Institutions and Organizations
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Kurahashi Yumiko's 1985 novel Amanonkoku Okanki (Record of a Round-Trip Journey to Amanonkoku) has been described as fantasy science fiction, feminist literature, political satire, and futurist picaresque. Whatever label one might pin on this novel, its thematic and structural emphasis on sexual adventures as an engine of storytelling is undisputable. The tale centers on the missionary P's journey to and from the land of men on earth to the land of women on Amanonkoku in the heavens, where his mission is to civilize and convert them to the monotheistic (monokami) belief system of men. By the end of the novel, however, the outer space travels of P turn out really to have been inner space travels in a woman's body; consequently, the imperialist plot to control Amanonkoku is revealed also to have been a bio-political plot about reproduction, sexuality, and gender difference.

Kurahashi's satire interrogates the politics of both feminism and anti-feminism even as it never lets the violence of presumptive male superiority off the hook. Professor Knighton will read Amanonkoku Okanki against the backdrop of Kurahashi's late-1960s Anpo and Beiheiren-era protests novel, Sumiyakist Q no Boken (The Adventures of Sumiyakist Q). In doing so, in today's historical moment of feminist backlash in Japan, American exceptionalism, and globalized military and religious war-mongering, Kurahashi's work takes on an almost prescient contemporary relevance.

Mary A. Knighton received her M.A. and Ph.D. in English (American Literature), as well as an M.A. in Japanese, at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research attends to global Modernism, the relationship between politics and aesthetics, and postwar Japanese literature, with a special interest in women writers and feminist theories of race, class and gender.

Philippines Conference Room

Mary A. Knighton Assistant Professor in English and Comparative Literature and Culture Speaker University of Tokyo
Seminars
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Klaus Scharioth became ambassador of Germany to the United States on March 13, 2006.

Ambassador Scharioth, who joined the Foreign Service in 1976, previously served as state secretary of the Federal Foreign Office (2002-2006), political director and head of the Political Directorate-General (1999-2002), head of the International Security and North America Directorate (1998-1999), head of the Office of the Foreign Minister (1998), head of the Defense and Security Policy Division at the Federal Foreign Office (1996-1997), and chef de cabinet to the NATO secretary-general in Brussels (1993-1996). In addition, he worked in the International Law Division of the Federal Foreign Office (1990-1993), the German Permanent Mission to the United Nations in New York (1986-1990), the Policy Planning Staff of the Federal Foreign Office (1982-1986), the German Embassy in Ecuador (1979-1982), and the Asia Division, Press Division and State Secretary's Office at the Federal Foreign Office (1977-1979).

Ambassador Scharioth holds a master's of arts degree, a law degree and a doctorate from the Fletcher School of Diplomacy.

Arrillaga Alumni Center
Lane/Lyons Conference Room
Stanford University
326 Galvez Street
Palo Alto, CA 94305

Klaus Scharioth Ambassador of Germany to the United States Speaker
Seminars
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The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was one of the first multilateral bodies where its members states, including the US, Russia, all other post-Soviet and European countries, agreed that democracy, rule of law, and human rights were an indivisible part of security. In the mid-1990s the star of the OSCE was on the rise: the organization deployed large multi-disciplinary field missions throughout the former Yugoslavia; it was involved in the protection of rights of ethnic minorities in the Baltics; it was designated to lead conflict-resolution efforts in the post-Soviet space. In addition, the OSCE was conducting election observation and democracy-promotion efforts in the region. With time, however, the consensus of the 1990s has eroded and the effectiveness of the organization is increasingly put into question by some of its member states. What can be learned from the OSCE's experiences? Can multilateral organizations effectively promote democracy in absence of consensus among its member states? The presenter will give a practitioner's perspective on these questions.

About the speaker
Dr. Vladimir Shkolnikov
has served as the Head of Democratization Department in the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (ODIHR/OSCE) since spring 2004. He is responsible for direction and management of ODIHR's democracy-promotion technical assistance programs in areas of rule of law, parliamentary support, political party development, gender equality, and migration policy development in the former Soviet states and in Southeastern Europe. Prior to assuming his post he held positions of migration adviser and election adviser at the ODIHR. He has traveled extensively, including to most of the conflict areas in the post-Soviet space. Prior to joining the ODIHR he was resident research consultant at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA. He received his Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the Pardee RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies.

CISAC Conference Room

Vladimir Shkolnikov Head of Democratization Department Speaker Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE
Conferences
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During the strategic modernization program that the Soviet Union undertook in the 1970s, it deployed a large number of multiple-warhead ballistic missiles. This deployment raised concerns in the United States about vulnerability of its land-based missile force and was one of the factors that contributed to the military buildup that the United States undertook in the late 1970s-early 1980s. The newly available documents that contain evidence of the Soviet missile programs demonstrate that the "window of vulnerability" did not exist and provide some insight into the Soviet modernization program.

Pavel Podvig joined CISAC as a research associate in 2004. Before that he was a researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT). He worked as a visiting researcher with the Security Studies Program at MIT and with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and he taught physics in MIPT's General Physics Department for more than ten years.

Podvig graduated with honors from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in 1988, with a degree in physics. In 2004 he received a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

His research has focused on technical and political issues of missile defense, space security, U.S.-Russian relations, structure and capabilities of the Russian strategic forces, and nuclear nonproliferation. He was the head of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces research project and the editor of a book of the same title, which is considered a definitive source of information on Russian strategic forces.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Pavel Podvig Speaker
Seminars
Authors
Michael A. McFaul
News Type
Commentary
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When presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin meet in Moscow next month, issues such as

START II, NATO expansion, trade with Iran and Iraq, and Russia's new draconian law on

religion are likely to dominate the agenda. To historians of US-Soviet relations, this agenda

should sound familiar as arms control, European security, regional conflicts, and human rights were the main components of most summit agendas between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This old agenda suggests that the promise of a new post-communist strategic partnership between the United States and Russia has not been realized. Especially as Russia continues to struggle in reforming its economy, many in the US have now concluded that engagement with this "basket case" is not worth the trouble--better to walk away from the failing project of internal reform and prepare instead to contain future external aggression.

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Authors
Michael A. McFaul
News Type
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The improvement in Russian-American relations is one of the few positive factors in the muddled picture of international relations today. Russian President Vladimir Putin's support for the American struggle against international terrorism has elevated communications between two former enemies to a new level. The upcoming November summit will be yet another sign of this. Politicians on either sides of the ocean are even calling the US and Russia "allies." Noting the decisiveness with which President Putin supports the US and Washington's extremely positive reaction to this, many Russian politicians and public figures have began speaking openly of Russia's entry into Western organizations and unions. Membership in the World Trade Organization is discussed in Moscow as an obvious reward Russia should receive for supporting American military actions; entry into the European Union is brought up as a relatively near goal, and so forth. The hopes are great, but do they reflect reality? Inflated expectations and skewed assessments of the speed and character of Russia's integration into the West are dangerous.

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Authors
Michael A. McFaul
News Type
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In the West, Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov is often described as "wily," "pragmatic," and "a realist" who seeks to carve out a place for Russia as a major player in the global game of balance-of-power politics. Usually these descriptions point to the turn in Russian foreign policy away from the "naive," Western-oriented approach taken by his predecessor in the Foreign Ministry, Andrei Kozyrev. Expressed support for Serbia in the most recent NATO showdown with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic over Kosovo is presumably yet further evidence of these so-called clever foreign policy maneuvers.

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Authors
Michael A. McFaul
News Type
Commentary
Date
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The second error of omission is a failure to acknowledge the real menu of choices foreign policymakers face, especially when dealing with a revolution in midstream such as Russia's in the '90s. The same Mikhail Gorbachev who let the Warsaw Pact fall apart and helped Germany reunite also let his government loot Soviet gold reserves and allowed his armed forces to kill innocent people in Georgia and the Baltic states. Was [George W. Bush] wrong to deal with such a leader? The same Boris Yeltsin who bombed his parliament in 1993, invaded Chechnya twice and allowed corruption to flourish also destroyed the Soviet empire, introduced markets and democracy to Russia, destroyed thousands of nuclear weapons, acquiesced to NATO expansion and cooperated with the United States to end the Kosovo war.

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