It took just
29 days for President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to flee Tunisia after mass
protests erupted in the country. Twenty-three
years of authoritarian rule crumbling in less than a month is rather
remarkable, especially considering the relative “calm” that had prevailed in
Tunisia during those two decades.
Tunisia
rarely hit the headlines then. No Islamists threatening to overtake the
government (the Islamist al-Nahda party was outlawed in 1991). No terrorist
networks causing security concerns (the exception being the sole attack on a
synagogue in 2002 which catalyzed stepped up security measures). No strategic interests for the USA
to speak of. And Ben Ali’s regime succeeded in marketing Tunisia as a safe
tourist haven. Cities like Hammamet allowed tourists to be parachuted into
newly built all-inclusive resorts that could have been anywhere in the world.
There was even a custom-built, sanitized version of a traditional medinah in Yasmine
Hammamet, which reminded one more of the artificiality of the world landmarks
in Las Vegas than of real North African souks.
Tunisia’s
sanitized image was also due to a severe crackdown on freedom of expression, as
the country had one of the highest levels of media control—especially of the
internet—in the world.
But what
Ben Ali’s flight showed is how fragile the foundations of his rule were. So vulnerable
that, in contrast to Iran and Egypt’s leaders’ resilience in the face of mass
protests, he quickly offered one concession after another before completely
giving up, making it clear that he was in fear for his life.
What will
happen next in Tunisia is uncertain. The Tunisian opposition is divided into
groups with wildly different agendas, from the Islamists of al-Nahda to the
secular reformists of the Congress for the Republic headed by Moncef Marzouki. There
is no political figure who can be clearly envisaged to become the next Tunisian
president, and the way the balance will tip—will there be democracy, or another
authoritarian regime of a merely different kind?—is unpredictable. But the
clearest lessons that have emerged from Tunisia so far are that there is a real democratic
potential in the Arab world and that authoritarian regimes in the region are
not always what they appear to be. Those lessons are important on two fronts:
On the
foreign policy front, the Tunisian uprising seems to have catalyzed US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to make the US administration’s boldest
verbal statement thus far on the need for reform in the Arab world. Describing
the political order of some Arab countries as “stagnant”, Clinton, on a visit
to Bahrain on January 13, said that “This is a critical moment and this is a test
of leadership for all of us”.
The United States is continuously criticized by democracy
experts for favoring stability over the risks of democracy in the Arab world,
and for backing up authoritarian leaders—whether directly or indirectly—for fear
of having to deal with an unfavorable alternative (namely, an Islamist
government, as in Egypt or Syria). Tunisia should be a relatively easy case for
the United States in this context, a litmus test of putting one’s money where
one’s mouth is. But it also shows how applauding stability can make countries
like the United States blind to the democratic potential lurking beneath the façade
of seemingly impenetrable regimes.
Western governments—including that of the United States—have
mostly publicly congratulated the Tunisian people on their uprising, and France
and other European countries refused Ben Ali entry on Friday when his plane was
looking for a place to land. This reaction has been met with cynicism by Hizbullah
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, a man who, since 2006, has been working to build up
his credentials as the only credible Arab leader in the present time. In a speech on Sunday, Nasrallah was quick to
point out the irony of Ben Ali’s lack of welcome in the very countries which he
had “served” throughout the duration of his rule.
So, on the regional front, the case of
Tunisia unveils how quickly US opponents like Nasrallah can capitalize on short-sighted foreign policy. Nasrallah’s statement paints Western support
for authoritarian Arab leaders as a house of cards that can crumble with the slightest shake—a
warning to the West and Arab leaders reliant on Western support alike.
It is no
coincidence that the reaction to the developments in Tunisia by other Arab
regimes has mostly been to lay low. And here we can find another, more
important, house of cards. Ben Ali’s regime has been exposed for the decaying
entity that it is, and already copycat protests in other Arab countries—Jordan,
Algeria, Egypt, and even Mauritania—have started. While a blanket domino effect
across the region is not likely, reformists can take heart from Tunisia’s
experience: while an authoritarian regime may appear to be indestructible, it may
well be a mere house of cards.