated circuit (IC) product development center in China together with an informative account of China's rise in the IC industry.

The globalization of the IC industry and the rise of China

The commoditization of semiconductor technology is marked by the encapsulation of previously proprietary technologies into commercially available equipment and software design tools. This has substantially lowered the entry barrier for IC design. It has enabled the emergence of a new generation of companies in the Far East in backend assembly and testing as well as IC design. The process is further helped by advances in communication technology that eases access to and sharing of information across geographies. Meanwhile, the IC industry is shifting from being technology-driven to application/market driven. The integration of product development and market has become an important differentiator in global competition. These industry changes are coupled with changes in the worldwide market, mostly noticeably the rise of Asia as a significant market.

China is rising quickly as a significant player in IC. It has a huge pool of talent and many "returnees" - those who grew up in China, were educated in the West and have returned to China to work; they are essential in transferring competence from the West to China. China also enjoys substantial cost advantage while having fairly decent productivity. Starting from the 1990s, the government has invested heavily, and issued extensive regulatory incentives, to promote the semiconductor industry. As a result, according to Lee, in 2004, there were 102 IC test and assembly companies, 50 foundries and 457 IC design companies operating in China. They generated a total revenue of $4.4 billion.

IDT's product development venture in China

IDT is a major IC design company. Its workforce of 3,700 (1,500 in U.S.) has designed 1,300 IC products in 15,000 configurations. In fiscal year 2005, the company garnered a revenue of $645 million, 25% of which went into R&D. In the late-1990s, frustrated by the high turnover and the shortage of talent in Silicon Valley, it opened up an operation in

China. China's abundant and low-cost talent pool provided an opportunity. The company was also attracted to its budding telecommunication market, an area IDT had wanted to get into.

Luckily for IDT, "it just so happened that Newave Technology Corporation was available." Newave was the first IC design start-up in China. Founded by several Chinese returnees in 1996, the company had 100 some engineers developing telecommunication IC for the China market. In 2001, IDT acquired Newave for $85 million. At the time of acquisition, Newave was working on two products but its revenue was very small. Since then, Lee built it into a successful product development center.

Challenges for setting up a product development center in China

Setting up and operating a product development center in China is full of challenges. Lee grouped them into two areas.

The first is organizational challenges, from defining the mission of the organization to every aspect of human resource management: recruiting, training, retention, etc. From the beginning, the mission was to be a self-sufficient, whole product development center. "They basically have the responsibility to develop the entire product from the specification to the manufacturing transfer and they also have the entire infrastructure such as HR, finance and legal to be self-sufficient to support the local needs." Such positioning is crucial in China because the competition for talent is extremely intense and this generation of young engineers is very ambitious, many wanting to start their own business sometime in their life. They are often impatient with long-term strategy. Therefore, "if you want to have top-notch talent working for you, you have to challenge them constantly in technical areas." Picking the right leader is also a key. IDT decided that this person had to be born in China, grew up in China, be western trained and have worked in western companies. Such a combination is ideal because there are a lot of subtleties that are culture specific and one has to be born and grow up in China to get it. In the technical area, IDT hired a few long-term expatriates from headquarters. They are the real masters in their respective fields in IC design. This is where the leverage comes from: "You use one super high power master technical guy to leverage the intellectual labors of the local engineers," said Lee.

The second challenge stems from social-cultural differences. A few examples: communications is a big issue, not so much because of language barriers but because of differences in culture and the level of professionalism. As Lee stated, "...it's more of the mindset. It's very difficult at the beginning to teach them how to communicate, when to communicate and what to communicate." Secondly, social-culture norms shape a different level of standard in decision-making and judgment call. Lee needs to put a lot of effort into teaching the local engineers how to think from the customer's perspective. Thirdly, employees are loyal to individuals rather than the corporation. These social-cultural differences are an area where there is no shortcut. They have to be overcome with training. Training means taking every opportunity to educate the local workforce: formal training programs, informal one-on-one coaching, ongoing training-by-doing, training over hundreds of conference calls over the past 4-5 years, you name it. "To some extent, this is sort of the brainwashing process," commented Lee. "There is no shortcut. You just have to put in a lot of TLC - tender, loving care. This is very challenging."

IDT's positive experience in China

While IDT "did run into many, many of those challenges," its overall effort in China has been extremely positive. The local team now manages a dozen of products, which involves some original work. The headquarter team is using some of the intellectual property generated by the folks in China. The local team even presented a paper in this year's IEEE ISSC Conference. It is the first paper coming out of China presented at such a prestigious conference. Productivity and cost advantage are also evident. Lee estimated that "for the team here in the United States to develop the same number of products will probably take them twice as long in time and probably cost 4-5 times more. This is really a good deal for the company."

Future outlook

Looking ahead, Lee highlighted a few issues that will shape China's IC industry. Overall, it will be a fertile ground for IC product development because of the talent pool. The job market will remain red hot with rapid increase of wages and high turnover rates. There will be hundreds of start-ups because of the low entry barrier. However, many will lack management experience and business acumen. Duplication of investment and engineering effort for the same market will result in the industry consolidating into dozens of medium size companies. In ten years time, these survivors will become significant suppliers to domestic IC demand in emerging applications such as wireless communication and digital TV. All in all, as Lee pointed out, "one needs to marry the best of the East and the West to create a world-class company."

Despite its attempt to soften criticism of the war, there is no evidence the Bush administration is capable of self-correction.

That came home to me the other day while listening to a senior administration official deliver an off-the-record tour d'horizon of American foreign policy. He is among the best minds in this administration, counted among the ranks of the realists, rather than the neoconservatives.

The United States stands alone as the most powerful nation in the world, the official began. In no previous moment of human history has a single state enjoyed such a dominant position.

When it comes to managing its relations with other would-be powers -- Europe, China, Japan and India -- the United States has done "extraordinarily well,'' he said.

The tensions generated by the war in Iraq have eased, the senior foreign policy official confidently asserted. The Europeans are content to gaze intently inward, he observed, while America strides the globe.

Japan is embracing the United States in a very close relationship that shows no sign of unraveling. Meanwhile the Bush administration has forged a growing partnership with India.

When it comes to China, the administration has chosen the path of accommodation and integration rather than containment of the rising power. He expressed confidence that American power and the prospect of democracy in China will secure the peace.

The only remaining challenge for the United States is to combat the threat of a radical Islamist movement that seeks to acquire weapons of mass destruction. For that, there is the promotion of democracy and American values around the world. After all, the official said with not even a nod to humility, "the U.S. is the most successful country that has ever existed.''

A year or two ago, the American people embraced this vision of a confident colossus, a Gulliver among the Lilliputians. That was before they watched the giant tied down in its attempt to export those American values by force of arms in Iraq.

The arrogance of this administration would be barely tolerable if it were not paired with a stunning incompetence, on display from Kabul to Katrina. That deadly combination has weakened American strength in the world. It has emboldened far more serious challengers in Iran and North Korea, who see the United States as too bogged down in Iraq to credibly threaten them with the use of force.

The war rated barely a mention in the sweeping view offered by the senior administration official, except indirectly. He offered a realist defense of the administration's democracy crusade.

World War II was fought with democratic goals, the official pointed out. And the Cold War -- the model for the current struggle against Islamic extremism -- was not just about balancing the power of the Soviet Union. The wars in Korea and Vietnam were really about determining which system those countries chose, he argued.

Those are curious examples to cite as a defense of the decision to go to war in Iraq. The United States shored up authoritarian regimes in Korea and Vietnam to counter the communist threat. Vietnam was a strategic mistake that took decades to overcome. And democracy came to Korea more than 35 years later, after a long period of economic development.

President Bush cited the democratic transformation of Korea -- along with Taiwan and Japan -- in a recent speech during his trip to Asia. But these are examples of the "conventional story in which you become rich and then you become democrats,'' as the senior official put it so well.

The administration proposes however to skip this long, but necessary, path to democratic capitalism when it comes to the Middle East. The policies of security and stability have failed there and a quicker route to democratic change is called for. But there is no historical evidence to suggest that this is any more than another manifestation of a blind belief in American power.

Democratic values have always been essential to American foreign policy. In practice, however, American administrations have often made painful choices between stability and the promotion of democracy. We saw that too often during the Cold War -- in Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968 or Tibet in 1959.

The administration might do well to recall the words of candidate Bush, uttered Oct. 11, 2000.

"It really depends on how our nation conducts itself in foreign policy. If we're an arrogant nation they'll resent us,'' Bush said. "But if we are a humble nation, they'll respect us.''

This week President Bush will seek to focus the nation's attention on border security and immigration reform. But the president's proposals won't protect Americans from our gravest cross-border threat: the possibility that a ship, truck or train will one day import a 40-foot cargo container in which terrorists have hidden a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon.

The Bush administration maintains that it has a smart strategy to reduce this risk. A new 24-Hour Rule requires that importers report the contents of their containers to customs inspectors one day before the boxes are loaded on ships bound for the United States. The Department of Homeland Security's National Targeting Center then reviews the data, checking against other intelligence to determine which boxes may pose a threat. Although the containers deemed high risk are inspected at cooperating foreign ports or when they enter the United States, the rest--more than 90 percent--land here without any perusal.

We have two concerns about this strategy. First, it presumes that the United States government has good enough intelligence about Al Qaeda to reliably discern which containers are suspicious and which are not. But our inability to thwart the attacks in Iraq demonstrates that we lack such specific tactical intelligence. And supporting customs inspectors, who must make the first assessment of risk, is not a priority for the intelligence agencies. Inspectors must rely on their experience in spotting anomalies--a company that claims to be exporting pineapples from Iceland, for example.

Second, determined terrorists can easily take advantage of the knowledge that customs inspectors routinely designate certain shipments as low risk. A container frequently makes 10 or more stops between its factory of origin and the vessel carrying it to American shores. Many of the way stations are in poorly policed parts of the world. Because name-brand companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors are widely known to be considered low-risk, terrorists need only to stake out their shipment routes and exploit the weakest points to introduce a weapon of mass destruction. A terrorist cell posing as a legal shipping company for more than two years, or a terrorist truck driver hauling goods from a well-known shipper, can also be confident of being perceived as low risk.

So what needs to be done? A pilot project under way in Hong Kong, the world's largest container port along with Singapore, offers one piece of a potential solution. At an estimated cost of $7 per container, new technology can photograph the box's exterior, screen for radioactive material, and collect a gamma-ray image of a box's contents while the truck on which it is carried moves at 10 miles per hour.

Terrorists can defeat radiation sensors by shielding a dirty bomb with dense materials like lead. But by combining those sensors with gamma ray images, the Hong Kong system allows inspectors to sound the alarm on suspiciously dense objects. Inspectors would need to analyze enough of the scans--perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent--to convince terrorists that there is a good chance that an indistinct image will lead a container's contents to be sent for more reliable X-ray or manual examinations. Images of container contents would then be reviewed remotely by inspectors inside the United States who are trained to spot possible nuclear weapons.

If terrorists were to succeed in shipping a dirty bomb, for example, the database of these images could serve as a kind of black box--an invaluable forensic tool in the effort to identify how and where security was breached. That information could help prevent politicians from reacting spasmodically and freezing the entire container system after an attack.

Such a program could significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists will smuggle plutonium or a dirty bomb through American ports. But it still would not stop a terrorist from importing highly enriched uranium, which can be used to construct a nuclear weapon. Lengthening the time that a container is screened for radiation would help, and this could be done without increasing waiting times if additional monitors were added to the Hong Kong system near the gate where the trucks must already stop for driver identification checks. Better still would be for the Department of Homeland Security to make the development of new technology that can recognize the unique signature of highly enriched uranium an urgent priority.

Finally, we must find ways to ensure that terrorists do not breach containers before shipments arrive at loading ports. Sensors should be installed inside containers in order to track their movements, detect any infiltration and discern the presence of radioactive material. Where boxes are loaded, certified independent inspectors should verify that companies have followed adequate protocols to ensure that legitimate and authorized goods are being shipped.

Taken together, these recommendations will require new investments and an extraordinary degree of international cooperation. But increased container security will not only help the United States prevent terrorism, it will also help all countries reduce theft, stop the smuggling of drugs and humans, crack down on tariff evasion and improve export controls. What's more, such a program would require an investment of just one one-hundredth of the capital that could be lost if we shut down the global container shipping system after an attack.

Container security is a complex problem with enormous stakes. American officials insist that existing programs have matters well in hand. But we cannot afford to take these perky reassurances at face value while the same officials fail to embrace promising initiatives like the Hong Kong pilot project.

One of the less publicized but perhaps most important matters before President Bush on his recent trip to South Korea for the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit was that of relations between the United States and the host country. Although South Korea has long been a close ally of the United States, relations between the two have cooled in recent years, and the alliance has come under great strain. Bush's trip did not set a new direction for the alliance, which has been drifting for the past few years.

There is a way to reverse this cooling in relations, I believe -- to promote U.S. strategic interests in the region, including denuclearization of North Korea; to retain U.S. influence there; and to strengthen a long-standing alliance. What is needed is an effort to widen the "North Korea problem" from one of nuclear weapons to one of unification.

Controversy over the fraying U.S.-South Korea alliance focuses almost exclusively on cultural or emotional issues. In the United States there are some who feel that South Koreans are insufficiently grateful for the steadfast U.S. support to South Korea, particularly for the American lives lost in defense of the South during the Korean War of 1950-53 and for the extensive economic and military aid since. Others feel that rising anti-American sentiment in South Korea reveals the naivete of a younger generation of Koreans who are insufficiently worried about the North Korean threat.

But the problems in the alliance are not a result of emotion, naivete or ingratitude. Indeed, even if none of those emotional and cultural issues existed, the alliance would still be in dire need of revision. To find the best path forward for both the United States and South Korea, we need to focus on the real issues.

The main factor straining the alliance is the unresolved Korean War and the continued division of the peninsula. This has created differing long-term strategic concerns for the United States and South Korea.

For South Korea, the key issue is not North Korean nuclear weapons -- it never was. South Korea's overriding concern is how to resolve the issue of national unification and integrate North Korea back into the world's most dynamic region, whether or not there are nuclear weapons. All other South Korean foreign policy issues take second place.

In contrast to Korea's regional issues, U.S. concerns are global and military. For at least the next several years, the United States will be mainly concerned with countering potential terrorist threats. Distracted by the overwhelming focus on anti-terrorism, homeland security and other issues, the United States has viewed its Korea policy as a narrow extension of its anti-terrorism policy, focusing almost exclusively on denuclearizing the North. These different strategic priorities have led to severe strains between the two allies, despite the desire of both to maintain a close relationship.

The United States can improve its position in East Asia, as well as solidify its alliance with South Korea, by widening its focus beyond North Korean denuclearization and coming out strongly and enthusiastically in favor of Korean unification. Although the United States rhetorically supports unification, it has been noticeably passive in pursuing policy to that end.

Such a policy shift would achieve many U.S. goals and would strengthen our alliance with South Korea in the process.

First and foremost, denuclearization is far more likely to occur with a change in North Korea's regime and a resolution to the Korean War than it is without resolving that larger issue. Until now the United States has put denuclearization first, without making much progress. Folding the nuclear issue into the larger issue would provide far more leverage on both questions and potentially create new or broader areas for progress.

Second, such a policy would provide grounds for agreement between U.S. and South Korean policymakers from which they could cooperate and work together, rather than against each other. Exploring the best path toward unification will require both economic and military changes in the North -- changes that will provide the United States with more flexibility to rebalance its own forces in the region.

Finally, it would put the United States in a solid position to retain goodwill and influence in Korea after unification -- something that is far from ensured today, when many South Koreans are skeptical about U.S. attitudes and policies toward the region. If the United States is seen as a major source of help for unification, it is far more likely that the post-unification orientation of Korea will be favorable to Washington.

This would be a major policy change for the United States, but given the importance of the region and of the Korean Peninsula, it is the best path to follow.