Institutions and Organizations
-
Carol Atkinson (speaker) is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. She retired as a lieutenant colonel from the U.S. Air Force in 2005. While in the military she served in a wide variety of management and operational positions in the fields of intelligence, targeting, and combat assessment. During the Cold War she flew on the Strategic Air Command's nuclear airborne command post as a target analyst. During Operation Desert Storm (1991) she worked on the intelligence staff in Riyadh, and, subsequently, on the contingency planning staff in Dhahran/Khobar, Saudi Arabia. While in the military, she taught at the Air Force Academy and the Air Force's Command and Staff College. Atkinson holds a PhD in international relations from Duke University, an MA in geography from Indiana University, and a BS from the United States Air Force Academy (5th class with women). She is currently a post-doctoral research fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California. Atkinson's primary research focuses on U.S. military-to-military contacts as channels of international norm diffusion. She is also working on a project examining the influence of educational exchange programs on democratization and a project on the social construction of the biological warfare threat in the United States.

Frank Smith (discussant) is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Chicago and a predoctoral fellow at CISAC. His research examines military and civilian decisions about biological warfare and tests different theories about the sources of military research, development, and doctrine, as well as the rise of civilian biodefense. In addition, he has worked on a variety of projects that address technology and national security at the RAND Corporation, Argonne National Laboratory, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. He earned his BS in biological chemistry from the University of Chicago in 2000.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Carol Atkinson Speaker
Frank Smith Speaker
Seminars
-

Seo-Hyun Park (speaker) is a PhD candidate in the Government Department at Cornell University and a predoctoral fellow at CISAC. Her dissertation project explores how the hierarchical regional order in East Asia has conditioned conceptions of state sovereignty and domestic identity politics in historical and contemporary Japan and Korea, with both countries alternating between deferential and defiant security strategies vis-a-vis regional hegemons such as China and the United States. Park has been a recipient of the Japan Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, the Mellon Fellowship, and the Cornell University Einaudi Center's Carpenter Fellowship. She has also conducted research in Japan and Korea as a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo and the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University. Her research interests include the politics of sovereignty and national identity, globalization and regionalization, anti-Americanism, and territorial disputes as well as general issues in East Asian security and politics.

Phillip Lipscy (discussant), a specialist on Japanese political economy and international relations, is a center fellow at FSI and an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University. His fields of research include international and comparative political economy, international security, Japanese politics, U.S.-Japan relations, and regional cooperation in East and South East Asia. Prior to joining Shorenstein APARC, Lipscy pursued his doctoral studies in government at Harvard University. He received his MA in international policy studies and BA in economics and political science at Stanford University. Lipscy has been affiliated with the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, The Institute for Global and International Studies at The George Washington University, the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for International Policy Studies in Tokyo. Lipscy's most recent research investigates negotiations over representation in international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. He is also researching the causes and implications of the rapid accumulation of international reserves in East and Southeast Asia.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 725-0938 (650) 723-6530
0
Acting instructor
Seo-Hyun_Park.JPG

Seo-Hyun Park is an acting instructor in the Korean Studies Program at APARC and a PhD candidate in the Government Department at Cornell University. Her dissertation project explores enduring patterns of strategic thinking and behavior in East Asia, examining how the hierarchical regional order has conditioned conceptions of state sovereignty and domestic security politics through comparative case studies of Japanese and Korean relations with China in the traditional East Asian order and with the United States in the post-1945 regional alliance system.

Park has been a recipient of the Japan Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, the Mellon Fellowship, and the Cornell University Einaudi Center’s Carpenter Fellowship, and most recently, the Predoctoral Fellowship at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. She has also conducted research in Japan and Korea as a visiting researcher at the University of Tokyo and the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University.  She received a B.A. in Communications from Yonsei Universitiy and an M.A. in Government from Cornell University.

Seo-Hyun Park Speaker
0
Former Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Former Assistant Professor of Political Science
phillip_lipscy_2018.jpg PhD

Phillip Y. Lipscy was the Thomas Rohlen Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Stanford University until August 2019. His fields of research include international and comparative political economy, international security, and the politics of East Asia, particularly Japan.

Lipscy’s book from Cambridge University Press, Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations, examines how countries seek greater international influence by reforming or creating international organizations. His research addresses a wide range of substantive topics such as international cooperation, the politics of energy, the politics of financial crises, the use of secrecy in international policy making, and the effect of domestic politics on trade. He has also published extensively on Japanese politics and foreign policy.

Lipscy obtained his PhD in political science at Harvard University. He received his MA in international policy studies and BA in economics and political science at Stanford University. Lipscy has been affiliated with the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo, the Institute for Global and International Studies at George Washington University, the RAND Corporation, and the Institute for International Policy Studies.

For additional information such as C.V., publications, and working papers, please visit Phillip Lipscy's homepage.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Phillip Lipscy Speaker
Seminars
-
Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) have been charged with the oversight and review of biosafety at thousands of biocontainment labs nationwide, hundreds of which are high level BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs.  In light of the recent rapid proliferation of BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities and the increases in biodefense, select agent, recombinant DNA, synthetic biology, and dual use research, questions have been raised about whether IBCs are fulfilling their oversight responsibilities.  This presentation will review information on the responsibilities and expectations of IBCs as currently constituted, and provide an analysis of IBC performance from survey data of hundreds of research institutions over the past 4-5 years.  The findings highlight serious ongoing problems with IBCs adhering to the NIH Guidelines. This does little to reassure that the current voluntary governance framework is an effective system to monitor and oversee US research facilities, including high-containment facilities, and their research activities. The findings strongly suggest the need for immediate improvement or replacement of the IBC system.

Margaret Race is an ecologist working with NASA through the SETI Institute in Mountain View CA and a former CISAC Science Fellow. She recently completed a study on public decision making and risk communication associated with the construction of BSL-3 and BSL-4 biocontainment labs nationwide.  The study, which was begun during her fellowship at Stanford University and CISAC, reflects her longstanding interest in risk perceptions, legal and societal issues, public communication and education associated with controversial science and technological proposals.  In her work with NASA, she focuses on planetary protection and the search for extraterrestrial life--which will someday involve construction of a BSL-4 biocontainment lab for handling and testing scientific samples returned from Mars and other solar system locations. During the past decade, she has been a lead member of an international team of researchers that helped NASA develop a protocol for the quarantine, handling, and testing of extraterrestrial samples from Mars. She has served on numerous National Resource Council studies analyzing risk communication and societal issues associated environmental protection on Earth and in space. Dr. Race received her BA degree in Biology and MS degree in Energy Management and Policy from the University of Pennsylvania, and her PhD in Ecology/Zoology from the University of California at Berkeley. Her teaching and research work has included positions at Stanford University (Human Biology Program), UC Berkeley (Assistant Dean, College of Natural Resources), and Office of the President, University of California (Senior Science Policy Analyst and Director of Planning). She was also a Postdoctoral Fellow in Marine Policy and Ocean Management at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Margaret Race Speaker SETI Institute
Seminars
-
 Is military conflict in space inevitable? Has former president Eisenhower’s vision of keeping space peaceful become outdated? How can the United States secure its space interests and assets without provoking international violence? Bound by a treaty written and signed forty years ago, every space-faring nation—save the U.S. and Israel—has gone on record in favor of a new agreement. A new Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) treaty could address changes in the post-Cold War world as well as modern satellite and weapons technologies that the 1967 treaty could not anticipate. But in the grand tradition of American exceptionalism, Washington has largely avoided the issue. The administrations of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush have blocked negotiations, citing potential threats to U.S. “rights, capabilities, and freedom of action.” Self-proclaimed “space warriors” even argue that U.S. military dominance in orbital space will be the only guarantee for international peace in the future. In Twilight War: The Folly of U.S. Space Dominance, Moore argues that the U.S. merely provokes conflict when it presumes to be the exception to the rule. “Unilateral military actions in space will not guarantee American security; they will guarantee conflict, and possibly, a new cold war,” Moore concludes.

Mike Moore is an author, journalist, and speaker, and research fellow at The Independent Institute. He is the author of many articles on national security, conflict resolution, nuclear weapons and proliferation, space weaponry, and related topics. Mike has spoken at many professional conferences and meetings sponsored by scientific organizations and policy institutes. Moore is the former editor of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2000, and he has also served as editor of Quill, the magazine of the Society of Professional Journalists. He was general editor of Health Risks and the Press: Perspectives on Media Coverage of Risk Assessment and Health and has been an editor or reporter for the Milwaukee Journal, Chicago Tribune, Chicago Daily News, and the Kansas City Star. His articles have appeared in the Brown Journal of World Affairs, Foreign Service Journal, Yes! A Journal of Positive Futures, and The SAIS Review and International Affairs. He has contributed chapters to The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, Cyberwar, Netwar and the Revolution in Military Affairs and Asia-Pacific Cooperative Security in the 21st Century. Moore has spoken at the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities, Fudan University (Shanghai), the National Atomic Museum, the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, the Nuclear-Free Future Foundation, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Stanley Foundation, the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts, the Eisenhower Institute, and the Nuclear Policy Research Institute.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Mike Moore Research Fellow Speaker The Independent Institute
Seminars
-
We examine two interrelated questions. How and where do we need to deploy nuclear detection portals in the real world? On the basis of which physical techniques should we design the technology to use in these portals? Today's national initiatives like the 9/11 Commission Act for scanning 100% of cargo at foreign ports of origin may be useful for interception of smuggled materials that are already assumed to be in transit -- by simply creating a roadblock for smuggling on high traffic routes, this does not get us any closer to dissuading adversaries from attacking by other means. Today's programs ignore the options (loopholes) within reach of the adversary that use alternative routes or countermeasures the attacker can employ against the detection technology. Loopholes can come as technical countermeasures usable against today's technology like passive gamma detection (shielding, fractionation) or against future technology like cosmic muon detection (dispersion, spreading). Loopholes may also be present in the form of transportation pathways not secured by any detection technology (private jets, sailboats, luxury cruise ships, and so on). In this talk, we discuss transportation loopholes and technical countermeasures in planned US initiatives using drive-thru nuclear detection portals for intercepting uranium. In addition to well-known countermeasures like shielding, we identify a novel countermeasure to cosmic muon detection based on horizontal spreading or dispersion. We show how to integrate passive gamma, neutron, muon, and active neutron detection techniques to make reliable detection portals (RDPs) invulnerable to simple countermeasures. We show where RDPs would need to be deployed around metropolitan areas and military bases to complement the national border, quantify how many RDPs would be required based on traffic flows, and define RDP specifications.

Devabhaktuni Srikrishna
’s publications and patents have spanned quantum computing, parallel computing, wireless data communications, and nuclear detection. He holds a BS in Mathematics from the California Institute of Technology and an MS in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was formerly Chief Technology Officer and a Founder of Tropos Networks (2000-2007). Tropos develops and manufactures wireless mesh routers for creating Wi-Fi service across metro areas currently operating in over 500 cities worldwide.

Thomas A. Tisch is a private high tech investor with operating and venture capital experience. In his career, he served as a partner at Portola Venture Fund, an initial investor in 3Com, and Software Publishing Corp and later at MBW Management where his investments included Netrix, Stratacom and Stac Electronics. Among operating roles, he was I instrumental in Etrade pioneering Internet brokerage as Vice President of Trade*Plus as it was known then. Mr. Tisch holds a BS in Engineering from the California Institute of Technology (1961), an MS EE from Stanford University and an MBA from the Stanford Graduate School of Business.

Narasimha Chari is the Founder and Chief Architect of Tropos Networks where he has been responsible for developing Tropos Networks' core intellectual property, including the design and development of the company's wireless networking and routing protocols. Among other honors, Mr. Chari was recognized by MIT Technology Review magazine in 2005 as one of the Top 35 Innovators under the age of 35. He has performed research, published papers and disclosed patents in a variety of areas of mathematics, physics, wireless networking and nuclear detection. Mr. Chari holds a BS in Mathematics and Economics from the California Institute of Technology and an AM in Physics from Harvard University.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Devabhaktuni Srikrishna Speaker
Thomas A. Tisch Speaker
Narasimha Chari Speaker
Seminars
Authors
Michael A. McFaul
News Type
Commentary
Date
Paragraphs
As the year draws to a close, write Michael A. McFaul and Abbas Milani in the Washington Post, it's important to note that the U.S. debate on Iran is stalled, trapped between "regime changers" vs. "arms controllers," "hawks" vs. "doves," and "idealists" vs. "realists." The National Intelligence Estimate released this month offers an opportunity to escape this straitjacketed debate by embracing a new strategy that would pursue both the short-term goal of arms control and the long-term goal of democracy in Iran.

Reprinted with permission from Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Company and The Washington Post

As the year draws to a close, it's important to note that the U.S. debate on Iran is stalled, trapped between "regime changers" vs. "arms controllers," "hawks" vs. "doves," and "idealists" vs. "realists." The National Intelligence Estimate released this month offers an opportunity to escape this straitjacketed debate by embracing a new strategy that would pursue both the short-term goal of arms control and the long-term goal of democracy in Iran.

The NIE's "key judgment" that Iran suspended its nuclear weapons program has thrust the arms controllers onto center stage. Because the nuclear threat is no longer immediate, the arms controllers insist that the time is ripe for the United States to engage in direct diplomacy with Tehran as a way to change the regime's behavior, but not the regime itself -- specifically, to persuade the mullahs to suspend their nuclear enrichment program.

Those who profess to back regime change claim that the NIE changes nothing and that the United States should continue to use coercive power, potentially including military strikes, to counter Tehran.

Both sides have part of the strategy right, but on its own neither offers a long-term vision for dealing with Iran.

It is folly to assume that advocates of military strikes are in the same camp as those who advocate regime change. There is no better way to prolong the life of the autocratic regime in Tehran, to strengthen increasingly weakened radicals such as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, than bombing Iran. Thankfully, the NIE has made military strikes less likely.

But the estimate provides no evidence to suggest that Iran's regime has changed its ways to be more compatible with American national interests or the interests of the Iranian people. The regime continues to repress its own people; supports terrorist organizations that threaten Israel and destabilize the governments in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories; and still has not suspended its enrichment program, the key aspect of developing a nuclear weapon. Iran's suspension of its military nuclear program in 2003 was a tactical response to revelations about the clandestine operation, not a fundamental shift in strategic thinking.

To presume, therefore, that the NIE gives the United States license to bargain with Iran over its enrichment program and forgo any pressure on the regime is also folly. Focusing solely on enrichment would play into the hands of the mullahs, who see how the NIE has weakened the coalition in support of serious sanctions. They have every incentive to stretch out any negotiations -- while continuing to develop their enrichment program. Days after the NIE was made public, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran plans to have a cascade of 50,000 centrifuges, surely enough to make highly enriched uranium. American diplomatic tools to alter this behavior are extremely weak. Moreover, this strategy gives Iran a free pass on its support for terrorism and human rights abuses.

The United States and its allies must develop an Iran strategy that establishes both short- and long-term goals. Specifically, the United States must recommit to a policy of encouraging democratization inside Iran, because only a democratic regime will stop supporting terrorist groups abroad and repression at home. A democratic Iran is also less likely to restart a nuclear weapons program, especially if the United States and a new Iranian regime establish close military ties, a likely outcome.

Although counterintuitive to some, diplomatic engagement is required to pursue the long-term goal of democratization and, in parallel, the short-term goal of arms control. The first American offer of direct talks should include everything: the prospect of formal diplomatic relations and the lifting of sanctions; the potential supply and disposal of nuclear fuel (from a third-party organization or state); suspension of nuclear enrichment; an end to aid to Hezbollah and Hamas; and a serious discussion about stopping the arrests of students and human rights advocates and the persecution of union leaders and religious minorities. Discussion of new security institutions in the region should also be on the table. America's experience dealing with the Soviet Union during the Cold War demonstrates that we can engage a despotic regime without compromising our commitment to democracy and human rights.

Greater contact between Iranian and American societies will further undermine the regime's legitimacy, strengthen the independence of Iranian economic and political groups, and perhaps even compel some regime leaders to cash out and exchange their diminishing political power for enduring property rights. Over the past four decades, autocratic regimes have rarely crumbled as a result of isolation but more often have collapsed when seeking to engage with the West. Even the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred not when tensions between Moscow and Washington were high but during a period of engagement.

Will Iran follow a similar path? We will never know if we do not try. Of course, the mullahs might reject our overtures, but their refusal would embolden the opposition inside Iran. And a serious attempt to engage the Islamic republic now would strengthen the American case for more coercive diplomatic and economic pressure, should they be necessary in the future.

Michael McFaul is a professor of political science at Stanford University. Abbas Milani is director of the Iranian studies program at Stanford. Both are fellows at the Hoover Institution.

Copyright Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive and The Washington Post. All rights Reserved.

All News button
1
-

For the past sixty years, most analysts have assumed that Japan's security policies would reinforce American interests in Asia. The political and military profile of Asia is changing rapidly, however. Korea's nuclear program, China's rise, and the relative decline of US power have commanded strategic review in Tokyo just as they have in Washington. What is the next step for Japan's security policy? Will confluence with U.S. interests--and the alliance--survive intact? Will it be transformed? Will Japan become more autonomous?

Richard J. Samuels is Ford International Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for International Studies. He is also the founding director of the MIT Japan Program. In 2001 he became chairman of the Japan-US Friendship Commission, an independent federal grant-making agency that supports Japanese studies and policy-oriented research in the United States. In 2005 he was elected a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Professor Samuels served as head of the MIT Department of Political Science between 1992-1997 and as vice-chairman of the Committee on Japan of the National Research Council until 1996. Grants from the Fulbright Commission, the Abe Fellowship Fund, the National Science Foundation, and the Smith Richardson Foundation have supported nine years of field research in Japan.

Dr. Samuels' recent book, Securing Japan, was published in 2007 by Cornell University Press.

His previous books include Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan, a comparative political and economic history of political leadership in Italy and Japan, "Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective, and Politics of Regional Policy in Japan.

His articles have appeared in International Organization, Foreign Affairs, International Security, The Journal of Modern Italian Studies, The Journal of Japanese Studies, Daedalus, The Washington Quarterly, and other scholarly journals.

Dr. Samuels received his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1980.

Philippines Conference Room

Richard Samuels Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Studies Speaker Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Seminars
-

As a result of the events which started in Poland with the birth of the Solidarity Movement in 1980 and the events that followed in the next decade, the political map of Europe has changed drastically. New spirit and new countries have emerged, changing the continent as radically as it was changed by the two World Wars. This time, however, change was achieved without (or nearly without) bloodshed . The process of unification of the continent which continued with the admission of Poland (and five other countries) first to NATO and then to European Union, changed those two institutions which are still re-defining themselves. This lecture will present and evaluate this new shape of Europe and of European institutions in light of these changes.

About the Speaker
Dr. Kozlowski earned an M.A. from the Department of Philosophy and History from Jagiellonian University in Krakow, after which he studied Political Science at the Sorbonne and English language at the London School of English. He earned his Ph. D. in History from Jagiellonian University in 1988. Dr. Kozlowski studied at Northwestern University (1986-87) and at Stanford University (1987-88) on a Fulbright Research Grant.

Dr. Kozlowski worked as a journalist and editor for a number of Polish publications including "Wiesci," "Wiadomosci Krakowskie," and "Tygodnik Powszechny", before joining the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 1990, Dr. Kozlowski has served as Minister-Counselor and Charge d'Affairs at the Polish Embassy in Washington D.C., as Director of the American Department and Undersecretary of State for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Ambassador of Poland to Israel, and as Ambassador for Polish-Jewish Relations. He is currently the Deputy Director of the Department of Africa and Middle East, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Encina Ground Floor Conference Room

Maciej Kozlowski Deputy Director, Department of Africa and Middle East, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs Speaker
Seminars
-
Some people said North Korea would not survive the end of the USSR and dissolution of the Soviet bloc. Some people said Kim Jong Il's likely tenure could be measured in months. Some people said that North Korea was on the verge of collapse in 1997; some people, in fact, proclaimed that the economy had already collapsed.

What sorts of myths and misperceptions do we entertain and perpetuate that make it difficult for us to deal with North Korea coherently?

Robert Carlin is a 2007 Pantech Fellow at Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center and has been a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University since 2005. After receiving an A.M degree from Harvard University's East Asian Regional Studies program, he joined the Central Intelligence Agency in 1971. From 1974 to 1988, he was a senior North Korea media analyst in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), where he received the director of the CIA's Exceptional Analyst Award. From 1989 to 2002, he was the chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Concurrently, from 1993 to 2002, Mr. Carlin served as senior policy advisor to the U.S. special envoy for talks with North Korea, taking part in every significant set of U.S.-DPRK negotiations of which there were many--during those years. He was on the delegation accompanying Secretary of State Madeline Albright to Pyongyang in October 2000. From 2003 to 2005, Mr. Carlin was senior political advisor to the executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), leading numerous KEDO negotiating teams to the DPRK. Altogether, he has made 25 trips to North Korea.

Much of Mr. Carlin's analysis on North Korea from his years at FBIS has been declassified and is available either in the "Trends in Communist Propaganda" or "Trends in Communist Media". Over the years, he has written chapters for several books on the Korean issue including, most recently, "Talk to Me, Later," appearing in North Korea: 2005 and Beyond. In 2006, he co-authored an IISS Adelphi paper "North Korean Reform: Politics, Economics and Security." His essay on negotiating with North Korea will appear in Korea 2007 - Politics, Economy, Society. Over his career, Mr. Carlin has lectured at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, the State Department's Foreign Service Institute, foreign ministries and intelligence organizations abroad, and numerous universities.

Philippines Conference Room

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C245 - Desk 2
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 736-0290
0
Carlin_Robert.jpg MA

Bob Carlin is a Visiting Scholar at CISAC. From both in and out of government, he has been following North Korea since 1974 and has made 25 trips there. He recently co-authored a lengthy paper to be published by the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, entitled "Politics, Economics and Security: Implications of North Korean Reform."

Carlin served as senior policy advisor at the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) from 2002-2006, leading numerous delegations to the North for talks and observing developments in-country during the long trips that entailed.

From 1989-2002, he was chief of the Northeast Asia Division in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State. During much of that period, he also served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Special Ambassador for talks with North Korea, and took part in all phases of US-DPRK negotiations from 1992-2000. From 1971-1989, Carlin was an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, where he received the Exceptional Analyst Award from the Director of Central Intelligence.

Carlin received his AM in East Asian regional studies from Harvard University in 1971 and his BA in political science from Claremont Men's College.

Affiliate
Robert Carlin Pantech Fellow Speaker Shorenstein APARC
Seminars
-

About the speaker

Steven A. Cook is the Douglas Dillon fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. Dr. Cook is the author of Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey (Johns Hopkins University Press, May 2007).

Prior to joining the Council, Dr. Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution (2001-2002) and a Soref research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (1995-96) He has published widely in a variety of foreign policy journals, opinion magazines, and newspapers including Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Wall Street Journal, Journal of Democracy, Weekly Standard, New Republic Online, New York Times, Washington Post, Financial Times, and the International Herald Tribune. Dr. Cook is also a frequent commentator on radio and television.

Dr. Cook holds a BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania. He speaks Arabic and Turkish and reads French.

About the moderator

Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as a special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon. He has also served as a consultant to the office of the Secretary of Defense and at the Sandia National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989), The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993), and with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (W.W. Norton, 2002). He is the co-editor of Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James L. Wirtz, Planning the Unthinkable (Cornell University Press, 2000). Sagan was the recipient of Stanford University's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching and the 1998 Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching. As part of CISAC's mission of training the next generation of security specialists he and Stephen Stedman founded Stanford's Interschool Honors Program in International Security Studies in 2000.

About Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey:

Ruling But Not Governing highlights the critical role that the military plays in the stability of the Egyptian, Algerian, and, until recently, Turkish political systems. This in-depth study demonstrates that while the soldiers and materiel of Middle Eastern militaries form the obvious outer perimeter of regime protection, it is actually the less apparent, multilayered institutional legacies of military domination that play the decisive role in regime maintenance. Steven A. Cook uncovers the complex and nuanced character of the military's interest in maintaining a facade of democracy. He explores how an authoritarian elite hijack seemingly democratic practices such as elections, multiparty politics, and a relatively freer press as part of a strategy to ensure the durability of authoritarian systems. Using Turkey's recent reforms as a point of departure, the study also explores ways external political actors can improve the likelihood of political change in Egypt and Algeria. Ruling But Not Governing provides valuable insight into the political dynamics that perpetuate authoritarian regimes and offers novel ways to promote democratic change.

Sponsored by FSI and the Council on Foreign Relations. 

CISAC Conference Room

Steven A. Cook Douglas Dillon Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations Speaker

CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E202
Stanford, CA 94305-6165

(650) 725-2715 (650) 723-0089
0
The Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science
The Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education  
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
rsd25_073_1160a_1.jpg PhD

Scott D. Sagan is Co-Director and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, and the Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He also serves as Co-Chair of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences’ Committee on International Security Studies. Before joining the Stanford faculty, Sagan was a lecturer in the Department of Government at Harvard University and served as special assistant to the director of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon.

Sagan is the author of Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton University Press, 1989); The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University Press, 1993); and, with co-author Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate (W.W. Norton, 2012). He is the co-editor of Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017) with Matthew Bunn; and co-editor of The Fragile Balance of Terror (Cornell University Press, 2022) with Vipin Narang. Sagan was also the guest editor of a two-volume special issue of DaedalusEthics, Technology, and War (Fall 2016) and The Changing Rules of War (Winter 2017).

Recent publications include “Creeds and Contestation: How US Nuclear and Legal Doctrine Influence Each Other,” with Janina Dill, in a special issue of Security Studies (December 2025); “Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel”, with Janina Dill and Benjamin A. Valentino in Security Studies (February 2022); “The Rule of Law and the Role of Strategy in U.S. Nuclear Doctrine” with Allen S. Weiner in International Security (Spring 2021); “Does the Noncombatant Immunity Norm Have Stopping Power?” with Benjamin A. Valentino in International Security (Fall 2020); and “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants” and “On Reciprocity, Revenge, and Replication: A Rejoinder to Walzer, McMahan, and Keohane” with Benjamin A. Valentino in Ethics & International Affairs (Winter 2019).

In 2022, Sagan was awarded Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at their International Nuclear Policy Conference. In 2017, he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award which recognizes the scholar whose “singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual and organizational complacency" in the international studies community. Sagan was also the recipient of the National Academy of Sciences William and Katherine Estes Award in 2015, for his work addressing the risks of nuclear weapons and the causes of nuclear proliferation. The award, which is granted triennially, recognizes “research in any field of cognitive or behavioral science that advances understanding of issues relating to the risk of nuclear war.” In 2013, Sagan received the International Studies Association's International Security Studies Section Distinguished Scholar Award. He has also won four teaching awards: Stanford’s 1998-99 Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching; Stanford's 1996 Hoagland Prize for Undergraduate Teaching; the International Studies Association’s 2008 Innovative Teaching Award; and the Monterey Institute for International Studies’ Nonproliferation Education Award in 2009.     

Co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation
CV
Date Label
Scott D. Sagan (Chair and Moderator) Co-Director, CISAC and Professor of Political Science Moderator
Lectures
Subscribe to Institutions and Organizations