Institutions and Organizations
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Abstract: The nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran moved the International Atomic Energy Agency to the center of public attention. Based on multi-archival research and oral history interviews, this talk will look into the early history of the IAEA’s nuclear inspectorate. The foundations of today’s safeguards system were laid in the mid-1950s, when a group of twelve nations negotiated the Statute of the IAEA. In the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union abandoned its formerly critical stance on nuclear safeguards. Following the entry-into-force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) comprehensive safeguards were introduced. The control of diversion was at the heart of the IAEA’s early safeguards system, while it neglected other aspects of the proliferation problem, such as the distribution of dual-use technology and related knowledge, or the development of clandestine nuclear programs. It was not lack of knowledge or imagination, but the complex technical, political, and legal background that was the reason for this limitation.

About the Speaker: Elisabeth Roehrlich is a senior researcher and project director at the University of Vienna’s Department of Contemporary History, and a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C. She received her PhD. in History from the University of Tuebingen, Germany, and held fellowships at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, the German Historical Institute in Washington D.C., and Monash South Africa. Her research focuses on the history of international relations and the evolution of the global nuclear order. She is the author of a prize-winning book about the former Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky (Kreisky’s Außenpolitik, Vienna University Press, 2009), and her work on the IAEA has been published or is forthcoming in journals such the IAEA Bulletin and the Journal of Cold War Studies. Roehrlich has been awarded funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), and the Austrian Central Bank to support her research on the IAEA.

The International Atomic Energy Agency and Nuclear Safeguards, 1953-1971
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Elisabeth Roehrlich Director IAEA History Research Project, University of Vienna
Seminars
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The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) Japan Program with the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies (FSI) as well as the Stanford Graduate School of Business, the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), and the Stanford Department of Economics will be hosting a memorial conference and service on December 4th and 5th in honor of the late Masahiko Aoki. December 4th will be a full day conference featuring topics within Masa's extensive field of study and research including theoretical and applied economics, theory of institutions, corporate architecture and governance, and the Japanese and Chinese economies. The day will culminate with a cocktail reception. The Celebration of Life on December 5th will be a gathering for family and friends in remembrance of Masa with a light lunch reception to follow.

December 4, 2015

Memorial Conference

Bechtel Conference Center, 616 Serra Street
Stanford University

Agenda

8:30am - 8:50am            Breakfast & Registration

8:50am - 9:00am            Welcome Remarks: Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University)

9:00am - 9:30am            Kenneth Arrow (Stanford University), “The Role of Organizational Structure in the Economy”

9:30am - 10:00am          Paul Milgrom (Stanford University), "Designing the US Incentive Auction"

10:00am - 10:30am        Break

10:30am - 11:00am        Koichi Hamada, Yale University, “Masahiko Aoki: A Social Scientist"

11:00am - 11:30am        Kotaro Suzumura (Hitotsubashi University), “Masahiko Aoki (1938-2015): Recollections of his Pilgrimage and Legacy in Japan”

11:30am - 12:00pm       Yingyi Qian (Tsinghua University), "Masahiko Aoki and China"

12:00pm - 1:15pm          Lunch

1:15pm - 1:45pm            Jiahua Che (Chinese University of Hong Kong) presenting Masahiko Aoki's

                                            "Three-person game of institutional resilience vc transition: A model and

                                              China-Japan comparative history"

1:45pm - 2:15pm           Miguel Angel Garcia Cestona (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona), "Corporate Governance and Employee Participation: some lessons from Mondragon"

2:15pm - 2:45pm           Herbert Gintis (Santa Fe Institute), "General Social Equilibrium and its Dynamics"

2:45pm - 3:15pm           Break

3:15pm - 3:45pm           Dale Jorgenson (Harvard University), "

"

3:45pm - 4:15pm           Avner Greif (Stanford University), "Comparative Institutional Analysis: China and Europe Compared"

4:15pm - 4:45pm           Francis Fukuyama (Stanford University), "Asian Kinship, Industrial Structure, and Trust in Government"

4:45pm - 5:00pm           Closing, Takeo Hoshi (Stanford University)

5:00pm - 6:00pm           Cocktail Reception

*Agenda is subject to change and will be updated as speakers are confirmed

 

December 5, 2015

Celebration of Life

Bechtel Conference Center, 616 Serra Street
Stanford University

Agenda

10:30am - 11:00am          Registration

11:00am - 12:00pm          Celebration of Life

12:00pm - 1:30pm            Lunch Reception

 

 

Bechtel Conference Center616 Serra StreetStanford UniversityStanford, CA 94305
Conferences
Encina Hall E301616 Serra StreetStanford, CA94305-6055
(650) 723-6530
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huijun_gu.jpg Ph.D.

Huijun Gu joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) for the 2015-16 year as a visiting scholar from Jiangsu Administration Institute, where he serves as an associate professor.

His research interests include Planning (规划) and Governance, industrial upgrading and government behavior.

Huijun Gu obtained his Ph.D. at Nanjing University in 2013, focusing on organizational behavior.

Visiting Scholar
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Sponsored by the Taiwan Democracy Project and the U.S. Asia Security Initiative at the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC)

Abstract

During the recent meeting between PRC President Xi Jinping and Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou, the “1992 One China Consensus” served as a mutually acceptable paradigm for maintaining “peaceful and stable” conditions across the Taiwan Strait.  For Xi Jinping, the warmth of the visit thinly veiled a message to Taiwan’s leaders and electorate, as well as to onlookers in Washington.  Chinese officials and media clearly link the talks and confirmation of the 1992 Consensus to “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”—a concept that is increasingly unpalatable to many in Taiwan.  Xi hopes to keep DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (and perhaps even future KMT leaders) in the 1992 Consensus “box” and to co-opt the U.S. in this effort, but perhaps underestimates the political transformation underway on Taiwan. 

The Xi administration has also hardened its position regarding “core interests” such as Taiwan, embodied in a “bottom line principle” policy directive that eschews compromise.  Although many commentators and most officials across the region have shied away from stating that the PRC and Taiwan are at the crossroads of crisis, the collision of political transformation on Taiwan and the PRC’s “bottom line principle” will challenge the fragile foundations of peaceful cross-Strait co-existence.  Changes in the regional balance of military power brought about by a more muscular People’s Liberation Army compounds the potential for increased friction, providing Beijing with more credible options for coercion and deterrence.

This talk will consider the politics and principles involved in cross-Taiwan Strait relations in light of the upcoming 2016 Taiwan elections and the policies of the Xi Jinping administration; and will discuss some of the possible implications for China’s national security policy, regional stability, and the future of cross-Strait relations.

Bio

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Cortez Cooper
Mr. Cortez A. Cooper III joined RAND in April 2009, providing assessments of security challenges across political, military, economic, cultural, and informational arenas for a broad range of U.S. government clients.  Prior to joining RAND, Mr. Cooper was the Director of the East Asia Studies Center for Hicks and Associates, Inc.  He has also served in the U.S. Navy Executive Service as the Senior Analyst for the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific, U.S. Pacific Command.  As the senior intelligence analyst and Asia regional specialist in the Pacific Theater, he advised Pacific Command leadership on trends and developments in the Command’s area of responsibility.  Before his Hawaii assignment, Mr. Cooper was a Senior Analyst with CENTRA Technology, Inc., specializing in Asia-Pacific political-military affairs.  Mr. Cooper’s 20 years of military service included assignments as both an Army Signal Corps Officer and a China Foreign Area Officer.  In addition to numerous military decorations, the Secretary of Defense awarded Mr. Cooper with the Exceptional Civilian Service Award in 2001.

2016 Taiwan Elections and Implications for Cross-Strait and Regional Security
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Cortez Cooper Senior International Policy Analyst RAND Corporation
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Encina Hall E301616 Serra StreetStanford, CA94305-6055
(650) 724-5579 (650) 723-6530
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nico_ravanilla.jpg Ph.D.

Nico Ravanilla joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center as Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow for the 2015-16 year.  His research interests are political economy and governance, comparative politics and Southeast Asia. While at Shorenstein APARC, Ravanilla will research how political selection impacts governance, and evaluate possible routes for incentivizing capable and virtuous citizens to run for public office.

His project titled “Nudging Good Politicians” looks at the case of the Sangguniang Kabataan, a governing body in the Philippines comprised of elected youth leaders. Ravanilla aims to apply his research to develop and scale up programs for politicians, especially those at the onset of their careers, which would include specialized leadership training and merit-based endorsement.

Ravanilla is also a Southeast Asia Research Group (SEAREG) Young Southeast Asia Fellow for 2015-16.  He received his Ph.D. in political science and public policy from the University of Michigan in summer 2015.

2015-16 Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellow
Encina Hall E301616 Serra StreetStanford, CA94305-6055
(650) 724-5595 (650) 723-6530
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Pavin_Chachavalpongpun.png Ph.D.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) during the 2015-2016 academic year from the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Kyoto University, where he serves as associate professor.

His research interests include Thailand's domestic political and international relations, particularly the role of the Thai monarchy in the political domain in the past decades; politics of Myanmar and Indochinese states; politics of ASEAN; and the concept of nationalism and its relevance to domestic and foreign policy. During his time at Shorenstein APARC, Pavin will work on the concept of neo-royalism and the future of the Thai monarchy--an issue which is important at this critical juncture of the royal succession in Thailand.  Pavin is the author of two books: "A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations" and "Reinventing Thailand: Thaksin and His Foreign Policy". He is also a chief editor of the online journal Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. After the coup of 2014, Pavin was twice summoned by the Thai military for his critical comments on its political intervention. Denying the legitimacy of the coup, Pavin rejected the summons. Shortly afterwards, a warrant was issued for his arrest and his passport was revoked. This situation forced him to apply for a refugee status with Japan. Pavin received his PhD from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He earned his BA from the Department of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand.
2015-16 Lee Kong Chian NUS-Stanford Distinguished Fellow on Contemporary Southeast Asia
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Abstract: Peter Hayes will talk about the risk of nuclear war and complexity. In a February 2015 report (Peter Hayes, "Nuclear command-and-control in the Millenials era", NAPSNet Special Reports, February 17, 2015, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-command-and…), he stated that “very few leaders or even strategic scholars pay attention to the new complexity of the operating environment in which national nuclear command-and-control systems operate, or the new characteristics of the command-and-control systems and their supporting CISR systems that may contribute to the problem of loss-of-control and rapid escalation to nuclear war.”

“Today, the underlying ground is moving beneath the feet of nuclear-armed states. The enormous flow across borders of people, containers, and information, and the growth of connectivity between cities, corporations, and communities across borders, is recasting the essential nature of security itself to a networked flux of events and circumstances that no agency or state can control. The meta-system of nuclear command-and control systems has emerged in this new post-modern human condition.” The report can be accessed here.

About the speaker: Peter Hayes is Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Australia and Director, Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California. He works at the nexus of security, environment and energy policy problems. Best known for innovative cooperative engagement strategies in North Korea, he has developed techniques at Nautilus Institute for seeking near-term solutions to global security and sustainability problems and applied them in East Asia, Australia, and South Asia. Dr. Hayes has worked for many international organizations including UN Development Programme, Asian Development Bank, and Global Environment Facility. He was founding director of the Environment Liaison Centre in Kenya in 1975. He has traveled, lived, and worked in Asia, North America, Europe and Africa.

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

 

Peter Hayes Director Speaker Nautilus Institute
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North Korea today threatened military action against South Korea if it did not end its propaganda broadcasts along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) within 48 hours. The broadcasts against the North are being systematically blared by loudspeakers over the border.   

South Korea resumed the broadcasts earlier this week after an 11-year hiatus, in retaliation for North Korea’s planting landmines just outside a South Korean DMZ guard post that crippled two South Korean soldiers on Aug. 4.

David Straub, associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and a former Korean affairs director at the U.S. Department of State, offers insights on the situation. Straub also spoke on PRI's "The World" radioshow on Aug. 20, the audioclip and summary can be accessed by clicking here.

What’s behind the current tensions on the Korean Peninsula?

Fundamentally, the current situation is just another symptom of the underlying problem, which is the division of Korea into two competing states, with one of them—North Korea—having a Stalinist totalitarian system and a Maoist-style cult of personality. Since North Korea can’t compete with the South economically and diplomatically, it uses the threat of force or the actual use of it to try to intimidate South Korea. The North Koreans know that South Korea tends to “blink first” and step back because it is democratic and its leaders are concerned about civilian casualties.

The current situation is also related to the leadership transition in North Korea, with leader Kim Jong Un succeeding his father Kim Jong Il three years ago. Kim Jong Un still feels insecure, which is clearly evidenced by his execution of his powerful uncle Jang Seong-taek in 2013 and many other leaders there as well. To solidify support for his rule, he also manufactures a South Korean threat to rally his people behind him.

What does North Korea want?

North Korea’s immediate demand is that South Korea stop its propaganda broadcasts across the DMZ. The South Korean broadcasts criticize the North Korean system and its leaders, which is something that the North, with its cult of personality, can’t accept. But the South resumed the broadcasts only because the North Koreans recently snuck into the South Korean side of the DMZ and viciously planted landmines just outside a South Korean guard post. These were clearly intended to maim South Korean soldiers. They did just that, blowing the legs off two young men.

The North Korean regime’s long-term aim is not just to survive but also to get the upper hand on South Korea, and eventually try again to reunify the peninsula on its own terms. That explains why North Korea behaves as it does, rather than reform its system and reconcile with the South.

The North also demands an end to all U.S. and South Korean military exercises on the peninsula—even though the North has a much larger military than the South and U.S. forces there combined and is developing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Ultimately, the North wants to end the U.S.-South Korean alliance and see U.S. forces withdrawn from the peninsula, in the belief that it will open the way to eventual victory over the South.

Why did the South resume the broadcasts? Was it a good idea?

South Korea resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts in retaliation for the maiming of two of its soldiers on August 4th. Rather than retaliate by attacking militarily, the South resumed the loudspeaker broadcasts because the South Korean military knows that North Korean leaders hate them.

The South Korean military believes that North Korean leaders hate the broadcasts because they are effective in educating young North Korean soldiers and civilians in earshot about the nature of the regime and its leaders. The South Korean military seems to assume that the broadcasts are effective in that regard because they anger the North Korean leaders so much. But I think the reason the broadcasts anger the North Korean leaders is due to the cult of personality. The North Korean system can’t accept the idea of its leaders being criticized.

So I don’t think it was necessarily a wise step on the part of the South Korean military to resume the broadcasts. On the other hand, politically, by crippling two South Korean soldiers, the North Koreans had left South Korea with no option but to respond in some way. After the North Koreans killed fifty South Koreans in two separate sneak attacks five years ago, the South Korean government warned that it was not going to sit back the next time. The resumption of the broadcasts has further raised tensions but, frankly, given the danger of war on the peninsula, the South doesn’t have a lot of good ways to respond to North Korean provocations.

How serious is the situation?

North Korea has now threatened military action in 48 hours if South Korea doesn’t end the propaganda broadcasts. The North often makes threats. Usually, it doesn’t carry them out, but sometimes it does.

The United States and South Korea are conducting an annual military exercise together in the South until the end of August—something else that the North Koreans are demanding an end to. Most experts feel that the North is unlikely to launch a major provocation while the American presence is bolstered and the U.S. and South Korean militaries are paying full attention. The North Korean leaders know they are weaker than our side, so they usually avoid frontal assaults and instead engage in sneak attacks, at times and places and in ways of their own choosing.

There is more uncertainty in recent years because of the aggressive and threatening behavior thus far of Kim Jong Un, who is young and inexperienced. He seems anxious about his position in the North and prepared to take risks to bolster it, including rallying the people behind him by raising tensions with the South. We also don’t know if the North feels freer to engage in major provocations because it has developed at least a handful of nuclear devices since its first nuclear test in 2006.

So I myself wouldn’t be afraid to visit Seoul now but the situation bears even closer watching than usual.

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North Korean soldiers stand guard at the Demilitarized Zone, 2008.
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Malaysian opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, imprisoned since February, is the focus of a pledge signed by 40 scholars and public figures lamenting his mistreatment and urging his immediate release.

The “Global Call for the Release of Anwar Ibrahim” condemns Anwar’s persecution by the Malaysian authorities and their ongoing repression of freedom of speech and assembly.

Anwar is serving a five-year prison sentence on a sodomy charge that virtually all observers believe was politically motivated. The pledge, released by Anwar’s family on Monday, marks his 68th birthday and almost a half-year spent in jail.

Stanford professor Donald Emmerson, who has known Anwar since the 1980s, welcomed the circulation of the pledge. “Even if the Malaysian government ignores the petition,” Emmerson said, “it is important for the international community to show that Anwar is not alone.”

Anwar’s ordeal dates back to 1998 when, as deputy prime minister, he had a falling out with then-prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, who drove him from office for apparently political reasons.

Malaysia’s current prime minister, Najib Razak, has continued this record of political persecution despite protests from around the world. Amnesty International has designated Anwar “a prisoner of conscience.”

Emmerson, who leads the Southeast Asia Program, joined Anwar on a panel in Nov. 2014 entitled “Islam and Democracy: Malaysia in Comparative Perspective,” hosted at Stanford by the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

Following that event, Anwar traveled back to Malaysia despite signs pointing toward his possible arrest.

“Anwar’s courage in the face of adversity is inspiring,” Emmerson said. “He could have chosen not to return from Stanford to Malaysia, thereby avoiding the risk of imprisonment. He could have gone into exile. Or asked for asylum outside Malaysia. Instead, he went home. How many of us, in his shoes, would have done the same?”

The pledge is attached below. Remarks and video from the CDDRL event with Anwar, Emmerson and Stanford’s Larry Diamond and Francis Fukuyama can be accessed here.

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Anwar Ibrahim, Feb. 2008.
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Drawing on twenty-four years of experience in government, Michael H. Armacost explores how the contours of the U.S. presidential election system influence the content and conduct of American foreign policy. He examines how the nomination battle impels candidates to express deference to the foreign policy DNA of their party and may force an incumbent to make wholesale policy adjustments to fend off an intra-party challenge for the nomination. He describes the way reelection campaigns can prod a chief executive to fix long-neglected problems, kick intractable policy dilemmas down the road, settle for modest course corrections, or scapegoat others for policies gone awry.

Armacost begins his book with the quest for the presidential nomination and then moves through the general election campaign, the ten-week transition period between Election Day and Inauguration Day, and the early months of a new administration. He notes that campaigns rarely illuminate the tough foreign policy choices that the leader of the nation must make, and he offers rare insight into the challenge of aligning the roles of an outgoing incumbent (who performs official duties despite ebbing power) and the incoming successor (who has no official role but possesses a fresh political mandate). He pays particular attention to the pressure for new presidents to act boldly abroad in the early months of his tenure, even before a national security team is in place, decision-making procedures are set, or policy priorities are firmly established. He concludes with an appraisal of the virtues and liabilities of the system, including suggestions for modestly adjusting some of its features while preserving its distinct character.

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